



St. Antony's International Review

Editors Roham Alvandi, Anna Hakala
Editorial Assistant Alisa Voznaya
Managing Director Emily Paddon
Associate Editors Taylor Owen, Saif Rahman, Saheel Shah
Book Reviews Editor Kalin Ivanov
Treasurer Gerwin Klaus
Copy Editor Samantha O'Connellr
Art Director Jure Stojan

Editorial Committee Jaffar Al-Rikabi, Alexander Betts, Ricardo Borges de Castro, Geoffrey Cameron, Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, Joanna Gorska, Janice Hwang, Nino Japaridze, Hilary Kalmbach, Mumtaz Lani, Shachar Nativ, Lea-Friederike Neubert, Naysan Rafati, Anne Roemer-Mahler, Noa Schonmann, Rebecca Steinfeld, Shefali Virkar, Leni Wild

Special thanks to Our anonymous peer-reviewers, Laurence Whitehead, Nadim Shehadi and Duncan Newbury of Chatham House, Susan Farrell and Raad Alkadiri of PFC Energy, Emma Tracy, John Nelson, Niel Townsend, St Antony's College Junior Common Room, and the Department of Politics and International Relations

Advisory Board Professor Archie Brown, Dr Patricia Daley, Professor Rosemary Foot, Professor Timothy Garton Ash, Sir Marrack Goulding, Dr David Johnson, Professor Margaret MacMillan, Dr Hartmut Mayer, Dr Alex Pravda, Professor Avi Shlaim, Dr Steve Tsang, Professor William Wallace

Contact Details

All submission, subscription and business enquiries can be addressed to:
 St Antony's International Review
 St Antony's College
 Oxford, OX2 6JF, UK
 Fax: +44 (0)1865 554465; Email: stair@sant.ox.ac.uk
 Web: www.sant.ox.ac.uk/jcr/STAIR

Printed and bound in the UK by The Alden Press, Oxford.

Typeset in JY Décennie, courtesy of Jack Yan & Associates Imaging.

ISSN 1746-451X (Print)

The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not represent the views of the Editors, Editorial Committee, Advisory Board, St Antony's College, or the University of Oxford.

© St Antony's International Review (2005). All rights reserved.

St Antony's International Review

Democratization

3

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 2, FEBRUARY 2007

Notes on Contributors	##
Editorial Introduction: Democratisation Roham Alvandi and Anna Hakala	5
Essay: Crafting Democratic Policing in New and Old Democracies Alfred C. Stepan and Arthur Trindade Maranhão Costa	11
Discourse and the Export of Democracy Richard D. Anderson, Jr.	19
On Novelty and Democracy: A Response to Anderson Par Engstrom	36
Orange People: Liberation Networks in Central and Eastern Europe Fredo Arias-King	40
Democratising Elections in the Post-Communist World: Definitions, Dynamics and Diffusion Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik	64
The Regional Organisation as an Agent of Democratisation? The African Experience <i>Hélène Gandois</i>	79
The Accidental Democratisers: A Response to Gandois Christine Cheng	97
Iraq and Democracy: An Interview with Ibrahim Al-Jaafari	102
Book Reviews	110

Notes on Contributors

Richard D. Anderson, Jr. is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Fredo Arias-King is founder of the academic quarterly, *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*.

Valerie J. Bunce is the Aaron Binenkorb Professor of International Studies, Professor of Government, and Chair of the Department of Government at Cornell University.

Christine Cheng is a DPhil candidate in Politics at the University of Oxford.

Arthur Trindade Maranhão Costa is Professor of Sociology at the University of Brasilia.

Par Engstrom is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at the University of Oxford.

Hélène Gandois is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at the University of Oxford.

Alfred C. Stepan is the Wallace S. Sayre Professor of Government and Director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy, Toleration and Religion at Columbia University.

Sharon L. Wolchik is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University.

ROHAM ALVANDI AND ANNA HAKALA

Democratisation has been defined by one prominent scholar of the subject as 'a complex, long-term, dynamic, and open-ended process. It consists of progress towards a more rule-based, more consensual and more participatory type of politics. Like 'democracy' it necessarily involves a combination of fact and value, and so contains internal tensions.'ⁱ This combination of 'fact and value', this tension between empirical and normative questions, has motivated the editors of the *St Antony's International Review* (STAIR) to dedicate this issue to the theme of democratisation. Six years ago, an issue on democratisation might have evoked images of Boris Yeltsin standing on a tank in front of the Russian Parliament in defiance of the attempted August 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, or the long queues of South Africans patiently waiting to elect Nelson Mandela as their president in 1994. Today it will likely bring to mind images of humiliation and cruelty at Abu Ghraib prison or the ink-stained finger of a first-time voter in Afghanistan or Iraq.

The literature on democratisation was mostly written during what Samuel Huntington termed the 'third wave' of democratisation, which began in Portugal in 1974.ⁱⁱ But how are we to conceptualize the post-Cold War 'fourth wave' of democratisation, an era which that same author controversially characterised as a 'clash of civilisations'?ⁱⁱⁱ Perhaps we should begin by asking, with Laurence Whitehead, for whom is this democratisation literature written? Our knowledge of democratisation, generally located within the comparative politics sub-field of political science, has developed in response to the practical needs of elites and counter-elites engaged in processes of democratisation.^{iv} How adequate is this literature for meeting their needs in the wake of the so-called 'war on terror'? As democracy emerges as a global norm, can this literature help us examine the efficacy and propriety of various avenues of democratisation? The articles found in this issue of STAIR help us confront these questions. They do so by addressing democratisation as both a phenomenon and a project. Each article tells us something not only about how and when democratisation has succeeded or failed, but also how that success or failure is related to the issue of legitimacy.

R. Alvandi & Anna Hakala, Editorial Introduction 'Democratization'
STAIR 2, No 2, (2007):5-10.

Is the process of democratisation essentially a shift from one form of discourse to another? In his thought-provoking article, Richard Anderson abandons the traditional emphasis on structural factors in studies of democratisation and presents a novel discursive theory of democratic change. Anderson argues that it is the displacement of an individual's personal identity by a positive social identity that makes participatory democracy possible. Voting in democratic elections is the act of an individual identifying with and acting for one social group (a party) against another (a rival party). Individuals acquire these positive social identities through exposure to discursive cues, and these identities can change when the individual is exposed to new discourses. For Anderson, democratisation is the transition from a discourse that contrasts social identities as 'positive to negative' to another that presents them as an 'opposition of positives.'

Alfred Stepan and Arthur Costa provide a clear example of such a discursive shift in their essay on the importance of democratic policing in the five democratic arenas identified by Stepan and Linz in their work, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (1996).⁹ Stepan and Costa argue that 'without a modern coercive apparatus, we cannot really think of a modern democratic state,' and highlight the important role of civil society in crafting democratic policing. They contrast a 'national security' discourse of policing in non-democratic states with a 'human security' discourse in democracies. Whereas the former views the subjects of police action as 'enemies,' the latter views them as 'citizens.'

Iraqi Democracy?

This discussion of democratic discourse is of relevance to the unfolding tragedy in Iraq. As a fallen dictator perishes at the hands of his victims, so too does the Ba'athi discourse of Iraqi nationalism that he ostensibly ascribed to. Can Iraqis now embrace a pluralistic and inclusive discourse of Iraqi nationalism? Anderson argues that, as in Germany, Italy and Japan, the occupying coalition forces can act as a 'discursively identifiable target for collective self-definition among the conquered populations.' In this way, Iraq's sectarian leaders can 'transpose the conflict from civil war to a struggle for the independence of Iraq.' However, as Par Engstrom argues in his response piece, Anderson 'gives no account of the motivations of actors underpinning such [discursive] practices.' The

Iraqi state, like many of Britain's former colonies, has been constructed and reconstructed on basis of *divide et impera*. While British colonialism favoured Iraq's minority Sunni Arabs at the expense of the Shi'a and Kurdish majority, the American-led occupation of Iraq has changed the balance of power in favour of the majority at the expense of the minority. Iraq's leaders now confront the awesome challenge of overcoming the very sectarianism that has propelled them into power. In his interview with Jaffar Al-Rikabi, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, a leader of the Shi'a *Dawa* party who served as Iraq's first elected premier after the fall of the Ba'thi regime, characterises Iraq's sectarianism as 'the biggest weakness of the Iraqi democratic experiment.'

The Democratic Norm

From Bush the elder to Bush the younger, the potency of the notion of a 'democratic peace' – the idea that democracies do not war with each other – has taken centre stage in America's post-Cold War foreign policy.^{vi} Some have concluded that the catastrophic failures of the American adventure in Iraq mark the end of a 'neo-conservative moment' in American foreign policy.^{vii} Yet as Iraq tragically descends into civil war, the Bush administration shows few signs of abandoning its prophetic mission to deliver 'God's gift to humanity' to every corner of the globe.^{viii} As U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice writes, 'Attempting to draw neat, clean lines between our security interests and our democratic ideals does not reflect the reality of today's world.'^{ix} Furthermore, the promotion of 'democratic ideals' is by no means an exclusively American endeavour. Rather, democracy is emerging as a global norm. As United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote his 2005 report, *In Larger Freedom*, 'democracy does not belong to any country or region but is a universal right.'^x

Despite the emergence of democracy as a global norm, there is no parallel consensus as to how it should be realised. If the experience of Iraq has made unilateral military interventions less attractive, what are the other avenues open to democratising agents? In her article on regional organisations as agents of democratisation in Sierra Leone, Lesotho and Burundi, Hélène Gandois argues that such organisations are both more legitimate and accountable as democratising agents because they act both collectively and locally. However, as Christine Cheng points out in her response piece, regional organisations are no less accountable or disinterested in their interventions than international organisations or

individual states. They are often dominated by regional hegemons who manipulate them for their own ends, and their membership includes the same unrepresentative governments that are themselves candidates for democratisation. Indeed, Africa's regional organisations are more conspicuous by their absence when confronted with violations of democracy in countries such as Togo or Zimbabwe. As Gandois concludes, 'Democracy still does not trump sovereignty and it is only gross violations of human rights – not the promotion of democracy as such – that enable the international community to set sovereignty aside.'

Democratic Contagion

If neither unilateral nor multilateral state interventions are appropriate avenues for democratisation, then perhaps our focus should shift from states to sub-state actors. Fredo Arias-King's article traces the creation of 'trans-national Orange networks' across the post-communist space in Europe. Beginning with the Prague Spring of 1968, he traces the influence of networks of democratising actors on the era of reforms in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, and the coloured revolutions from the 1990s to the present. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik analyse the last decade of democratisation in post-communist Eurasia, focusing on eight national elections in Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.

What is of interest for both Arias-King and Bunce and Wolchik is the effect of one post-communist democratic transition on another. Arias-King calls this cascade an 'Orange contagion', which spread not only through a passive 'demonstration effect,' but also via an active network of individuals and non-government organisations that mobilized to support the spread of democracy to their neighbours. Bunce and Wolchik argue that in each of their eight cases of democratising national elections, 'the long-term expansion of civil society, in part because of the long-term and sizeable investment of the United States,' played a crucial role in creating a 'democratic opening.' Like Arias-King they argue that this democratic diffusion was achieved thanks to the participation of 'graduates' of earlier democratising elections who believed that 'it was in their interests and in accordance with their values to help neighbouring liberal oppositions defeat dictators.'

While these 'Orange networks' have been more successful as agents of democratisation than states acting unilaterally or collectively, we might expect their intervention outside of the post-communist space to be seen

as illegitimate. As Bunce and Wolchik write, communism succeeded in creating 'a regional definition of comradeship' among anti-communist actors in the Soviet Union and its satellite states. Therefore, intervention by anti-communist fellow travellers across national borders was not regarded as 'foreign' intervention. But would these American-funded Cold Warriors be as welcome in Iran for example, a country at the top of the United States' democratisation agenda? There are those who are eager to spread the 'Orange contagion' to what Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr characterise as Iran's century-long struggle for democracy.^{xi} However, as Iran's most prominent political dissident, Akbar Ganji, writes, 'We have learned from our history that despotism can be imported, and that despotic rulers can survive with the help of outsiders. But we have also learned that we have to gain our freedom ourselves, and that only we can nourish that freedom and create a political system that can sustain it.'^{xii}

Conclusion

We began by asking what the literature on democratisation can offer us in the wake of the 'war on terror'? The articles presented here demonstrate that history will make and remake our understanding of democratisation. In this sense, it is history that drives theory. Yet implicit in our current conceptualisation of democratisation is our internalisation of democracy as a moral good. Perhaps this explains why the shadow of Iraq has fallen on military intervention, but not on the norm of democracy itself. In this sense, theory drives history. The articles presented in this issue of STAIR highlight this democratisation dialectic, not by the answers they give us, but by the questions they provoke. They remind us that we cannot restrict ourselves to merely asking questions about democratisation as process. We must also ask, whose interests does democratisation serve? Is it a panacea for the scourge of terrorism, leading ultimately to a Kantian perpetual peace? Or will democratisation empower authentic counter-hegemonic voices that we may not want to hear?^{xiii}

Notes

ⁱ Laurence Whitehead, *Democratisation - Theory and Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 27.

ⁱⁱ Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)

- iii Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996)
- iv Laurence Whitehead, 'Comparative Politics: Democratisation Studies,' in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), *A New Handbook of Political Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 353-371.
- v Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
- vi For a discussion of the democratic peace thesis see Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism* (New York: Norton, 1998)
- vii G. John Ikenberry, 'The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment,' *Survival* 46:1 (Spring 2004): 7-22.
- viii George W. Bush, *State of the Union*, 28 January 2003, Washington DC, accessible at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html>
- ix Condoleezza Rice, 'The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting Freedom Is the Only Realistic Path to Security,' *The Washington Post*, 11 December 2005.
- x United Nations. General Assembly. 59th Session. In *Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, accessible at: <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/index.html>
- xi Guy Dinmore, 'Opposition Exiles Train in 'Non-Violent Conflict' Tactics,' *Financial Times*, 16 June 2005. Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, *Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). See also Anoushiravan Ehteshami's book review in this issue of STAIR.
- xii Akbar Ganji, 'Money Can't Buy us Democracy,' *The New York Times*, 1 August 2006.
- xiii F. Gregory Gause III, 'Can Democracy Stop Terrorism,' *Foreign Affairs* 84:5 (September/October 2005): 62-76.

Crafting Democratic Policing in New and Old Democracies

11

ALFRED C. STEPAN AND ARTHUR TRINDADE MARANHÃO
COSTA

Democracy cannot flourish in complex modern societies without its own legitimate state coercive apparatus. Normally, in democracies, the only part of the state that is authorized to use force against its own citizens is the police. They are part of the apparatus of social control. Without such an apparatus private force might be used against the citizen's right to organize unions, to peacefully assemble to articulate their needs and to freely create and mobilize political parties. Without legitimate, credible and predictable force that is useable by the democratic state the public coffers would not receive sufficient taxes to finance the public goods that the electorate wants the new democratic government to supply. In short, without a modern coercive apparatus, we cannot really think of a modern democratic state.

In many of the new democracies that have emerged out of past authoritarian states the old means of social control are largely gone, but new ones – involving the police as one element, bounded by horizontal and vertical social controls, legitimated and made accessible to the citizens – have not been put in place. In this context crime often increases. Unless this process is reversed democracy may not deepen. Worse, dangerous non-democratic attitudes and actions might begin to appear. Some of the initial supporters of the new democratic regime may come to believe that the previous non-democratic regime was more efficacious and appropriate, for a society such as theirs. Some citizens might condone, or even become, vigilantes. Off duty police might be paid to act as death squads. How can new democracies avoid this vicious cycle?

Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, in *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (1996), identified five major arenas of a well functioning democracy: civil society, political society, the rule of law, a useable state and economic society. In this brief essay we discuss what tasks new and old democratic regimes must address concerning the police in each of these five arenas.

A. Stepan & Arthur Trindade Marahao Costa, 'Crafting Democratic Policing in New and Old Democracies' *STAIR* 2, No 2, (2007):11-18.

Since the existence of a coercive apparatus is a necessary condition of a democratic state, it follows that one of the tasks of civil society is to be engaged in thinking about how such an apparatus can be crafted. Most of the new democracies had policy institutes (and university courses) that examined the policy issues fundamental to improving the quality of democratic life, such as welfare, human rights, environment, law, taxation and health. However, many of the new democracies had few, or no, university programs or policy institutes devoted to the discussion of how their democracy should craft democratic policing practices.

In cases where foreign aid to new democracies goes towards the task of improving police forces, the aid all too often takes the form of police-to-police assistance. While this assistance is often valuable, it does not necessarily help engender informed and creative thinking about the role of the police in civil society itself. The creation of new forms of democratic control cannot be left to the police alone.

If the history of democratic police reforms in both old and new democracies were studied more closely we believe it would reveal an interactive pattern. This interactive pattern often starts with civil society protests, the documentation of police abuses and suggestions for new policies. Then, as we shall see when we examine the state arena, new policies, training and procedures emerge, devised and implemented by police professionals appointed by, or at least supported by, elected leaders in political society. But this positive interactive pattern, which may start a virtuous, instead of a vicious, cycle of police behaviour, is greatly helped if civil society groups continuously generate new ideas and information about the police and the policing needs of the citizens.

There are numerous demands and types of information that are characteristically generated by civil society and not, in the first instance, by elected officials or state employees within or outside of the police. For example, civil society groups can compile data on the excessive use of lethal force by the police. Normally, over the course of a year more citizens are wounded than are killed in armed exchanges with the police. For example, in New York City, the wounded-to-killed ratio is about 2.5 to 1. In contrast, in Rio de Janeiro, a police chief (who had played a major role in the repressive apparatus during the most extreme period of military rule) awarded medals and bonuses during the democratic period to the policeman who killed 'marginals' in the line of duty. A number of civil society groups began to compile and disseminate comparative data that gave *prima facie* evidence that the Rio police were using undue force.

For instance, in 1995, for every citizen wounded by the police 2.7 were killed, virtually the reverse of New York City. Furthermore, in 1995, 9.3 per cent of all civilians killed in Rio were killed by the police. In New York City, before Patrick Murphy's reforms, 5.5 per cent of all civilians killed in the city were killed by the police. By 1993, after the Murphy reforms, this figure had been reduced to 1.3 percent. The police in Rio de Janeiro today still kill a very high number of people in the course of police work. However, the issue of undue force is at least now on the agenda, largely as a result of the research and protests emanating from civil society.

Data can also be collected to give an indication of civil society views of fairness and 'usability' of police services. We need more public opinion polling (supported by civil society as well as by publicly funded national and international organisations) to help determine whether, when and where police assistance might be required, citizens (1) would approach the police and (2) would expect fair treatment. To be most useful, this question should be worded uniformly across the countries where the poll is administered and the poll should be conducted annually. The survey sample should be of sufficient size to allow for socio-economic analysis of which groups are the most and which are the least likely to approach the police and which groups are the most and least likely to expect fair treatment.

Civil society can also generate demands for civilian oversight agencies. In the United States, before the riots of the 1960s, there were very few Civilian Complaint Police Review boards. In 1998 there were 94 such boards and in 2006 three-quarters of the largest cities had them. Much, though not all, of the initial pressure for these boards came from civil society. Whether these boards are 'weak' (have auditing rather than investigative powers and are under internal police control) or are 'strong' (have investigative powers, sometimes auditing powers and are under external civilian control) depends to a great extent on the effective demands made by civil society on the elected representatives in political society.¹

Political Society and Democratic Police Practices

By 'political society' in a democratising setting we mean that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest and then to exercise, legitimate control over public power and the state apparatus. At most, civil society can destroy a non-democratic regime. However, a full

democratic transition and especially democratic consolidation, must involve political society. Civil society includes the world of trade unions, citizen's pressure groups, the media, women's groups and NGOs. The world of political society includes political parties, legislatures, electoral rules, constitution making, political leadership and inter-party alliances.

Through acts of omission and commission, political society can either engender or imperil the emergence of democratic policing practices in a newly democratising context. Political society can refrain from creating or tolerating paramilitary forces. The temptation, occasionally succumbed to by newly elected democratic governments, is to alleviate their anxieties about police and military loyalty during the process of democratic reforms by encouraging or tolerating the arming of the government's civilian supporters. This militarizes the polity, creates confusion about legitimate chains of command and normally destabilizes the chief executive. Toleration or ambivalence about paramilitary violence by the new democratic government, as seen in Weimar Germany, in Argentina in the mid-1970s and in Iraq from 2004-6, almost always erodes democratic authority.

Political society should insist on the use of the police, not the army, as the preferred instrument for the maintenance of civil peace. The police should be given a political and not a military chain of command and can be decentralized (with few weapons as in the United Kingdom) or centralized (with some units possessing significant weapons as in France). All democratic police should have missions that are fundamentally oriented towards services to citizens. They should be under overall political control and should be accountable to and controlled by, non-military laws and systems of justice.

The leaders of political society must direct the police to peacefully manage major demonstrations. Unlike the army, the police must be trained and equipped by their police commanders to endure abuse, projectiles and even firebombs, without attacking the citizens with their firearms. Detailed 'rules of engagement' that prevent or minimize deaths must be a major part of police work.

If the police are organized on a centralized, unified and state-wide basis, as in France, Italy and Chile, the national legislature and the national executive must develop the political and strategic capacity to give overall guidance to the police and to create systems of police accountability. If the police are organized on a decentralized basis, as in the federalized police systems of Brazil, Russia, the United States and Germany, no federal sub-unit of the police can have the right to violate, in the name of states' rights, the polity-wide, constitutionally embedded, individual

rights of citizens. Such police violation of citizen's rights in the name of states' rights was common practice in the southern states of the USA until the early 1960s and continues to occur in Brazil and Russia today.

Finally, if women tend not to report major cases of domestic violence and rapes to male-dominated police forces, political society can pass laws and budgets for the creation of police units or stations that are wholly staffed by women and designed to deal with domestic violence. The staff should include social workers specialized in dealing with domestic and sexual violence. Such programmes have been implemented with good results in some Brazilian cities.

Rule of Law and a Democratic Police

Non-democratic regimes often leave behind a legal structure or set of rules that are in significant tension with the rule of law and a democratically controlled police. If police units suspected of the use of undue force inherit the right to collect and weigh evidence and to conduct trials in cases of undue force against citizens, police impunity will prevail over the democratic rule of law. Every effort must therefore be made to create an inter-party majority to change such laws. Political society will be greatly helped in its efforts to create a law-bounded state if major organs of civil society, such as think-tanks concerned with the police, bar associations and the media, urge political leaders to make these crucial reforms. Such reforms should include, for example, making off-duty policeman who commit crimes subject to the normal laws and procedures that apply to all citizens.

A Useable State and a Democratic Police

So far we have talked about how civil society, political society and the legal system can help foster democratic police practices. A careful analysis of many of the reforms that have improved police-community relations, enhanced systems of control and accountability and reduced the undue use of lethal force, reveals that their design and their eventual acceptance by the police as legitimate owes much to the leadership of police professionals. Such leadership is normally part of the interactive process we mentioned previously. A reform system that has been externally imposed has a smaller chance of successful implementation than

reforms that have a meaningful degree of internal professional initiation and development.

Here we highlight some recent police reforms to show how an interactive reform process, involving meaningful professional inputs by the police themselves, has emerged relatively successfully. Our example is the reform process in one particular instance, namely the use of lethal force by the police in New York City. We choose New York City because it has historically had a major problem with the abuse of force by its police and its reform efforts and results are therefore illustrative.

In 1971 the New York Police Department (NYPD) killed 93 and wounded 221 citizens in the course of its police work. In 1972 a new Police Commissioner who had extensive experience as a NYPD police officer, Patrick Murphy, devised a set of reforms concerning the use of lethal force. Four years later, in 1976, these figures had dropped to 25 citizens killed and 79 citizens wounded by the NYPD. The concern expressed by some police officers that the new reforms, which for the first time in New York history specified the explicit and quite narrow conditions under which police could use their weapons, would make police more vulnerable to being shot did not materialise. In 1971, 11 NYPD police were killed on duty and 47 were wounded. Yet in 1976, four years after the reforms were introduced, no police were killed on duty and only 11 were wounded.

A key component of the reform was the development of the most explicit rules of engagement governing police use of weapons ever promulgated by a US police force. All police were instructed and intensely trained in the new five step rules of engagement program. These rules were: (1) first, attempt verbal persuasion; (2) if this fails, if at all possible, use your own body to achieve a peaceful outcome; (3) if this fails, use a non-lethal weapon, such as sprays of pepper; (4) if this fails, use a non-lethal impact weapon, such as a baton or an electric stick; (5) if this fails, consider drawing and discharging a lethal weapon, but *only* if the life of the policeman or another person is in danger. In order to ensure that these five rules of engagement are being adhered to, two other procedures were put in place. First, all police officers are required to hand in their weapon at the end of each day in order to verify that it has not been discharged and, if it has been discharged, a full report must be made to the external Firearms Discharge Review Board. Second, if a policeman has discharged his weapon, he or she must submit a full report to the duty officer that same day. Commanders of precincts are held personally and professionally responsible for the enforcement of these procedures. Murphy greatly reinforced the power and role of the Internal Affairs Division, which investigated and disciplined police commanders suspected of tolerating any violations of these new professional norms.²

Modern consolidated democracies require a set of socio-politically crafted and accepted norms, institutions and regulations to mediate between the state and the market. Linz and Stepan called such norms and institutions 'economic society.' In some countries the state is so weak that it cannot establish sufficient credibility, legitimacy, autonomy and coercive capability to regulate and tax its citizens. In such circumstances there may be rudimentary markets, but there cannot be a robust market economy because economic society is too undeveloped. In such circumstances, paying for and regulating, the police becomes that much more difficult, if not impossible (for example in many African countries, or in the republics of the Russian Federation in the 1990s).

Where there is a stronger 'economic society,' a democratic state can take steps to improve careers in law enforcement and the police. Personnel should be paid adequate salaries and pensions, so that police can cut down on 'moonlighting' and petty corruption as a source of extra income. Professional regulations might be established to prohibit, as in Great Britain, Australia, Japan and Hungary, police being hired as off-duty security forces by the private sector. If off-duty or retired police act as paid agents in death squads, the state should investigate, prosecute and convict those persons or groups in 'economic society' who pay the off-duty police. In some cities such as Rio de Janeiro, some police officers have been convicted for death squad activities, but none of their paymasters in economic society have been convicted and jailed.

Concluding Comments

We end with a particularly egregious example of undue lethal force in Brazil, which painfully illustrates what can happen if the work of control in the five democratic arenas has not been done and the old 'national security' approach against the 'enemy' is not supplanted by the 'human security' approach toward 'citizens.'

In April 1996 a group of landless peasants from an increasingly effective mobilizing group called the MST (peasants without land) were on a peaceful march to Belém, the capital of the state of Pará, a state where there had already been clashes between landlords and the MST. The Polícia Militar of Pará ordered the protesters to stop their march. However, the mission, training, equipment and leadership structure of the military police were closer in style to that of the military than that

of a democratic police force, as the police treated the protestors as an external, potentially armed 'enemy' rather than as 'citizens.' The protestors continued their march. From a video recording and eyewitness accounts it is clear that some barriers were being overturned, some stones were being thrown at the police and some abusive shouting at the police occurred. The next thing that the video shows, and numerous eyewitnesses recount, is that the military police opened fire with automatic weapons. By the time the shooting and the beatings ended, 19 peasants were dead. No military police were killed or wounded.

There was an investigation, but the laws and procedures concerning the police that were created by the military regime were still in effect. During the first eleven years of civilian rule, civil society had not effectively demanded improved police rules, the political society had not yet changed the existing police rules and the police had not yet been re-crafted by police professionals to operate in a democratic state. Thus, the evidence was collected by the military police command itself and the police interviewed eyewitnesses. Furthermore, the police had no written rules of engagement so it could not be demonstrated that the police violated standard procedures of the democratic state and a democratic police force. The military police commander simply said his police were threatened. A trial found the police not guilty. The federal government asked for a retrial, but more than ten years after the slaughter no police have been convicted or imprisoned for undue use of lethal force.³

Notes

¹ Benjamin Reames, 'Creating Citizen Accountability in Federal Systems: The Diffusion of Police Oversight Policies in Brazil and the U.S.,' PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 2006.

² See Amnesty International, *Police Brutality and Excessive Force in the New York City Police Department* (New York: Amnesty International, 1996). See also James J. Fyfe, 'Administrative Interventions on Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Examination,' *Journal of Criminal Justice* 7:4 (Winter 1979): 309-323. For an analysis of the important contribution of Patrick Murphy, as an insider who imposed new professional standards on the NYPD, see Jerome H. Skolnick and James J. Fyfe, *Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use of Force* (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 178-189.

³ After intense legal resistance by security forces and their political allies, 127 military police and 19 higher-ranking officers went on trial in 2002. All but two officers were absolved. Four years later neither of these two officers had been convicted. See, Amnesty International, 'Brazil: The Eldorado dos Carajás massacre 10 Years On,' *News Service* 097, 18 April 2006.

RICHARD D. ANDERSON, JR.

A call for papers inviting critical assessment of theories of democratisation tacitly recognizes that the reasons why dictatorships turn into democracies remain unknown. The question why some polities *become* democracies cannot be answered unless it is understood how other polities *are* democracies. Yet these two questions are usually investigated in isolation. The joint topic is unmanageably vast and arguably implicates every major question in political science.

Conceding the audacity of the enterprise, here I briefly review a novel theory of both democratisation and democracy. The theory takes the concepts of discourse and identity as empirical variables. It uses these concepts as explanations for how large populations can overcome the chaos-inducing properties of self-interest. Turning to agents' choices, it abandons the blind alleys of structural variables – economic development, civic attitudes and social organisation. Instead, the theory claims that both dictatorship and democracy depend on how a natural language is used by its speakers to construct social identities. Presented tersely, the assertions are sweeping: each can be further substantiated.

