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Editorial Introduction

The Resurgence of Identity Politics New Phenomena or Echoes of History?

Katharine Brooks, Molly McParland, and Jeremy Pilaar

Despite scholars' predictions that identity politics were a dying phenomenon, it now appears that these ways of political thinking, once thought to be redundant, have been resurrected in new forms. The nationalist ideologies of the twentieth century have been displaced not by an era of co-operation and harmony but by new identity clashes. Across the world, nations and groups are persistently defining their politics by 'who they are' rather than 'what they want.' At the international level, meanwhile, nations and groups are progressively organizing and identifying on a regional basis—sparking fierce debate as to how regions can be defined—who belongs and who does not. Indeed, it would seem that the quest for identity and belonging in a globalized world remains one of the most important themes of the current global political arena—dictating policies, alliances, patterns of conflict and co-operation, and the relationship between the twenty-first century individual and the world they inhabit.

Questions of identity thus have several important consequences for the politics of the future. The first is that the political projects of élite groups, such as the European Union, are falling foul of the discontent of national polities. The question of how to cultivate a regional identity that is capable of competing with resurgent nationalism is therefore an essential part of rescuing the European project. The second is that fabricated narratives of civilizational clash appear now to have the potential to conjure these clashes into an emerging reality. It is becoming increasingly clear that academics cannot simply ignore this narrative; it has already proven too potent to be dismissed. Rather, this narrative must be contested by a truer retelling of history. This issue thus seeks to reinvigorate the conversation about identity politics and investigate the

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continuing significance of the question 'who are we?' for the politics of the twenty-first century. It investigates the role of questions of identity in the international and regional relations of states as well as its role in uniting and dividing individuals locally, nationally, and globally.

Seeking to draw from the experience of an academic who has worked on the topic of identity politics for many years, STAIR spoke to Craig Calhoun, director of the London School of Economics. Within this discussion, he argued, as he does in much of his work, against prevailing assumptions that the politics of identity are *necessarily* divisive. Rather, he sees that it can also be a powerful uniting force that underwrites the ability of groups to accept the costs of democratic losses and redistributive policies. What determines whether any given identity is inclusive or divisive, and the parameters of who may be included, depends upon the narration of the identity narrative. What emerged most clearly from this interview, however, is that many of the issues addressed by the authors in this journal have also manifested in other times and places: the challenges in creating new regional identities being the same challenges as those faced during the creation of national identities in previous eras. Similarly, the challenge immigrants face in being recognized as part of the national group was also faced by other members of that group in previous eras, such as those from peripheral regions, the working classes, and minority groups. Thus, issues that are often perceived to be new phenomena are in fact echoed throughout history. In the same vein, he argues that our current political identities have deep roots in time, with individual leaders and events having long legacies, more through the way they are interpreted by successive élites and masses over time, but of long duration nonetheless. Thus, only through understanding the history both of out own identities, and of the role of identity in previous historical eras can we truly address the challenges of the present.

In the first article in the journal, Jonathan Leader Maynard addresses the role of identity in conflict and seeks to challenge the work of scholars such as Mary Kaldor whose scholarship suggests that a fundamental shift in the dynamics of global political violence has taken place in recent times, involving a decline in 'ideological' conflicts, and a rise in conflicts of 'identity.' Instead, he contends that the 'identitarian narrative' is based upon two false assumptions, that questions of 'identity' and 'ideology' are somehow fundamentally different and that 'identity' is now a more fundamental part of conflict than it has been in the past. He then offers an alternative account of the importance of identity, and its relationship to violence. Leader Maynard suggests that the identitarian component of political ideologies impact on political violence in six ways. Firstly, through the provision of *mobilization co-ordinates* to political leaders seek-

ing to enact large scale violence; and thus requiring significant group participation. Secondly, in the creation of *targeting categories* or conceptual schemas identify the planned victims of the violence. Thirdly, as a means of providing coherent visualization of the *virtue system* of a given ideology—wherein perpetrators of violence are encouraged to align themselves with a valorization of violence and brutality as well as other specific moral goods that the virtue system prescribes. Fourthly, in the formation of obligation hierarchies within a specific identity groups and to the exclusion of other identity groups, or re-moulding a group's sense of moral obligations as tracking exclusive racial or national lines. Fifthly, in perpetuating a victimhood narrative wherein individuals of the perpetrator group are told that their own identity is the target of violence, or non-violent moral harm, therein legitimating their own acts of violence. Finally, the final and most affectively intense mechanism by which identities can influence violence is as an actual object of *group hatred*. He thus develops a more nuanced account of the precise role that questions of identity play in political violence

In the second article, Sophie Rodger investigates the role of identity in the unexpected endurance of de facto states. Utilizing the case studies of Taiwan and Northern Cyprus, Rodger argues that these isolated entities have fostered remarkably strong internal sovereignty owing to the highly effective nation-building measures employed by élites. Indeed, she argues that the forging of a cohesive national identity has ensured the survival of these states in the face of international predictions of their demise; and demonstrates how shifting perceptions of belonging have made these cold conflicts ever more intractable as time wears on. She investigates both the role of élites and popular discourse in the creation of distinct national identities in these unrecognized enclaves. She moreover finds that as these identities strengthen and develop away from the identity of the parent state, it becomes progressively harder for groups to imagine a future together, and the prospect of rejoining the parent state becomes gradually more remote.

Bettina Schorr addresses the question of the construction of regional political identities, examining specifically the rise and decline of a Latin American regional identity. This article seeks to address a deficit within an otherwise burgeoning literature on new regionalism, namely the lack of systemic analysis of the role of regional identity construction in processes of regional integration. In particular, it notes that the salience of a regional identity does not seem to mirror processes of regional integration. Taking the salience of a regional political identity as a dependent variable, it seeks to answer the question of why the notion of a regional identity is sometimes mobilized by political leaders and sometimes not.

Tracking its emergence from the writings of Simón Bolívar through to today, she argues that Latin American identity politics are in a constant state of flux with the 'regional identity' and competing national identities constantly vying for prominence. She also identifies the key role that individual leaders, in this case the figure of Hugo Chávez, in constructing, moulding, and elevating the regional identity.

