Wealth without Agency

The critical mineral race and the limits of strategic agency in the Global South: the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo

Abstract

Contemporary geoeconomics is largely defined by the competition between the US-led West and China, which manifests through these regions’ attempts to defend and increase their centrality in global production and communication networks, notably in the digital realm.1 In this context, Western powers face a structural limit to their technological dominance: their reliance on foreign critical minerals, the production and transformation of which is overwhelmingly dominated by China. Critical minerals – such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements (REE) – are geographically dispersed around the world, with many of the known reserves located in Global South (GS) countries. These minerals are vital to advanced technologies needed for industrialized countries’ twin digital and green transitions (semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, or solar panels) and advanced military applications. This criticality is further heightened by the absence of viable substitutes, the concentration of minerals in a few geographies, and the vulnerability of supply chains to external shocks like geopolitical tensions and environmental regulations.