The theory bears implications for a question of much current interest: whether democracy is exportable. Many foreign invaders have prevented democracy from emerging, but can occupying armies produce democracy? If democracy depends on how native speakers deploy their own language, the answer can only be no. The negative answer is evident in three cases widely believed to have been successful exports of democracy: Germany, Japan and Italy. These cases are also instructive for my underlying claim that democracy does not depend on economic development, civic attitudes, or social organisation. Democracy emerged in these three countries despite war-time devastation that had reduced their populations to an abysmal poverty, despite civic attitudes that had sustained willing compliance with Hitler and Tojo and at least a grudging tolerance of Mussolini, and despite social organisation that had upheld National-Socialism, militarism or fascism. Examination of these three cases forms the basis for some very brief concluding reflections on whether democracy can develop in Iraq.

Richard D. Anderson Jr., 'Discourse and the Export of Democracy'
STAIR 2, No 2, (2007):19-35.

A discursive theory of democracy explains why people vote, even though voting is costly and promises the individual no compensating gain. In equating democracy with voting, I of course bypass exercises called 'elections' conducted by dictators who deny or restrict choice among candidates, or subject the powers of elected officials to review by self-appointed supreme authorities. A theory of authentic voting answers a different question than that of conventional theories of democracy, which ask why the electoral institution comes into being. Persistence in posing the wrong question explains why theoretical advance has remained a slog. If too few people take the streets to demand the vote, rulers eagerly repress them; if enough do, rulers grudgingly grant elections. The interesting question about democracy is why anybody wants to vote or any ruler expects people to.

According to the discursive theory of democracy, people vote when their social identity displaces private concerns. An individual who counts the cost in time and effort to the personal self will abstain, but an individual who contemplates his or her social identity will not. Decades of laboratory experiments have shown that a person whose attention has been drawn to a social identity will accept small costs to members of his or her own group if the costs result in the person's perceiving, even without a foundation in reality, that payment of the costs discriminates against members of an opposing social group. Repeated in many cultures with experimental subjects of both sexes and a range of ages, these experiments suffice to explain why people accept the costs of voting.¹ While voting is costly, the cost is small, and the action of casting a ballot discriminates *in the mind of the voter, not necessarily in the electoral outcome*, against someone, a candidate, who personifies an entire group, a party, defining itself as opposing the group to which the voter adheres by the act of voting.

The argument that the displacement of personal by social identities makes people vote directs attention to the question of what identities are. Concepts of identity are bewilderingly multifarious. Nevertheless, a definition by extension is possible. It starts with social identity. On inspection any social identity turns out to be a predicate. It is the complement to the English sentence beginning 'I am...', expressing a range of meanings that every other natural language can also formulate. A person's social identity is the predicate that the individual *would* (not 'could,' as possibilities are infinite) apply to the self. Such predicates are social, because they are categories potentially encompassing not only the individual who

would use them, but other persons as well. From such a definition of social identity, the meaning of personal identity becomes apparent: it is the unique intersection of the many categories that combine a given person with various others. Being a linguistic predicate, identity is acquired in the same way that people acquire language in general, through exposure to discursive cues (which may be linguistic or other). Being a speech act, a social identity is as labile as any other speech act. Even though social identities may not change much during a person's lifetime or even across generations, they owe their stability to repeated encounters with similar discursive cues. Exposure to a new discourse is capable of effecting a profound change in social identity, as the experience of any immigrant attests. Identities are 'locally situated interactional processes' arising from the exchange of discursive cues.² One of the many social identities borne by any given person may temporarily become ascendant, taking control of that person's behaviour, when he or she encounters the appropriate discursive cues. If the recent record of discursive interactions reminds people of a social identity, they will pay the costs of such collective action as voting; if not, they will revert to the personal identity that makes them decide their behaviour by monitoring private costs.

While making democracy possible, social identity can also motivate the collective action that sustains a dictatorship. The ability of a single dictator or a few members of a junta (e.g. the former Soviet Politburo) to block many millions from voting depends on repression achieved by the collective action of enforcers composing a small but still numerous minority of the population ruled by a dictatorship. Any dictatorship exhibits complementary social identities forming a pattern that contrasts sharply to that found in democracies. In dictatorships, whether hereditary or self-appointed, political identities form a privative opposition, juxtaposing a positive identity borne by the minority of enforcers against a political non-identity imposed on the residual majority. In a traditional dictatorship like medieval England, enforcers bearing the identity 'noble' – a word originally meaning 'known' (in context, to each other) – imposed on others the label 'villein,' formed by elongating the word for a noble's property with a suffix meaning simply 'pertaining to.' In a modern dictatorship such as the former Soviet Union, enforcers bearing the identity 'communist' cooperate to impose rule on *bespartiinye*, 'non-party ones.' Such non-identities soon become negatives: 'villein' comes to mean 'evildoer' in English, and 'ugly' in French, while no less a figure than Stalin remarks that those who are not communists are 'nothing in the eyes of the party'.³ Imposition of non-identities protects dictatorships by depriving people other than the enforcers of the motivation to act collectively

While political identities in dictatorship contrast a positive to a negative, political identities in democracy form an opposition of positives. Democrats may in practice comprise almost all the residual non-Republicans among adult citizens of the United States, but neither party label defines a negative or an appurtenance of the other. Indeed, I have been able to find only one political party in a democracy with a name that even includes a negative element, the former Anti-Revolutionary Party in the Netherlands. Moreover, in context its name is a *litotes*, the expression of a positive by negation of a negative, deliberately chosen by the party's founder. The same applies to 'Independent' in the United States, the guise that Republican voters often prefer.⁴ Neither Democrats nor Republicans impose the label on the other; instead, each tries to recruit the bearers of the opposite label to adopt its own.

The shift from the privative to the positive opposition that characterises democratisation takes place when political discourse changes. Discourse may be distancing or ordinary. Distancing discourse cues the audience to recognise separateness from the speaker's identity. The ultimate example of a distancing discourse is any language foreign to the audience, yet every language native to an audience offers opportunities to construct distancing cues. Ordinary discourse combines the speaker or writer and the audience into the shared identity of a temporary speech community. To the degree that ordinary discourse is repeated, that community persists over time. As we have seen, dictatorships (hereditary or self-appointed) must separate the social identity of enforcers from that of the population whom they repress, and to whom they deny social identity, at least in its political form. Therefore, dictatorships must use either a foreign language, as evidenced by colonialism, or a distancing form of a local language. While this discourse causes most audience members to dissociate from the speaker, a few who would describe themselves as unlike the majority of the audience instead identify with the speaker's distinctiveness, recruiting themselves into the separate identity that establishes and sustains a dictatorship. Democracies, which rely on sharing a political identity with candidates to motivate voters, must use discourse that is ordinary at least to large numbers of citizens. If the citizenry consists of multiple language communities comparable in size, democracy must proceed in all the sufficiently widely spoken tongues. Discourse in a citizen's own speech enables the citizen to infer whether he or she belongs to the same social identity as a candidate. If this inference is positive, the citizen becomes motivated to vote.

The possibility of using distancing discourse to stimulate the formation of the privative opposition characteristic of undemocratic regimes implies a hypothesis usable for an empirical check on the theory. Re-

gime type should be predictable from the frequency in political texts of metaphors and diagrams of interpersonal distance. Table 1 reports the frequency of one set of metaphors and two diagrams in Russian. The three indicators have been counted in the discourse of the authoritarian Politburo between 1964 and 1985, of the transitional Gorbachev Politburo during 1989, and of prominent politicians during the two years preceding the election of December 1993. The Russian metaphors reported in Table 1 are the five basic terms for size corresponding to the English words 'big, large, great, high, wide'. Excessive use of these metaphors cues inference of distance from the speaker because the audience member construes the personal self as occupying a position near the middle of any dimension of size. Diagrams are represented by noun-verb ratios and by person deixis. Since a clause is defined by a single verb, noun-verb ratios offer a measure for the length of clauses: longer clauses illustrate more discursive distance from the speaker to the audience. Person deixis is measured here by the ratio of plural to singular forms of the first person: plural 'we' constructs discursive distance by presenting the individual who is speaking as numerous relative to the individual listener. The noun-verb ratios are estimates computed from a large and random sample of strings in the computer texts. The metaphors and pronouns are counted. The frequency and ratios are then compared to those found in two counts of the same form in two large surveys of Russian texts of all kinds labeled 'Vernacular' with the date of publication. While Table 1 reports only three indicators, many others conform to the same pattern.

Table 1: Three Measures of Discursive Distance in Soviet and Post-Soviet Political Russian

<i>Politics</i>	<i>Five Size Metaphors (Frequency per 1000 Words)</i>	<i>Ratio of Nouns to Verbs</i>	<i>Ratio of First- Person Plural to Singular</i>
Authoritarian	11.5	3.4	7.3
Transitional	6.0	2.7	4.9
Pre-Electoral	3.8	2.0	1.6
Vernacular 1977	5.3	1.6	0.4
Vernacular 1993	3.8	n/a	0.9

As Table 1 makes clear, discursive distance declined markedly, and political discourse converged toward ordinary usage, between 1985 and 1993. This reduction in discursive distance predicted political change.

During the authoritarian period ending in 1985, no real elections were held and no authentic voting could occur. In the transitional year 1989, an election was held in which candidates campaigning in ordinary Russian managed to force their way onto the ballot in some locales and even win a few seats. However, the Politburo members whose discourse is reported in Table 1 did not stand for office, and tried with much, though not complete success, to pre-select those candidates who were allowed onto the ballot. Following two years of conducting politics in ordinary Russian, after the collapse of the August 1991 coup, an election was held that offered an open contest with multiple candidacies. The openness of this election was evident from the defeat suffered by supporters of the incumbent president. In the Soviet-to-Russian case, distancing discourse predicts suppression of authentic voting, reduction of distance predicts inconsistent enforcement of the suppression of authentic voting, and ordinary discourse predicts authentic voting.

In general, regime type should be predictable, given observations of the linguistic behaviour of the population, discursive choices by persons offering themselves as political leaders, and the resulting inferences about patterns of social identity. A point deserving emphasis is that if discourse predicts dictatorship or democracy, both must be entirely independent of structural conditions. Whether to express a given idea using nouns or verbs, whether to call an idea 'big,' or what form of the first person to adopt is a purely free choice open to any speaker's discretion. It does not depend in any way on the speaker's extra-linguistic circumstances.

Foreign Imposition of Democracy? Germany, Italy, Japan

If foreign occupation contributed at all to each move towards democracy, its contribution was highly ambiguous. In all three countries, post-war politicians secured identification with their voters by standing up to demands by the Occupation authorities described as unreasonable. The principal contribution of the Occupation authorities to the introduction of democracy was a service in reverse: they provided a discursively identifiable target for collective self-definition among the conquered populations. I present the German case, to which my linguistic knowledge grants me more access, in some detail. I describe the other two more briefly, since very similar processes occur in all three.

Any discussion of democracy in Germany must start with High German consonantism, the linguistic habit that produces sequences like English *ten*, Dutch *tien*, High German *zehn* or English *pound*, Dutch *pond*, High German *Pfund*. Beginning among Lombards, who established a kingdom in Italy in the fifth century, the High German consonants spread northwards not much beyond the watersheds of the Moselle and the Main. A gradual change from Latin to German between 1200 and 1400 produced a further association of High German with the speech of the ruled. Chancelleries diagrammed social distance using cumbersome spellings and elaborately complex sentences, full of subordinate clauses, with verbs deliberately relocated to the end. Martin Luther borrowed the chancellery language of Saxony to lend his vernacular Bible an authority comparable to that of the Latin preferred by his theological opponents. By the nineteenth century, nationalist writers had revived High German to replace the French for which German princelings had largely abandoned it. Linguists attending state-sponsored conferences who tried to bring orthography more into line with contemporary pronunciation met a rebuff from Bismarck himself. He insisted on preserving historical forms within the Prussian bureaucracy. The result was a foreign language to the native Low German speaker [in the north], who usually wrote and spoke it according to rules laid down in textbooks. The Middle and South German, on the other hand, tended to strike a compromise between his native dialect... and any prescribed or suggested pronunciation of [High German].⁵

Any such observation must be decisive for a theory attributing regime type to social identity cued by discourse. The existence of High German amidst a welter of local languages (labelled 'dialects') cued the emergence of a *Bildungsbuergertum*, an 'education-citizenry,' composed of graduates of the superior secondary school known as the *Gymnasium*. Members of the *Bildungsbuergertum* were commonly Protestants, concentrated in the North German territories comprised of the expanded state of Prussia. This emphasised the difference between them and the local population speaking Low German.⁶ The urge to discriminate, rooted in the discursive cueing of opposed social identities, motivated them to seek employment in the Imperial administration known as *die Verwaltung*. The associative meaning of this word may be judged from the information that the insertion of two semantically empty elements (-ge- after the prefix and -ig- before the suffix) produces the noun for 'rape'. As this meaning was not democratic, neither was the institution nor its denizens.

Divided by their local forms of German, members of the population attached themselves to the *Heimat*, the home locality, refusing to leave and intolerant of outsiders.

This linguistic background presented obstacles to the democracy introduced in 1918. Yet the politicians who formed the Weimar Republic did not even concern themselves with the implications of Germany's linguistic disunity. All Weimar parties practised a distancing discourse characteristic of authoritarian regimes, regardless of whether they used it to express democratic values. It has been called the discourse of *Berufstand*, or 'occupational group.' Instead of speaking to the individual voter, Weimar politicians addressed themselves to the category in which employment placed voters, with labels for any given group varying by party. The Communists' *Arbeiterklasse*, 'working class,' became the liberals' *Arbeiterschaft*, and the Nazis' *Arbeitertum*, while the socialist SPD preferred to disaggregate the working class into economic sectors. Even at that time, it was understood in Germany that this discourse of corporate entities deconstructed democratic convictions. A spokesman for a liberal party perceived, presciently, that German political discourse was 'unsurpassed in the organisation of the occupational estate or economic stratum but pathetic in... fitting the self into a conception of the general welfare.'⁷ When the Depression deprived five million voters of their jobs, appeal to identities defined by employment cut voters loose to support other parties, and some moved to the Nazis.⁸

The consequence was the turbulence of voting that doomed the Weimar republic. Germans voted in response to recruitment by local activists dispatched by every Weimar party, who talked to voters in their own local speech. However, as soon as voters began to identify with a party and exposed themselves to its distancing internal discourse, many became disaffected and left, making themselves available for recruitment by activists from some other party. A party such as the SPD, whose leaders were willing to make what they openly labeled the 'sacrifice' of complying with democratic norms, might have accepted electoral defeat, as the party's share of the vote fluctuated downward.⁹ When the Nazis temporarily became the beneficiaries of shifts in ballot choices, their leader, Hitler, saw no reason to preserve electoral institutions certain to expel the Nazis from office in the near future. During the five months between the two elections in 1932, his party lost a ninth of its vote share.¹⁰ Looking back in a 1937 speech, Hitler explained his reasoning: 'All those who already earlier were with two or three parties, those have certainly already sufficiently proven their unreliability by their previous changeable activity'.¹¹

The internal discourse of the NSDAP crowded out other forms of public political expression. Praised by its exponents as *volkstuemlich vereinfacht* ('folkishly simplified'), in fact, Nazi discourse simply imitated Hitler's continuous code-mixing of written and oral forms.¹² As usual, a distinctive discourse prompted inference of the privative opposition characteristic of political identity in dictatorship. This was expressed by one contemporary in these words: 'You are nothing, your people [Volk] is everything'.¹³

While the distinctive discourse of national socialism has received extensive analysis, post-war political German has drawn little attention. Such excess of attention to dictatorial over democratic discourse is natural enough. Being ordinary, democratic discourse is not remarkable, and being unremarkable, it tends to go unremarked. As the Occupation authorities began to license German newspapers, journalists called for a language that would depart from Nazi models made familiar by a dozen years of experience. Their goals were expressed in declarations that German had become 'impure' or 'violated'.¹⁴ On the left, politicians promptly reconstituted the two Weimar parties SPD and KPD and revived their pre-war discourse. On the right, however, Konrad Adenauer broke with both Nazi and Weimar practices.

Adenauer's September 1949 speech to the brand-new Bundestag evinces the discursive transformation characteristic of democratisation that re-scales the political leader to the magnitude of the citizen. Compared to Hitler, Adenauer shifts from 'we' to 'I'. Where Hitler belittles voters with a plural 'little people,' Adenauer equates them with his singular self by his singular *Waehler*, the word for voter that means 'chooser'. He dignifies them with his metaphor *Schiedsrichter*, the word now used for the referee at a sporting event, as it refers to the honorary task of presiding at a duel. Where Hitler attributes the voters' behaviour to the 'greatness' of his own program, Adenauer attributes his own behaviour to voters' preferences even on questions labeled 'great'. Yet Adenauer's speech is in the most refined High German, full of very long sentences and deliberately elevated grammar.¹⁵ His use of High German raises the question how a discourse associated for a millennium with authoritarian rule could possibly promote democracy.

The answer is a change in the linguistic behaviour of the audience. As much as a fifth of the post-war West German population consisted of refugees, and until the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, almost a third more joined them by fleeing East Germany. The North or Middle German of the refugees was not the same as that of the localities where they found homes. Destruction by bombing of a quarter of German housing had driven city dwellers to undamaged rural areas. As the refugees

and the homeless could only speak with their hosts in High German, all had to depart from the previously customary use of local speech. The importance of local *Heimat* in German identity receded.¹⁶ Meanwhile, territories lost to the new West German federation were all zones of North and Middle German. Thus speakers of Upper German, closest to High German, composed a larger proportion of the electorate. Finally, war had left the population with a surplus of women, always given more to correctness in speech. All these developments produced an electorate tending to speak High German more than ever before.

The larger discourse, of which Adenauer's 1949 address was one product, supplied cues from which West Germans gradually inferred a new sense of identity. This was evident five years later in the slogan with which they greeted the astounding triumph in the 1954 World Cup: *wir sind wieder wer!*¹⁷ This exclamation is nearly as ungrammatical in German as its literal rendering in English, 'we are again who', as the interrogative pronoun *wer* cannot act as a complement. Of course, the clause takes its effect from the assonance between *wir* and *wer* and the alliteration of both with *wieder*. Yet the exclamation also had meaning: Germans had again become the answer to a question about their identity, 'who are we?'. The contrast with the inference from Nazi discourse that Germans were a 'you' who were 'nothing' could not be starker.

Meanwhile, what of the Occupation? The new Federal Republic developed from the so-called 'Bizone,' formed when the British and Americans combined their administrations, where the administrative language was English. Occupation policy included 're-education' to instil democratic values. Germans' resistance to this patronising policy impelled British officials to renounce the very word.¹⁸ Rather than encouraging a free press, the occupiers imposed licensing and shut down at least one newspaper that pointed out the coincidence of 're-education' with Nazi *Umschulung*.¹⁹ An announcer appointed by the Americans to Bavarian radio, where he was responsible for reporting the news from a US point of view, became 'one of the most hated journalists in Bavaria'.²⁰ Inconsistent de-nazification transformed initial German sympathy into resentment of arbitrariness and injustice.²¹ The Allies' attempt to rule through non-partisan German administrators gave both Adenauer and his social-democrat rival opportunities to appear as nationalists by standing up for their parties.²² In short, the Occupation provided a discursively identifiable target for post-war German politicians. They used this to rally the voters around a shared national identity never previously linked to the entity compounded from the various West German territories. In this way, the Occupation may be said to have contributed to democratisation, but this was a service in reverse.

If modern German politics can be traced to linguistic developments in the fifth century, Italian politics owes much to linguistic encounters in the previous millennium. Forms of Latin spoken in the peninsula began to diversify immediately after the Roman conquest. Rome itself became polyglot. Over the next millennium, regional languages in Italy diverged to the point of mutual unintelligibility. Since the Tuscan variant written by Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio conserved more features of the original Latin recognised as a model, Tuscanisms marked a distinctive discourse of rule throughout the peninsula. After an interlude when Tuscanised Italian was displaced variously by French, Spanish and German, it was revived and adopted by loyalists of the French-speaking, Spanish-thinking monarch from the House of Savoy. Revival of Italian presaged the unification of Italy in 1861. Italian had always been 'the language of an oligarchic minority,' and upon unification it was 'a matter of concern' to less than three percent of the population of the new Italian state.

The so-called Liberals, who controlled the new state, extended the initial franchise to even fewer people than those who knew Italian. Schooling was legally compulsory after 1877 but sporadically enforced. Yet it gradually extended knowledge of Italian, and so the tying of the franchise to education slowly enlarged the pool of voters until a universal adult male franchise was granted for the election of 1919. Even so, in popular usage Italian remained secondary to the regional languages. Liberals maintained control of parliament only by relying on markedly illiberal owners of great landed estates in the South to deliver the votes of sharecroppers. The sharecroppers, themselves speaking no Italian, had been enfranchised to counterbalance voter support for the socialists. The latter support came from former peasants taking factory jobs in northern cities, where the mixing of villagers from adjacent areas had eroded the jagged contours of local linguistic variation.

Although able to control parliament, the Liberals remained suspicious of Italian citizens cued by linguistic diversity to distinguish their identities from that of their rulers. The Liberals also resented their dependence on the political support of large landowners who rejected Liberal ideas. When Mussolini appeared on the scene in 1922, Liberal politicians offered only feeble resistance. Mussolini's Italian has received far less scholarly attention than Hitler's German. While some comparisons between Mussolini's Italian and Hitler's German might be drawn, the reason why Mussolini's discourse has commanded relatively little attention also offers a solution to the generally recognized conundrum as to

why his political opponents hardly put up a fight: discursively he was far more like them than were the voters, whom they really feared.

By the time of Mussolini's arrest in 1943, Italian had begun to change from an authoritarian discourse into a language suitable for establishing democracy. As in Germany, the reason was a change in voters' usage. If, in 1925, knowledge of Italian among the general populace had been concentrated in Tuscany, by 1951 Italian was known to 87 percent of the citizenry. Mussolini's encouragement of industrial employment, his practice of conscription for war, and his regime's enforcement of compulsory schooling had combined to alter language use.²³ By June 1945, the spread of Italian had made it possible for voters throughout the peninsula to recognize a 'simple and cordial style' in a speech by the newly appointed prime minister Ferruccio Parri, a Milanese, and to welcome it with 'sympathy and confident expectation'.²⁴ Starting with the 1946 plebiscite on whether to choose a monarchy or republic, women voted for the first time. Their greater propensity for linguistic correctness increased the proportion of Italian speakers in the electorate, and their greater sociability exposed men who still did not know Italian to repetition of political messages in local languages that the women could also speak. Thanks to the women's influence on men, in the 1948 founding election, the turnout of 92 percent exceeded the proportion of Italian speakers.

As in Germany, the occupation contributed at most a negative example. It administered in English, and allowed domination of policy by the British. Following Churchill's orders, they favoured retention of the monarchy over the republic. The successor authority of the Occupation (Labour having replaced Churchill) remained neutral with regard to the plebiscite deciding between monarchy and republic. Yet it hampered the revival of Italian political parties. It also imposed a peace treaty received by Italians with 'disappointment and bitterness,' at the same time as declaratory policy was calling upon them to establish a democratic state. Indeed, the Allied military government handed over full sovereignty to an unelected royal government a full two years before approval of the Republic's democratic constitution.²⁵

Japan

Shortly after the Lombards began modifying German consonants, the Japanese began writing in Chinese. Over time, they shifted to the use of Chinese characters to write Japanese. The mnemonic cues that helped Chinese speakers learn to write their own language in painted char-

acters provided little or no aid to speakers of unrelated Japanese. The Japanese devised a syllabary to represent inflections prominent in their language but absent in Chinese. They also used the syllabary for inter-linear glosses of the otherwise unmemorable characters. The result was a written language that could be mastered only by unusually protracted study, even then requiring much intellectual effort even from its most adept users. In addition, the requirement introduced by the Tokugawa shoguns that the highest lords reside half the year in the capital Edo (now Tokyo) spread Edo dialect among the rulers around the country. Meanwhile, Tokugawa requirements that other Japanese not leave their home districts reinforced the mutual unintelligibility of local forms of speech.

In other words, the same pattern arose in Japan as in Italy and Germany: a tiny educated minority spoke a distinctive dialect rooted in inaccessible written forms. This minority controlled a populace divided among speakers of many mutually unintelligible or barely intelligible local languages. Similar linguistic choices produced political parallels. The enforced peace of the Tokugawa period turned *bushi*, trained in sword strokes, into bureaucrats, trained in brushstrokes. Just as *die Verwaltung* denounced political parties as subordinating any national interest to selfish interest, so the Japanese bureaucratic reformers who introduced the Meiji Constitution in 1889 consulted German constitutional lawyers and established 'transcendental' cabinets above party. Just as German political parties seized control of the cabinet in the Weimar Republic, so did Japanese parties after 1918. While the Japanese politicians did not need a military defeat to do so, an unconquered military constricted their influence. Like their German counterparts, the Japanese party politicians governed in a distinctive discourse, publishing all government documents in *futsibun* ('simple classical grammar and colloquial vocabulary') instead of the *kogobun* ('written style in the spoken language') used in novels, newspapers and letters. Like the Germans, a discourse isolating Japanese parties from their voters left them vulnerable to a 1931 takeover by a uniformed political movement. In this case, it was the army, ruling through the established bureaucracy. As in Germany, armed dictatorship led to military catastrophe in 1945.

Military defeat produced a new constitution in 1947. Although the Occupation authorities dictated the draft in English, they accepted an expert sent by the prewar ruling oligarchy to translate it into Japanese. His proposed translation would have vitiated the American attempt to establish popular sovereignty. It would instead have preserved the 1889 constitution's fiction of imperial sovereignty, which had in fact empowered oligarchs to rule with no regard for voters. The American preference

for 'popular sovereignty' (*shuken zaimin*, 'main-power resides-people') ultimately prevailed. Yet this was only because Japanese party politicians insisted on rewriting the draft in which the oligarchy's expert had persuaded the Americans to accept a meaningless 'supremacy' (*shiko*) instead. Ironically, the grudging American concession to the Japanese oligarchy's expert turned *shiko* into the foreign demand that the Japanese politicians defeated with their *shuken zaimin*. The whole episode looks like a masterful tactic inspired by the Americans' cultural tradition of *judo*, although surely it was not. Japanese politicians were in turn able to mobilise public pressure in favour of sovereignty because even the highly educated Japanese expert, assigned to produce the formal translation, was unable to render the concepts into classical forms. He was forced to begin with a colloquial *kogobun* version that was distributed prematurely to newspapers. Publication of a constitution expressed in *kogobun* paved the way for an orthographic reform cutting the number of characters by about two thirds, though still not eliminating them; thereby making political discourse substantially more like public usage.²⁶ Once again, women achieved the vote, and even obtained formal recognition of their equality. Their rights were secured by an unlikely coalition of Japanese women activists with American women assigned to occupation headquarters.²⁷ While Japanese women had been denied the education enabling them to read the original larger character set, transition to colloquial prose enabled their greater sociolinguistic competence to spread political identities among Japanese men.

Conclusion

If democracy can develop in post-war Germany, Italy, and Japan, it is certainly possible in Iraq. Contrary to decades of fruitless theorising in political science, democracy is not a matter of structural conditions, but of choices about discourse. These choices result in inferences of identity conforming to either the privative opposition found in dictatorships, or the positive opposition characteristic of democracies. Democracy is attainable in Iraq, but an occupation army cannot achieve it. The Sunnis must stop dispatching suicide bombers, the Shi'a must disband their militias and the Kurds must repudiate ethnic cleansing of Arabs settled by the former dictatorship in 'their' territory, and restore them to their homes. A suicide bomber is the ultimate example of discrimination driven by social identity – accepting death to the self, grief to the family and loss to the community in return for imposing more deaths, more grief

and more loss on the communities of others. The social identities that make some Sunnis recruit suicide bombers and others volunteer, that turn Shi'a into raiders who murder and torture and Kurds into *pesh-merga*, literally 'face death,' are inferences from distancing discourses. Sunni and Shi'a are religious communities whose leaders practise two different Koranic discourses in a form of Arabic otherwise no longer spoken, while Kurds define themselves by the contrast between Kurdish and Arabic. The religious leaders must either switch to colloquial Arabic or, more practically, confine their discourse to prayer, while Kurds and Arabs must each recognise the other's language as acceptable for their own politics. The likelihood that any of this will occur is, of course, small. Iraqi women are more emancipated than in most other Muslim states, but they can only help effect democratisation, as women did in Germany, Italy and Japan, if men renounce their distancing discourses. Some Iraqi leaders may be able to transpose the conflict from civil war to a struggle for the independence of Iraq. These include those who stood up to the occupying powers through statements such as the recent denunciation of the State of Israel for attacking fellow Shi'a in Lebanon. However, whether the occupying powers would tolerate any such initiative seems doubtful. The likelihood that Ahmed Chalabi can fill the shoes of an Adenauer must be nil.

Notes

¹ Marilyn B. Brewer and Rupert J. Brown 'Intergroup Relations,' in Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey, eds., *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. II (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 566-67.

² Deborah Schiffrin, 'Narrative as Self-Portrait: Sociolinguistic Constructions of Identity,' *Language in Society* 25 (June 1996), 200.

³ Quoted in J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, *The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939*, with translations by Benjamin Sher (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), 233.