In the last article, Isabella Hermann employs a constructivist angle to explain the deterioration in relations between Venezuela and the US following the election of Hugo Chávez. She rejects the conventional assumption that this deterioration in relations was either a natural product of changing power dynamics in Latin America or the result of aggressive and hostile behaviour on the part of Hugo Chávez. Rather, she argues that the deterioration in relations is the result of a fundamental disagreement over the 'status' of Venezuela within the international hierarchy. This article thus contributes to the constructivist literature on the role of identity and status in International Relations and offers a new perspective on the causes of the strained relations between the US and Venezuela.

General Section

Though the articles in the general section cover topics ranging from the norms surrounding aggressive warfare to the budding aid partnership between Mali and China, all three encourage scholars to re-evaluate some of the most prominent theoretical frameworks through which they currently examine global affairs. By challenging oft-cited concepts in the fields of International Relations and Development Studies, the authors uncover holistic analytical approaches that shine new light on the empirical cases they present and raise important questions for future research.

Anatoly Levshin revisits the tension between scholarly accounts dating the emergence of the crime of aggressive war to the signing of the 1945 London Charter and those arguing that such norms only arose in 2010, following the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in Kampala, Uganda. He questions conventional narratives that pit these two interpretations against one another by underlining that each falls prey to assumptions of non-monotonicity and bivalence, forcing scholars to espouse too restrictive a view of the historical record. By rejecting such suppositions, Levshin highlights the possibility of a theoretical compromise that both accommodates the norm's birth following World War II and concedes that it remained largely unrealized until after the turn of the millennium.

Paul Kramer works to reshape researchers' conceptual toolkit by critiquing the use of intersectional frameworks in analyses of development programs. Kramer outlines the bounds of intersectionality by explaining that it projects rigid (and often Westernized) categories onto developing world subjects, isolating a small set of essentialized characteristics instead of attempting to grapple with human complexity. Drawing on the experiences of queer subjects in the Philippines, India, and South Africa, Kramer notes that intersectional studies risk exposing practitioners to blind spots by limiting their gaze to a handful of such identity classifications. He contends that 'assemblage' can overcome this weakness by helping scholars detect the material processes that construct unique subject positions.

Finally, Clara Braungart brings further clarity to the realm of development intervention by couching her exploration of Sino-African relations in Honneth's theory of recognition. Braungart moves beyond the large body of scholarship solely interested in appraising aid partnerships' material results by stressing that recognition and humiliation fundamentally shape the processes by which such outcomes arise. Through an in-depth investigation of Malawian policymakers' relationships with Chinese donors, Braungart finds that the former's understanding of collaboration depends on a range of intangible factors, including the international prestige a project affords and the degree to which it interferes with national sovereignty. Braungart's work emphasizes that future research should employ more rigorous theoretical lenses to probe the symbolic dimensions of development partnerships alongside their more visible material counterparts. ■

Feature Interview: Craig Calhoun (LSE) in Conversation with STAIR

By Katharine Brooks

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Within this interview, Craig Calhoun, the Director of LSE and author of numerous publications on the topic of identity politics, is invited to comment on recent developments in the realm of identity politics, both nationally and globally, and to respond to the arguments of the articles within the journal.

STAIR: *Beginning then with a discussion of the role of identity in democratic politics: In your article on "Nationalism and Cultures of Democracy," you argued that democracy requires a "sentiment of common belonging [that is] strong enough that it enables citizens to absorb the frustration of losing political battles over particular policies and leaders while remaining committed to the larger structure of integration."[1] Drawing on this observation, some scholars and policymakers are suggesting, particularly in light of the failure of the Arab Spring, that a national sense of belonging and common interest is a precondition to democratization. To what extent do you agree with this claim?*

CC: I would argue that nationalism is useful, but not a precondition. It is certainly true that some form of social solidarity is a precondition for democratization but that doesn't necessarily entail the nationalist form of it. While nationalism has been the most common form in the modern era, there's no principled reason why the nation *has* to be the only forum in which democratic solidarities are created. The question then is what could be alternative units of solidarity? Cities, for example, are very plausible units—and here you of course have images of ancient cities—but you can imagine that cities today could be the units of belonging, of democratic provision, and that people could have an identity attachment to a city in the same way that they often have to a nation. It is certainly true, however, that modern democracy involves the creation of relation-

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ships among strangers and that there has to be a way of constructing solidarity between them, in whatever unit that democracy is operating in.

STAIR: *Following on from that, why do you think it is that some variations of nationalism are more favourable towards high levels of economic redistribution than others? So, for example, nationalism within Europe often appears to be more favourable towards high levels of economic redistribution than American nationalism.*

CC: I'm not sure that differences in the ideas of nationalism are the explanation for variations in redistributive policy. I do think that having a sense of solidarity with fellow citizens can underwrite redistributive policies, just as it can underwrite other government agendas or toleration for losing elections. However, the difference between the American and European case, although Europe generally has experienced ethnoculturally created nationalisms to a greater extent that the US, is more the result of historical circumstance. The big differences were the relative strength of socialist social democratic labour movements in Europe and the severity of the shocks caused by World War I, the Great Depression and World War II. It was these very severe shocks that essentially produced the post-World War II redistributive policies in that they led the élites to participate sufficiently in policies of redistribution. Moreover, the generalization that Europe has been favourable towards redistributive policies applies only to the period 1945–1975. There were nationalist ideologies before that, channelled into other things. In regard to facilitating redistribution at this point in time; although they were a condition, they were not the cause.

STAIR: *On a similar note, in your book, Nations Matter, you argue that nationalism generates feelings of social solidarity with fellow citizens and has thus been one of the background conditions on which modern democracy has been based.*[2] *What effect do you think high levels of immigration in recent decades have had upon levels of social solidarity within Western countries?*

CC: That is correct, nationalism is *one* of the background conditions. It's important to note that there are also more material kinds of integration that allow for democracy to operate. Along with ideas about nations, culture, language and a sense of belonging are the solidarities that are predicated upon various networks of solidarity inside a country. Immigrants are potentially a challenge to each of these but how that challenge is met is the real issue. We are familiar with discussions about the 'cultural' integration of immigrants, about their 'assimilation.' However,

we also need to think about whether immigrants integrate socially into a country, through intermarrying, living in mixed communities, attending the same schools, etc. It is equally, if not more important, that they integrate into these social networks, and I think that immigrants have, in general and over time, integrated significantly in both the European and North American context, as well as in Latin America and many other places. However, the challenge of immigration becomes much greater if that kind of social integration and network building does not happen.

This process of social integration can take a fairly long time, and often takes a generation or two. It's very often the children of immigrants who become more fully integrated. This process also takes longer, and is more difficult to ensure when immigration happens fast, or in large numbers, or is organized in ways that don't produce these social network nexuses. That is particularly the case where economic factors lead to segregation of immigrants into different housing and different life experiences. A good example of this is the situation of North African and Middle Eastern immigrants in the *banlieues* of Paris. In this case, minimal conditions of life are met but the conditions for social mobility and integration with the rest of the French population are weak. Within these areas, the people think of themselves as French—often Arab French or Muslim French—but still French. Yet, they are blocked from integrating socially with the rest of France, blocked from job opportunities, and blocked from educational opportunities. These are the factors that encourage some people from among the immigrant populations to react against the prospect of assimilation.

STAIR: *If we move now from the national level to the international arena, what role do you think processes of identity formation have played in current trends towards regional integration and co-operation?*

CC: When you say "current trends," it is not actually clear whether there is a trend towards greater regional integration at the moment or whether we are in the midst of a reversal of this process. The jury is still out as to the future trajectory of European regional integration in particular. In regard to the development of regional identities, however, it's evident that this again is shaped by histories of various kinds, histories of empires, religions, and wars. The stories of European identity prior to the EU were often stories of French vs. German, English vs. French and, for that matter, English vs. Scottish, as well as Catholic vs. Protestant, and these identity barriers had to be overcome. Moreover, the geography of Europe had to be rethought. Over 200 years of organizing geography through nation-states had to be fundamentally reconceived. So histories

matter, and the manner in which they get narrated into stories determines whether they are conducive either to division or to the formation of a collective identity. While stories bring people together, they also divide people: we've now had an efflorescence of stories about a common European identity but this has accentuated those features that separate Europe from other places, particularly the Muslim world, and has also deepened some divides within Europe.

If there is such a 'shift' going on, it is also the result of geopolitics, obviously aided by changing narratives of identity. In part the re-regionalization is the result of the weakness of, and failure to renew, global institutions. We still live with the Bretton Woods institutions and we lack the political will to reform them effectively, and this creates reasons to look for other institutional frameworks and structures. For example, Southeast Asian countries faced with Chinese power and with their own economic underdevelopment were incentivized, in the absence of strong global institutions capable of managing these problems, to form a series of regional alliances to foster trade, security and development. This eventually led to the creation of ASEAN and thus the beginnings of a process that could eschew in a strong Southeast Asian identity. Right now this identity is weak but regional integration is facilitating its growth.

STAIR: What factors, then, do you believe have inhibited the construction of pan-regional identities?

CC: The factors that make the construction of pan-regional identities difficult are very similar to the difficulties that were encountered in the construction of nations. The forging of national identities that corresponded to the boundaries of nation-states and the populations inside them was a long historical process in which people didn't necessarily believe that these were the units to start with. The putting together of France and the image of the 'Hexagon' had to contend with strong political rivalries. Several of the dukes were at various points more powerful, or at least as powerful, as the kings at the centre, and there was a lot of contestation, and indeed violence, during the process. There are also religious divisions to overcome. For example, there were horrific incidents during the creation of France, such as the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre of the Huguenots, an early example of ethnic cleansing.

There are a number of divisions that can inhibit the construction of collective identities: religion, culture, loyalty, and language. In some places one can be more important than the other, but in other places they often come together, with different religious or ethnic groups also being separated linguistically. There are also sub-national identities that

are influenced by part of the rest of the world more than they are influenced by the rest of the nation to which they belong; for example the south east of the UK may have stronger global relations, economically and culturally, than it has with the rest of the UK.

These obstacles to forming nation states are pretty much the same obstacles to forming pan-regional unity. The nations are like the dukes, they embody the same kind of regional differences in terms of language, culture, and religion, as the dukedoms of France did at the time of the forging of the French nation.

There are also material forces that can inhibit the creation of pan-regional identities. Just as the concept of the EU was popular when people thought it was improving their life chances, so during an economic crisis the public mood has shifted considerably. Over the last seven years, it is noticeable that the crisis has been overwhelmingly narrated in national terms. Prior to the economic crisis, there was considerable discussion of a European identity, admittedly more of an élite project than a popular one. But from 2008, the narrative of Europe, as told by the élite, has been in terms of its constituent nation states, not the greater whole. Reference is made to what is happening in Germany or Greece rather than Europe. As the benefits of the EU have been eclipsed by its troubles, the language of the narrative, and so the depth of the shared identity, has changed.

STAIR: *I'd now like to discuss the role of identity in conflict. In his article in the journal, Jonathan Leader Maynard counters the prevailing "identarian" narrative of contemporary conflict, arguing that all political identities are inherently ideological constructions, and contends that claims that modern conflicts are no longer ideological but rather "all about identity" are fundamentally misplaced. To what extent do you agree with this claim?*

CC: I would argue that you cannot make a categorical opposition between ideology and identity and I think people sometimes *identify* very closely with an ideology. For example, if you think of the history of the labour movement in which the identities of 'worker,' 'working class,' and 'labourer' were formed, it becomes clear that identity construction is never free from an element of ideology. I also think that present day conflicts include elements of political ideology, and of social identity, and of economic interest. I also agree that ideology is often central, is often key and, if you take a fairly expansive reading of the meaning of 'ideology,' it can also be the prism through which one interprets material interests.

Material interests are important, in and of themselves, however. It is a mistake to think that identity politics is ever just somehow about iden-

tities as though they were free floating cultural phenomena that didn't have material roots. Identities are also ways of understanding and codifying your material conditions; so you can identify the most important factor influencing your opportunities in life, be that your gender, your ethnicity or your religion, or any other identity. There's an interaction between the development of such an identity and the material conditions, albeit not through a one-to-one determination. Importantly, identities aren't just 'free floating,' as though people just read a book and think "oh, I'll be one of those." Identities are partly ascribed, they are not all choices and the way that society identifies you, the identity it ascribes to you, shapes your life chances in various ways. You might think that it shapes your life chances in more ways than it does, there is also a perceptional element. But it is about what happens in the eyes of other people as well as your own eyes.