⁴ Bruce E. Keith, David B. Magleby, Candice J. Nelson, Elizabeth Orr, Mark C. Westlye, and Raymond E. Wolfinger, *The Myth of the Independent Voter* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1992).

⁵ John T. Waterman, *A History of the German Language* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1966), 56-62, 106-174.

⁶ A.J. Nicholls, *The Bonn Republic: West German Democracy 1945-1990* (Harlow, Essex: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997), 85-88.

⁷ Thomas Childers, 'The Social Language of Politics in Germany: The Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic,' *American Historical Review* (1990) 95(2):331-358.

⁸ Bruno S. Frey and Hannelore Weck, 'A Statistical Study of the Effect of the Great Depression on Elections: The Weimar Republic, 1930-1933,' *Political Behavior* 5, no. 4 (1983), 403-420.

⁹ Hans Mommsen, *From Weimar to Auschwitz*, trans. by Philip O'Connor (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton, 1991), 43.

¹⁰ Frey and Weck, 411.

¹¹ Hildegard von Kotze und Helmut Krausnick, eds. and commentators, with the assistance of F. A. Krummacker, *Es Spricht der Führer: 7 Exemplarische Hitler-Reden* (Gütersloh: S. Mohn, 1966),

¹² Siegfried Bork, *Missbrauch Der Sprache: Tendenzen Nationalsozialistischer Sprachregelung* (Bern: A. Francke AG Verlag, 1970), 91-94.

¹³ Victor Klemperer, *Die unbewältigte Sprache* (Darmstadt: Joseph Melzer Verlag, 1946), 31.

¹⁴ Urs Widmer, *1945 oder die "Neue Sprache"* (Duesseldorf: Paedagogischer Verlag Schwann, 1966), 26.

¹⁵ Klaus Stuewe, *Die Rede des Kanzlers: Regierungserklärungen von Adenauer bis Schroeder* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fuer Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 139; Stuewe, ed., *Die grossen Regierungserklärungen der deutschen Bundeskanzler von Adenauer bis Schroeder* (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 2002), 35-47.

¹⁶ Nicholls, 9-10.

¹⁷ For discussion, see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "'Wir sind wieder wer': Wandlungen im politischen Selbstverständnis der Deutschen,' in Juergen Habermas, ed., *Stichworte zur 'Geistigen Situation der Zeit,'* vol. 1, *Nation und Republik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979), 185-209.

¹⁸ Kurt Juergensen, 'The Concept and Practice of "Re-education" in Germany, 1945-50,' in Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson, eds., *The Political Re-education of Germany and Her Allies after World War II* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 84-85.

¹⁹ Widmer, 30, 63.

²⁰ Jutta-B. Lange-Quassowski, 'Coming to Terms with the Nazi Past: Schools, Media, and the Formation of Opinion,' in John H. Herz, ed., *From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), 86.

²¹ Herz, 'Denazification and Related Policies,' in Herz, ed., 15-38.

²² Michaela Richter, 'From State Culture to Citizen Culture: Political Parties and the Postwar Transformation of Political Culture in Germany,' in John S. Brady, Beverly Crawford, and Sarah Elise Wiliarty, eds., *The Postwar Transformation of Germany: Democracy, Prosperity and Nationhood* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Michigan, 1999), 127-131.

²³ Giacomo Devoto, *The Languages of Italy*, trans. from Italian by V. Louise Katainen (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978), 230-231, 317; Bruno Migliorini, *The Italian Language*, abridged, recast and revised by T. Gwynfor Griffith (Boston : Faber and Faber, 1984), 160-179, 260.

²⁴ Giuseppe Mammarella, *Italy after Fascism: A Political History 1943-1965*, newly revised and enlarged edition (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1966), 97.

²⁵ Mammarella, *passim*; quotation on 173.

²⁶ I have drawn especially on Kyoko Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution: A Linguistic and Cultural Study of its Making* (Chicago: Chicago, 1991), especially 205-219; J. Marshall Unger, *Literacy and Script Reform in Occupation Japan: Reading between the Lines* (New York: Oxford, 1996); and Yaeko Sato Habein, *The History of the Japanese Written Language* (Tokyo: Tokyo, 1984), esp. 36, 58, 77, 97-101.

²⁷ Susan J. Pharr, 'The Politics of Women's Rights,' in Robert E. Ward and Sakimoto Yushizaku, *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu: Hawaii, 1987), 221-252.

On Novelty and Democracy: A Response to Anderson

PAR ENGSTROM

In his essay, Richard Anderson sets out to provide 'a novel theory of both democratisation and democracy'. When examining claims of novelty it is often useful to start from what is implicitly, or explicitly, written-off as old. In this response I will therefore take as my point(s) of departure a number of insights accumulated over the years in the rich literature on democracy and democratisation relating to: (1) the mapping out of the conceptual boundaries of democracy and the implications resulting from the choices made in this exercise; and (2) different understandings of the political dynamics underpinning processes of democratisation.

Overall, Anderson seeks to develop a 'discursive theory of democracy' that focuses on the development of linguistic practices and their effects on the construction of social and political identities. Anderson considers the 'choices about discourse that result in inferences of identity conforming to either the privative opposition found in dictatorships or the positive opposition characteristic of democracies,' and insists on a privileged status of agency over structural variables in explaining the political changes that underpin processes of democratisation. Following from this, Anderson seeks to apply his theoretical claims to the question of 'whether democracy is exportable,' which he discusses in more restrictive terms of whether 'occupying armies [can] produce democracy,' with Germany, Italy and Japan before and immediately following the Second World War as his empirical examples.

On Democracy

Most discussions of democratic theory make the point of highlighting the rich intellectual history of democracy as a political model. David Held, for example, distinguishes and elaborates on eight very different models of democracy.¹ Anderson, however, does not explicate the meaning of 'democracy'. When entering debates on democratic theory such omissions raise questions regarding the theorist's understanding of the conceptual boundaries of democracy. For instance, Anderson seems to equate democracy with voting, without recognizing the

Par Engstrom, 'On Novelty and Democracy: A Response to Anderson'
STAIR 2, No 2, (2007):36-39.

implications arising from such a restricted definition. As a burgeoning literature on the 'quality' of democracy now recognizes, a narrow understanding of democracy limited to the act of voting in elections – even if freely contested, fair, regular and competitive – often seem to condone political practices and accept socio-economic conditions hardly corresponding to the promised benefits of democracy for those living under its rule. Conversely, positing electoral rights as the criteria for democratic governance may for some polities put the barrier prohibitively high. For example, on this account, the US could scarcely have qualified as a democracy before the civil rights movement successfully mobilized around the question of electoral rights and the establishment of effective universal suffrage in that country following the adoption of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.² The broader point here, of course, is to emphasise the importance of locating one's claims in a theory of democracy, of recognizing the relationship between narrower and wider conceptions of democracy and the implications flowing from choices made in favour of one over the other.

Anderson focuses on the construction of social and political identities when emphasising the crucial socialising function of political discourse in a democratic polity. He argues that 'regime type should be predictable given observations of the linguistic behaviour of the population'. In particular, Anderson stresses one important dimension of democratic discourse – that of the linguistic construction of political and social identities of individuals as equals in a polity. He offers a learned discussion of particularly the German case and provides some interesting insights into the transformative potential of language at the social-psychological level and how language constructs and reconstructs agents. One should note the rather surprising absence of any references to the work of either Michel Foucault or Jürgen Habermas in Anderson's treatment of a 'discursive theory of democracy'. Indeed, Foucault's analysis of power within discursive formations could shed important light on how agents perpetuate power through the adoption and adaptation of a discourse of democracy in the cases examined by Anderson. Even more, one would have thought that a discussion of Habermasian ideas regarding the ways in which language – or the practice of engaging in dialogue – transforms the thinking of agents, could have offered important insights. Habermas' efforts to find transcendent rules to which agents could agree and which could form the basis of debate in a democratic society would have been pertinent in this regard.

When the focus shifts to questions of democratisation we move away from a static conceptual debate about what democracy is – and is not – to a debate surrounding the nature and logic of dynamic political processes. Here and at the most basic level, there are at least two important processes of democratisation that could usefully be distinguished: democratic transition and democratic consolidation (or, broadly speaking, ‘institutionalisation’). The scholarly debate regarding democratic transitions has been dominated by two main approaches that put equal emphasis on internally oriented processes of political change. On the one hand, the modernisation literature focused on the same social and economic prerequisites for democratisation that Anderson hopes to move away from. On the other, the ‘transitology’ literature emphasised political processes and elite initiatives and choices to account for the move from authoritarian rule to democratic regimes. Whilst the former concentrated on impersonal or structural processes of change, the latter was explicitly agency-based, but the agency that mattered was that of domestic actors and especially domestic elites. The analysis of consolidation processes shifts interests away from the search for preconditions or catalysts of change to the study of factors that enable or constrain the stabilization and legitimisation of new democracies. Consequently, though part of the process of political regime change as a whole, the process of democratic consolidation aims at solidifying the new achievements, routinising the new forms of political interaction and deepening the nature of the new democracy.

A number of issues emerge from this account. First and most obvious, all existing democracies are products of democratisation. But this also means that conceptual clarity is needed when discussing democratic transitions, not only with regards to the direction in which political changes are going, that is, towards democracy however understood, but also with regards to the political organisation of the society in which processes of democratisation are said to take place. Here, ‘dictatorship’ as discussed by Anderson is only one of many categories of undemocratic governments. Indeed, other forms of regimes come to mind in relation to the period Anderson’s cases are drawn from; ‘totalitarianism’ most clearly of course. To the extent that one is of the view that political changes are never occurring in a (social, political, economic, cultural, historical etc.) vacuum but are at least in part context-dependent, the particular features of these categories matter and analytical choices in favour of one category are not inconsequential.

Second and related to this, there is a growing recognition that the nature and direction of democratisation as a process is contingent and open-ended. This change in perspective on democratisation has made democracy seem

more attainable and, moreover, shifted the analytical focus from relatively unchangeable structural factors to the study of different forms of agency. As Amartya Sen points out, the passing of the notion that modernity is a pre-requisite for democratisation has an important normative implication: '[a] country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy; rather, it has to become fit through democracy.'³ Furthermore, it has usefully shifted the focus of democratisation studies to individual agency. Anderson makes a strong case in favour of agency: 'Turning to agents' choices, [Anderson's theory] abandons the blind alleys of structural variables – economic development, civic attitudes, social organisation.' Although I welcome the attention given to agency, I question whether the best approach is to argue for an either/or approach. For example, constructivists in the discipline of international relations accept the basic premise that agents and structures are 'mutually constituted'. This perspective acknowledges that social context may constrain particular actions, but emphasises that structures do not determine behaviour. Hence people both perpetuate and alter their worlds. Thus, a more fruitful avenue to explore would be to avoid the false dichotomy between agency and structure and instead examine, understand and perhaps explain, the choices agents make, bearing in mind the structures within which they operate. From this certain questions follow. For instance, how do linguistic practices change and why? That is, if actors are conditioned ('constituted') by the prevailing socio-historical contexts of their times, how and why do some adopt new discursive practices rather than follow habitual ones and to what extent do these new practices reflect new ways of thinking? Is the 'why' question important, or is Anderson only seeking to understand, rather than explain, how linguistic practices change? After all, can you sensibly separate the 'how' from the 'why'? Moreover, while Anderson gives privileged space to observable linguistic practices, he gives no account of the motivations of actors underpinning such practices. In other words and to reiterate, it would be useful to move beyond unproductive 'either-or' theoretical debates to analyses in which both agents and structures matter and are explained and understood.

Notes

¹ David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).

² Some would even refer to the problematic constitutional status of Puerto Rico and its inhabitants in the contemporary US polity in order to push the claim that democracy promotion, if sincere, starts at home.

³ Amartya Sen, 'Democracy as a Universal Value,' *Journal of Democracy* 10, no.3 (1999): 4; emphasis in original.

Orange People: Liberation Networks in Central and Eastern Europe

FREDO ARIAS-KING

'We have underestimated completely the processes taking place in Poland, Hungary and especially recently in East Germany, and their effect and influence on our society.'¹

— Miloš Jakeš, Deposed Czechoslovak Communist Party leader, 25 November 1989

This article aims to broadly trace a specific aspect of the trans-national 'effect and influence' (in Jakeš's words) of the processes of liberation in the past half century in central and Eastern Europe. It will begin with a brief exploration of the origin of the trans-national Orange networks, their interaction behind the Iron Curtain, their zenith in 1989 through 1991 and reappearance in the partially reformed post-communist space and end with their latest activities.² Undoubtedly, the contagion effect from abroad is but one in the constellation of factors (mostly domestic) that make possible these liberations.³ And, within this factor, the trans-national Orange networks are also but one element. This article will focus on this specific aspect.

Because the numerous individuals and groups that have organised to overthrow communist and neo-communist regimes have a multiplicity of ideologies and goals, for simplicity, the label 'Orange' will be used to describe them collectively for the purposes of this article, despite its recent discomfiture. Besides the events in Ukraine's in late 2004, orange has been used by several opposition forces in the region.

Similarly, because the regimes targeted by the Orange people also span different categorisations, I will also continue with an earlier hypothesis that the nature of such regimes cannot be easily defined by ideology nor any well-constructed system of values. Their common denominator instead seems to be a compulsion to engage in illiberal and antisocial behaviour, perhaps carried over from self-selection to and training in their respective *nomenklatura*. Noting that not all communist-party members engage in antisocial behaviour (in fact, regime moderates who played key liberating roles will also be defined as Orange people here), it is also true that, with few known exceptions, the key individuals that make up such antisocial regimes had been part of the communist *apparat*. In this sense, noting that such individuals change ideology and political

Fredo Arias-King, 'Orange People: Liberation Networks in Central and Eastern Europe' *STAIR* 2, No 2, (2007):40-63.

orientations quite rapidly, in this article I will use the label 'antisocial' to describe the nature of such individuals and their regimes rather than 'communist,' 'fascist,' 'sultanistic,' 'illiberal' or other labels, since it captures their collective essence in one word. The American Psychiatric Association defined antisocial as:

...fail[ure] to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior...such as destroying property, harassing others, stealing or pursuing illegal occupations. Persons with this disorder disregard the wishes, rights or feelings of others. They are frequently deceitful and manipulative in order to gain personal profit or pleasure ... They may have an arrogant and inflated self-appraisal and may be excessively opinionated, self-assured and cocky [yet] may display a glib, superficial charm and can be quite voluble and verbally facile.⁴

Václav Havel captured the essence of the non-ideological struggle between Orange people and antisocials, while reflecting on the Velvet Revolution: '... I wouldn't answer that it was the victory of one ideology over another, of one state over another state ... But I say certain values triumphed. Freedom triumphed over oppression. Respect for human dignity triumphed over humiliation.'⁵

If gaining profit and pleasure at others' expense is the goal of the antisocial, the motivation of the Orange people is more elusive. Viktor Frankl spoke about the power of involvement and its relation to self-esteem, which he called 'logotherapy'—from the Greek logos, or meaning.⁶ But why this seemingly universal theory seems to fit the Orange people, who are but a distinct minority after all, is not simple to answer.

Risking the label of Manichaeism, this article follows the broad groups established by Timothy Garton Ash when describing events in the 1989 revolutions: Us, Them and the Outside world.⁷

Genesis of the Orange Contagion

The evidence points to the 1968 Prague Spring as an important source of the Orange contagion that spread throughout the bloc, which caused the eventual demise of communism and continued to have ripple effects in the post-communist period.

After the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and Alexander Dubček's internal exile, the Orange torch was carried by a handful of individuals who had contributed to the brief experiment

in liberalisation. Those that had an impact beyond their borders were mainly two: Zdenk Mlynář and Jiří Hájek. The latter was the main figure who continued the advocacy of the Prague Spring and its mystique, and served as the nexus between the Prague Spring and the Velvet Revolution. Mlynář played a similar role, although he was eventually exiled.

Hájek, a social-democrat who had joined the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia when both parties were forced to merge in the late 1940s, became foreign minister as part of a group of non-communists and reform-communists appointed by Dubček to lend credence to the Prague Spring reforms. Dubček called Hájek a man of 'solid liberal reputation.' Immediately following the invasion, Hájek flew to New York to denounce it before the UN General Assembly, before returning to Prague. He later became one of the original authors and spokespersons of Charta 77, along with the playwright Havel, Pavel Kohout and the philosopher Jan Patočka, amongst others. With Patočka having died during detention and Havel serving years in prison, Hájek effectively carried the Charta 77 torch for much of the time prior to 1989.


Though it preceded the Prague Spring, the Hungarian revolution of 1956 did not seem to have the same influence on subsequent events in the region for several reasons. This failure seems to lend credence to the advocates of non-violent resistance,⁹ as the violent nature of 1956 was used by its antisocial opponents and propagandists to dissuade others from following its example.

The Orange contagion between Czechoslovakia and Poland is complex and seems to have taken a back-and-forth motion, with activists influencing and feeding off one another mostly through the 'demonstration effect' and limited personal relations.

On 8 March 1968, 5,000 students at Warsaw University assembled to protest the expulsion of their fellow student Adam Michnik.¹⁰ An attempt by police to scatter them ended in the quick spread of student disturbances throughout the country, in what became the largest civil movement in all of Eastern Europe since 1956. Many had been shouting 'Poland is waiting for her Dubček!' ¹¹ Jacek Kuroń and Michnik formed KOR, the Committee for the Defence of Workers (later renamed KSS-KOR) in September of 1976. Despite the regimes' efforts to quarantine both countries, KOR seems to have influenced Charta 77, which was officially revealed in January of 1977. Apparently, Hájek drew much inspiration from KOR, seeing it as the 'ideal' to follow.¹² One of the key players in the Polish dissident movement since its inception, Zbigniew Romaszewski, recounts the many tribulations in cooperating with the Czechoslovaks.¹³ In 1978, the KSS-KOR members organized the first of three clandestine meetings with some of the Charta 77 activists at the *řnieřka*-

Sněžka mountain at the Polish-Czechoslovak border. Though it is difficult to trace any direct external influence on the genesis of Solidarność (the spontaneous workers' protest at the Lenin Shipyard over the unjust treatment of Anna Walentynowicz), the adhesion of Kuroš and Michnik to the workers' movement led by Lech Wałęsa transformed it into the formidable force that it became and brought the foreign Orange contagion with it. After the electoral triumph of Solidarność in 1989, Michnik became again an Orange missionary, travelling to see his old friends in (still 'normalized') Czechoslovakia, in Hungary (around the time of the Imre Nagy reburial, the key moment in their revolution) and later went to encourage the Ukrainian independence movement.

Table 2: Orange Tree, 1968-2006



It is odd that in the literature on liberations and democratisation, transnational influences are seldom discussed.¹⁴ When speculating about what it would take for Poland's regime to collapse, Michnik underestimated the possibility for the USSR and, more specifically, for its Communist Party (CPSU), to become the catalyst of East-European liberation.¹⁵ Archie Brown, in contrast to Michnik, later called the Soviet influence 'decisive,' arguing that Gorbachev's democratizing reforms within the USSR itself, especially after the 19th Party Conference in mid-1988, were more important than any influence exerted by the West (including the Pope, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher) on Eastern Europe.¹⁶ However, Brown's otherwise precise analysis oddly omits the ways in which the Prague Spring positively influenced Soviet reform, both through the 'demonstration effect' and, more importantly for purposes of this article, the effect it had on actual people inside the Soviet regime.

When asked about the difference between perestroika and the Prague Spring, Soviet spokesman Gennady Gerasimov famously answered, 'nineteen years'. More than intellectual coincidence in an attempt to reform communism from above, there were several direct links or 'action channels' that spread the Orange contagion from Czechoslovakia to the USSR. I can identify three: Soviet system insiders directly exposed to Czechoslovakia; system insiders indirectly exposed to the Prague Spring; and system outsiders indirectly exposed to the Prague Spring.¹⁷

The first group is the most important and also surprisingly large, not only in terms of numbers, but also in terms of the influence the group had on subsequent events in the Soviet Union and its relations to its satellites.

Several of the key architects of the Soviet 'new political thinking' in foreign relations had been exposed to Czechoslovakia during the 1960s. This 'Prague group' included such future notables as Georgy Shakhnazarov, Aleksandr Bovin, Yevgeny Ambartsumov, Fyodor Burlatsky, Gerasimov, Georgy Arbatov, Yegor Yakovlev, Oleg Bogomolov, Anatoly Chernyaev, Yuri Karyakin, among others.¹⁸

Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, the future architect of glasnost and perestroika, also described the Prague Spring as a turning point in his thinking about the Soviet system. He later admitted that having been sent on the back of Soviet tanks to re-indoctrinate the Czechs and Slovaks deeply affected him.¹⁹

But of all the system insiders exposed directly to Czechoslovakia, the most important was of course Mikhail Gorbachev. One must recall that

his radical reforms preceded the rise of the radical democrats and other effectively organized Orange elements inside the USSR.²⁰ In addition, he seems to have actively encouraged and certainly blessed the fall of most of the allied regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989.²¹ Much remains to be studied of this period in history and one can begin with the future general secretary's exposure to the Prague Spring.

As with Yakovlev, the crushing of the Prague Spring affected Gorbachev directly, though various channels. Gorbachev already had an emotional tie to Czechoslovakia, where his father was seriously wounded near the end of the Great Patriotic War. In addition, Mlynář was reportedly Gorbachev's best foreign friend at Moscow State University, where they studied together for five years (1950-55) and even lived across the hall from each other at the dormitory some of that time. Gorbachev recounts how Mlynář returned to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1967 and spent some time with him in Stavropol, discussing in detail the latest events in Czechoslovakia.²² Shortly thereafter, at the age of 37, Mlynář became a high-ranking member of the Czechoslovak leadership and a key architect of the Prague Spring. After its crushing, he suffered repression and house arrest (and finally exile after he co-authored *Charta 77*). Gorbachev was then sent to Czechoslovakia a few months after the invasion to work on re-imposing conformity with Moscow, mostly through youth groups. In his memoirs, he recounts how workers refused to meet with the Soviet delegates and how he came to many realisations, one of which was how events on the ground flatly contradicted the official reasons for the invasion.²³ He later mentioned to Czech interviewers that he felt the utter resentment of common people towards the Soviets, how this experience 'opened my eyes. I saw that we had humiliated a nation.'²⁴ He traces the dreaded 'era of stagnation' squarely on the crushing of the Prague Spring.²⁵ In a long conversation with Mlynář, Gorbachev mentioned that while rising in the ranks of the CPSU, 'the Czechoslovakia of 1968 was for me a major impulse toward critical thinking. I understood that there was something in our country that was not right. But this impulse came from the outside world.'²⁶

The second group affected by the Prague Spring were those system insiders that were indirectly exposed. The 'demonstration effect' of the Prague Spring and its end affected other parts of the Soviet establishment. For example, Len Karpinsky, whose father had been close to Lenin, was a rising star in the Party and a protégé of both Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev who broke with privilege to protest the invasion.²⁷ Another child of Party privilege, Pavel Litvinov, the grandson of Stalin's foreign commissar, participated in a small but stunning protest in Red Square by the Kremlin, carrying banners in Russian and Czech denouncing the

invasion, for which he was sent to Siberia.²⁸ A third system insider that wrote critically of the 1968 invasion and was therefore banished from his institute was Yuri Levada.²⁹ All of these individuals played key roles in the Soviet transformation under perestroika.

For the purposes of this article, Andrei Sakharov is considered a 'system outsider' since he had started unequivocally breaking with the system at the time of the Prague Spring. Sakharov, the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, had his major 'stepping forward' as a dissident at the time of the events underway in Czechoslovakia in 1968, writing his essay *Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*, which became an instant samizdat classic, with more than 18 million copies distributed in several countries.³⁰ As he writes,

What so many of us in the socialist countries had been dreaming of seemed to be finally coming to pass in Czechoslovakia: democracy, including freedom of expression and abolition of censorship; reform of the economic and social systems...and full disclosure of the crimes of the Stalin era.³¹

In a letter to Dubček, Sakharov later wrote that the Prague Spring was a major inspiration for him, that 'The year 1968 influenced my fate. Spring brought hope...I am convinced that the breath of truth that the Czechs and Slovaks inhaled...is the prologue to today's bloodless revolutions in the countries of Eastern Europe.'³²

The leading dissident Yelena Bonner, who was to later wed Sakharov, was also affected by that invasion and it was likely a chief reason for her decision to quit the CPSU and step forward against the Soviet system.³³ After their release from internal exile in December 1986, Sakharov and Bonner went on to become the leaders of the fast-growing reformist (and anti-communist) movement, especially after the first Congress of People's Deputies in the spring of 1989. There, USSR People's Deputy Sakharov and his allies organized the Interregional Group faction, which later became the genesis of the Democratic Russia Movement, the group that propelled Boris Yeltsin to the Russian presidency in June 1991 and made its mission extirpating Russia from the USSR. This movement was formed shortly after Sakharov's passing by his disciples: the sociologist Galina Starovoitova, the physicist Lev Ponomarev and the dissident priest Gleb Yakunin, among others.

Some of these system outsiders also later became exposed to Polish activists directly.³⁴ Romaszewski had gone to visit Sakharov himself in the USSR in 1979.³⁵

The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were significant since they in many ways were the conduit of much of the Orange contagion from the outer empire into the USSR itself. For example, one of the key Estonian activists and future co-founder of the Estonian Popular Front, Tunne Kelam, had translated and distributed in Estonia the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which were published in the Czechoslovak press during the Prague Spring. Later, Kelam did the same with *Solidarność* material.³⁶ The founder of Sõjrdis and future Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis said that the main factors that shaped his world view were the Hungarian revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring and Poland.³⁷ He mentions that, specifically, the idea for Sõjrdis was modelled after the Estonian Popular Front.³⁸

Only a few analysts detected the important developments in the Caucasus and their broader impact. The de-facto war between Armenia and Azerbaijan established several precedents for the USSR. The vote of the Nagorno-Karabakh Soviet on 12 July 1988 to join Armenia was not initially challenged by Moscow and therefore became a bold first act of self-determination within the USSR and a major victory for one of the key popular fronts that would soon play the leading roles in dismembering the Union, the Karabakh Committee, led by Levon Ter Petrossian and several other civic and intellectual figures.³⁹ There were also contacts between *Solidarność* and Armenian activists, even before the breakthrough in Poland.⁴⁰ The Russian democrats also cooperated closely with the Orange Armenians, as Sakharov travelled there to help with the 1988 earthquake relief and to denounce the pogroms and Starovoitova represented Yerevan at the Congress of People's Deputies.

Though the genesis of the Romanian revolution of late December 1989 is mostly attributed to the accidental activism of Father László Tőkés and fellow Magyars in Romania aware of developments in Hungary, few analysts noticed the role played by Moldova. Sharing language and history with Romania and with a relatively porous border, Moldova was, since 1988, awash in large demonstrations against the Party leader, Semyon Grossu, which quickly turned anti-Soviet. Led by the Popular Front, these demonstrations succeeded in ousting Grossu and in forcing the Party to comply with several demands. Glasnost in Moldova meant that Romanians could watch 'corrupting' broadcasts, as East Germans could with West German television, as Azeris with Turkish television and as Estonians (in Tallinn) with Finnish television. Moldovan activists (including the leaders of the Front) routinely travelled to Ceaușescu's Romania for political activism.⁴¹

The collapse of the outer empire, in turn, further inspired the democracy and independence movements in the USSR, which finally col-

lapsed in 1991 after a failed coup attempt that August and the signing of the Belovezha accords in December. Thus the 'post-communist' era began.

The Post-Communist Uprisings

As small and marginal Portugal was the lark of the 'Third Wave' of world democratisation,⁴² small and marginal Bulgaria was likewise the lark of the 'Second Regional Wave' of specifically post-communist Orange revolutions in its part of the world. Few analysts have traced the genesis of the post-communist Orange contagion to Bulgaria, but that is where the causal links lead to.

Bulgaria had undergone an incomplete transition. Todor Zhivkov was ousted by popular uprisings and palace intrigues but his allies remained in power until the general elections of 1991. By then the democratic forces were much better organized and had formed an unusually effective Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), which gained a plurality of seats in the new legislature but needed the small party of ethnic Turks to form a government. Philip Dimitrov, a lawyer who had braved defending the ethnic Turks against the increasingly repressive Bulgarianisation campaign in the last months of Zhivkov's regime, was catapulted into high politics when he gained the leadership of the SDS and became prime minister in 1991. However, the leader of the Turkish party withdrew his support a year into Dimitrov's government and the former communist party headed by Zhan Videnov eventually returned to power.

While in opposition, the SDS began to strengthen and engage in serious party-building. Notably, they introduced the innovative (even for all of Europe) concept of primaries, which helped to consolidate the democratic forces.⁴³ The SDS candidate for the presidency, Petar Stoyanov, beat the incumbent in the primary and then won the presidency against the communist candidate.

After Videnov's disastrous economic performance laced with corruption and increasing repression, it was not clear if he would respect the scheduled elections. In late 1996, young activists began to stage protests in Sofia and set up a tent city in a plaza near downtown. They were also reacting to a clumsy statement months before by Boris Yeltsin that made it seem that the Bulgarian leadership was negotiating to enter the Commonwealth of Independent States. On 11 January 1997, in a scene reminiscent of the fateful events in Prague on 17 November 1989, police with truncheons moved in and began to beat up students. Dimitrov, who

had been there inspiring the Orange youth, was struck down by security forces who had recognized him and had to be hospitalised.⁴⁴ Instead of intimidating the students, this action created social outrage and led the students' parents and others to join the street protests. With little further resistance, Videnov stepped down and the electoral victory of the SDS was recognized. Ivan Kostov, the finance minister in the Dimitrov government, became the new prime minister.