It's also the case that there are always multiple potential identities. You can say that "my class identity is more important than my gender identity" or "my gender identity is more important than my national identity." One of the big questions is to what extent these get packaged together, because powerful movements often emerge either when people believe one single identity to be of overwhelming importance or when multiple identities are very aligned so that they fit easily together. But the opposition between these movements being driven either by identity *or* by ideology is probably false.

STAIR: *On a similar note, in her article on de facto states such as Somaliland, Taiwan, and Northern Cyprus, Sophie Rodger argues that shifting perceptions of identity and belonging, cultivated through effective nation-building efforts and the simple passage of time, have made it progressively harder for parties to find acceptable solutions to these conflicts, as communities have grown accustomed to living apart. What do you think can be done to prevent processes of independence or state separation from becoming divisive or even violent?*

CC: First let me say that I like the category of de facto states instead of the notion of 'failed states'; which implies that they were somehow previously successful states that have now run into difficulty. I also agree with the premise of the article, that separation and secessionist movements are almost always divisive, if not severely violent. At the point where you're in a situation where people feel that they need a secessionist movement in order to realize their own aspirations, that is already a problem. At that point secession may be legitimate, but it is not something one would ever wish on a country. If you look at examples throughout history, from the partition of India to the recent secession of

South Sudan, the split always has a fissiparous tendency: the split has bigger costs than people can calculate and independence—or so-called 'independence,' brings weaker benefits than people imagine it will.

What can be done to prevent this from being the case, or at least to mitigate the harms? Once again, the key is social integration between groups, the fostering of cultural and social commonalities, the use of a common language and common institutions. You only really get pulls to separate when interdependence isn't reinforced by a set of institutions that people need in their lives. For example, the NHS was a reason, during the Scottish referendum, for the UK to stay together. However, the extent to which the last forty years have seen attacks on shared institutions and resistance to investing in them, as well as growing inequality and resistance to redistribution, has begun to pull the UK apart.

Shifting from Britain to Somalia, which has no history as a strong nation state. It never built welfare state institutions and it doesn't have effective integration of markets, social networks, culture, or shared institutions. Here it is much easier for various pre-existing groups, be they tribes or clans, to pull apart. These groups can also be semi-artificially created. The divisions within Somalia are partly a result of the splitting of the country between the colonial powers. But all of these schisms are much easier to exploit in the absence of integrative institutions that deliver some kind of service that people want.

STAIR: *Continuing on the theme of conflict, Isabella Hermann details how she believes the current tension between Venezuela and the US to be the result of "status misperception," meaning that the US's perception of Venezuelan identity, past and present, did not match Venezuela's self-perception, leading to misunderstanding and frustration between the two states. To what extent do you think that questions of status or identity misperception play a role in inter-state conflict, both historically and today?*

CC: I think that that's a true analysis and I think it works in both directions, because I think that the Venezuelan state supports an account of US actions that does not match US perceptions. This divergence in perceptions does make it harder to work together, including on projects that should be of mutual interest. There are of course clashing material interests too, and clashing political projects, but misperception is an important factor. You see this most obviously in the failure to recognize, in cases like the revolutions in Cuba and China, that these were movements of national independence that to some extent have seen the US story as inspiring. They were met with not an embrace of a common narrative, but with American actions that were repressive and hostile. There is a

profound disjoint between the prevailing assumption that revolution is always bad, and the US's annual celebration of July 4. And that comes from a failure to recognize similarities in the narratives of others.

STAIR: *We've now discussed many cases where identity politics works as a divisive force and indeed, most scholars assume that identity politics are necessarily divisive. However, in much of your work, you seek to challenge this, arguing that they can also be a cohesive factor. What can leaders of states do to ensure that the political identity of their nation is inclusive rather than divisive?*

CC: Well, part of what I am saying is that the political identity of a nation that unites the people of that nation may divide it from others. However, that internal unification means they can accept redistribution, engage in common projects, build roads, etc. This doesn't mean that the people of that nation will be in solidarity with or at peace with their neighbours; rather these two phenomena are often two sides of the same coin. Division and unity is an inside-outside dichotomy. The size of the container that denotes the 'inside' realm can shift, and can include more or less people. The criteria of its boundaries can change, but the nature of the inside–outside dichotomy will remain.

The content of identity structures matters particularly in countries that are very large and that have large amounts of diversity. In these cases, it is important to have structures of recognition that enable the various groupings into which people are divided to coexist. The alternative is to try and eradicate those various lines of difference in an assimilationist policy that will attempt to create a unified culture, and this is probably harder now than it has been in the past.

Therefore rulers, social movement activists, whoever is concerned about the internal cohesion of a country, need to be concerned about the various factors that I've been repeating over and over again, and how they are produced, but also about the content of the identity itself, which can be more or less integrative. If the content of an identity, such as 'British' or 'English,' includes a racial element, the identity will prove much less able to integrate citizens who do not conform to this racial group. These particular identities do actually include a racist element, and so the challenge now is to remake this identity without this racial element, and in a way that can unify those who are actually citizens now.

Remaking an identity involves retelling a narrative. In the case of the UK that would involve telling a narrative that includes an account of the role of immigrants in the history of being English or being British, and a recognition of the contributions of immigrants. Some immigrant groups get folded into the national narrative; we no longer think of the Germans

who came to Britain with the Hanoverians as immigrants, for example, because by the eighth generation they had just become British or English, depending on what nationality you're stressing. But other groups are more obviously linguistically, or racially, or otherwise marked, and endure an immigrant status for much longer. These groups have a place in the national narrative as well. Caribbean immigration to Britain, for which the 1950s was a turning point, needs its representation in a common national narrative that includes the British Empire, slavery, and the role of sugar plantations, as well as immigration.

It is *how we narrate* the national narrative that helps people to make sense of this history. If the narration is "well, Britain was white and everybody spoke English until in the 1950s these other people started coming," that is very different from a narration of "the British Empire generated a set of entitlements for people to come, desires for people to come, and reasons why their homelands have been destabilized such that they will come." This makes for a very different story, and that work of rewriting the national narrative is really important for generating the mutual recognition between different groups that nations require in order to function.

This re-narration is a challenge, and has always been a challenge. Even in Britain, which is a sort-of middle-sized country, the different regions were not always very clearly aware of each other. Part of building a British identity involved the fight for recognition by various regions. The Jarrow March was a demand for recognition as well as for food aid. It was about saying "We are English too." Similarly, the working class movements of the nineteenth and twentieth century, although they were certainly about demanding better working conditions or wages—and in some cases the maintenance of old craft traditions, they were also movements of people demanding common citizenship rights and who were not recognized in the dominant narratives of Englishness of the day. These were people who lived in industrial cities that often didn't have anyone elected to Parliament to represent them, while Old Sarum had two MPs since 1295. I think we therefore need to recognize that this call for recognition and common citizenship isn't new with immigrants.

STAIR: *It would be good to discuss at this point, then, the role of historical events in national narratives and the construction of political identities. For example, in 2002, you edited the book Understanding September 11, detailing the many ways in which 9/11 had changed the world and seeking to offer comparative perspectives to explain the event.*[3] *Over a decade on, to what extent do you feel that 9/11 continues to define American political identities, and what do*

you think this says about the role of historical events in forging political identities generally?

CC: I think historical events have a big impact, but partly through the way in which people respond to historical events. Moreover, historical events happen in a trajectory, in a particular context. For example, 9/11 occurred within a historical context that included the unresolved issues of both the Vietnam War and the first Gulf War. This context shaped the desire, particularly on the part of the Bush administration, to engage in a victorious struggle against its enemies. The events of 9/11 have an impact, therefore, but this impact is in turn shaped by previous events, the historical trajectory, and by current political alignments.

We see the impact of the response to 9/11 today in the way in which President Hollande responded to the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks. Even though I would imagine that he doesn't agree very much with the ideology of George Bush, he nonetheless frames the issue in same way. The problem is described as a *war* and terrorism is discussed as if it were in and of itself an ideology, although also pretty closely confounded with Islam, rather than viewed as a tactic that people use to try and accomplish something; indeed a tactic that has been used by many groups throughout history. The biggest terrorist attack in the US prior to 9/11 was Timothy McVeigh's blowing up of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. He was a white American nationalist radical but this event is not discussed within the current narrative on terrorism where a terrorist is someone who is Muslim and who "hates our liberties." This narrative is the result of 9/11, but it is more the result of the way in which the US responded to 9/11.

STAIR: *In a similar trajectory, Bettina Schorr, in her article also on Venezuela, describes the role of charismatic leaders such as Chávez in moulding national political identities. To what extent do you believe leaders, as opposed to events, are able to mould national identities to their will, and how long are the legacies of individual leaders?*

CC: Identities are always more than just the products of the intentional action of any individual or group, they are the products of not-consciously controlled forces. Charismatic individuals can have a significant influence, but they figure in our narratives to a greater extent than their actual role in forging that narrative, because they become symbols for broader forces they don't entirely produce. So, Chávez in Venezuela, or any major post-independence leader, comes to symbolize the aspirations, resentments, and stories of the people of the country.

This can be the case for multiple groups of people, for who a leader symbolizes different things. For some Venezuelans, the *chavista* story is partly a story of indigenous people, and Chávez is invested with credit for improving the circumstances of indigenous people. For some people, however, the story was not about race or ethnicity, but about democracy, and those people are often more disappointed by what happened under the *chavistas*. What charismatic leaders often do is connect up and symbolize several different narratives.

Having said that, the decisions that they make do have a big impact upon the future of their states, not just because they're charismatic but because they possess state power, often at critical times, and so can implement decisions that shape countries for long periods of time. A good example is the role of Meles Zenawi and Isaias Afwerki in Ethiopia and Eritrea, respectively. These were both leaders who came to power on the back of military struggles. They both carried a certain amount of inspiration and charisma; they both achieved credibility through their larger than life characters. However, they do very different things with their power. One of them produces a dictatorial state, the other produces a much more effective multiparty, multicultural state. Not unilaterally of course, neither one of them did that unilaterally. Rather, they worked within a range of other forces that shaped their circumstances; but they played a role and there were choices that they made. Isaias Afwerki made choices that led to Eritrea becoming the fairly dictatorial party state that it is now, which it previously wasn't. This was not a fate that was preordained for Eritrea, and we can't ever know what would have happened if any of the assassination attempts against him would have succeeded.

You ask how long these legacies live on though: I think that although legacies often live on a long time, when people talk about these leaders—when people talk about the Bolivarian traditions—this is what Bolívar symbolizes; this is not Bolívar. ■

Notes

[1] Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Cultures of Democracy," *Public Culture* 19, no. 1 (2007): 160.

[2] Craig Calhoun, *Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).

[3] Craig Calhoun et al., eds., *Understanding September 11* (New York: New Press, 2002).

Identity and Ideology in Political Violence and Conflict

Jonathan Leader Maynard

A familiar narrative in International Relations scholarship suggests that a fundamental shift in the dynamics of global political violence has taken place in recent times, involving a decline in 'ideological' conflicts, and a rise in conflicts of 'identity'. But the contrast this argument relies on, between ideology and identity, is untenable and unproductive, implausibly denying that ideologies and identity are inextricably interrelated, and exaggerating the novelty and causal centrality of identity's role in conflict. But this is not to say that identity plays no such role. This article explains the failings of the familiar narrative about identity, by demonstrating its fundamentally ideological nature and its nuanced causal role in political violence. It then proceeds to offer a better theoretical framework for thinking about the multiple links between identity and violence. Centrally, I identify six specific causal mechanisms through which identities encourage violence by providing: (i) mobilizing co-ordinates, (ii) targeting categories, (iii) virtue-systems, (iv) obligation hierarchies, (v) victimhood, and (vi) group hatred. Finally, the article considers how this framework permits a more plausible reformulation of some of the kernels of truth in the familiar narrative about identity's importance in contemporary conflict.