Slovakia was the next post-communist revolution. Like Bulgaria, it had undergone a brief spell of freedoms followed by a re-imposition of the vestiges of the old regime, which had lingered in the government and other structures and from there sabotaged the inexperienced democrats to engineer their own return to power. Vladimír Mečiar, unlike other Dubčekite who had been purged from the communist leadership after 1968, defied expectations and began to change Slovakia into a pseudo-democracy, a key factor in the 'Velvet Divorce' in early 1993.

Slovakia was ripe for a peaceful revolt, but it was the Bulgarians that apparently helped provide a catalyst. Some of the key organizers of Slovak civil society speak of an event in 1997 in Vienna organized by the Foundation for a Civil Society, when several NGOs and student activists gathered in an auditorium to hear a delegation of Bulgarian and Romanian Orange activists on their defeat of Videnov and Ion Iliescu, respectively. 'So, what are you doing here in Slovakia in this regard?' asked the Bulgarians. Apparently, there was only silence and some embarrassment. The Foundation for a Civil Society began to prepare the civil campaign OK'98, one of whose key ingredients was to mobilize youth through rock, an idea hatched by a U.S. Peace Corps volunteer named Mike Hochleutner. The Foundation hired Marek Kapusta, who went on to organize the 'Rock volieb' (Rock the Vote) campaign.⁴⁵

Slovak youth (as elsewhere in the region) had a low voter turnout (just over 20% in past Slovak elections), although they usually voted against the antisocials and in favour of liberal parties. So the key was to increase youth involvement, which was done through music and fun—as is oftentimes the case in Orange campaigns.⁴⁶ With limited resources, Kapusta and a handful of colleagues organized a series of events at festivals and concerts, spreading thousands of stickers and T-shirts, placing video ads at movie theatres (finding a loophole in Mečiar's media law, which prohibited his competitors from placing ads on 'electronic media') and getting domestic and international sports, cultural and music figures (including the American gangsta rapper Coolio) involved in what became a country-wide 'cool,' yet non-partisan, youth movement, which the regime could not bring itself to stop. In the 1998 elections,

youth participation reached an astonishing 80%, handing Mečiar a defeat, which he received with tears on national television.

The New-York-based Freedom House organized a conference in Slovakia of youth activists from the region, many of whom had left their countries for the first time. Their list of participants reads like a 'who's who' of future revolutionaries.⁴⁷ Kapusta himself went to Ukraine and Croatia, working with NGOs that, in Ukraine, eventually formed Pora (It's Time) in 2004. In Croatia, Kapusta met Slobodan Đinović, one of the founders of Otpor (Resistance) in Yugoslavia, which had been founded around the time of the Slovak breakthrough (October 1998). Kapusta travelled a dozen times to Yugoslavia to help train and motivate the Otpor leaders, including Aleksandar Marić. Otpor was largely *sui-generis*, but it did borrow some strategies from Rock volieb and other OK'98 components.⁴⁸ Otpor had built itself into a massive organisation, claiming to have between fifty to sixty thousand activists around the country. It was after building this formidable network that they used some of the branding concepts in elections as in Slovakia (where these came before or even instead of building organized networks). The only relevant external factor in building this powerful organisation was material assistance from abroad, but the 'brains' behind it were all Serbian.⁴⁹ Another distinctive feature of Otpor was their effective use of humour and parody to mock Milošević's regime.⁵⁰ Because it is difficult for antisocials to counter them, humour and mocking were perhaps the most effective weapons Otpor and other Orange groups had against Milošević and his regime until the NATO bombings (which started in March 1999) changed the political equation against him in complex ways.

Another Orange contagion into Yugoslavia came via Estonia. Mart Laar, the former prime minister and liberation figure, travelled to Belgrade at the behest of Margaret Thatcher to advise young oppositionists, mostly from the G-17 group of experts who participated in the revolution and would go on to take the financial reins of the country.⁵¹

The breakthrough came in October 2000 when the residents of Čačak, under their anti-regime mayor Velimir Ilić, organized a large caravan to Belgrade. Composed of cars and trucks plastered with Otpor stickers and carrying about 10,000 people (with many war veterans with military training), the caravan linked up with the striking miners of Kolubara and managed to storm the parliament building and overthrow the Milošević's regime after breaking several police barricades along the way.⁵²

After the breakthrough in Yugoslavia, Otpor activists together with Kapusta travelled to Ukraine, working with the Freedom of Choice Coalition – whose key leaders later formed Pora. The Serbs also travelled to

Georgia, training the activists of Kmara! (Enough!), which was perhaps the most visible example of trans-national cooperation between Orange activists in recent times (as the Georgian protesters were carrying Otpor signs still in Serbian) and which facilitated the peaceful revolution that ousted Eduard Shevardnadze following the tainted parliamentary elections of November of 2003. Perhaps more than Kmara!, the main avenue of Orange contagion into Georgia came gradually over the years through its vibrant NGO sector, much of which was built up with foreign training and support. This civil society, together with a strong free press (especially Rustavi-2 television), weak state authority (and the lack of coercion) and Georgians' strong sense of nationhood, arguably provided the main ingredients for the breakthrough.⁵³

Though the Kremlin and its sympathizers usually consider Ukraine a confused and inert geopolitical object of foreign powers (and treat it accordingly), the fact is that Ukraine has displayed an impressive drive to consolidate its sovereignty since the days of mass mobilisation against the Soviet regime in 1989-91. A bubbling civic NGO sector, a national identity (gradually spreading eastward), elections (albeit imperfect), some prosperous democratized neighbours, a semi-illegitimate-but-not-too-repressive government and a respected alternative elite made Ukraine a prime candidate for a peaceful revolution. Unlike their Russian equivalents, the bulk of Ukrainian youth activists and NGOs were committed to integration with Europe and liberal values.⁵⁴

Several of the key Orange activists from previous cases were invited by this budding civil society and congregated over a period of years in Ukraine. However, despite rhetoric by the Kremlin and conspiracy theorists, the Ukrainian Orange Revolution was mostly the result of domestic factors combined with an ever growing mass of outraged citizens, and not of plotting by 'dark forces' from abroad.⁵⁵ This however does not belittle the importance of the Orange foreigners who played a part in training their Ukrainian counterparts as well as in the operational success of the Maidan demonstrations. Several Ukrainians who had been involved in the 'Ukraine without Kuchma,' 'For Truth' and other related movements were inspired by Otpor's success in Serbia and by their web-site detailing their methods. It was crucial that Ukraine's NGO sector had experience with civic mobilisation in the elections at the turn of the century. However, those elections featured no real challenger to the Kuchma regime and there was no real chance of a breakthrough. Nonetheless, NGOs were putting together the first big election-related non-partisan projects. When the time was ripe and the Ukrainian democrats had a viable candidate, they knew what to do and how. Later, Freedom House brought some of the Otpor leaders to Ukraine, including Stanko

Lazendić and Marić.⁵⁶ The latter made headlines when he was turned away at the Ukrainian border (despite having a valid visa) when the government got wind of his activities. Both Black and Yellow Pora, which were formed in late 2003 and early 2004, as well as Znayu! (I Know!), were the main beneficiaries of the Orange foreigners' advice.⁵⁷ Their strategies and symbolism largely echoed those of Otpor and other previous efforts, though they adapted the strategy to Ukraine's specificities.⁵⁸

Though there were some Orange links to Kyrgyzstan over the years, it is difficult to find an Orange causality to the Tulip Revolution of March 2005.⁵⁹

Moldova's Orange people are a special case. If Moldova has escaped the Belarus scenario, the credit goes squarely to the creativity and tenacity of its Orange people. These are gathered in a slew of parties and NGOs, but mostly the Christian Democratic People's Party (PPCD), which is the successor to the Popular Front, the liberation vehicle in 1988-91.

The PPCD wielded the most influence in the late perestroika and early independence periods, but was unable to capture the presidency, which went to one ex-nomenklaturshchik, followed by another. The PPCD played various but minor roles in parliament during those ten years, while Moldova sunk into political and economic mismanagement. But it was forced to play a liberation role in the streets once again after the 2001 victory of the unreconstructed communist party (PCRM), whose president, Vladimir Voronin, threatened to imprison the opposition leaders (namely Iurie Roșca) and turn the country into a 'European Cuba.' This was the period of 'red' Voronin. Key in this reorientation was the 'federalisation' effort, a complex geopolitical game by Moscow to essentially crack Moldovan statehood by supporting the separatist region of Transnistria, with the active help of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). But after looking inevitable for more than two years, this project died dramatically when, following a massive November 2003 demonstration in Chișinău organized by the PPCD and its youth branch, led by Victoria Cușnir, Voronin at the last minute refused to sign the agreement, prompting a break with Putin.⁶⁰ Following that November Voronin began his 'pink' period, breaking with Moscow and openly adopting much of the PPCD's geopolitical and reform agenda. Nonetheless, the PPCD did put up a spirited challenge to the communists in the March 2005 elections, exchanging their trademark yellow for orange and openly speaking about a possible revolution if the vote was not respected. Several Orange activists from abroad came to Moldova in solidarity, including Dimitrov, Dick Morris, Kapusta, Václav Malý and Tomáš Pojar as well as various Georgians and Ukrainians. After the March 2005 elections, however, Voronin and Roșca unexpected-

edly reached an agreement to isolate the pro-Putin ‘centrists’ (gathered around the Moldova Democratî bloc) whereby the latter became vice-speaker of parliament in exchange for the votes that gave the PCRM the majority necessary to reappoint Voronin as president. It is not certain where this “Orange evolution” will lead.

Today’s Orange People

Several Orange people find the time to assist new generations of Orange activists in the countries that have yet to undergo a deep transformation, namely three—Russia, Belarus and Cuba. The remainder of this article will concentrate on the Orange activity in Russia.

In Russia, the Orange forces are congregated certainly in a multiplicity (though dwindling) of NGOs but mostly around the two main liberal parties—the Union of Right Forces (SPS) and Yabloko—as well as a couple of large socio-political movements, namely the People’s Democratic Union, led by former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov. Both democratic parties have their ancestry in the Interregional Group of USSR People’s Deputies and later the Democratic Russia Movement (DDR), intermingled with some perestroika architects.

SPS occupies the liberal-Right of Russian politics and Starovoitova was perhaps the key founder of this stream, as she helped pass the torch of the democratic forces to Yeltsin after Sakharov’s passing in late 1989. DDR never officially became a party and essentially dissolved after achieving its chief goal: ending the CPSU’s monopoly of power.⁶¹ For the next electoral contest, the 1993 Duma elections, the leadership of the liberal-Right in Russia fell to the technocrats that Yeltsin brought in to implement economic reforms, key among them being acting prime minister Yegor Gaidar. But the democratic parties suffered a defeat and Gaidar was replaced as head of government. After that, the reigns of the party were essentially taken over by the former Nizhny-Novgorod governor Boris Nemtsov, Irina Khakamada and Anatoly Chubais. Starovoitova later again stepped in alongside Yakovlev to help unify other smaller forces with Russia’s Democratic Choice, thereby forming the Union of Right Forces. Its new leader is the young former vice-governor of Perm, Nikita Belykh.

Yabloko was formed by three individuals—Grigory Yavlinsky, Yuri Boldyrev and Vladimir Lukin (thereby the convenient YABL acronym)—though only Yavlinsky continues at the helm of the party, which combines social-democratic and liberal views. As with SPS, Yabloko derives

most of its support from the large cities, especially Moscow and St. Petersburg, and is strong with the intelligentsia. Other Orange luminaries from the Soviet and Russian transition were attracted to its ranks, namely the famed investigative reporter Yuri Shchekochikhin (who in 2003 died under mysterious circumstances after suffering an acute toxic reaction) and Sergei Mitrokhin. Gorbachev in the early '90s also flirted with Yabloko, attending some of its congresses.

Neither Yabloko on the one hand nor SPS and its predecessors on the other have surpassed single digits of support in national elections, both failing to enter the current Duma after the 2003 elections.

The Ukrainian Orange Revolution greatly inspired the Russian democrats and injected some needed optimism into their ranks. Several Russian youth activists assisted their Ukrainian counterparts in the events leading up to Maidan, holding regular seminars with them in Ukraine. One such seminar near Yalta in September of 2004 united the leading youth-branch leaders of Ukraine, Russia and Moldova, where they shared strategies for the upcoming elections.⁶² Later, the Russians sent a strong contingent to Maidan during the height of the crisis, as did the Moldovan PPCD, represented there with about 700 protest-hardened youth activists that added perhaps the least-recognized contribution to the success of the Orange mobilisation in Ukraine. From the Orange Revolution awoke the short-lived hope that something similar was also possible in opposition to Putin.

Another sign of hope that appeared was the much-awaited and certainly needed gradual cooperation between SPS and Yabloko, which interestingly began with their youth branches. Perhaps because of the long history of bad blood between the respective party leaders, it was the youth-branch leaders (Julia Malysheva and Il'ya Yashin) that took the initiative for a common front which they named *Oborona* (Defence).⁶³ Its founding meeting in March of 2005 adopted *Otpor's* (and *Maidan's*) fist as its symbol and actively discussed the strategies that had made possible the breakthroughs in Ukraine, Georgia and Yugoslavia.⁶⁴ *Oborona* made international news when in April of 2005 it organized a large anti-Lukashenka protest in Minsk together with numerous Ukrainian Orange veterans. Though they were swiftly arrested, nonetheless it had been perhaps the largest such protest in Belarus in numerous years. They had chosen the anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster as a way of adding a 'catalyst' to see if the protest would spread through Belarusian society (knowing that these revolutions usually happen after such a catalyst, the last five of which were a disputed election).

Another positive development that sprang from *Oborona* was the fielding of joint candidates by Yabloko and SPS for the Moscow Duma

elections, which some hoped (and others feared) would set a trend in other Russian regions and perhaps end with a pan-federation merging of both democratic forces (which to date is elusive). The new SPS chairman, Belykh, reached out to Yabloko and seemed to distance SPS from the Kremlin.

Oborona however, like many other promising Orange ventures in Russia before it, became mired in political intrigues and Yabloko's participation dwindled with the withdrawal of its youth leader Yashin from the Oborona governing body, although SPS youth leaders downplay this schism.⁶⁵ In addition to her duties at SPS and Oborona, Malysheva was recently elected to also head the youth branch of Kasyanov's movement. Another youth group, Da (Yes), has as its mission the strengthening of democracy and civil society.⁶⁶ Led by Gaidar's daughter Maria, Da perhaps unconsciously replicates the Yugoslavian and Ukrainian youth models of having a 'good cop / bad cop' approach to challenging the regime.⁶⁷ In November, Maria and other activists placed a large banner on a bridge facing the Kremlin, reading 'Give elections back to the people, bastards!'

The Kremlin has responded by forming youth groups of its own, including 'Idushchie vmeste' (Walking together) and later 'Nashi' (Ours), which are described by their critics as mainly a subsidized collection of young careerists but also thuggish elements that may be needed later to break up Orange protests in Russia. Their sleek propaganda, showing smiling and uniformed youth and proudly displaying bombed-out cities in Chechnya, does smack of pseudo-fascism, or what their critics call 'nashism.'

In Russia, the Orange people are not as powerful and influential as in other countries that underwent successful revolutions. Several complex factors play into this reality, including: the confused geopolitical identity, the misperception that 'democrats' already had their chance in 1991, the inability to blend liberalism with nationalism and the popularity of the antisocial regime due to Putin's aggression against the despised oligarchs and Russia's strong economic growth (due mostly to past reforms, the flat tax and petro-dollars).

However, Putin's vulnerabilities also cannot be underestimated. Traditionally, leaders in the region can fall unexpectedly. The Soviet system fell not to the radical democrats alone, but when they managed to swing enough moderates in the system to their side, as they did on several key moments in 1989 to 1991.⁶⁸ This is perhaps why Putin has concentrated on repressing not so much overt oppositionists, but oligarchs, media, legislatures and other regime elements that may escape his control and ally with his open opposition. That is why some believe that his former

prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, is perhaps a more formidable figure than the traditional democratic oppositionists. Putin's vulnerability was manifest with his disproportionate and almost hysterical reaction to 'The Other Russia' conference organized in Moscow by several key Orange activists old and new, including Kasyanov and the chess master Gary Kasparov along with some illiberal figures such as Sergei Glazyev (who was beaten unconscious on his way to the conference). The conference was meant to draw attention to the shortcomings of Putin's regime a few days before he was to host the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg. A new rash of high-profile murders has again cast a shadow over the nature of Putin's regime.

The Outside World

Paradoxically, there is a widespread belief that the Orange movements are financed by shadowy forces in Washington. In reality, however, Orange people should not assume that the State Department will automatically help them. Those that know Washington intimately understand why this is. Mainly, the State Department suffers from multiple and mutually contradictory objectives, only a minor one of which is assisting democrats.

In any case, support for unknown Orange people is there, if searched for correctly. Most of it comes from four overlapping clusters: Ethnic lobbies, NGOs (and both party institutes), Congress and the media. Key individuals also play a part.

U.S. administrations are peppered with American officials from ethnic communities who lobby for the Orange movements in their ethnic homelands, as the geopolitical aspirations of these movements largely coincide with U.S. national security interests. An example of the effectiveness of this activism was when Tomáš Masaryk initially founded Czechoslovakia, not back home, but in Pittsburgh with the help of Czech and Slovak immigrants and their offspring, and later convinced President Woodrow Wilson to lend a hand.

There are a few NGOs in addition to Freedom House. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), for example, is a government-funded grant-making organisation and has both the resources and the capacity to act. But Orange people should exercise caution as some officials at NED have been known to take a hostile attitude to certain activists. Accordingly, Orange activists that are from the liberal-Right and live in a high-risk environment should instead endeavour to en-

gauge the International Republican Institute (IRI) or the Heritage Foundation directly.

The ethnic lobbies and NGOs routinely work with sympathetic members of Congress from both parties and their staffers, as well as with journalists and media outlets. In the end, the number of members of the second and fourth estates who are aware of Orange causes, albeit vocal, are quite limited.

This is where key individuals such as Bruce Jackson and Dick Morris come in. As the leading advocate promoting the expansion of NATO eastward, Jackson has gathered other powerful figures around him both in Washington as well as in European capitals. Morris, the former Clinton advisor, is increasingly involving himself with the Orange cause, advising candidates such as Viktor Yushchenko, Roşca, Orbán and Russian democrats. Their impact cannot be underestimated, as they act where institutions oftentimes fail to. The U.S. Congress was largely ignoring Moldova until Morris published an article in the widely-read *The Hill*—the first one there to have mentioned the word ‘Moldova’—exposing the State Department’s complicity with Moscow to play geopolitics with the small country.⁶⁹ The U.S.-Moldova Foundation brought Morris to the Moldovan cause and was also key in keeping Roşca out of prison and in reversing the momentum of the ‘federalisation’ project. This is one of many examples of the different clusters within Washington acting together for a specific Orange cause across the Atlantic.

Because of geographical and national realities, Orange supporters in Europe are more diffuse and less cohesive when compared to those in Washington. The first Orange stop should be the offices of the European People’s Party (EPP) in Brussels and the German and Dutch *Stiftungen* (especially the Konrad Adenauer) as well as the UK’s Westminster Foundation. The EU Parliament has numerous former Orange activists as MPs. ‘New Europe’ also has a collection of institutions and activists, mostly centred around the Prague-based People in Need Foundation and its sister organisations in Slovakia, People in Peril and the Pontis Foundation. The former Slovak dissident and foreign minister Pavol Demeš now heads the German Marshall Fund in Bratislava. Poland has IDEE (directed by Irena Lasota, a leading student activist from 1968), the Lech Wałęsa Institute, in addition to the new Freedom and Democracy Foundation. The main Baltic Orange missionary (mostly on governance issues) is Mart Laar.

Moscow, of course, represents the ‘other’ side of the foreign coin. Unlike the 1989 anti-communist revolutions, which drew inspiration from Gorbachev, the second-wave Orange people were aware that their

antisocial leaders were being openly supported by the Kremlin or at least by powerful lobbies in Moscow. While generally confused about its motivations and goals in the region, Moscow's elites have coalesced around the idea of a 'great power' (*derzhavnost'*).⁷⁰ Moscow now largely concentrates on using hydrocarbon prices and financial influence to coax political elites in other countries (including in Western Europe) to acquiesce to its political designs.

Russia's designs have more impact in the late transitions, since here the main factor that divides the Orange forces after the breakthrough is not ideology but the power and money of the oligarchs and other corrosive elements of the previous regime, with which Russia has influence. This fate famously befell the Orange coalition in Ukraine, with a timid president Yushchenko reluctant to use his powers to dismantle the Kuchma regime and instead reaching out to many of its elements. This lack of resolve towards the oligarchs likely paved the way for the return of Viktor Yanukovych.

Conclusion

The networks of individuals that assist one another in overthrowing dictatorships and pseudo-dictatorships are perhaps not the main ingredient in the cocktail of prerequisites for successful liberation breakthroughs in east-central Europe, which include other powerful elements such as the 'demonstration effect,' internal social change and outside (i.e., Western) influences, among others, whose order of importance and causality in explaining revolutionary outcomes is difficult to assert with certainty. However, these Orange networks are a crucial factor that oftentimes remains understudied by scholars. Whether these networks developed from direct contact, by example, by virtual of space (such as Western radio broadcasts) or rallying points (such as the Helsinki Final Act), they became a formidable force beginning mostly in the late 1960s, culminating in several dramatic upheavals twenty years later and continuing to overwhelm even the most brutal attempts to suppress them. Though not all successful peaceful revolutions in the region witnessed participation by these networks, most of them did.

Scholars studying the dynamics of liberation in the region cannot underestimate, as Jakeš and other antisocials did, the trans-national Orange networks.

¹ Cited in Blaine Harden, 'Czechoslovak Party Ousts Leaders, Gives Up 'Leading Role', *The Washington Post*, 25 November 1989, p. A1.

² A longer version of this article exploring more in-depth the Prague Spring's influence on Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union, will be published in a forthcoming issue of *Demokratizatsiya*.

³ A leading study outlining in detail the contextual factors that compelled each Soviet republic to break away is Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, *Nation & Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

⁴ American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994), 646-7.

⁵ Quoted in Jeremy Bransten, 'Czech Republic: Former Leaders Argue Over Meaning of 1989,' [Available Online] Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 17 November 1999 [cited May 2006]; Available from <http://www.rferl.org/specials/communism/10years/cz6.asp>

⁶ Viktor E. Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy*, 17th printing (New York: Washington Square Press Editions, 1970), 179.

⁷ Timothy Garton Ash, *The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990/99).

⁸ Alexander Dubcek, *Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubcek* (New York: Kodansha America, 1993), 145.

⁹ A Freedom House study looking at over 50 transitions concluded that non-violent resistance to authoritarian rule precedes more durable outcomes after the breakthrough. See Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, 'How Freedom Is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy' (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2005), 8.

¹⁰ Irena Lasota was a key organizer of this protest.

¹¹ Jacques Rupnik, 'Dissent in Poland, 1968-78: The End of Revisionism and the Rebirth of Civil Society,' in Rudolf L. Třkés, *Opposition in Eastern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 62-8.

¹² Interview with Jan Hájek, who recalls his father's words from 1976-77, Benešov, Czech Republic, 5 May 2006.

¹³ Conversation between Tomasz Pisula and Senator Zbigniew Romaszewski, Warsaw, 5 June 2006.

¹⁴ An exception, which perhaps is the most comprehensive account of the effect and influence of the liberation of Eastern Europe on the Soviet Union, using a wealth of archival research in nine languages, mainly (but not exclusively) through the prism of the 'demonstration effect' as well as Gorbachev's unique role, can be found in the three-part *tour de force* by Mark Kramer, 'The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union,' *Journal of Cold War Studies* (Fall 2003, Fall 2004 and Winter 2004).

¹⁵ Michnik, 158.

¹⁶ Archie Brown, 'Transnational Influences in the Transition from Communism,' *Post-Soviet Affairs* 16 (2000): 177-200.

¹⁷ I discussed these action channels earlier in Fredo Arias-King, 'Czech Mate,' *The Harvard Crimson* 27 (February 1998): 12.

¹⁸ For a discussion of their role in ending the Brezhnev Doctrine, see Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., 'The Nature of the Beast,' *The National Interest* (Spring 1993): 46-56; and Charles Gati, *The Bloc that Failed: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 76-82. See also my interview with Gennady Gerasimov, 'From Brezhnev Doctrine to Sinatra Doctrine,' *Demokratizatsiya*, 13 (2005): 292. Shakhnazarov's views on the need for de-ideologizing Soviet-East-European relations can be found in his 'Vostok—Zapad: k voprosu o deideologizatsii mezhsudarstvennykh otnoshenii,' *Kommunist*, no. 3 (1989): 67-78. For his inside role on pressing the allied regimes to reform, see Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 182. See also my interview with Yevgeny Ambartsumov, Tepoztlán, Mexico, 19 March 2006, upcoming in a future *Demokratizatsiya* issue.

¹⁹ Yakovlev declared this in a speech before the 28th CPSU Congress in July of 1990, quoted by V.I. Vorotnikov, *A bylo eto tak: Iz dnevnika chlena Politbyuro TsK kpps* (Moscow: Soviet Veteranov Knigoizdaniya, 1995), 398.

²⁰ Alexander Lukin, 'Interpretations of Soviet State and Social Structure: Perceptions of Members of the First Russian Democratic Political Groups,' 1985-1991,' *Demokratizatsiya* 3 (1995): 365-91.

²¹ Fredo Arias-King, 'Soviet Domestic Politics and Collapse of the Outer Empire, 1989,' *Demokratizatsiya* 7(1999): 278-296.

²² Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 82.

²³ *Ibid.*, 100-1.

²⁴ The interviews of Soviet leaders made by Czech TV is reviewed by Matt Frost and Jeremy Bransten, 'Czech Republic: 1968 Viewed from the Occupiers' Perspective,' [Available Online] RFE/RL, 10 August 1998, [cited May 2006]; Available from <http://www.rferl.org/features/1998/08/F.RU.980810130007.asp>

²⁵ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, pp. 82-3.

²⁶ Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 47.

²⁷ David Remnick, *Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire* (New York: Random House, 1993), 169-79.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 18-21.

²⁹ See the account of Hedrick Smith, *The New Russians* (New York: Avon Books, 1991), 83-6.

³⁰ Alexander Babyonyshev, ed., *On Sakharov* (New York: Vintage, 1981), xxii.

³¹ Andrei Sakharov, *Memoirs* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1990), 281.

³² Dubček was quoting from a letter that Sakharov wrote him right before his passing in late 1989. Alexander Dubček, commencement address at The American University, Washington, DC, 13 May 1990, published in Fredo Arias-King, ed., *Sloboda!: Czechoslovakia's Road to Freedom* (Mexico, DF: Frente de Afirmación Hispanista, 1991), 11-12. *Sloboda!* in its entirety can be found free in www.ariasking.com

³³ George Bailey, *The Making of Andrei Sakharov* (London: Allen Lane, 1989), 244.

³⁴ Conversation with Sergei Kovalev, Warsaw, 28 August 2005.

³⁵ Interview with Zbigniew Romaszewski, Warsaw, 26 June 2002.

³⁶ Interview with Tunne Kelam, now a Euro-MP, Brussels, 22 June 2005. See also Kelam, *Estonia's way to freedom* (Tallinn: AS Pinton Trükikoda, 2005), 6-7. See also Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 85, 171-73.

³⁷ Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 49.

³⁸ Vytautas Landsbergis, *Lithuania: Independent Again* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 102-3.

³⁹ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *The End of the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 57. Her book is a good history of the popular fronts throughout the USSR and she was one of the first scholars to link the fall of the Berlin Wall to the remote Caucasus. For a brief history of the Karabakh Committee, see the interview with Ara Sahakyan, 'The Politics of Independence and Transition,' *Demokratizatsiya*, 14 (2006): 171-83.

⁴⁰ Conversation with former Armenian president and leader of the Karabakh Committee during perestroika, Levon Ter Petrossian, and with former prime minister and key Karabakh Committee activist Hrant Bagratyan, Yerevan, 17 June 2005.

⁴¹ Various conversations with Iurie Roşca, Vlad Cubreacov and Constantin Robu, Chişinău, August 2004.

⁴² Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

⁴³ For a discussion of the uniqueness of the SDS, see M. Steven Fish, 'Postcommunist Subversion: Social Science and Democratization in East Europe and Eurasia,' *Slavic Review* 58 (1999): 813.

⁴⁴ Conversation with Philip Dimitrov, Elena Dimitrova and Nadezhda Mihailova, Mexico City, 22 November 2001.

⁴⁵ Presentation by Marek Kapusta at a World Movement for Democracy panel, São Paulo, Brazil, November 2000.

⁴⁶ For an excellent study tracing the main groups that led to the 1989 revolutions and how they challenged the regime through festive activities, see Padraic Kenney, *Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

⁴⁷ Conversation with James Denton, who at that time was executive director of Freedom House, Washington, DC, 11 December 2006.

⁴⁸ Presentation by Slobodan Đinović at a World Movement for Democracy panel, Durban, South Africa, 2 February 2004.

⁴⁹ I thank Marek Kapusta for pointing this out. Email from Kapusta to author, 3 September 2006.

⁵⁰ Conversation with Marek Kapusta, Banská Štiavnica, Slovakia, 8 May 2006.

⁵¹ Conversation with Mart Laar, Ixtapa, Mexico, 2 January 2003.

⁵² See Dragan Stojkovic, 'Bulldozing the Regime,' [Available Online] *Transitions Online* [cited October 2000]; Available from <http://www.tol.cz>

⁵³ These four ingredients are laid out by James Wertsch, 'Georgia as a Laboratory for Democracy,' *Demokratizatsiya*, 13 (2005): 520-2.

⁵⁴ Two thorough comparative studies of Ukrainian and Russian youth activists are Viktoriya Topalova, 'In Search of Heroes: Cultural Politics and Political Mobilization of Youth in Contemporary Russia and Ukraine,' *Demokratizatsiya*, 14 (2006): 23-41; and Taras Kuzio, 'Ukraine Is Not Russia: Comparing Youth Political Activism,' *SAIS Review* (Summer-Fall 2006): 67-83.

⁵⁵ For a thorough sociological study of the reasons of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and how they were mostly derived from local and domestic concerns, see Viktor Stepanenko, 'How Ukrainians See Their Orange Revolution,' *Demokratizatsiya*, 13 (2005): 595-618. For a discussion of the Russian tendency to allege conspiracies, see Alexander Zaslavsky, 'The Dark Forces: Popular Analogies in Russian Politics,' *Demokratizatsiya*, 9 (2001): 75-89.

⁵⁶ Interview with Ukrainian activist and leader of Znayu, Dmytro Potekhin, Moscow, 11 July 2006.

⁵⁷ For the differences between Black and Yellow Pora, see Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 73-6.

⁵⁸ For a discussion of Pora's basic strategy, see Pavol Demeš and Joerg Forbrig, 'Pora—'It's Time' for Democracy in Ukraine,' in Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul, eds., *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 85-101.

⁵⁹ See Eugene Huskey's interview with leading oppositionist-turned-foreign-minister Roza Otunbaeva, *Demokratizatsiya*, 13. See also Erica Marat, *The Tulip Revolution: One Year After* (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2006), 14.

⁶⁰ This episode is discussed in Fredo Arias-King, 'An Almost Decisive Year' (2004 Annual Survey on Moldova), [Available Online] *Transitions Online* [cited July 20006]; Available from <http://www.tol.cz>

⁶¹ Lev Ponomarev, 'The Democratic Russia Movement: Myths and Reality,' *Demokratizatsiya*, 1 (1993): 16.

⁶² This author was present at this seminar and partook in its discussions. I am grateful to Victoria Cuşnir, Galina Fomenchenko and Oleksandr Yarema for the invitation.

⁶³ A living history of Oborona can be found in its web blog and those of its main leaders. See for example <http://community.livejournal.com/ru—oborona/>, <http://j-malisheva.livejournal.com/> and <http://helios256.livejournal.com/> (16 May 2006).

⁶⁴ This author was present at that founding meeting at Yabloko's headquarters in Moscow, March 2005.

⁶⁵ Interview with Malysheva, Moscow, 7 March 2006.

⁶⁶ Talk by Maria Gaidar at the conference commemorating the 25th anniversary of the founding of Solidarność, Gdańsk, 30 August 2005. See also my interview with Gaidar, Moscow, 8 March 2006, which will be published in *Demokratizatsiya*, Fall 2006 issue.

⁶⁷ For a comprehensive discussion of the contemporary Russian youth groups, see Michael Schwartz, upcoming article in *Demokratizatsiya*, Fall 2006 issue.

⁶⁸ Gordon Hahn, *Russia's Revolution from Above: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime* (New Brunswick, CN and London: Transaction Publishers, 2002). A study that reflects a similar logic in explaining the breakthrough in Poland is Marjorie Castle, *Triggering Communism's Collapse: Perceptions and Power in Poland's Transition* (Lanham, MD and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).

⁶⁹ Dick Morris, 'East Europe's orange dawn,' [Available Online] *The Hill* [cited July 2005]; Available from <http://thehill.com/thehill/export/TheHill/Comment/Dick-Morris/021605.html>

⁷⁰ Several classic essays have been written about this imperial proclivity and its possible origins. See for example Victor Yasmann, 'Red Religion: An Ideology of Neo-Messianic Russian Fundamentalism,' *Demokratizatsiya*, 1 (1992): 20-40; John Dunlop, 'Alexander Dugin's Foundation of Geopolitics,' *Demokratizatsiya*, 12 (2004): 41-58; Grigory Yavlinsky, 'Putin Represents an Imperial Course for Russia,' *Demokratizatsiya*, 12 (2004): 9-12; and J. Michael Waller, 'Death and Resurrection of the KGB,' *Demokratizatsiya*, 12 (2004): 333-56.

Democratising Elections in the Post-Communist World: Definitions, Dynamics and Diffusion

VALERIE J. BUNCE AND SHARON L. WOLCHIK

From 1996 to 2005, eight national elections took place in post-communist Europe and Eurasia that replaced illiberal political incumbents with leaders of the democratic opposition. This wave of democratic change began in Romania and Bulgaria in 1996 and 1997, respectively and then moved to Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.¹ While these watershed elections did not in every case usher in a full-scale democratic order, they did contribute to an overall improvement in the post-communist region's democratic performance – as highlighted, for example, in a recent report by the National Endowment for Democracy, evaluating the spread of democracy around the world and growing threats to international democracy assistance.²

Were these eight cases of governmental turnover electoral revolutions, as they have often been characterised, or is this terminology misleading with respect to both the processes involved and their political consequences? Why were liberal oppositions in these eight cases – but not in others in the region – so successful in winning political power? What explains the geographical spread of these electoral breakthroughs? For example, was it simply a matter of similar local conditions giving rise to similar political results or were there international and transnational influences at work? Finally, why has this wave of democratic change through elections come to an end – a conclusion that seems to follow – given the recent re-election of authoritarians and/or their parliamentary allies in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in 2005 and Belarus in 2006?

The purpose of this article is to provide some answers to these questions. The analysis that follows is drawn from a research project we have carried out over the past year and one-half that analyses the origins, dynamics and consequences of these eight pivotal elections and that compares these watershed elections with failed attempts by liberal oppositions elsewhere in the post-communist region to defeat authoritarians at the polls.³ Our evidence is drawn from a range of sources including comparative studies of democratisation, elections and democracy promotion in this region and elsewhere; studies of specific regimes, oppositions, elections and civil societies; and more than one hundred interviews with

V. Bunce & Sharon Wolchik, 'Democratising Elections in the Post Communist World: Definitions, Dynamics and Diffusion'
STAIR 2, No 2,:(2007):64-78.

the American democracy promotion community and domestic participants in the pivotal elections that took place since 1996 in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.

Democratising Elections

What do these eight electoral episodes have in common and what do their similarities suggest about the dynamics involved and their political import? At first glance, one is struck by the many differences among the elections of interest in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan from 1996 to 2005. The varying regimes types provide one source of those differences. For example, while the 1997 Bulgarian elections took place in a largely democratic polity, the Serbian elections in 2000 occurred in an authoritarian regime – indeed, in one that had become more repressive over time. Yet another variation among our eight cases is in the type of election. While the watershed elections in Romania, Serbia and the Ukraine were for the presidency (in these mixed presidential-parliamentary systems), the pivotal elections in both Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and Georgia in 2003 (which were also mixed systems) were for the parliament – though they led in both cases to the rapid departure of sitting presidents (Akayev and Shevardnadze, respectively). Finally, there is a sharp contrast in how political power was transferred. Thus, in the first four elections in the wave (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Croatia) the change in government took place immediately following the official announcement of the election results. However, in the four elections that followed in Serbia, Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan mass protests challenging the official results were instrumental in forcing authoritarian candidates (and even presidents not up for re-election, as in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan) to grant their offices to the opposition.

These and other differences aside, however, there are nonetheless good reasons to treat these eight electoral episodes as a common political phenomenon – what we prefer to term ‘democratising elections’ rather than, as is more common and in our view somewhat misleading, ‘electoral or coloured revolutions’.⁴ In the process of distinguishing their common aspects, we gain insights into the dynamics involved as well as their political importance.

We can begin by noting that all of these elections took place in regimes where the liberal opposition had long faced considerable difficulties in winning political power – either because authoritarian leaders had been able to use formal and informal methods to limit competition and thereby

extend their incumbency from one election to the next (as with the competitive authoritarian regimes in Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan) or because incumbents in largely democratic polities had been extremely successful in demobilising supporters of the liberal opposition while dividing, co-opting, marginalising and often harassing the liberal opposition (as in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia).⁵ Despite the differences among these regimes, therefore, they all featured important limits on the ability of democratic oppositions to compete effectively for political power.

Second, all eight elections had the same result: defeat of authoritarian politicians (whether they were incumbents, designated successors or parliamentary allies of the incumbents). While this observation is obvious, it carries some subtle and important implications that build upon the first point about the considerable constraints on political competition in these eight national contexts. One is that in comparison with elections that failed to defeat authoritarians these eight electoral episodes were distinctive not just in their results, but also in their combination of unprecedented optimism among opposition leaders and citizens about the potential for political change with detailed planning about how to win power and the hard political work that necessarily accompanies the translation of subversive political plans into concrete political results.

It could be argued that these elections were not hard-won so much as predetermined – for example, by disastrous economic performance, widespread corruption at the elite level or actions of the leadership that finally exceeded the limits of a hitherto tolerant population and by a default dynamic, in which increasingly vulnerable incumbents or their anointed successors ‘dropped’ power into the hands of the opposition forces. Moreover, the very fact of holding elections, even in relatively authoritarian regimes, exposes incumbent governments to the possibility of losing power – whether authoritarians are prepared for that option or not.⁶ Finally, elections are widely recognised as ideal mechanisms for introducing democratic political change. They are closely associated in the public mind with democracy in general and political participation, regime evaluation and accountability in particular; they take place within fixed periods of time and thereby target efficiently the interests, values and energies of both voters and opposition leaders; and they have visible political results, which can play a vital role in the mobilisation of voters and political protesters. From this vantage point, therefore, it is hardly surprising that elections, as schools for democracy, would and could function as powerful instruments of democratisation in political contexts where the quality of democracy was compromised.

However, these considerations should not blind us to some important reasons as to why these elections were in fact singular political developments that succeeded due to the concerted efforts of oppositions and citizens in surmounting obstacles to democratic change. First, the economic and political context of these eight elections varied significantly – for example, with respect to economic pressure, popular support of the government, the size of the opposition, its historical performance and levels of political repression. Earlier elections, featuring similar profiles, had not led to the victory of the opposition. Second, if these elections were a foregone conclusion, then why were they so close – despite, for example, the singularly hard work of the opposition during the campaign? Third, whether from a regional or a global perspective, these kinds of elections do not usually occur in regimes dominated by authoritarian leaders. They are the exception, not the rule.⁷

They are exceptional, because of one over-arching problem: the failure of the liberal opposition to compete effectively for political power – given internal problems, public apathy, at times hostility to the opposition and the resourcefulness of authoritarian governments committed to bending the rules and using the media and even thugs to stay in power. Thus, in order to replace dictators with democrats, these elections had to transform an habitually divided, often compromised and invariably urban opposition into an effective nationwide political force; expose the weaknesses of the incumbent government; convince young people to register and to vote (as with the OK98 campaign in Slovakia, Otpor in Serbia, Kmara in Georgia and Pora in the Ukraine); persuade alienated citizens to go to the polls, support the democratic opposition (and not stay home or vote for the incumbents or their various collaborating parties) and thus play an active role in removing authoritarian leaders from power. The opposition and political activists had to persuade citizens to take personal risks – for example, by taking to the streets in Serbia, Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan and demanding a transfer of political power from authoritarians to democrats.

What all eight elections featured, therefore, was not ‘politics as usual,’ but rather, a deliberate and demanding strategy of winning power through what we term the electoral model. This model was based upon four key actions. First, the creation of a unified opposition; second, improvements in the quality and transparency of electoral procedures (to ward off, for example, biases in candidate selection, construction of voter rolls and vote tabulation); third, spirited campaigns that highlighted the costs of continuing the regime and bringing opposition leaders in direct contact with both new voters as well as citizens outside the capital and major cities; finally, increases in both voter registration and turnout. Additionally, depending

upon the regime context, the opposition and their allies also exploited media openings and institutional loopholes (such as the law in Serbia requiring a posting of election results outside each precinct or the role of a relatively independent Supreme Court in the Ukraine in calling for new elections). They also made use of exit polls, parallel vote tabulation and both internal and external election-monitoring; and where 'stolen elections' were a distinct possibility, established contacts with security forces during the elections and prepared for the possibility of mass protests as a way to force authoritarians to accept defeat and transfer political power.

This leads to the final similarity among our eight elections and one which, once more, highlights their characteristics and political importance. All of these elections led to significant changes in governments, their governing ideologies and represented constituencies. Thus, they all invested in democratic governance, albeit in different ways and to different degrees, as one might expect given variations in political contexts. Thus, some of these elections contributed to the consolidation of democracy and to significant progress in economic reforms, with the latter investing in the former as in Bulgaria and Romania. In Slovakia, the elections ended a dangerous interlude of 'de-democratisation.' The hybrid regimes in Georgia, the Ukraine and, more difficult to gauge, Kyrgyzstan – all long perched between dictatorship and democracy – moved towards democracy. In Croatia and Serbia these elections were responsible for an actual change in regimes and not just governments.⁸ While there were no guarantees that these electoral turning points would translate into the creation of full scale democratic orders – especially in the short-term and in contexts where former regimes had been more autocratic, corrupt and long ensconced and where external actors, such as the European Union, were unavailable to extend incentives for democratic deepening – all eight elections nonetheless put into place a necessary condition for democratic development: replacement of authoritarian with more democratic leaders. Thus, all of these elections shared the critical consequence of producing a democratic opening.⁹

Precisely because they provided such an opening, these elections, when taken as a group, can be characterised as having produced a second round of democratisation in post-communist Europe and Eurasia – the first round having taken place between 1989 and 1992, when communist regimes and states unravelled and new and subsequently durable democracies arose in the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia.¹⁰ Indeed, Freedom House figures document that the one event common to improvements since the early 1990s in democratic performance in the post-communist region is an election that brings the liberal opposition to power – whether that election took place early or, as in the cases of interest in this article, later in the transition period.¹¹

Our discussion of the commonalities among our eight democratising elections and their success in overcoming sizeable obstacles to democratisation through elections, particularly in more repressive political contexts, introduces an important puzzle. Why did the post-communist region witness eight such elections since 1996 – a rate of democratic change through watershed elections that has no equivalent in any other part of the world?¹² Our answer to this question can be simply put: the post-communist region, with some states and some elections far more endowed than others, featured a remarkable set of conducive conditions for electoral breakthroughs by the democratic opposition. Let us turn, first, to a two-way comparison that highlights some differences between earlier elections in our eight cases and the breakthrough elections on the one hand and between our eight successful electoral episodes and other elections in the region where democratic oppositions also tried hard to contest power, but failed in their quest, on the other. The first factor that emerges as critical from this comparison is the long-term expansion of civil society, in part because of the long-term and sizeable investment of the United States through its democracy assistance programs. Here, it is striking to note that members of these organisations played a key role in criticising the regime, in encouraging the participation of publics and in carrying out some of the tasks of the electoral model – for example, recruiting political candidates, registering new voters, getting out the vote and using the campaign to criticise the regime and raise popular expectations about the prospects for political change. Moreover, all the sites of the successful democratising elections had far stronger civil societies than we find in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.¹³

Also important in many cases were some medium term developments that enhanced the potential effectiveness of the electoral model of regime change, albeit in different ways in different countries. Thus, in most cases we see declining regime control over the media, the development of a more united and optimistic opposition with expanded generational and geographical reach, and deployment of public opinion polls that identified both issues of public concern and constituencies in support of liberal political change. In addition, oppositions were more ready to implement the electoral model as a result of their participation in both local elections and political protests. These experiences in challenging the government's political domination helped bring oppositions together in a common cause, identify effective issues and candidates and 'practice' useful electoral techniques, such as serious campaigning,

expanded voter registration and the use of both internal and external electoral monitors. Yet another factor was the demonstrated ability of the opposition to convince the public that the regime did not serve their interest; that it was vulnerable; that the opposition would serve citizens better; and that the opposition could in fact not just win elections, but also take power.

Let us provide a few examples of these important influences – while recognising that their role varied from case to case. Thus, in Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and the Ukraine the opposition had succeeded in winning some key local elections prior to the ‘big’ election that ended the rule of the Croatian Democratic Union, ousted Milosevic, Shevardnadze and his allies and the Kuchma/Yanukovitch group, respectively. In Slovakia, Georgia, the Ukraine and most importantly Serbia younger people were organised into popular movements prior to the key election or played pivotal roles in getting out the vote. Otpor in Serbia, for example, originated in 1999 when students organised themselves in opposition to educational reforms that threatened to end the autonomy of Serbian universities. Otpor played a critical role – not just in exposing the weakness of the regime and in reaching out to very young people throughout the country, but also in pressing the opposition to work together, to commit itself to regime change and to focus its efforts on identifying a single leader who could win. It was also Otpor that mobilised important supporters for the cause of ending the Milosevic era, such as the Serbian Orthodox Church, which had beforehand been a clear supporter of the Milosevic regime since it formed in the second half of the 1980s (though the Georgian Orthodox Church did not make the same switch prior to the electoral revolution in 2003). In Slovakia, young people played a key role in the ‘marches’ across Slovakia which the opposition used to get their message to voters while faced with the manipulation of the media through Meciar. They also worked with the ‘Rock the Vote’ campaign that, together with other actions of the OK98 Campaign, resulted in an 80 percent turnout rate of first time voters, a key element of the opposition’s support.

There is a final factor that had an impact on success: full implementation of the electoral model, as described earlier. We see in all of our successful electoral episodes (but less so in Kyrgyzstan and in none of the failed cases) the creation of an opposition that was much more unified than in the past, often with close ties to the non-governmental (NGO) sector; significant voter registration and mobilisation drives; pressure on regimes to improve the quality of voter lists; pressure on central election commissions to be more representative in their membership, to tighten up their procedures, to change their voting procedures with respect to

the certification of election results and to carry out their tasks in a more transparent fashion; wider distribution of campaign materials that advertised the cost of the incumbent regime and encouraged voters to treat their ballots as critical; and campaigns conducted by opposition groups that were far more ambitious than their predecessors or those of incumbent politicians and parties.

With respect to the final point: it is particularly striking how little effort Milosevic put into campaigning and, at the same time, how successful Dzurinda, Saakashvili and Yushchenko – and to a lesser extent Kostunica – were in carrying their campaigns to every nook and cranny of their countries. In addition, the elections included sophisticated ‘get-out-the-vote’ campaigns prior to and on election day, in combination with a rapid tabulation of votes, often advertised repeatedly during election day through press conferences et al., a factor which was critical in Serbia in particular and especially so in getting out voters during the last two hours of the election. Finally, the democratising elections included internal and in some cases, external election monitoring as well as extensive use, in most cases, of exit polls and especially parallel vote tabulation. All of these mechanisms provided a comparative standard against which ‘official’ results could be contrasted.

The success of all these efforts rested upon the ability of the opposition to surmount two long-standing obstacles. First, they had to convince their colleagues within the opposition that they should remain in the opposition, participate in the elections and collaborate closely with one another. In the Serbian case, for example, the struggles against Milosevic prior to 2000 had often involved serious disputes within the opposition (with respect to individuals, strategies and sometimes even policies) and decisions of some opposition leaders either to boycott the elections or to collaborate with the regime. In Slovakia, the parties that ousted Meciar as Prime Minister in March 1994 and formed a coalition that governed the country for several months, failed to cooperate in the September-October 1994 elections and were defeated by Meciar. By 1998, the opposition had learned their lesson.

Second, the opposition had to convince the public that their votes would count, that the regime had crossed an unacceptable threshold with respect to corruption and violation of the rules of politics, that the opposition deserved their support and could actually win and that the ‘alternative’ tabulation of the vote (as in Serbia, Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan) was more accurate than the official one. Here, it is important to note that in Serbia studies documented that a majority of non-voters in elections prior to 2000 were opposed to Milosevic. Similarly, public opinion surveys in Slovakia made it clear that first time voters, who did

not generally vote, would vote for the opposition coalition. Therefore, transforming the non-voters into voters – or the alienated citizens into activists – was critical.

In Serbia, Georgia and the Ukraine in particular, there was an additional burden on the opposition. They had to prepare for public protests in the event that the regime lost, but refused to vacate office. This preparation built upon popular mobilisation and protest techniques used in the past. It also capitalised on contacts already established outside the capitals and large cities through the campaign and through the work of civil society organisations, which were numerous and had a history of cooperation and self-organisation. Civil society groups were particularly well developed in Slovakia, but they were also important in Serbia and Georgia where several of the founders and leading activists of Otpor and Kmara had been involved in student politics in earlier years. Similarly, in the Ukraine, organisations devoted to civic education and the protection of citizens' rights had developed associations through previous activities that proved important in 2004.

However, the success of such protests also depended upon another development: conversations during the campaign between opposition groupings and security forces that reminded the latter that they had also paid dearly for the actions of the regime. What is striking about the protests that followed the attempts by the regimes to rig elections in Serbia, Georgia and the Ukraine is the fact that the security forces, even when pressed by the regime to act against protesters, stood by while thousands of people took to the streets – indeed, hundreds of thousands in the cases of Serbia and the Ukraine in particular. Indeed, the sheer number of protesters in Serbia and the Ukraine as well as Georgia and their success in capturing the centre of the capitals would have made it extremely hard for security forces to carry out repression – even if they had wanted to do so.

Does this list of factors encouraging successful electoral challenges to the rule of authoritarians mean that there is a ready formula for success or that success itself can be reduced to the degree to which the political context was flexible enough to create the loopholes necessary for empowerment of the liberal opposition? We reject both interpretations for several reasons. One is that the successful cases varied in the relative importance of the factors discussed above. While the election organisation, CeSID and the youth movement, Otpor, for example, were critical voices in Serbia, the disintegration of the Shevardnadze coalition and the pluralist media were decisive in Georgia. Another counter argument maintains that the political context in both Serbia and the Ukraine was repressive. The relatively liberal politics of Romania, Bulgaria and Slo-

vakia did not produce democratising elections before 1996, 1997 and 1998, respectively. Finally and perhaps most importantly: the key issue in all these cases was the willingness of members of the opposition to collaborate with one another and to carry out the often arduous tasks of implementing the electoral model. Moreover, the decision to work together existed independently of what regimes in power said or did.

International Diffusion

Thus far, we have treated our democratising elections as separate cases, with their ability to defeat dictators at the polls as a function of specific factors revealed through a comparison among countries and over time. However, to understand the wave of such elections, we need to take the term 'wave' seriously. Thus, it makes sense to view the distinctive success of such electoral efforts in the post-communist region as a reflection of the cross-national diffusion of political change. Indeed, there is growing evidence not just of international factors being critical for democratisation, but also of democracy spreading within regions.¹⁴

There are many reasons to argue that diffusion dynamics played a critical role in these democratising elections in the post-communist region. In particular, we can note at the outset that the electoral model applied in the post-communist area was itself the product of international diffusion – in several ways. Thus, discussions within the American democracy promotion community, focusing on the question of how to rid Slovakia of Meciar and Serbia of Milosevic, brought up the examples of the Chilean referendum in 1988 – where a pro forma vote was turned into a spirited challenge to the Pinochet regime – and both the work of Solidarity in Poland in the early 1980s and the critical Polish election in June 1989, when Solidarity, to everyone's surprise, took full advantage of a semi-competitive election and eventually formed a government in August of the same year. Indeed, some of the Americans who worked on the Chilean campaign participated in the Serbian case twelve years later and brought their experiences with elections as instruments of democratisation with them. At the same time, the electoral model was a product of intra-regional developments and their interaction with one another; that is, the eighty-eight day protests in Serbia following the local elections of 1996, the Romanian elections of 1996 and the Bulgarian protests of 1997 (influenced by Serbian developments) that eventually led to the pivotal elections in Slovakia in 1998 and in Croatia and Serbia in 2000. What we are suggesting, therefore, is that these cases all influenced one

another. The electoral model, which was first fully articulated and implemented in the post-communist region in the Slovak elections of 1998, was influenced by the Romanian and Bulgarian experiences in 1996 and 1997. Indeed, several key activists in the Bulgarian and Romanian elections participated in a meeting with the Slovak opposition and American democracy promoters that led to the design of the OK98 campaign.¹⁵

If the development of the model of democratising elections was strongly influenced by both developments in the post-communist region and the Chilean precedent, the model itself – as it emerged in Slovakia in 1998 – then diffused to other sites within the region. How did this happen? It would be easy to reduce the cross-national movement of the model of democratising elections to demonstration effects; that is to a recalculation on the part of both oppositions and citizens about their prospects for democratic change through elections as a result of positive precedents in their regional neighbourhood. There is little doubt that this happened – and for many of the same reasons that protests spread throughout Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. This is a region, after all, which shares a common political and economic past; which was once integrated into both a common political-economic and a security system during the Cold War (though Albania and Yugoslavia were outside these formations); and which featured, as a result, significant similarities in political and economic structures, issues on the agenda after the end of communist rule and the like.

However, it is also important to recognise that the process of transfer in the case of democratising elections was active, not just passive; network based and not just a matter of structural similarities; and a process involving the deliberate transplantation of strategies and models. Just as there is strong evidence, for example, of growing cross-national collaboration among national dissident communities in the region prior to the protests of 1989, so there is equally strong evidence of active collaboration among opposition groups in the region starting in the second half of the 1990s and incorporating in their spreading cross-national networks American and other international democracy promoters. This collaboration in turn allowed for a sharing of political strategies, including the mechanics involved in implementing the electoral model.

Central to this process, it is important to recognise, was a key attitudinal component. As in 1989, so a decade later with the democratising elections, there was a strong belief among 'graduates' of the successful democratising elections that it was in their interest and in accordance with their values to help neighbouring liberal oppositions defeat dictators. At the same time, it is striking how prevalent the assumption was that strategies used in one country successfully were necessarily relevant

to other countries in the postcommunist region. Of course, part of this process occurred because liberal oppositions wanted power and because regional democracy exporters believed that a more democratic neighbourhood necessarily would invest in their democratic experiment. However, at the same time, it is critical to recognise that the spread of these democratising elections reflected hard work and the active collaboration of transnational democracy promotion networks. Thus, just as graduates of the 1998 Slovak election assisted the Serbian and Croatian oppositions in their 2000 elections, so Serbs and Slovaks assisted the Georgian opposition and Georgians then joined the network, which also included activists from Poland and other post-communist countries once the process moved to the Ukraine. Moreover, these networks built upon a rich tradition of protest networks and repertoires that date back to the 1980s and even earlier. To provide one example: Otpor made considerable use of street theatre, as did Polish dissidents in the 1980s, the Baltic opposition at the end of the decade and the Ukrainian opposition soon thereafter.¹⁶

Central to this complex diffusion dynamic are three assumptions made by opposition forces in this region in particular. The first is the widespread recognition that circumstances are similar among states in the area; the second is empirical evidence (dating back to 1989/1990) that democracy can arise, even in seemingly inhospitable circumstances and certainly in countries that were once communist; the third is that opposition movements forging a political breakthrough have the responsibility to help others do the same. Communism may have failed at many of its tasks, but it did succeed in creating a regional definition of comradeship.

Diffusion and its End

Let us close this paper by briefly addressing a final issue that many studies of diffusion ignore. Why has the spread of democratising elections seemingly come to an end? In our view, there are two related factors at work, both of which are built into the diffusion dynamic itself. One is that diffusion processes, especially when they involve a subversive product, such as challenging the power structure, tend to move from optimal to suboptimal contexts. Diffusion, as a result, tends to produce variable results and eventually comes to an end. Thus, it is not surprising that the later the elections were in the wave, the less they were planned and the more they substituted demonstration effects – the appeals of attractive

precedents, especially for groups out of power – for supportive local conditions or arduous and detailed preparations for political change. Thus, it is not surprising that the later the democratising election, the less it led, especially in the short-term, to stable or fully articulated democratic systems.

The other reason for there having been a lull in democratising elections is that incumbent authoritarians, like liberal oppositions, have been able to learn from their neighbours. In their case, the key insight is that they have been forewarned and forearmed and they have even begun to organise themselves against the electoral virus – what Vitali Silitski has termed the formation of an ‘authoritarian internationale,’ which includes leaders from Russia, China, Kazakhstan and Venezuela.¹⁷ Since these leaders operate in relatively authoritarian contexts and thus have considerable resources at their disposal to secure their powers and since they face a liberal opposition less willing and able to implement the electoral model than the oppositions in Serbia, Georgia or the Ukraine, authoritarian incumbents are in a good position to stop democratising elections – by weakening civil society, harassing the opposition, controlling electoral procedures and outlawing or limiting the activities of both local and international NGOs.

Only time will tell if they succeed in countering democratisation through elections. However, it is important to remember that this model has been around for twenty years and its power rests not just upon the effectiveness of the electoral model as an instrument of democratic change, but also on the global norm, even for authoritarian regimes, of holding regular elections and giving at least the appearance of both political accountability and some competition for political power.

Notes

¹ Michael McFaul has drawn some insightful conclusions about coloured revolutions in the post-Communist region. See ‘Transitions from Post-Communism,’ *Journal of Democracy* 16, July (2005): 5-19. Our study, however, adds a number of new cases to the analysis – by offering a different definition of these ‘revolutions,’ by bringing in more recent examples and by introducing some controls into the analysis through the addition of some failed attempts to defeat dictators at the polls. In addition, we do not see these revolutions as discrete events, but, rather, as participants in a diffusion dynamic. Finally, we diverge from McFaul by arguing that there is no single path to successful electoral defeat of authoritarians. Instead, while there are some key similarities among the successful cases, each case nonetheless features some distinctive elements. For example, an unusually large and effective youth movement or an unusually attractive opposition candidate can compensate for the constraints imposed by unusually repres-

sive authoritarian regimes. Indeed, this is precisely why these pivotal elections have taken place in such a range of regime contexts.