Introduction

A familiar narrative in International Relations scholarship suggests that a fundamental shift in the dynamics of global political violence has taken place in recent times, involving a decline in 'ideological' conflicts and a rise in conflicts of 'identity.' In her influential work on 'new wars', Mary Kaldor argues that "the goals of the new wars are about identity politics in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars."[1] A central argument of Samuel Huntington's controversial Clash of Civilizations thesis is, similarly, that patterns of conflict and co-operation are now produced "not for reasons of ideology or power politics or econom-

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ic interest but because of cultural kinship."[2] Huntington further quotes Jacques Delors' claim that "future conflicts will be sparked by cultural factors rather than economics or ideology."[3] A range of scholarly and public commentary on 'ethnic conflict' also reproduces this narrative. Chaim Kaufmann's work on preventing civil wars, for example, asserts that there is a deep contrast between 'ideological civil wars' and 'ethnic civil wars,' suggesting that the latter are both more intractable and more dominant in our times.[4] And recent international conflicts, and media coverage of them, seem to reinforce this picture. In 2014 alone, the world saw a bitter contest of sovereignty between the Ukrainian government and pro-Russian armed movements in the Donetsk region, the continuation of a catastrophic sectarian civil war between different ethno-religious groups in Syria, the extension of this violence into Iraq accompanied by mass killings, and the latest round of hostilities between the Israel Defence Forces and the cluster of armed groups, dominated by Hamas, that control the Gaza Strip.[5] Conflicts across the fault lines of identity are never far from the news, and in dozens of less noticed struggles around the world, different ethnic, national, or religious groups appear locked in hate-filled mutual killing.

Yet this general story about contemporary violence, which I shall refer to as the 'identitarian narrative,' is fundamentally untenable. Its two central components—the postulation of a basic contrast between 'ideology' and 'identity,' and the suggestion that 'identity' is now much more central to conflict than it has been in the past—are at odds with leading empirical and theoretical research on identity, ideology, and violence. And beyond its descriptive inaccuracy, this narrative obstructs efforts to develop sophisticated models of the complex dynamics of real world political violence. The simplicity of the story is alluring, and there are kernels of truth to be found in it. But rather than elegantly capturing genuine insights about the contemporary world, it reinforces myths and entrenches impoverished conceptual and theoretical constructs in the study of international politics.

In this paper I aim to put the study of the relationship between identity, ideology, and political violence on a better footing. In Section I, I explain why the identitarian narrative must be discarded, reviewing the theoretical and empirical defects of its two main components—the dichotomy between ideology and identity, and the attempt to explain contemporary violence primarily through identity. In Section II, I then offer an alternative account of the importance of identity, and its relationship to violence, better grounded in recent research on both phenomena.

Identity as Ideology

The identitarian narrative treats identity and ideology as fundamentally separate, dissimilar, and contrasting—with contemporary conflict revolving more around identity than ideology. But, whilst this is a common way of speaking within International Relations scholarship, the idea that there is a fundamental contrast between identity and ideology is a peculiar one. In most of the disciplines that study identity and ideology, the two concepts are seen as essentially overlapping and interpenetrating, though not identical.[6] Identities—constructed conceptualizations of individual or group selves—are always ideological, and ideologies—distinctive systems of ideas that shape individuals' perceptions of their political and social world and their behaviour in that world—always include and appeal to various identities. The argument that identity must be viewed as ideological has been made forcefully within the literature on conflict and violence by Siniša Malešević,[7] but it is also widely affirmed by specialist theorists of both ideology and identity.[8]

Of course, 'identity' and 'ideology' are both ultimately analytical tools, and are topics of definitional disputes between scholars.[9] As such, it is obviously possible to define identity and ideology in such a way as to sustain the identitarian narrative's sense of contrast between the two. But the test here, as with any definitional move, is a) whether this results in a clear and intuitive way of talking about the phenomena one wishes to denote, and b) whether it is productive for various research goals—analysis, research design, theoretical understanding, and so forth.[10] The decision to set up identity and ideology as contrasting phenomena cannot pass this test. On the contrary, when interrogated it leads to idiosyncratic, perverse, and deeply counterintuitive theoretical implications, and runs counter to important and sometimes obvious truths about the things scholars typically call ideology and those they typically call identity.

First, the assumption of a fundamental opposition or contrast between identity and ideology effaces awareness of the deep importance of identities to *all* ideologies. It implies, for example, that the classic 'big ideologies' of the twentieth century did not incorporate critical conceptions of political, ethnic, or national identity. This is clearly false. Even a cursory examination of the central ideological discourse, concepts, and governing practices of the Western and Eastern blocs in the Cold

War (seen by most International Relations theorists as the archetypal 'ideological' conflict) reveals the saturation of their politics with conceptions of identity, as Robert Jervis has persuasively demonstrated.[11] Historians have now explored in considerable detail the Soviet government's integration, from at least early in the Stalin era, of traditional Russian nationalism into the doctrine, institutions, and symbolism of Soviet Communism.[12] And scholars have also extensively studied the central importance of ethnicity to practices of communist rule in both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.[13] Contrary to the assumption of a basic split between ideological and identity-based violence, a plethora of work has demonstrated how communist violence in the Soviet Union, China, Cambodia and elsewhere was profoundly shaped (though not totally determined) by the conceptualization of a range of 'ethnic' minorities as 'ideologically' suspect from the perspective of a communist regime.[14] The 'national operations' that ran alongside Stalin's more famous 'Great Terror' of 1937-8 and that continued during and after World War II with the deportations of "Finns, Germans, Kalmyks, Karachays, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tartars, Crimean Greeks, Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, and Khemashils," stand as major examples.[15] The targeting of ethnic Chams, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Thai as the most literally genocidal components of Cambodia's 'autogenocide' under the Khmer Rouge is another.[16] Highly ideological communist regimes frequently practised ethno-nationalist violence.