² 'The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance', A Report prepared by the National Endowment for Democracy for Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, June 8, 2006.

³ For comparative purposes, we have also analysed a group of elections where the liberal opposition mounted significant electoral challenges to authoritarian rule and where protests broke out in response to a declaration of victory on the part of incumbent authoritarians, but where these challenges failed nonetheless to lead to electoral change. These 'failed' cases include Armenia, 2003-2004; Belarus, 2006; and Azerbaijan, 2005.

⁴ Although we have ourselves used it in previous writings, we have chosen not to use the more familiar phrase, electoral or coloured revolutions, because the term 'revolution' leaves some mistaken impressions—that the processes of political change were violent and that the result was the creation of new states, regimes and social orders. Instead, what defined these events was that change—often significant and always in a democratic direction—occurred through elections, with democratic means used in effect to achieve democracy-serving results. Once we privilege elections as the agent of change, moreover, we expand our universe of cases to include not just Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan between 2000 and 2005, which involved street demonstrations and protests after attempts by incumbents to steal the elections or their failure to leave office, but also the earlier cases of electoral change in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Croatia, where the opposition did not need to use these tactics. Moreover, there is strong evidence that all of these cases relied on the same model of defeating authoritarians and that they influenced one another.

⁵ See, especially, Larry Diamond, 'Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,' *Journal of Democracy* 13, April (2002): 21-35. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,' *Journal of Democracy* 13, April (2002): 51-65. On the dilemmas posed by electoral authoritarianism for both incumbents and oppositions, see Andreas Schedler, ed., *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006).

⁶ See, especially, Andreas Schedler, ed., *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006).

⁷ Competitive authoritarian regimes, for example, are both common and relatively durable. See Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era* (Unpublished book manuscript, 2006). Diamond, 'Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.' Marc Howard and Philip Roessler, 'Liberalising Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,' *American Journal of Political Science* 50, April (2006): 365-381.

⁸ On the political consequences of these elections, see, for example, L. Kurekova, 'Electoral Revolutions and their Socio-Economic Impact: Bulgaria and Slovakia in Comparative Perspective' (Master Thesis, Central European University, Budapest, 2006). Venelin Ganev, *Preying on the State: State Transformation in Postcommunist Bulgaria (1989-1997)* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming, 2007). Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, 'Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions,' *Journal of Democracy* 17, October (2006): 7-18. On elections as a democratising force, see Staffan I. Lindberg,

'The Surprising Significance of African Elections,' *Journal of Democracy* 17, January (2006): 139-151.

⁹ See Milada Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration After Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) for an analysis of the EU's impact.

¹⁰ For two similar explanations of variations of political trajectories immediately after the fall of both communism and communist states, see Valerie Bunce, 'The Political Economy of Postsocialism,' *Slavic Review* 58, Winter (1999): 756-793. Michael McFaul, 'The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World,' *World Politics* 54, January (2002): 212-244.

¹¹ M. Steven Fish, 'Democratisation's Prerequisites,' *Post-Soviet Affairs* 14, July-September (1998): 212-247. Valerie Bunce, 'Sequencing Political and Economic Reforms,' in *East-Central European Economies in Transition*, eds. John Hardt and Richard Kaufman (Washington, DC: Joint Economic Committee, 1994), 46-63.

¹² Evidence on this point is presented in Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, 'Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions,' *Journal of Democracy* 17, October (2006): 7-18.

¹³ See USAID, *The 2005 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2006).

¹⁴ See, in particular, Laurence Whitehead, ed., *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge, 'Diffusion is no Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy,' *Comparative Political Studies* 39, September (2005): 1-23.

¹⁵ See, for example, Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, 'A Regional Tradition: Popular Mobilization Against Dictators under Communism and Postcommunism,' and 'Defining and Domesticating the Electoral Model: A Comparison of Slovakia and Serbia,' papers presented at the Conference on 'Waves and Troughs of Postcommunist Democratization,' Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, Stanford University, April 28-30, 2006. In addition, see Bunce and Wolchik, 'International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,' *Communist and Postcommunist Studies* 39, September (2006): 283-304. An important part of the diffusion story, however, is the role of the United States and its unusual commitment, by comparative standards, to both civil society and electoral assistance in the post-Communist world. See, for example, Steven E. Finkel et al., 'Final Report: Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy-Building: Results of a Cross-national Study,' Version no. 34, U.S. Agency for International Development, January 12, 2006.

¹⁶ Archie Brown, 'Transnational Influences in the Transition from Communism,' *Post-Soviet Affairs* 16 (2000). Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

¹⁷ Vitali Silitski, 'Another Contagion: Preemptive Authoritarianism in the Former Soviet Union following the Coloured Revolution,' paper presented at the conference on 'Waves and troughs of Post-Communist Transitions: What Role for External versus Domestic Variables?', Center on Democracy, Development and the rule of Law, Stanford University, April 28-29, 2006.

The Regional Organisation as an Agent of Democratisation? The African Experience

79

HÉLÈNE GANDOIS

Can the African regionalist experience shed any new light on the topic of democracy promotion by foreign powers? Most people do not spontaneously associate 'democracy' and 'Africa', and this is indeed partially justified by the classification by Freedom House of eighteen African countries out of fifty-three as 'not free.' Nevertheless, the wave of democratisation in the 1990s significantly changed the landscape and the analysis of African politics and international relations. The 1990s witnessed an epochal change characterized by the fading experience of colonialism in Africa, thus allowing a greater focus on internal peace. This reality has to be put in perspective with, and linked to, the rise of regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the African Union (AU).¹ These three institutions have promulgated democratic norms and taken on challenging roles such as peacekeeping operations, democratic consolidation, and democracy promotion.

Considering the African experience, what role can regional organisations play in order to promote democracy? Democracy is understood here to include competitive elections, broad adult suffrage, protection of minority rights and respect for civil liberties.² Regional organisations are understood as international organisations whose membership is limited by geography.³ In attempting to answer the broad enquiry above, the first set of questions is: Do regional organisations have a role to play in democracy promotion? Indeed, is the regional organisation a legitimate agent of democratisation? This raises the question of the norm of sovereignty – as non-interference – that can clash with the promotion of democracy from abroad. The second set of questions is more practical: How can a regional organisation promote democracy? Are they efficient? In order to address these questions, I present case studies that focus on three African regional organisations with significant experience in peacekeeping, leading to elections and the restoration of democracy. A closer look at the experience on the ground should lead us to re-evaluate the agenda of democracy promotion versus sovereignty and national interest.

Hélène Gandois, 'The Regional Organization as an Agent of Democratization? the African Experience' *STAIR* 2, No 2, (2007):79-96.

Reconciling Democratisation from Abroad and Sovereignty

How legitimate are regional organisations as agents of democratisation? How can one resolve the clash between the two norms of sovereignty – understood as non-interference in the domestic affairs of a state – and the emerging norm of democracy? This paper argues that it is possible to reconcile the two because the meaning of sovereignty has changed both globally and regionally. With its origins as Westphalian sovereignty, the norm was transformed into sovereignty as the state's 'responsibility to protect' citizens beyond its borders (whether internationally or regionally). It is this mutation that allows us to outline a possible reconciliation between sovereignty and promotion of democracy.

Sovereignty from Westphalia to Responsibility to Protect (1648 – 2005)

The principle of sovereignty has its origins in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which marked a time in history when interference in the affairs of another state was the greatest threat to international peace and security. This new principle of international relations was later formalized by Vattel as follows: 'Every nation that governs itself, under what form soever, without dependence on any foreign power, is a Sovereign State.'⁴ The phrase 'under what form soever' clearly indicates that the nature of the government, be it democratic or autocratic, is of no concern to outside actors. The definition of sovereignty as non-interference arose from this seminal moment. The closely intertwined concepts of sovereignty and non-interference are indeed the two sides of the same coin. However, sovereignty cannot be limited by this definition. Westphalian (or external) sovereignty stresses non-interference from outside actors but also implies a certain amount of domestic or internal sovereignty.⁵ External sovereignty implies the recognition by its peers that a state is a juridically independent territorial entity – this has also been called juridical sovereignty.⁶ Due to its status as a sovereign state, it has the right to freely decide which agreements or treaties into which it will enter. Other states refrain from intervening in its internal affairs. Thus, each state has the right to determine its own political system and authority structures. Internal sovereignty, more than a norm, is a premise to external sovereignty. It 'is rather a description of the nature of domestic authority structures and the extent to which they are able to control ac-



tivities within a state's boundaries.⁷ Internal sovereignty is control over a given territory and population, although the exact form of this control is considered unimportant. Put in other words,

...internal sovereignty is a fundamental authority relation within states between rulers and ruled, which is usually defined by a state's constitution ... External sovereignty is a fundamental authority relation between states, which is defined by international law. Thus, as seen from inside a state, sovereignty is paramount authority, and as seen from outside it, it is independent authority.⁸

In the ideal state system, external and internal sovereignty are both concomitant and mutually supportive.

Sovereignty is not, however, a monolithic concept. As an historical phenomenon it has evolved through several catalytic moments or 'revolutions'.⁹ It is also, in the long run, a relatively new phenomenon and just another arrangement of political life in Europe following the *Respublica Christiana* of the Middle Ages. Jackson notes that '[t]here is nothing about it that is natural, inevitable, or immutable. Sovereignty is a juridical idea and institution.'¹⁰ As a socially constructed norm, it has changed due to historical circumstances like the emergence of democracy and human rights. The restrictions imposed upon sovereignty, especially the increasing impact in recent decades of human rights and democratic norms, have slowly brought 'a shift from a culture of sovereign impunity to one of national and international accountability',¹¹ i.e. to sovereignty as responsibility to protect. Without going into the details of the history of the norm, a few milestones are worth mentioning. In his 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, United Nations (UN) secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali was among the first to advocate a change by stating: 'The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty ... has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.'¹² Then, in 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) published its report *The Responsibility to Protect*, thus introducing the new language of the 'responsibility to protect'.¹³ It was finally endorsed and recognized as a new international norm by the 191 member states of the United Nations on September 16, 2005. 'Responsibility to protect' means that the state has the primary responsibility to protect its population. If it fails to do so because it is unable or unwilling to fulfil its responsibility, outside intervention is then contemplated in cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.



Africa's Responsibility to Protect as the Legitimisation of Sovereignty?

Just as in Europe, in Africa the norm of sovereignty has evolved in its meaning, a trend that can be traced in the experience of African regional organisations. State sovereignty was a foreign concept that was used by local elites in the historical moment of independence. The absence of deep roots of the concept in African history and experience then facilitated the modification of the concept by regional organisations. This re-invention is not however without its inner contradictions and dilemmas, especially when it comes to reconciling sovereignty and democracy.

While Westphalian sovereignty as a form of political authority was alien to Africa before colonial times, it nevertheless became the cornerstone of African international relations. The Western European concept of sovereignty was adopted and adapted to the reality of African politics. By examining the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), it is clear what principles were expected to govern the relations between African states. The Charter exalted external sovereignty through the principle of non-interference and *uti possidetis juris*. This latter principle made the fragile African frontiers permanent; the existing boundaries became the basis for determining territorial jurisdiction. Immediately after independence, the priority of African rulers was to establish political control over their territory. Since most states were incapable of resisting a war of invasion at the time, it was in the rulers' common interest to declare their current borders permanent. The greater emphasis on sovereignty by these new countries is thus understandable as it was a question of political survival.

This move towards strict juridical sovereignty, however, led to outrageous abuses. Under the mantle of external sovereignty, African leaders were free to build national unity and state consolidation was seen as an overriding imperative. In many instances, this policy had very serious consequences. Sovereignty after independence was designed to give free rein to leaders at the national level. Whoever was in power could exercise it to deny the human rights of some groups or individuals. To a certain extent, this conception of sovereignty allows abuse by the strongest within a particular territory. 'It rewards those who mount anti-democratic coups. It rewards those who rig elections. It rewards those who intimidate the population who rule through and for one ethnic or social group against others.'¹⁴ But such a formula could not be sustainable in the long run. These gross abuses of power in a small number of African states were highlighted during the 1990s. This led to numerous inter-

ventions, notably the military intervention of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia. 'The cruel calculus of sovereignty versus misery has changed the way the international community thinks about foreign intervention and the rights of states.'¹⁵ Such an intervention is one of the most obvious signs that sovereignty was being reinterpreted. This was the outcome of a normative conflict between sovereignty on one hand and human rights and democracy on the other within numerous African states. It is this rising profile of the abuses under the mantle of sovereignty that led to the loss of legitimacy of this understanding of sovereignty. The erosion of sovereignty was paralleled by the development of the norm of democracy in Africa.

The difference in political legitimacy between the international and national level has been brought to the fore by the notion of the responsibility to protect. The inconsistency between the two is clear: domestically, only a legitimate authority can be considered sovereign (for instance through popular sovereignty); internationally, legitimacy is either not an issue or is provided by the recognition of a state by its peers. This dichotomy, a wall between domestic and international legitimacy, has started to crumble with the increasing importance of human rights, accountability and democracy. The legitimacy of sovereignty has changed 'from efficacy (or, as I [Charles Sampford] prefer to call it: 'the prior successful use of force) to the active consent of the governed'¹⁶ or 'from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility.'¹⁷ Previously, a dictator who had seized power through a coup d'état was recognized as head of state by his peers. This is still partially true today but is slowly changing in the African continent.¹⁸ However, as Sampford notes:

...if sovereignty is seen as extending only over those to whom the sovereign power is democratically accountable, then this principle provides members of any group over which that sovereign power is claimed a right to democratic participation ... Sovereignty is no longer the recognition of a power over a people but the collective right of a people to participate in, and benefit from, an independent political community, participating as an equal in the community of nations.¹⁹

International legal sovereignty would then be reconciled to popular sovereignty. Sovereignty as the responsibility to protect emerged because external sovereignty now needs to stand on the shoulders of a legitimate internal sovereignty. To make sovereignty legitimate means to make it democratic, transparent and accountable. The legitimacy of a sovereign state now lies

in the individual seen as the natural and ultimate source of power. It is this gradual empowerment of the people that lies at the root of this normative revolution. Legitimate sovereignty is a way for the people to become masters of their own destiny. While the new definition of sovereignty as responsibility to protect is still far from this idea of popular sovereignty and democracy as a human right, it seems to logically point in this direction.

Although the step from responsibility to protect to popular sovereignty has not yet become fixed at the normative level, military intervention on the basis of responsibility to protect tends to lead to elections and the establishment of other democratic institutions. As Fouad Ajami has argued, 'in the face of an absolutist doctrine of the rights of nations, there is now a tentative right to interfere. Man cannot eat sovereignty, we have learned; the order within nations is just as important as that among them.'²⁰ The assumption behind this idea of 'order within nations' is that order is best kept if all parties and interests are represented in a democratic regime. Most interventions are indeed more about maintaining order than promoting democracy per se, as will be seen in the case studies. Nevertheless, interveners in charge of post-conflict situations privilege the establishment of democratic institutions, not only because it is the dominant norm today, but also because it is the most likely way of establishing a lasting order. Arguably, a legitimate order – one that is accepted by all actors and groups – is a lasting order as they would have no reason to violently rebel against it. Democratic institutions are built to allow for the peaceful expression of opposing interests and should be representative of and responsive to these demands in an accountable and transparent manner. While elaborating the right type of democratic institutions that would allow for this peaceful expression of interest may be difficult (which explains the multiplicity of electoral regimes around the world), it seems to be the most likely solution for ensuring a lasting order. It is true that order could be achieved through different means, e.g., military occupation or an authoritarian regime. However, these alternatives are not viable in the long run as they offer few, if any, institutional outlets for managing popular grievances. Some also argue that democracies are better at ensuring the economic performances of countries.²¹ Furthermore, on a practical basis, the financial and military support that was offered to dictatorships during the Cold War is hardly available anymore.²² Thus, the practice has apparently moved faster than the norm with intervention motivated by the responsibility to protect or by the desire to maintain order having as an outcome an attempt at democratisation. In short, while sovereignty as responsibility to protect is for now strictly limited to gross violations of human rights, it nevertheless opens the door to the idea of promotion of democracy from abroad, both theoretically and in practice.

How does this evolution of the norm of sovereignty affect the role of regional organisations as agents of democratisation? Concretely, it helps to answer the question of who should intervene after a military coup, for instance. Who has the greatest legitimacy to intervene? I argue that regional organisations have the greatest legitimacy to intervene in the affairs of a member country for the following three reasons: the regional organisation is more easily accepted as an intervener, it is more accountable and more empowering. First, it is easier to be judged by one's own peers, thus facilitating an intervention. Indeed, as Farer remarks:

...a doctrine attributing authorizing power to regional organisations could be more easily reconciled with respect for the principle of sovereignty, if such power could be exercised only with respect to actions against member states. In their case, one can argue prior consent to the procedures whereby the organisation acts. If the target is a non-member state, reconciliation is far more problematical.²³

From a legal point of view, the same argument of prior consent could be made: by signing and ratifying the Constitutive Act of the African Union, member states have consented to intervention if the African Union decides to do so. The same can be said of ECOWAS and SADC. Second, the regional organisation possesses a degree of accountability. The greater the link between the intervener and the population on whose behalf the intervention takes place, the more legitimate the intervention. A regional organisation will be more accountable than the UN Security Council. The imbalance of power at the regional level is not as great as between, say, Liberia and the UN Security Council. Finally, being a member of a regional organisation ascertains a certain degree of reciprocity and dialogue between intervener and the country whose sovereignty is being set aside, something usually difficult to achieve at the level of the international community. It allows for a greater voice given to the population. Regional organisations cannot truly be considered as complete outsiders since their very existence is based on an expressed logic of integration and inclusion. Overall, while no panacea, recourse to regional organisations when democracy and human rights are threatened by a military coup or by civil war is one of the most legitimate and reliable options to promote and guarantee democracy from abroad.

If intervention by a regional organisation can be considered legitimate, how are African regional organisations concretely promoting democracy? What are their tools and how efficient is their action? First, ECOWAS, SADC, and the African Union have the legal tools that provide them with a right to intervene based on the norm of the responsibility to protect and the rejection of military coups. ECOWAS is governed by the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. SADC followed suit with the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. At the continental level, in 1997, the OAU issued a Declaration rejecting unconstitutional changes of government. In 2000, article 4h of the Constitutive Act of the African Union clearly established 'the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.'²⁴

After this quick survey of the legal instruments available to these three African regional organisations, it is now time to turn our attention to what regional organisations can concretely do – beyond these legal provisions – to promote democracy within their member states. The most advanced research attempting to theorize the link between regional organisation and democratisation can be found in Jon Pevehouse's recent book *Democracy from Above: Regional Organisations and Democratisation*.²⁵ Pevehouse addresses the question of how concretely regional organisations can influence first the transition to and second the consolidation of democracy.

Another possible way of addressing the issue is to separate the different means of action into 'carrot and stick' incentives. The regional organisation can dangle four types of carrots to encourage and support a transition to democracy. First, involvement by or joining a regional organisation can provide some degree of legitimisation to the elites of the interim regime. Regional organisations not only have an impact on the domestic elites but can also influence the whole population by legitimising the interim regime. Association to a democratic regional organisation, be it through membership or through another status, Pevehouse argues, 'can serve as a visible commitment to continue reform, helping convince the public to invest in the new regime.'²⁶ Second, regional organisations can help assuage the fear of democracy many business elites and military leaders entertain by

helping to lock in economic policies decided upon by domestic elites.²⁷ Regional organisations can also slowly accustom elites to the transition to democracy by socialising the military, who are afraid of losing their hold on power, to their role in a democracy. Regional organisations such as NATO conduct joint training operations helping to socialise military leaders as to the role of the military in a democratic state.²⁸ Third, direct financial assistance from the regional organisation to the country undergoing a transition to democracy is another additional mechanism uncovered by Pevehouse in his case study on Hungary. The regional organisation can also elect to 'pay-off' – in the form of subsidies for instance – disaffected groups. Finally, in a more interventionist manner, a regional organisation can ask for institutional reform to ascertain the longevity of the new democratic institutions.

On the other hand, the 'stick' policies are designed to punish any backsliding to autocracy. The main approach consists in pressure by member-states of the regional organisation on an offending country. This means that in order to influence or pressure for change, members of regional organisations can, as a first step, openly and publicly condemn their neighbours' action following a military coup or a gross violation of human rights. They can push the issue further by imposing sanctions or other types of punishments such as the suspension of membership.²⁹ From another point of view, regional organisations can increase the cost of backsliding to autocracy. By imposing conditions on membership, regional organisations manage to bind both the losers and the winners of the democratisation process by making any attempt to go back to autocracy very costly. Membership criteria usually contain – implicitly or more often explicitly – some sanctions if the conditions are not met. As Pevehouse notes: 'Any financial assistance from the organisation, preferential trade arrangements, monetary policy coordination, military protection, even international status brought by membership would all be put at risk by a democratic reversal.'³⁰ These potential costs serve to deter losers, but also winners who would undermine liberal reform in order to keep their favoured position in society.

Overall, Pevehouse provides us with useful insights into the relationship between regional organisations and democratisation, which can be assessed and augmented in the light of the African experience. The applicability of his theory to African regional organisations is somewhat limited because he focuses mainly on democratic regional organisations, i.e. on regional organisations where a significant proportion of members are democracies. This is overall not the case in Africa, be it in the African Union, ECOWAS, or SADC. Pevehouse also

concentrates on the advantages accruing to states that join a democratic regional organisation, for instance the impact of joining the European Union. In the African case, African states are all already members of a significant number of regional organisations and they have little prospect of creating a new regional organisation or joining a new one.

It is worth noticing that of all the different ways a regional organisation can have an impact on the process of democratisation, Pevehouse never mentions military intervention, election monitoring, or the provision of exit options for elites, three mechanisms widely prevalent in Africa. Arguably, in very few cases in Africa can we actually talk of a fully consolidated democracy. Most states are in a transition phase and are at greater or lesser risk of a military coup or rigged elections. African regional organisations have organised themselves in order to counter these eventualities. In the event of a military coup, the first mechanisms of pressure correspond to what Pevehouse outlined, i.e. public condemnation and/or suspension of membership.

Another innovative AU mechanism recently put in place is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) that monitors democracy and good governance.³¹ The next step reached in certain cases is a military intervention aimed at toppling the coup leader and restoring calm and security. These are sometimes followed by election monitoring, which is another widespread practice. Finally, African regional organisations offer interesting exit options to former heads of state and government. Sometimes, national leaders attempt to stay in power out of personal self-interest and/or greed and because they do not see any viable or tempting option once they release their grip on power. There seems to be an interesting socialisation effect between heads of regional organisations and heads of state and government. For instance, Salim Ahmed Salim, former prime minister of Tanzania (1984-85), became secretary-general of the OAU from 1989 to 2001. More recently, Alpha Oumar Konaré, former president of Mali (1992-2002), served as president of ECOWAS in 1999 and of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) in 2000 and became Chairman of the African Commission in 2003. Lately, the reverse phenomenon – from regional organisation to state – can also be witnessed with Yayi Boni who became president of Benin in April 2006 after several years as president of the West African Development Bank (BOAD). With all those mechanisms in mind, it is now time to take a closer look at the different experiences of ECOWAS, SADC and the African Union.

The case studies below focus on instances where one of the main avowed reasons behind the intervention or pressure from an African regional organisation was to promote democracy. As we have seen previously, most of their legal instruments give the regional organisation a right to intervene in cases of crimes against humanity and gross human rights violations. The democratic focus is clear in cases such as Sierra Leone, Lesotho and Burundi. These can be considered at least as partial successes but will be assessed against other cases where the regional organisation decided not to act. Other case studies could have been chosen here, such as Sudan or Zimbabwe; however, since the intervention in Sudan is not over it is difficult to reach solid conclusions. The Zimbabwean case, while especially interesting as a possible counterexample, has not reached the point of military intervention. We will now see how each African regional organisation translated its words into action.

The intervention of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone in 1997 is striking on several accounts. While ECOWAS had been involved in Liberia and Sierra Leone with ECOMOG since 1990, this 1997 example is particularly significant as it was the first time that an all-African force used military means to restore an elected, democratic government in power. Also, unlike the typical UN peacekeeping mission, ECOMOG's deployment entailed fighting its way into a civil war in an attempt to hold the warring factions apart by force. Second, if we take a closer look at the mechanisms of pressure ECOWAS used after the coup d'état by Koromah, we can see a whole range of more or less intrusive mechanisms that go far beyond the ones outlined by Pevehouse. These mechanisms included: closing embassies, imposing economic sanctions and an economic embargo, negotiating and enforcing peace accords and removing the junta in power by military force in order to restore president Kabbah.

Despite the fact that ECOMOG seems to have overall increased the prospects of a democratic transition in Sierra Leone, it is still worth asking whether ECOMOG's agenda was truly the promotion of democracy. Why was there no intervention in 1992 when Capt. Strasser orchestrated a coup – even though arguably, he did not topple a democratic government? ECOMOG has since acted to control conflict in other cases: Guinea Bissau (1999), Guinea-Liberia border (2001), Côte d'Ivoire (2002) but has declined to intervene in other situations like the unconstitutional changes of government in Nigeria or in Togo. This indeed questions the democratic credentials of these kinds of interventions. As Adebajo contends,

...both ECOMOG interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia were born primarily out of the desire of two strong-willed Nigerian autocrats to further their own personal ambitions while burnishing Nigeria's leadership aspirations in West Africa.³²

One should not forget that the main advocate of intervention, Nigeria, was itself not a democracy... Finally, from a more practical point of view, ECOMOG came across three problems. ECOWAS member states were sharply divided between Anglophone and Francophone states about the intervention itself. Due to the forceful nature of the intervention, ECOMOG came to be perceived as one of the players rather than a neutral peacemaker. And finally, the logistical and financial burden of the operations proved in certain instances rather debilitating. Overall, ECOMOG's strategy was largely improvised and ad hoc.

The intervention of SADC in Lesotho occurred in somewhat different circumstances: it was triggered by contested elections and civil unrest, albeit not civil war. Following contested elections, SADC approved military intervention by South Africa and Botswana to bring calm to Lesotho and preserve the democratic regime. By May 1999, the troops had been replaced by an advisory team mandated to help retrain and restructure the Lesotho Defence Force. An Interim Political Authority (IPA), charged with reviewing the electoral structure in the country, was created in December 1998. The IPA introduced a partially proportional electoral system to ensure the presence of the opposition in the National Assembly. Successful elections were held under this new system in May 2002. For the first time, opposition political parties won significant numbers of seats, and despite some irregularities and threats of violence, Lesotho experienced its first peaceful election. As with ECOMOG's intervention in Sierra Leone, democracy seems to have better prospects in Lesotho after SADC's intervention.

Due to circumstances, the mechanisms used differed slightly. Facing civil unrest, the military intervention led to fewer confrontations than in Sierra Leone where the fighting was especially brutal. The intervention was short and was soon replaced by other pressure mechanisms such as election monitoring and assistance in reforming the electoral law. SADC, nevertheless, faced challenges of its own. Even though intervention laid the groundwork for future elections in Lesotho, South Africa weathered tremendous criticism for its interference in Lesotho's internal affairs.³³ Just like Nigeria in ECOWAS, South Africa was the regional hegemon that had pushed for the intervention. Due to its past and its economic weight and power, such a role by South Africa is often resented in the

region. Logistically and financially, the intervention was also dependent on South African and, to a lesser extent, Botswanan means and financial backing. Finally, the authenticity of the democratic agenda of the intervention can be questioned. South Africa pursued strategic as well as normative goals in the Lesotho intervention. Having a civil war in a neighbouring state would do nothing to help the economic or political climate in South Africa. Furthermore, with the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Lesotho controlled a crucial source of water for South Africa. South Africa and Botswana chose to enact a 1994 agreement making them guarantors of the democracy in Lesotho under the auspices of SADC in order to increase the legitimacy of their intervention. But where are the democratic credentials of SADC when it comes to Zimbabwe? For instance, Robert Mugabe won Zimbabwe's March 2002 presidential elections under questionable circumstances according to certain observers. But, 'the SADC Council of Ministers [...] declared the election 'substantially free and fair' and considered that the vote was a 'true reflection' of the people's will.'³⁴ When it comes to Zimbabwe, geopolitical concerns, rather than democratic ones, prevailed.³⁵

The last case study focuses on Burundi where the African Union has been actively engaged in efforts to resolve the conflict since 1993. It stepped up its engagement by deploying its first peacekeeping mission in April 2003. With the UN being reluctant to send a peacekeeping mission, the African Union and the Burundian parties agreed to the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) that, at full capacity, consisted of some 3,335 troops primarily from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.³⁶ AMIB's mandate was to monitor the ceasefire, facilitate DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of combatants) and to deliver humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, 'senior AMIB officials drafted rules of engagement (ROEs) to allow their troops to use force to protect civilians in "imminent danger of serious injury or death".'³⁷ Its overall aim was to prepare the conditions for the arrival of a UN peacekeeping mission. Although a countrywide referendum to pass an interim constitution proceeded peacefully in February 2005, the political and social environment in Burundi remained volatile as the country prepared for a series of elections between June and September 2005. The elections were won by the former Hutu rebels.

Just as in Sierra Leone, the decision to launch a peacekeeping operation was first taken by an African regional organisation and subsequently endorsed by the UN. Overall, the track record of this first peacekeeping mission by the African Union is positive and has led to the restoration of peace and democracy, despite the persistent tensions between Hutus and Tutsis. The range of mechanisms to achieve such results ranged from

public condemnation to economic sanctions to negotiating and co-signing peace agreements to launching a peacekeeping operation. The African Union, like the other African regional organisations, has used the full range of tools at its disposal. But again, as in the other case studies, the importance of the democratic ideal is partly questionable. While democracy promotion did play a role, factors such as concern over the flood of refugees from Burundi influenced the African Union's decision to launch AMIB. Finally, from a practical point of view, AMIB had to face the traditional limitations of peacekeeping missions. Its mandate was too broad, especially in the context of continued insecurity. AMIB lacked the requisite financial resources to carry out such a robust mandate and has lacked the capacity to achieve it completely and satisfactorily.

Conclusions

African regional organisations have had some success when it comes to the promotion of democracy from abroad. But is the issue of democratisation truly at the core of their endeavours? When addressing the question of the boundaries and links between democracy, human rights and sovereignty, African regional organisations seem to privilege a minimal approach. The regional organisations try to uphold a minimum standard, i.e. avoid military coups or unconstitutional changes of government and ensure free and fair elections. Rather than agents of democratisation, they act as guarantors of democracy³⁸ as well as guarantors of peace and order. Ultimately, while one can find progress on paper, geopolitical concerns still seem, in the end, to dominate the rationale for intervention. Fortunately, guarantees of democracy and of defence of the national interest are not necessarily at odds, but the tension between the two is very real. The fact that African regional organisations sometimes decide not to intervene clearly points to the political struggles within African regional organisations over the real or rhetorical nature of their democratic commitment.

Regional organisations have a comparative advantage due to their proximity to the country they are putting pressure on: they have a better understanding of local politics and key players. Also due to this proximity and the fact that all concerned parties are members of the same regional organisation, their intervention and pressure can be considered more accountable and legitimate. Yet, due to this very proximity that leads to engagement, there are a number of challenges that they have to confront. The neutrality and impartiality of the interventions by regional

organisations is often undermined by the decisive position of a regional hegemon such as Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC. They provide their respective regions with the requisite resources, capacity and political legitimacy for intervention, but at the same time, the dependency of ECOWAS and SADC on them means the regional peace and security agendas may be shaped by the domestic problems and national interests of these powerful states. This has notably been the case of the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This begs the question of what would happen if the regional hegemon were part of the conflict. Beyond this legitimacy issue, African regional organisations also face enormous resource and capacity constraints. Owing to asymmetrical political and economic development of member states, they often have differing political and security agendas and visions, thus making any attempt at cohesion very difficult. These broad differences are augmented by the uncoordinated initiatives of donor countries. Indeed, the dynamics at the international level also play a significant role. African regional organisations are embedded in broader networks of actors that have conflicting influences over them: indirectly, through the conditionality of foreign aid, and directly, with the financial and technical support to the African interventions.

In the end, what does the African experience tell us about the relationship between sovereignty and democracy? Democracy still does not trump sovereignty and it is only gross violations of human rights – not the promotion of democracy as such – that enable the international community to set sovereignty aside. Yet, democracy as a norm is growing in importance. Now that Westphalian sovereignty has been weakened, democracy as popular sovereignty could, in the long term, follow the steps of the responsibility to protect and complement it.

Notes

¹ The nexus of the end of the Cold War, the wave of democratisation and the revival of regionalism in Africa constitute the broader international environment in which this inquiry is embedded. The question of causation and of how each dynamic causes or influences the other, while interesting, is somewhat too ambitious for the scope of this paper.

² I am following Mainwaring's definition of democracy. Scott Mainwaring, 'Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues,' in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 297-98.

³ See Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, 1971), 5.

⁴ Emmerich de Vattel, *The Law of Nations: Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns* (1758), Book I, par.4.

⁵ Stephen Krasner contends that there are three elements: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian / Vattelian sovereignty, and domestic sovereignty. See Stephen D. Krasner, 'Sharing Sovereignty. New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,' *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004). Overall, since international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty are so closely related, they can be subsumed under the notion of external sovereignty. See Robert H. Jackson, *Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations: From Anarchy to Cosmopolis* (New York: Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

⁶ See Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States : Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁷ Krasner, 'Sharing Sovereignty. New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,' ,88.

⁸ Jackson, *Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations: From Anarchy to Cosmopolis*, 75.

⁹ Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001). He mentions two revolutions: Westphalia and decolonisation.

¹⁰ Jackson, *Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations: From Anarchy to Cosmopolis*, 74.

¹¹ Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, 'The Responsibility to Protect,' *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 6 (2002): 102.

¹² Boutros-Ghali Boutros, *Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992), par.17.

¹³ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 'The Responsibility to Protect,' (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

¹⁴ Charles Sampford, 'Democratic and Global Challenges to the Concepts of 'Sovereignty' and 'Intervention',' in *Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th World Congress in Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy* (Pace University, New York: 29 June 1999).

¹⁵ Fouad, Ajami, 'Somalis: The work of order and mercy', *U.S. News and World Report*, December 21, 1992, 25. Quoted in Ibrahim A. Gambari, 'The Role of Regional and Global Organizations in Addressing Africa's Security Issues,' in *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*, ed. Edmond J. Keller and Donald S. Rothchild (Boulder, CO ; London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 31.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 'The Responsibility to Protect,' 13.

¹⁸ For instance, General Pervez Musharraf who came to power through a military coup in 1999 is considered as a legitimate leader and as one of key allies of the United States in its 'war on terror.' However, the OAU has decided to suspend the membership of any country whose leader has seized power through unconstitutional means. See *Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government*, adopted by the 36th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, Lomé, Togo, 10-12 July 2000.

¹⁹ Sampford, 'Democratic and Global Challenges to the Concepts of 'Sovereignty' and 'Intervention.'

²⁰ Ajami, 'Somalis : The work of order and mercy,' 25. Quoted in Gambari, 'The Role of Regional and Global Organizations in Addressing Africa's Security Issues,' 31. This quote interestingly points in the direction of another possible cause for the existence of 'quasi-states.' Robert Jackson stresses political underdevelopment while economic underdevelopment could be another reason for the limitations of the concept of sovereignty in Africa. It would then lead us to think further about the importance of a material basis for sovereignty. I thank Christopher Bickerton for pointing out the implication of this quote to me.

²¹ Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein, *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

²² The question whether the same practice could be resurrected within the framework of the war on terror or in order to ensure oil supplies remains open.

²³ Tom Farer, 'Legal and Legitimate Use of Force: The Case for Moderate Reform of the Original Understanding,' (Unpublished work, 2005), 29.

²⁴ African Union, 'Constitutive Act,' (Lomé, Togo: 11 July 2000), article 4(h).

²⁵ Jon C. Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁷ See Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff, 'Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements,' *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (2000). Or Helen V. Milner, 'Regional Economic Cooperation, Global Markets, and Domestic Politics,' in *Regionalism and Global Economic Integration: Europe, Asia and the Americas*, ed. William D. Coleman and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (London: Routledge, 1998).

²⁸ Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization*, 20-24.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 19. See African Union, 'Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government,' (Lomé, Togo: 12 July 2000).

³⁰ Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization*, 39.

³¹ Just like election monitoring, the state has to volunteer to participate in the APRM and its results can always be catered towards a specific political agenda. It is a recent mechanism with very few countries having completed the process.

³² Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 104.

³³ Roger Southall, 'An Unlikely Success: South Africa and Lesotho's Election of 2002,' *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41, no. 2 (2003).

³⁴ Bruce Baker, 'When to Call Black White: Zimbabwe's Electoral Reports,' *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 6 (2002): 1149.

³⁵ It is worth noting that the conclusions reached by the SADC Parliamentary Forum differed sharply from that of the SADC Council of Ministers and considered the elections as neither free nor fair.

³⁶ Kristiana Powell, *The African's Union Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 2005), 34.

³⁷ Ibid., 26.

³⁸ See Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney, 'Guaranteeing Democracy: A Review of the Record,' *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 2 (1998). See also Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein, *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace* (Oxford: Routledge, 2004).

The Accidental Democratisers: A Response to Gandois

97

CHRISTINE CHENG

One of the most remarkable changes in world politics in the post-Cold War era has been the growing importance of regional organisations. Although these institutions were created to promote regional trade, they have evolved since the end of the Cold War to encompass political and security functions as well. Nowhere has this been more evident than in Africa. As the norm of non-intervention is increasingly challenged both inside and outside of Africa, African regional and sub-regional organisations are assuming greater responsibilities in conflict resolution and peacekeeping.

As Africa's regional organisations¹ become more active in the internal affairs of their member states, the nature of their interventions also merit closer and more systematic examination. In this spirit, Hélène Gandois asks, 'what role can regional organisations play in order to promote democracy?' Gandois makes a unique contribution to the academic literature by examining the effect of military intervention by Africa's regional organisations on the democratisation process. Her article distinguishes between two forms of intervention: in Sierra Leone, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) *upheld democracy* in the face of a destabilising coup d'état; in Lesotho and Burundi, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) intervened to *encourage elections* to take place. Even though both types of interventions supported democratisation in these conflict-ridden countries, Gandois concludes that the underlying causes of each of these military interventions were deeply rooted in geopolitical interests. While I found myself agreeing with the general thrust of her arguments, there are several normative and empirical assumptions made in her article that deserve closer examination.

Democratisation and Re-establishing Order

According to Gandois, interveners want to establish order and the best way to do this is through democratic institutions. In the case

Christine Cheng, 'The Accidental Democratisers, A Response to Gandois' *STAIR* 2, No 2, (2007):97-101.

studies presented, the primary objective for African regional organisations is to re-establish and, where necessary, impose order. Yet holding elections, a common mechanism for democratising, is a divisive and potentially explosive event in the fragile environments where regional organisations are intervening militarily. Instead of the restored order that interveners hope to achieve through democratisation, the empirical evidence shows that the transition to democracy just as often results in disorder depending on when and how it takes place. Elections, in particular, should not be seen as a panacea for addressing deeper political problems.

Roland Paris' astute critique of democratisation after war sheds light on why elections pose such a challenge in this context. Paris attributes the problem to three factors: existing societal cleavages, a lack of conflict dampeners and weak institutions.² In the face of elections, these factors make it extremely difficult to establish order.

Paris also points out that, fundamentally, elections are a competition: they invite debate and confrontation. In established democracies, elections serve as an escape valve for society's collective frustrations with its government. While violence may occasionally erupt, a combination of established norms and credible threats of sanctions prevent candidates and their supporters from becoming violent. However, in polarised societies, any pre-existing divisions are aggravated by elections. Rallies, demonstrations and marches held in support of one candidate or another can easily lead to violent clashes because the democratic norms that prevent established democracies from turning violent will not have had time to take root. The institutions that would normally prevent a situation from getting out of hand, such as the police or judiciary, remain either too weak to defend democracy or so strong that they threaten it.³ All of these problems may be further exacerbated by a country's political architecture. For example, a winner-takes-all system could raise the stakes and increase the levels of electoral violence.

If, as Gandois asserts, African regional organisations are encouraging democratisation because they believe it is the most efficient way to establish order, then they should also bear in mind that at the very least, *democratisation takes time* and is perhaps in the end, an impossible undertaking for external actors.⁴ Further, in societies with vast political cleavages, democratisation seems as likely to cause disorder as order.

When trying to understand the role of regional organisations in the democratisation process, it is important to bear in mind that in the three cases described by Gandois, neither upholding nor establishing democracy was cast as the primary motivation for military intervention. Rather, the support for democratic institutions was a by-product of other motives. This is not surprising if we consider that regional organisations operate based on the interests of their member states: we would *expect* more powerful and important member states to have greater influence in the decision-making processes, as with Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC. Still, if we take Gandois' interpretation of the cases as a given and we attempt to generalise from these cases, the conclusion would be that a violation of democratic practice alone would not be a strong enough trigger for a regional organisation to pursue military intervention.

What is more telling, as Gandois points out, is not where interventions take place, but where they do not. If regional organisations were unwavering agents of democratisation, then we should have witnessed more intrusive interventions in places like Togo and Zimbabwe, especially in light of the 1997 Harare Declaration condemning unconstitutional changes of government. For example, in Togo, the AU recognised the 2005 military takeover as an unconstitutional change of government. Yet initially, this forced regime change resulted in nothing more than international condemnation. In spite of its earlier condemnation of the regime, the AU subsequently chose to accept the results of the May 2005 election — even though the EU suspended aid to Togo following opposition claims of a rigged election. In Zimbabwe, President Mugabe has managed to fix several elections with nary a peep from SADC or the AU. In both cases, democracy was undermined and in both cases, nothing was done. It is the lack of intervention in these two cases that severely undermines the argument for regional organisations as agents of democratisation.

Still, what really matters in the end is how the internal political actors in other African states interpret the lack of intervention in these cases. The knowledge that democratic norms can be violated without triggering military intervention will affect the political calculus in the rest of Africa. Interestingly, there is a strong possibility that the AU response may soon become more robust and more consistently applied after the 2007 AU Summit discussions on the proposed African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance.⁵

Gandois asserts that regional organisations have greater legitimacy to intervene than other international actors for three reasons: '[they are] more easily accepted as an intervener, [they are] more accountable and more empowering.' However, it is just as feasible to argue that a regional organisation is less likely to be accepted, less accountable and less empowering than the United Nations because the interests of regional hegemony (like Nigeria and South Africa) dominate regional organisations. In contrast, the influence of any one country is diluted in international organisations, and an intervention is less likely to be perceived as an extension of a regional hegemon's foreign policy. In regional organisations, even where prior consent has been given by all the member states, the regional hegemon's interests can still have an enormous impact on the nature of the intervention itself.

When arguing that regional organisations are more accountable because of a closer link between the intervener and the population of the target country, Gandois asserts that, 'A regional organisation will be more accountable than the UN Security Council.' But in fact, neither institution is particularly accountable to the target population since the only official link back to the citizenry is through state officials (heads of state or appointed representatives) who may be part of the problem in the first place. No matter who the intervener is, the population will not have any recourse if the intervention is not successful. Finally, it should be pointed out that there is no way to measure accountability for any intervention.

Even if we could assume that regional organisations have greater legitimacy to militarily intervene, there is still the question of whether they are the most legitimate agents of democratisation. As Gandois herself points out, 18 out of 53 African countries are labelled 'not free' by Freedom House. In the other 35 'free' countries, democracy is often fragile and rarely is it deeply institutionalised. Considering the spotty record of its membership, it is difficult to imagine how African regional organisations could hold great legitimacy in this area.

A Promising Area of Research

By focusing on the democratising effects of military intervention, Gandois has highlighted an important mechanism for democratisation. Her article has implications that extend far beyond Africa's borders. From

UN peacekeeping missions to NATO interventions to the unilateral interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the role of interveners as democratising agents deserves further examination. In choosing to examine the role of African regional organisations in this process, Gandois has cast a critical eye on a set of important, but understudied organisations. Without overstating the case, her article highlights the transformational role that these organisations play in the democratisation process. However, it remains to be seen whether Africa's regional organisations will take on a more robust role as true agents of democratisation.

Notes

¹ For simplicity, the term regional organisations will be used to refer to both regional and sub-regional organisations.

² R. Paris, *At War's End* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

³ *Ibid.*, Chapter 9.

⁴ On the difficulties of external intervention in state building, see C. Bickerton, 'Exporting State Failure,' in *Politics Without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations* (London: University College London Press, 2007). On other unsuccessful efforts at transplanting political structures, see Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁵ For the full text of the draft charter, see <http://www.afrimap.org/standards.php>.

AN INTERVIEW WITH IBRAHIM AL-JAAFARI

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Jaafari served as Vice President of the Iraqi Interim Government from 2004 to 2005 and as Prime Minister of the Iraqi Transitional Government from 2005 to 2006. In an interview with Jaffar Al-Rikabi, he offers an Iraqi perspective on democratisation.

Q: How would you define democracy? Is it fulfilled merely by holding elections?

Ibrahim Al-Jaafari (IA): There is much debate about the definition of democracy, but generally there are certain characteristics that all democratic nations demonstrate. Elections are not the only characteristic, but they are an important one. And elections are not only held to choose a parliament or a chief executive: through elections, you also approve your constitution. Thus the set of principles and values that form the basis of the workings of a political regime are chosen through democracy.

Democracy is also about protecting minority viewpoints whilst ensuring the representation of the majority's opinions. Democracy is, in Lincoln's words, 'government of the people, by the people, for the people'. Democracy is not restricted to politics in my opinion. In fact, democracy can be corrupted politically through an elected dictatorship which dominates the media and resources. What you need is a democratic culture: a democratic mentality throughout society, in education, in the family and even in the security forces.

Q. What are the difficulties facing Iraq in her transition from the totalitarianism of Saddam's regime and a history of dictatorial rule to the kind of democracy that you have just described?

IA: There are several obstacles that face us. There is the fact that there are people fighting democracy in Iraq today. There are those who think that their interests would be harmed if democracy were to take root. These people use violence and terrorism, adopting such slogans as 'fighting occupation' or 'fighting for Islam' to hide their personal or party interests. They seek to misrepresent the meaning of democracy and its different institutions. Here the key point is not the presence of those who disagree peacefully with democracy or do not believe in it – indeed, a democratic Iraq would allow for such peaceful opposition. It is the fact

An Interview with Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, 'Iraq and Democracy', *STAIR* 2, No 2, (2007):102-109.

that certain groups resort to the killing of innocents, to kidnappings and other unlawful acts, in a bid to destroy the credibility of the democratic government in the eyes of the Iraqi people.

Another obstacle is the misunderstanding of democracy amongst the population and the political elites. There are those who see democracy as a means to grab as much power as possible and, when they fail, they turn into enemies of the democratic process and seek to block its success.

Another difficulty, or rather, challenge that faces us is to spread the democratic culture I mentioned earlier. Iraqis need to know what federalism is and what the various advantages and disadvantages attached to different varieties of federalism are when they vote for it. They need to know the political programmes of different parties and their separate goals when deciding for whom to vote. The goal we aspire to is having an informed population, accustomed to democracy, such that you can have, within one household, different members of the family voting for different parties and leaders because they have different preferences and convictions. Blind obedience to political, religious or tribal leaders needs to stop.

A democratic Iraq needs to shed old habits and reform institutions such that hierarchies are built on popular election and based on merit. We need to redouble our efforts if we are to get there.

Q. Where has Iraq reached on this path of change?

IA: In my opinion, when you consider the tyrannical nature of the previous regime, what Iraqis have been able to achieve within a short space of time is very impressive. When you look at Iraq today, you see political pluralism. There are numerous political parties and leaders on a national and regional level along with many religious and political symbols. In Iraq, you have freedom of the press and of expression. Such representation of a diversity of views was never permitted under the old regime. When we mention such achievements, we do not discount the presence of difficulties and challenges, nor are we saying that we have reached the desired end. No country has been able to hold national elections, draft and vote on a constitution within a year. Democratisation is a process which develops over many years. Thus what Iraqis have been able to achieve in the face of terrorism and in the context of a history of dictatorship and an absence of democratic culture, is quite remarkable.

Q: There are those who reject or criticise such a notion of democracy, which they say is based on sectarian and ethnic divisions. They argue that the so-called democ-

racy in Iraq has come to fragment the fabric and unity of Iraqi society. Is democracy in Iraq driven by fixed sectarian and ethnic divisions? Should it not be based on continuously changing policy platforms and programmes?

IA: In answering this question, we must distinguish between the ideals and values of democracy and how democracy may be practised. We can see, for example, a variety of democracies in the West. One difference may be whether they have a presidential or parliamentary system. In the US, Americans voted directly between George Bush and John Kerry, or in the election before that, between Bush and Al Gore. In contrast, under a parliamentary regime, you do not vote directly for the chief executive, who is instead elected in one way or another from the legislature. There is a practice of bargaining and striking deals in accordance with sectarian or ethnic divisions. This, in my opinion, is not actually democratic and is particularly common in times of transition and in divisive situations. This situation, I feel, is the biggest weakness of the Iraqi democratic experiment. I look forward to the time when we can free ourselves from a political process which has come to revolve around ethnic, religious or sectarian divisions. You cannot have an Iraqi Prime Minister, who is at the same time Arab, Kurdish and Turkoman, or Muslim, Assyrian and Sabian, Shiite and Sunni: he or she can only be one of each of these. Iraqi leaders should not be elected on these criteria, but on their ability to govern, to lead their people and on the vision they hold.

Q: *Let us return to the issue of the extent to which Iraq has been able to transform itself to a genuine democracy. There are those who say that democratic values are foreign to the Iraqi people and to the region. They say that, in fact, they were forced upon Iraqis by American tanks and that this is why Iraq today remains dependent on the presence of us troops and why there has been so much chaos since the downfall of the regime. They say that it is an experiment that has succeeded in the West but cannot succeed in Iraq and the Middle East in general. What is your reply to such arguments?*

AI: First, we should look at the relationship between democracy and humanity. There are no differences in nature between 'Western' man, 'Eastern' man, 'Southern' man or 'Northern' man. Talk of democracy being naturally suited to some people over others is false: discriminations based on race, ethnicity, language or regions were discredited long ago. We can observe certain obstacles to the spread and consolidation of democracy, so we need to look at how best to overcome such obstacles. Secondly, regarding the reference to Allied and US presence in Iraq, we need to note several things. Firstly, this was not the choice of the Iraqi

people. One of the most spectacular failures of the abolished regime was that it dragged Iraq into so many wars, the last of which was this so-called 'Third Gulf War'. Secondly, it is important to remember that politically, socially, psychologically and thus democratically, the Iraqi people toppled the regime before the tanks entered Iraq. Iraqis resisted the regime with everything they had and, in the 1991 uprising, 350,000 paid the price. When the tanks entered Iraq, they did not face the Iraqi people, but a band of thugs that had imposed themselves on the people. Nor did they come in to impose democracy – the millions who went out to vote chose democracy and made it possible, despite international scepticism of the viability of holding elections. The coalition forces removed the obstacle to Iraqi freedom and it was the free will of the Iraqi people that opted for democracy. Moreover, the presence of troops today is at the behest of the democratically elected Iraqi government, thus it is democracy and not the tank which rules Iraq today. Nor does democracy normally require the presence of foreign troops, as can be seen in the many functioning democracies worldwide. In Iraq, it is the threat of terrorism that makes their presence necessary and when this terror is defeated, there will no longer be any reason for the US tanks to remain in Iraq.

Q: What then is your response to those who argue that Iraq and the region today needs stability, even if this comes through the re-establishment of dictatorial rule, more than a democracy that is unable to offer security and stability to its citizens?

IA: I disagree with such claims. First there is the question of each country's priorities. If you have a security problem with political roots, then by accommodating all the different factions democratically and through the presence of democratic security forces, you solve the problem. The same goes for other problems, whether economic, political or social. Here, what you have is what I call a 'democratic club,' whereby democratic nations can be closer to one another in nature and in aims, despite geographic distances, than two neighbouring countries where one of the two may not be democratic. Democratic states work together to address problems they face and to realise goals they share. Also implied in the claims you mentioned is the notion that somehow Iraqis are different, or the Middle East different, such that democracy cannot take hold. I have already answered this point. What makes democracy appropriate in the US and not appropriate in Iraq? What is the reason? Democracy is the means by which human diversity is reflected and accommodated. Moreover, I believe that society in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular, is more suited to democracy than many other societies in the

world. Iraq has an ancient history of respect for law and order and of religious and cultural diversity. For centuries, different peoples have lived as one under the banner of Iraq. This rich culture of acceptance, diversity and mutual respect makes Iraqi society well suited to democracy.

Democracy and Islam

Let us move on to discuss the relationship between Islam and democracy. You have just compared Iraq to the US. There are those who point to a fundamental difference between the two: they see a conflict between democratic values and mechanisms on the one hand and Islam on the other.

Q: My first question is thus the following: are the values and mechanisms of democracy in harmony with Islam?

IA: Yes, with all certainty. What is wrong with giving people the right and freedom to elect their own leaders based on a conscious choice? What is wrong with electing your own region's representative in a parliament, or selecting the articles that underpin the workings of your government in a constitution? Islamists have been the driving force behind this democratic process in Iraq. Nor is this a solitary example. Look at Turkey and the way democracy is being consolidated with the participation of Islamists and with a largely Muslim population, much of which is religious. In Islam we have the notion of 'Shura' and choosing the best scholars. It is viewed as a good thing that a person has the respect and support of others in his/her society. Thus, here again, there is no clash whatsoever. If we look at important characteristics in democracies, the same can be said. The inclusion of minorities and the protection of their rights are extremely important in Islam and this is also an essential article of democracy. An active role for women in society is another. Islam insisted on an equal role for women in society long before women's rights were recognised worldwide. Why can an Iraqi woman have an active role in resisting Saddam's regime and be imprisoned, tortured or executed for her activism, but not be allowed an active role once Iraq is free from dictatorship and tyranny? Many common features which democratic countries share are thus embraced and insisted upon by Islam.



Q: *As one of the leaders of the Islamic 'Da'wa Party,' you and your party must believe in democracy, rather than seeing it merely as a means to power. Is that the case?*

IA: Everything I have talked about today illustrates our belief in democracy. Our problem is not with democracy, but rather it is with its absence for all these decades and with what this has brought Iraq and its people. Such a strategy, which uses the democratic system to reach power and then destroy democracy, is hypocritical and completely rejected both Islamically and democratically. That does not mean that we (as a party) are supportive of everything in the Iraqi constitution, or of all the different practices that have developed over the last three years. Our position is that we are in support of the principles that the Iraqi political process has been built on, namely freedom and democracy, and we will work to address the areas where we feel there are weaknesses. This is of course a natural process, as constitutions and political practices and conventions evolve over time.

Q: *What is your reaction to those movements who see themselves as Islamist, but who regard democracy as heresy and as imitation of the West?*

IA: This is a point of view. If it is based on carrying and using weapons, then it is a dangerous one that is rejected and must be resisted. We believe that there is no conflict between Islam and democracy; they believe that there is. Let us then have a dialogue with one another. Democracy did not begin in the US. It has its roots in ancient civilisations like ancient Greece. Democracy then was partial, in that women and slaves, amongst others, were not allowed to vote, meaning that it was restricted to about 10% of the population. Since then, democracy has developed amongst different nations and different cultures and shows different characteristics depending on the society that adopts it. What has allowed all the different groups in Iraq – the Arab, the Kurd and the Turkoman, the Muslim, Assyrian and Sabian – to reach the parliament and debate live on television broadcasts seen around the world? This is a great advantage of democracy. To those who disagree, we say that society is open and we invite them try to convince people of their views through open dialogue if they believe they are right. But to impose their view on people, that is what cannot be allowed to happen.



Let us now consider the impact of the changes taking place in Iraq on the region and on the wider world.

Q: There are those who claim that a democratic Iraq poses a threat to countries of the region, especially neighbouring ones, which explains why these countries are interfering in Iraq today in defence of their national interests. What is your opinion on the alleged threat that a democratic Iraq poses to its neighbours and to the region?

IA: Democracy in Iraq came to help Iraqis build a new state and to govern their affairs away from the dictatorship of old times. It did not come as a means to intervene in the affairs of other countries and so it does not pose a threat to any neighbouring country. Just as we Iraqis do not wish nor allow any country to interfere in our affairs, so we do not allow ourselves to interfere in the domestic affairs of others. This is the first point. However, nobody today lives in isolation from everybody else. This means that changes in Iraq will without a doubt have some sort of impact on other countries, particularly our neighbours and those in the region. One example is the enhanced role of Iraqi women in politics and society. I feel that this has been a good change, perhaps convincing other nations to follow suit, hence the moves towards greater political participation for women in some countries in the region. Such influence, however, is not part of a deliberate state policy attempting to interfere in the domestic politics of other nation-states. It is the free choice of other countries of the region to take or reject as much or as little as they wish from the Iraqi experience, just as we have taken and are continuing to take from others as we form our own experience.

Q: How then do you assess Iraq's current relations with countries of the region and how do you see them developing in the future?

IA: Iraq inherited a bad situation: a relationship of war with Iran, the precedent of the occupation of Kuwait, mutual suspicions with Saudi Arabia and tense relations with Turkey, Jordan and Syria. Since August 2003, we have worked to turn a new page. We are building much firmer and more positive relations with Kuwait, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iran and we hope to do the same in the future with Syria. Geography has made us neighbours and it is to our mutual benefit that we establish peaceful relations within the region. We have abandoned Saddam's aggressive policy and we have replaced it with policy that looks to build ties based on the desire for peace and the pursuit of mutual interests.



Q: There are those who say that the opposite is occurring today – Iraq's neighbours are the ones meddling in Iraq's affairs?

IA: We hear of such talk, but here we must make an important distinction. There is a difference between what a government's policy and stance is and what some of its citizens' actions may be. There is a difference between a state which allows its land to be used as a training ground for terrorists and one in which this happens despite the government's efforts to eradicate such occurrences. To give you an example, there were two Kuwaiti terrorists who entered Iraq, whom the Kuwaiti prime minister – who is not an Emir – made me aware of when I was prime minister. Their entry into Iraqi territory for the purposes of committing acts of terror does not mean that Kuwait is against Iraq nor against the changes taking place. Indeed, Kuwait was one of the first to celebrate with Iraqis the fall of dictatorship and the birth of democracy. We seek to build strong ties with everybody in the region. We wish to work together to fight terrorism, which at the end of the day strikes everybody. For example, Jordan became a target not too long ago.

Q: You have talked about this idea of a 'democratic club' – how do you see Iraq's ties with the democratic countries of the world, ties which should of course be strong economically, politically and culturally?