Similarly, Western liberal capitalism in the Cold War was not an abstract political doctrine empty of identity. Notions of 'the West' itself, and of American identity, 'manifest destiny,' and uniqueness—all old, ideationally thick, and culturally sedimented tropes—played a central role in both public attitudes and élite policy formulation in the Cold War.[17] Key documents that shaped the foundations of American grand strategy, such as George Kennan's "Long Telegram" of 1946 or his "X Article" on the "Sources of Soviet Conduct" that appeared in *Foreign Affairs* a year later, are replete with conceptualizations of both American and Russian identity. Kennan talks of the "natural outlook of the Russian people," and the "traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity,"[18] and placed important explanatory emphasis on "Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise" contrasted with those of the "Russian–Asiatic world."[19] Concluding his *Foreign Affairs* article, Kennan could scarcely have made American national identity more central to the effort to formulate ideological opposition to Communism:

> The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United

> States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation. Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.[20]

Throughout the Cold War, reference to American values and the intense valorization of America's national and also religious identity (contrasted with 'godless communism') saturated US political discourse on foreign policy.[21] Jimmy Carter supported his efforts to place human rights at the centre of US foreign policy with the claim "the very heart of our identity as a nation is our firm commitment to human rights."[22] Ronald Reagan's 'Evil Empire' speech of March 1983 may be better remembered for its Manichean presentation of the Soviet enemy, but the bulk of the speech was concerned with adulating the American nation and the Judeo-Christian values Reagan presented as its core characteristics (reflecting his immediate audience, the National Association of Evangelicals). Reagan repeatedly referenced the "greatness of America" and argued that Judeo-Christianity "permeates our history and our government. The Declaration of Independence mentions the Supreme Being no less than four times. 'In God We Trust' is engraved on our coinage."[23] By contrast with the Soviet Union, Reagan asserted that "whatever sad episodes exist in our past, any objective observer must hold a positive view of American history, a history that has been the story of hopes fulfilled and dreams made into reality."[24]

Of course, communism and liberal capitalism are to a degree weak examples of the interrelation of identity and ideology, since they each purport to reject exclusive national loyalties in place of transnational cosmopolitanism or class solidarity. The notion of a fundamental contrast between identity and ideology looks even more bizarre when considering ideologies like Nazism, or Hutu Power ideology, or sectarian religious fundamentalism. All of these are obviously *ideologies*, in the sense that they are complex systems of ideas about politics and society that direct individuals' behaviour. They are not just blunt assertions of a group label, but rich and dangerously alluring networks of values, narratives, concepts and beliefs about the world—and scholars rightly and consistently use the term ideology to describe them.[25] At the same time, they are blatantly identitarian, demanding exclusive and deep loyalties to

racial or religious groups, and characterized by animosity towards certain out-groups seen as polluting, threatening, and criminal/heretical.

This is all aside from the fact that some identities are *explicitly* ideological, in that individuals do not only define themselves as American, Croat, Hutu, or some other ethno-nationalist label, but also as 'conservatives,' 'socialists,' 'Bolsheviks,' 'patriots,' 'Leftists,' 'Maoists,' 'progressives,' and so forth. To the degree that politics and violence are sometimes organized around 'labels,' there is no reason why these must be ethnic or nationalist labels, which have received too exclusive a focus in recent scholarship.[26] If the concept of identity is going to actually do any explanatory work in political science, this must be by invoking a range of sociological and psychological accounts of the specific mechanisms by which identity shapes individual behaviour.[27] The bulk of those mechanisms apply to any form of identity, including ideological/political/factional identities. These still provide simple concepts around which violence becomes targeted, can still generate strong in-group attachments and out-group animosities, and can still function as evocative pointers to culturally sedimented myths and notions used to motivate and legitimate violence.

Indeed, in much 'ideological' violence, the political or factional labels may be more important for many perpetrators and their supporters than elaborate ideological doctrines. In twentieth-century persecutions of 'communists,' whether politically in McCarthyite America or lethally in Indonesia, Chile, Argentina, and El Salvador,[28] many participants did not possess any deep understanding of who communists were or what they believed.[29] But their (supposed) identification as communists was enough for them to be targeted. Similarly, Soviet authorities under Stalin famously struggled to develop any thick or coherent definition of 'kulaks,' yet killed and persecuted those smeared with the label nonetheless. The same could be said of animosity towards 'Islamic fundamentalists' in our own era. Individuals, organisations and states do not need to have a deep understanding of the ideologies or identities of others to be willing to kill them as an 'other.' In an almost identical way to which perpetrators willingly internalise simple *definitions* of different ethnic groups as the enemy (though buttressed by a range of ideological justifications and characterisations to support such claims),[30] so they willingly internalise definitions of political enemies as dangerous, criminal, and deserving of violence.

Just as ideologies are so often fundamentally bound up with identities, so are identities inextricably ideological. Central to almost all modern theories of identity is an awareness that they are neither ideationally empty labels nor primordial and eternal attachments. Instead, they are

contingent, fluid, ideationally thick, and socially constructed notions of selfhood,[31] although often long-lasting ones which draw heavily on well-established historical tropes and myths and which are difficult to change rapidly.[32] Widespread campaigns of political violence cannot be sustained by just a 'label,' that label has to have an importance and resonance for relevant actors, and that importance and resonance is a consequence of the thicker meanings and beliefs attached to that label, ones rooted in complex social processes of identity construction and multifaceted psychological tendencies driving identity attachment.[33] Most clearly, individuals differ in a huge number of ways—they potentially possess a huge number of identities—most of which are never considered relevant for politics. Identity construction is thus about the ideological conversion of certain lines of difference into politically and psychologically relevant axes, and this requires deeper ideological understandings than a mere awareness of difference. Philip Hammack rightly notes how "the master narratives of Palestinian and Israeli identity clearly possess ideological foundations that contribute to the intractability of their conflict."[34] And this is true of all such conflicting identities, whether along Sunni-Shia fault lines in the contemporary Middle East, ethnic campaigns of Hutu versus Tutsi violence in Rwanda and Burundi, or Serb-Bosniak-Croatian divides in 1990s Yugoslavia.

In such instances, violence does not just happen because groups of individuals with one label see individuals stuck under another label as different and therefore want to kill them.[35] In most cases, periods of violence are preceded by long periods of relative peace, and often harmonious and integrative intergroup relationships.[36] Escalation towards violence involves the creative ideological mobilization of existing identities—again, the conversion of certain lines of difference into salient lines of conflict (and co-operation), as ideological producers make sense of political events via identity and link identity-based appeals to concrete political problems and solutions.[37] In this respect, as Malešević puts it:

> ... there is no significance difference here between today's depictions of the citizens of Iraq as mutually exclusive Shia, Sunni and Kurds, and yesteryears' socialist rhetoric of proletariat and bourgeoisie locked together in an uncompromising class war. They both invoke group labels as part of a concrete ideological project to justify a specific political course of action, including warfare, and to mobilise popular support. Ethnic, religious and nationalist ideologies are grounded in systematic programmes just as much as the 'old' ideologies of socialism, liberalism and conservatism [...] In other words, there is no identity without ideology and no ideology can successfully mobilise mass support without constructing meaningful group labels.[38]