IA: We want them to be strong on all these levels. When you open up to countries of the 'democratic club,' you find much held in common. They understand and appreciate the value of a democratically elected prime minister and government. You share common values and equal respect and a rejection of those regimes that impose themselves on their people through force and coercion. Iraq, once it stabilises, will also be a centre for foreign investment and here democratic countries, especially those who have helped Iraq over the last few difficult years, will be invited to participate. Thus, rebuilding Iraq will create another opportunity for building firm ties with democratic countries in particular.

Q: Finally, Dr. Jaafari, can Iraq become a beacon for democracy in the future, in a region which has been ruled with an iron fist for decades?

IA: I believe so. This is not a choice we are making nor a deliberate government policy. I think it will come automatically when other societies witness the benefits of democracy and the respect it affords to society. In this way, democracy becomes a project of natural growth, arising because of shared values in humanity and because of the desire of all societies to live a free, prosperous and dignified life.



Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul, eds. *Revolution in Orange: The Origin of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*.

Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2006. 216 pp. \$16.95 (pbk). ISBN 0870032216.

Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*.

New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. 256 pp. \$27.50 (hbk). ISBN 03001129042006.

JASON ANDERSON (USAID Afghanistan)

Imagine journalists and political analysts at the Boston Tea Party or at the storming of the Bastille, witnessing revolutions first-hand and relating them with insiders' knowledge. In such a fashion do essays recount Ukraine's dramatic 2004 presidential election in *Revolution in Orange: The Origin of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*. Two experts of post-Soviet politics edit the volume and contribute their own accounts.

Laying aside these essays momentarily, the events leading to the 'revolution' (a term which, in hindsight, some feel is too strong) read like a thrilling novel, with plotting domestic and foreign authorities, a flamboyant female oligarch with a murky past, and a modest, clean-boy banker who became the hope of protesters. Leonid Kuchma, president of Ukraine from 1994 to 2004, had picked his successor Viktor Yanukovich who went into a runoff against Viktor Yushenko, the banker. After Yanukovich was declared winner amidst ballot irregularities, the plot climaxed with a two-week, round-the-clock protest in the November snow, followed by an eventual re-run from which Yushenko emerged victorious.

Reading these essays, three aspects of the revolutionary saga come to the fore. First, public disdain for the Kuchma administration. The all-but-unproven links of Kuchma to the murder of a journalist in 2000 were the beginning of the end, combined with the timing of Yushenko's September poisoning. Second, the strength of civil society. Organized

youth activists proved foot soldiers in regional politicking and exit polls, helping to sway fence-sitting voters and provide an 'alternative' to the state-controlled vote tallies. Third, the ability of the opposition to bypass state media limitations. Effective use of the internet, related in the chapter by *Ukrainska Pravda* editor Olena Prytula, in addition to a single low-wattage TV station provided the underdogs with unprecedented national coverage.

The election was also a referendum of industrial, Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine versus European Union (EU) oriented western Ukraine. Two Russian authors analyse the election through Russian eyes. George Soros's rumoured support of the opposition in Georgia's 2003 'Rose Revolution,' and ads of 'Bushschenko' (a combined facial picture of George W. Bush and Yushchenko) worked in the authorities' favour, while voters were disgusted with the obvious linking of Yanukovych with Kuchma and Russian oligarch interests. Most accounts are that with generous help from Kremlin go-betweens, the Yanukovych camp outspent all others by 5 to 10 times, even considering United States and EU grants for domestic non-governmental organisations that specialised in voter education.

Left virtually unmentioned, however, is the major paradigm shift that transcends the question of who funded what. The Kuchma administration was fooling most of the people some of the time, through blatant machinations and murder. Since elections in the early 1990s, it appeared that more widespread democratic change was simply a matter of time. An active civil society and campaign missteps by the authorities allowed voters to speak in Ukraine in 2004, mostly because they had tools to do so under an evolving governance paradigm of enfranchisement and transparency.

This collection includes contributions from native Ukrainians close to the events, yet it fails to explore electoral fraud and the questionable past of co-oppositionist Yulia Tymoshenko. By contrast, Andrew Wilson's *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* fully airs the dirty laundry, including transcripts of conspiring election officials as well as someone ('probably' Kuchma) caught on covert recordings. More of a detailed chronology, Wilson's book fills in the gaps and rewards those inclined to read beyond the headlines.

On the whole, *Revolution in Orange* is critical and personal, yet at times gushing; it is detailed and well documented yet slightly nostalgic. As over half of the authors are Ukrainian, and of those almost all living in Ukraine, they recount the events with understandable elation. All writers do distil the message, as in the chapter on the activist group *Pora!*, that 'a broad-based democratic movement challenged a pseudo-democratic

regime that was determined to prolong its rule through electoral falsification' and won.¹ Skilfully building coalitions and driving ideological wedges into oppressive governments – these are the lessons for aggrieved oppositions elsewhere – lessons that emerge from both books.

Notes

¹ Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul, *Revolution in Orange: The Origin of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2006), 85.

Milada Anna Vachudova. *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism.*

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 280pp. £21.00 (pbk). ISBN 0199241198.

Heather Grabbe. *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe.*

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 224 pp. £45.00 (hbk). ISBN 1403949034.

DIMITAR BECHEV (European Studies Centre, St Antony's College, University of Oxford)

Both popular perceptions and academic discourse often link the spread of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with accession to the EU. Indeed, the Union's eastward enlargement – which culminated in the big-bang expansion of May 2004 and the recent addition of Bulgaria and Romania – was guided by the Copenhagen criteria, stressing, among other things, democratic governance. The consolidation of CEE democracies – like southern European countries' movement away from authoritarianism in the 1970s – proceeded hand-in-hand with their drawing closer to the EU. Yet, the con-

nection is far from straightforward. Analysts have warned that convergence with EU standards boosts national executives at the expense of parliaments, and tends to narrow the space for party competition. Pushed to its extreme, this criticism links the loss of sovereignty associated with Europeanisation with the rise of populist xenophobes, from Andrzej Lepper in Poland to the Ataka party in Bulgaria. So how potent a democratisation catalyst is the EU? What are the instruments of influence at its disposal, beyond the mere attraction of membership? What are the benefits and limits of EU influence?

These are some of the questions examined by Milada Anna Vachudova and Heather Grabbe, both long-time observers of EU enlargement. Their books look at the process from different angles. While Vachudova pays attention to domestic political developments in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, Grabbe concentrates on the EU itself, the evolution of its policy, and the 'nuts and bolts' of enlargement. Grabbe is also more focused, surveying the areas of free movement of persons and border controls in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. For all its engagement with the EU, Vachudova's book reads like a grand overview of the politics and economics of CEE since the *annus mirabilis* of 1989. While dealing with enlargement, Grabbe is more interested in the Europeanisation of public policy – the 'download', as she calls it, of templates and institutions from the EU level to member states, both old and new.

The books provide different accounts of enlargement. Europe Undivided argues that CEE faced two distinctive scenarios in the early 1990s. In some countries, pre-1989 opposition to communism evolved into strong pro-reform parties following a 'liberal path'. Others such as Slovakia, Romania and, to some degree, Bulgaria were dominated by former elites and retained features of authoritarianism. At the same time, Vachudova observes that in those early years the EU exercised only passive leverage and did not directly intervene in domestic politics. This changed by 1997, when the accession process got underway in earnest and the European Commission developed more sophisticated conditionality instruments reaching deep into the politics and economics of candidate countries ('active leverage'). In Vachudova's view, passive leverage alone was incapable of transforming the 'illiberal' countries, whose governments paid lip service to the goal of EU membership, but engaged in the politics of ethnic intolerance or economic mismanagement. By contrast, active leverage, as demonstrated by Vladimír Mečiar's fall from power in Slovakia in 1998, boosted pro-reform politicians and ultimately contributed to democratic convergence across CEE. Although Vachudova believes that domestic conditions matter greatly for the outcome of political and economic transition, she credits the EU for 'locking-in' and steering democratisation.

Grabbe's assessment is more nuanced. She believes that the EU had a great deal of potential influence over the candidate countries, but she also

alerts us to the constraints the Union faced. EU demands were often vague, preventing the Commission and member states from effectively coordinating their policies and allowing CEE politicians space for manoeuvre. During the negotiations, the EU used its bargaining power, which stemmed from asymmetric interdependence with CEE, to obtain outcomes which were not easy to accept for the candidate countries, notably the temporary closure of EU labour markets and exclusion from Schengen. This was bound to result in political backlash in countries like Poland, where even mainstream politicians adopted a combative attitude towards Brussels, not to mention the populists of the extreme left and right. What also emerges from Grabbe's account is that Europeanisation affected state machines rather than societies at large. Its scope and depth depended on the policy-implementing capacity of institutions and on prior experience of EU standards (in Hungary this experience dated from as far back as the 1980s). For Grabbe, accession 'exacerbated statist tendencies in CEE, which were already evident owing to previous decades of state socialism'.¹

Vachudova acknowledges these criticisms but is more relaxed about their seriousness. Important areas such as healthcare, education and social protection remain outside the EU's reach and, therefore, open to domestic debate and political competition. Secondly, concerns about the quality of political systems are less relevant for the 'liberal' countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary), which had developed all the features of a healthy democracy by the mid-1990s. However, these arguments might be an easy way to avoid the question. In all societies concerned, EU membership has done little to legitimise political elites in the eyes of voters. Recent years witnessed, in countries as diverse as Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria, the rising popularity of actors contesting the established consensus on economic and social liberalisation. At the same time, large segments of society, particularly in 'laggard' countries like Bulgaria and Romania, trust Brussels institutions more than their own elites, and consider it legitimate that the EU should tie the hands of those elites. While the EU has done much to improve the quality of governance across the region, there is no simple answer to questions about the EU's impact on democracy in CEE.

Notes

¹ Heather Grabbe, *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 208.

Rasma Karklins *The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post-Communist Societies.*

115

New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005. 219pp. \$25.95 (pbk). ISBN 0-7656-1634-3.

MONICA CIOBANU (Plattsburgh State University of New York)

The System Made Me Do It makes a valuable and overdue contribution to the study of corruption and its relationship to democratic consolidation in post-communist countries. Whilst previous studies of democratization emphasize the rule of law, accountability and transparency as essential aspects of a substantive or institutionalized democracy, this book is the first comprehensive attempt to bring theory together with comparative data on post-communist corruption.

The author argues from a neo-institutional perspective that the right institutions can challenge citizens' ingrained attitudes and behaviours. Since the culture of corruption is embedded in existing institutional structures, improving the institutions would diminish corruption and dissuade citizens from accepting it. The author supports this argument with a diverse methodology combining quantitative and qualitative data from targeted surveys of firms, experts and officials, as well as case studies and discourse analysis. Examples from Russia, the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania provide a clear illustration of how corruption is viewed and experienced by local citizens and government officials, including law enforcement officers.

The legacies of communism and the specific conditions of transition resulted in permissive attitudes towards corruption. The communist regime taught ordinary people to rely on close networks of family and friends for material and non-material goods and services. Corrupt activities penetrated daily interactions between public officials and citizens, exacerbated by intentional bureaucratic over-regulation and disorganization. The resulting mistrust in state institutions was aggravated during transition by the opportunities for corruption during privatization.

The author's ultimate conclusion is that three interrelated strategies are critical to containing corruption: the de-monopolization of decision-making, the limitation of discretion and the strengthening of accountability. To paraphrase the author, the system can undo what it made me do. Unfortunately, with the exception of the public health care system,¹ there are few concrete examples illustrating how this proposed anti-cor-

ruption strategy could be put into practice. A good test of the effectiveness of institutional anticorruption reforms would be the recent preparations of Bulgaria and Romania for accession to the European Union.

Especially provocative and cogent is the chapter on 'The Opposites of Corruption,' about the relationship between corrupt behaviour and weak institutional legitimacy. In the absence of a clear separation between public and private morality, corruption undermines the equality of citizens before the law and throws into question the ideas of citizenship and democratic legitimacy. Given this state of affairs, it may seem dubious that positive change can be expected from reformed or new institutions. After reading this book, however, even readers unconvinced by neo-institutional theory will be less fatalistic about corruption. *The System Made Me Do It* should be recommended to students of democracy and comparative politics, policy-makers, and all those involved with civil society.

Notes

¹ Rasma Karklins, *The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post-Communist Societies* (New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), 115-120.

Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, *Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty*

Oxford: OUP, 2006. 232pp. £14.99 (hardcover). ISBN 0195189671.

ANOUSH EHTESHAMI (Durham University)

The success of the little-known Dr Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran's 9th presidential elections in June 2005 reopened the debate about the nature of politics in Iran. Here was a man, elected mayor of Tehran with little more than a 12% turnout in 2003, who not only forced an unprecedented second round in the country's long-established presidential vote, but went on to defeat with a large margin the favourite

candidate, former president Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (1989 – 1997). Ahmadinejad's platform of social justice, a return to the revolutionary ideals of the Islamic Republic and an effort to end corruption resonated with the electorate. His ability to move the agenda away from the norms established by the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997 – 2005) displayed a mastery not previously associated with Ahmadinejad. Peddling a populist-nationalist agenda and rejecting 'liberal' values, he managed to wean the people off Khatami's diet of social and political reforms. Rafsanjani's inability to read the public mood, the Council of Guardians' weighting of the electoral system against reformists and the massive mobilization of support for Ahmadinejad in the week leading to the second vote had much to do with his success. But there are deeper forces that can explain the pendulum of modern Iranian politics according to a recent book by two distinguished scholars of Iran.

In *Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty*, Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr make the strong argument that a unique form of democracy has become an unintended consequence of the 1979 revolution. Even Ahmadinejad, who vehemently rejects democracy, had to submit himself to the ballot box. Gheissari, professor of history at the University of San Diego, and Nasr, professor of Middle East and South Asian politics at the Naval Postgraduate School, argue that even if Iranian state behaviour does not (normatively) reflect democratic values, 'in many regards Iranian society has already turned the corner'.¹ Society, they contend, has already adopted the democratic ethos at the grass-roots level due to reasons located in the modern history of Iran. The authors trace the century-old struggle of the Iranian state and society for modernity through the lens of efforts to democratize both. Their main contention is that the focus on the 1979 revolution has generated a degree of determinism or 'tunnel vision' in the study of Iranian history and politics which has produced a 'simplified and predetermined view of events, a sort of cul de sac history'.²

To fully understand the forces at play in Iran today, the revolution must be viewed as 'an interregnum in a longer process of state-building that began in 1905 and is still unfolding'.³ To place the revolution in its proper context, Gheissari and Nasr take stock of state-building efforts since the 1905 Constitutional Revolution which produced new political practices, language and attitudes. These early gains were not consolidated because of deep disagreements among factions about the extent of democratic rights being proposed, foreign pressure and the ability of the old order to adapt itself to the new environment. In the end, fear of disintegration encouraged a centralizing tendency and a new political

role for the military. Although the military lost its shine in subsequent years, the authoritarianism that this period spawned persisted until 1979. After the Pahlavi regime Iran found itself in the grip of a wholly religious identity as clerics strove to redefine the nature and priorities of the Iranian state. The revolution and the war that followed, argue Gheissari and Nasr, enabled the further extension of state authority into civil society. But the process of state-building did not end there. After the 8-year war with Iraq, a new president (Hashemi-Rafsanjani) put forward a more developmentalist set of objectives. Ironically, the failures of the 'Second Republic' created the conditions for the rise of a pro-democracy movement.⁴ For the next eight years Khatami experimented with the democracy game but conservatives rallied to weaken his reforms and eventually used the same electoral system that had brought the reformists success to end their rule.

Iran post-Khatami, therefore, should be examined from the perspective of history and the ongoing struggle (over time and over regime types) for democracy. The battle between the state and society has not ended and Iranians today are debating the same core issues that their grandparents debated in 1905 – 1906. The rise of Ahmadinejad represents a turning point in the struggle between democracy and state-building, but if I am reading Gheissari and Nasr's argument correctly, it cannot represent the outcome of that struggle. Being wise scholars, Gheissari and Nasr refrain from commenting on how long the struggle will continue and how it might end. It is therefore with great anticipation that I look forward to reading their thoughts on the impact of Ahmadinejad's presidency on the century-long battle for democracy in Iran.

Notes

¹ Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, *Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty* (Oxford: OUP, 2006), vi.

² *Ibid.*, 9.

³ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 128.

Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*.

119

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. 400 pp. \$24.95 (pbk). ISBN 069112275X.

RICHARD PONZIO (St Antony's College, University of Oxford)

From international wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, to conflicts within states, the United Nations' (UN) democratic peacebuilding activities have never been more important. Applying relevant theories and methods to the study of UN peace operations, Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis seek to explain how well the UN functions in assisting the reconstruction of peace in war-torn lands. Doyle and Sambanis, who are professors at Columbia and Yale respectively, refer to peacebuilding as 'an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution.'¹ In more practical terms, peacebuilding is an effort to strengthen state institutions, increase political participation, and deepen civil society. Through statistical analysis of all civil wars since 1945 and ten case studies – four of which are painted as failures for the UN – Doyle and Sambanis argue that success (or failure) to build sustainable peace is influenced by three key factors: first, the factions' degree of hostility; second, the extent of local capacities remaining after the war; and third, the amount of international assistance. Though the UN is poor at imposing a settlement by force, UN operations with a transformational, democratic development mandate contribute to a reduction in violence and to positive or 'participatory peace' rather than solely the termination of war (or 'negative peace').²

The strength of this book is its style and scope, using sophisticated quantitative measurements. In a vast literature on peacekeeping and peacebuilding based predominantly on empirical, single case studies, the comprehensive survey by Doyle and Sambanis improves our understanding of the bigger picture about when and how the UN can best intervene in armed conflicts. Building on Doyle's earlier research on democratisation and inter-state conflict,³ the book's rich theoretical framework (chapter two) and ample references to post-war democratization further challenge the reader to consider the conditions under which external actors can facilitate democratic reforms and improve the management of intra-state conflict.

On the other hand, the choice of the study's ten cases raises questions about possible selection bias. Moreover, the cases are not covered in the level

of detail necessary to substantiate many of the authors' qualitative findings and policy prescriptions. For instance, Doyle and Sambanis' seven-step plan for sequencing the management of peacebuilding generalizes the timing and importance of specific activities that will vary, sometimes widely, between UN missions. By concurring with Roland Paris, Elizabeth Cousens and other scholars who argue that security and the rule of law should precede political liberalization, the authors underestimate both the limited staying power of the international community and the benefits of an integrated strategy, in which security and the rule of law are reinforced from the outset by political participation.

Another problem is the authors' interchangeable use of 'peacebuilding' and 'peacekeeping', leading to an occasional lack of conceptual clarity. This is a missed opportunity given that the proponents of the new UN Peacebuilding Commission continue to struggle to define the parameters of peacebuilding. Similarly, the proxies assigned for measuring local and international capacities (both argued to be central to peacebuilding outcomes) privilege quantifiable over less tangible indicators that are equally relevant, such as the skill level of civil servants and politicians and their political legitimacy. The authors also emphasize increased economic assistance to minimize the risk of renewed fighting, without elaborating adequately the rationale or the specific types of international support required.

Notwithstanding the above weaknesses, *Making War and Building Peace* is a groundbreaking study in the peacebuilding and post-war democratisation literature. Bringing flesh to Doyle and Sambanis' seminal article on peacebuilding⁴ through the introduction of a theoretical framework, case studies, and a detailed statistical analysis of modern civil wars, it will prove invaluable to a new generation of scholarship. *Making War and Building Peace* will also help guide policy debates about the UN's comparative advantages in the field of peace and security.

Notes

¹ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 22.

² *Ibid.*, 114.

³ For his classic work on the democratic peace theory, see: Michael W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs (Parts I and II),' *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, no. 3-4 (1983).

⁴ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,' *American Political Science Review*, vol. 94, No.4, December 2000.

John Anderson, ed. *Religion, Democracy and Democratization*.

121

London: Routledge, 2006. 225 pp. £65.00 (hbk). ISBN 0415355370.

A. ALEXANDER STUMMVOLL (St Antony's College, University of Oxford)

*Religion, Democracy and Democratization*¹ consists of ten essays about the complex relationship between religion and democracy. The overall questions posed by editor John Anderson (University of St Andrews) are twofold. Firstly, how have religious belief systems engaged with the idea of democracy and processes of democratization? Secondly, do these forms of religious engagement have any impact on the emergence and consolidation of democracy?

Traditionally, emphasis has been placed on the political 'multivocality' of religious belief systems. This concept refers to the idea that all religions contain intellectual resources that can be used to promote democratic as well as anti-democratic projects. This view is shared by some contributors. Anoush Ehteshami, for example, argues that whereas certain Islamic concepts such as *shura* (consultative council) or *ijma* (consensus) lead towards democracy, other elements such as the location of sovereignty in God (rather than the people) and attitudes towards minority rights point in more problematic directions. The ambivalence of political Islamism is also pointed out by Claire Heristchi's chapter on the Islamist discourse of the *Front Islamique du Salut* and the democratic experience in Algeria, 1989-1992.

The major strength of the book is in highlighting the limits of 'multivocality'. Anderson emphasizes that 'at any one point in time, the dominant voices and practical political circumstances may work more or less in support of democratization efforts.'² This analysis fills a gap in the literature whose recent methodological 'alert for multivocality'³ has promoted the idea that every religion, in theory, is compatible with democracy. The volume adds value by rightly stressing that such an insight can only be the starting point and not the conclusion of scholarly analysis. The consequences of religion's engagement with democracy are more vital than their theoretical compatibility.

The volume captivates the reader with its array of empirical case studies which come down on one of three sides. First, religion can

make a positive difference. Steve Bruce claims that 'there is a strong and non-accidental relationship between the rise of Protestantism and the rise of democracy,'⁴ even if causal links such as toleration, privatization of religion or egalitarianism are often unintended consequences. In their analysis of the Catholic Church's role in the post-1990 democratic consolidation in Hungary and the Czech Republic, Zsolt Enyedi and Joan O'Mahony note a 'substantial contribution to the development of democratic norms,'⁵ which manifests itself in the avoidance of populist or demagogue appeals and the active promotion of social progress and minority rights.

Second, religion can make little or no difference. Examining the relationship between evangelical Protestantism and democratization in Latin America and Asia, Paul Freston stresses that 'the fragmentation of evangelicalism means its direct political impact is always smaller than might be hoped or feared.'⁶ Based on a statistical analysis of Latin American evangelical Protestants, Anthony Gill adds that 'denominational affiliation had little impact on economic and political attitudes.'⁷

Third, religion can make a negative difference by thwarting the emergence and consolidation of democracy. In these instances, democratization happens in spite of and not because of religion. Jeff Haynes's chapter on sub-Saharan Africa concludes that, despite the notable exception of South Africa, 'religious actors have not been able to help advance democracy beyond a stage often characterized by cosmetic rather than substantial changes.'⁸ Chetan Butt claims that despite Hindu nationalism's alleged tolerance and diversity, its leaders undermine democracy in India by pursuing antisectional and authoritarian policies which are at odds with minority rights and democratic ideals. And Duncan McCargo disagrees with the widespread belief in Buddhism's benign political nature, noting that 'Buddhism in the Thai context has become an authoritarian religion, intolerant of dissent and unwilling to accept critical voices.'⁹

Few, if any, single works have dealt with religion's political significance for democracy in such breadth and diversity before. While the authors could have gone further in identifying the causal links between religion and democratization, the book makes a persuasive case. Moreover, Anderson's lucid literature review and elaboration of the limits of religious 'multivocality'¹⁰ deserve to become required reading for anyone interested in the relationship between religion and democracy.

¹ Previously published as a special issue of the journal *Democratization*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2004).

² John Anderson, ed. *Religion, Democracy and Democratization* (London: Routledge, 2006), 214.

³ See, for example, the seminal chapter by Alfred Stepan, 'The World's Religious System and Democracy: Crafting the 'Twin Tolerations,' in *Arguing Comparative Politics*, Alfred Stepan (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 223.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 87.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 160.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 192-217.

Khaled Abou El Fadl, *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy*.

Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004. 136 pp. \$16.95 (pbk). ISBN 0-691-11938-4.

AMR YOSSEF (School of International Studies, University of Trento)

The idea that Islam and liberal democracy are incongruent owes its popularity to the 9/11 attacks, to the reality of authoritarianism in the Islamic world and to the recent electoral victories of anti-Western Islamists in the Middle East. *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy* challenges the received wisdom, arguing instead that Islam and democracy are compatible.

The lead essay by Khaled Abou El Fadl, an Islamic jurist and American lawyer, asserts that the Islamic tradition of legal-political thinking contains ideas of representation and consultation, without providing a direct link with democracy. Hence, Abou El Fadl makes the case for de-

mocracy by invoking the Islamic idea that humans are God's vicegerents – meaning that God's sovereignty does not rule out human agency in the socially-conditioned interpretation of divine principles. Moreover, he links the core values of Islam (justice, consultative governance and mercy) with those of democracy.

From this perspective, the power of Muslim rulers is constrained by consultation and they are ultimately accountable to their peoples. At the same time, governments should be bound by Shari'ah moral commitments and should not invoke *Shari'ah* to pass laws that contradict these very commitments, such as Saudi restrictive laws against women. Abou El Fadl evokes the Quranic core values of justice and diversity, which democratic systems seek to protect. Along with mercy, these values are re-analysed so that the commitment to human rights becomes an integral part of respecting God's vicegerents and pursuing the ultimate goal of justice.

Eleven essays provide critical responses to this argument. Noah Feldman and Bernard Haykel emphasise the need for a more articulate synthesis of Islamic democracy and for securing popular support. Muqtadar Khan suggests that Abou El Fadl's discussion glosses over political philosophy, and proposes the Medina Compact as the Islamic model of social contract. Mohammad Fadel criticizes Abou El Fadl for venturing too far from traditional Islamic theology whose view that 'the first moral obligation of a human being is inquiry'¹ would have strengthened Abou El Fadl's case.

Some contributors, such as Kevin Reinhart and Saba Mahmood, find fault with Abou El Fadl's idealisation of Western liberalism, suggesting that the West could also learn from Islam. Nader Hashemi and John Esposito are concerned about the prospects of Islamic democracy, arguing that the West should observe its own democratic ideals when dealing with the Islamic world and allow reforms to emerge from within. Abou El Fadl's reply to these critiques endorses some of them while disagreeing mainly with Khan who, in Abou El Fadl's view, has arbitrarily selected the Medina Compact as the sole model of Islamic democracy. Also, he considers that Fadel's suggestion on traditional theology neglects the necessarily context-contingent reading of religion.

Attempts to indigenise democracy within an Islamic framework are by no means new. Nonetheless, unlike advocates who rely on textual interpretations of the Quran, Abou El Fadl's approach is novel in adhering to the core values of Islam and those of democracy. Through his in-depth comparison, Abou El Fadl vividly demonstrates the compatibility between Islam and democracy. His essay is enriched by other contributors who widen the debate. The main drawback of these accounts, however,



is privileging theory over application. The book would have been more compelling if at least one contributor had presented practical proposals or examined real-world attempts to reconcile Islam with democracy, as in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Islam and the Challenge of Democracy is insightful and coherent, with serious implications for promoting democracy in the Islamic world. Authoritarianism is the product not of the teachings of Islam, which are essentially congruent with democracy, but of the politics of Muslim autocrats. The weaknesses of Western democracy should not preclude Muslims from drawing upon this model. Lastly, in the opinion of this reviewer, the West should not undermine the legitimacy of democratically-elected Islamists such as Hamas. To do otherwise would be to deepen the (mis)perception that the 'war on terror' is a cover for a war on Islam.

Notes

¹ Khaled Abou El Fadl, *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 83.








 **trusted advisor**
to energy companies and government
organizations around the globe

 **expert**
a diverse team of experts and advisors

 **global**
membership, advisory and consulting services on
energy markets and companies worldwide

 **integrated**
sector and regional expertise across the
energy value chain



The International Politics Of Oil Call For Papers



St Antony's International Review

129

One of the consequences of human dependence on oil has been the task of managing extraordinary economic, political, social and environmental risks. Yet in an increasingly carbon-constrained world, with insatiable global demand and finite supply, the challenge has become ever more acute. This special issue invites academic and policy experts as well as young researchers from a range of intellectual backgrounds to reflect upon the political implications posed by humankind's continuing consumption of oil. The Editors are particularly keen to attract analysis with a regional focus.

Areas of enquiry could include, but are not limited to, the following:

Oil in foreign policy and conflict

Oil is often presumed to be a trump card in foreign policy and a source of conflict, effectively sidelining the causes of human rights, democracy and the environment. Yet to what extent is this the case and, conversely, what difference does it make when oil is not present?

Oil and development

The Middle East fostered the model of the rentier state in world politics. Other countries such as

Nigeria and Russia have given us the notion of oil kleptocracies. How analytically useful are these models today, and what can we learn from examples of the new oil producing states found in Africa or Central Asia? To what extent are the livelihood interests of indigenous peoples in oil-rich regions now a central consideration for public and private authorities?

Political economy of the hydrocarbon industries

In what ways or to what extent is Big Oil threatened by the rise of resource nationalism and the ambitions of national oil companies, notably in consumer markets such as China and India, and in producer states such as Russia and Saudi Arabia?

Methodological problems

Is the world running out of oil, or into new supplies? What are the origins and consequences of inaccurate or politicised data?

Managing the global commons

Is corporate social responsibility within the oil industry simply 'greenwash'? Has the long-term prospect of continued decline in supply coincided with, or indeed forced, a philosophical paradigm shift regarding the consumption of fossil fuels specifically and the environment more generally?

For information on guidelines for contributors, please see the frontpage of our website at:
<http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/jcr/STAIR>
or email stair@sant.ox.ac.uk

St Antony's College Oxford
OX2 6JF UK
fax 44 (0) 1865 554465

DEADLINE: January 31, 2006.

130 *Back Cover*