So ideology and identity are not the same, but they are deeply interrelated, and forms of identity politics rely on complex underlying systems of ideas just as much as the notionally more conventional politics of left and right.[39] As Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Elisabeth Jean Wood point out, "despite the distinction in earlier literature between 'ideological' and 'ethnic' groups or conflicts, ethno-nationalist groups in civil conflict also embrace an ideology, namely that of nationalism."[40] Indeed, *all* collective violence has an ideological dimension (that is, dynamics dictated by the distinctive belief systems of its participants) just it always has psychological, economic, geopolitical, and institutional dimensions—though all these dimensions may vary in their causal significance from case to case. One important part of the ideological dimension concerns the conceptions of identities held by groups and individuals, leaders and masses, killers and bystanders, and so forth. Conceiving of conflicts in this way allows us to trace nuanced changes in the sorts of identities that conflicts are orientated around, the salience of identities (versus other sorts of ideas) in the overall ideological landscape, and the causal pathways through which identities shape violent practices.

By contrast, the notion of identity and ideology as fundamentally different leads to paradoxes, such as Kaldor's confusing conclusion that whereas identity politics are "inherently exclusive" (as if no efforts to form inclusive political identities had ever been attempted), "the politics of ideas [...] are open to all and therefore tend to be integrative" (as if systems of racism, discrimination, oppression, and identity-conflict did not depend on 'ideas').[41] This distinction—which seems to amount to 'ideas' denoting the projects Kaldor sees as legitimate, whereas 'identities' denote nasty movements—cannot be maintained consistently, since it is obvious that one can have identities that one might consider progressive, and ideas which can be terribly damaging. Consequently, Kaldor is forced into needless contorted assertions to try to iron out the inevitable wrinkles in this conceptual framework. Recognizing that projects she sees as legitimate are sometimes also mobilized in the name of religion or culture, Kaldor declares that "this is not what is meant by identity politics" because these projects are "demands for cultural and religious rights" which are still built around "a political programme."[42] But how can this distinction be operationalized, other than by the thick and thoroughly contestable normative judgements of the analyst? Contrary to portrayals of identitarian violence as wild hatred of those carrying another label, vicious identitarian movements—like the Nazis, Serbian nationalists under Milošević, or the Islamic State—often frame their demands as being assertions of legitimate 'rights,' and do have powerful

visions of the future and programmes they believe will get them there (often involving authoritarian policies and violence, framed as necessary measures to protect national or group security). The distinction between a politics of identities and a politics of ideas is a bogus or at least no more than polemical one.

And the effort to crudely hive off identity from ideology does not produce a heuristic analytical gain which might justify putting up with these problems. We can, as I show in Section II, capture some of the genuine differences Kaldor wants to point to, such as the increasingly fragmented nature of identities, without deploying rigid and misleading divisions between identitarian and ideological conflicts. These promote those simplistic characterizations, firmly rejected in case-specialist and comparative scholarly research, of conflicts as being driven by mysterious and unchanging 'ancient hatreds.'[43] They encourage the crude and essentialist conceptions of identity for which Huntington's work has been so extensively criticized,[44] and suppress awareness of complex processes of political and ideological contestation of identity. As Christian Gerlach writes, "[i]f scholars view ethnicity as immutable and rank it as a cause of violence by itself, they rarely discuss just why and how ethnic ascriptions may become so strong and irreconcilable."[45] And ultimately identitarian portrayals of conflict often prove impressionistic or even arbitrary, sorting conflicts into notionally distinct types based on highly superficial portrayals that do not correspond to qualitatively distinct dynamics on the ground.[46]

Identity and Violence

The second component of the identitarian narrative—which sees contemporary political violence as centrally (and to a greater extent than in the past) driven by cleavages between different identities—is also dubious. The fact that conflicts' fault lines often correspond to group boundaries for which prominent labels are available makes it easy to look at contemporary violence and see it as 'about' identity. But the best in-depth quantitative and qualitative studies have repeatedly cast doubt on such assessments.

In quantitative research on conflict, there is little support for the suggestion that identity cleavages are a primary cause of violence. Having conducted an extensive analysis of conflicts between 1950 and 2001, Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch summarize their findings by noting that:

> [...] cultural traits and identity influence dispute patterns, but in ways that run

> counter to conventional beliefs. Most notably, we find little evidence of clashes between civilizations or that conflict is generally more common between states where the dominant groups possess different cultural affinities, broadly defined. Indeed, if anything, our results suggest that ties of similarity rather than difference often give rise to conflict.[47]

A similar study by Errol Henderson and Richard Tucker on interstate wars between 1816 and 1992, conducted with respect to Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis, similarly finds no correlation between civilizational difference and conflict in the Cold War and early post-Cold War era, and an inverted relationship (civilizational similarity provoking conflict) prior to the Cold War.[48] As these theorists emphasize, identity divides are simply far more common than violent conflict—so whilst it is statistically likely that conflicts often occur between groups with differing identities, this does not make identity a generalizable cause of violence. As David Laitin demonstrates, for any randomly chosen pair of neighbouring ethnic groups, those defined by the form of identity most emphasized in scholarship as a cause of violence, only five in 10,000 show recorded violence in a given year.[49]

In research on genocide and mass killings, often seen as characteristic of vicious identitarian conflict, the findings are the same. In three independent research projects Barbara Harff, Benjamin Valentino et al., and Matthew Krain all find no reliable correlation between measures of divided identity and mass killing.[50] Summarizing a number of leading works in the study of genocide and mass atrocities, the leading genocide scholar Scott Straus writes:

> The authors make several related claims. First, deep divisions, prejudice, and discrimination are more frequent occurrences than is genocide. Many societies are fractured ethnically, racially, culturally, and religiously, but only in a few does genocide materialize. Second, cultural explanations cannot explain the timing of genocide. Deep divisions, prejudice, and discrimination are fairly constant; genocide is not. Third, evidence from several cases suggests that divisions, prejudice, and discrimination do not necessarily predate the violence ... Fourth, authors cite social-psychological experiments and studies of perpetrators showing that individuals do not necessarily commit violence because of ethnic or religious hatred.[51]

Of course, just because identity cleavages are not good predictors of conflict does not necessarily mean that they do not, in a number of particular conflicts, play an important causal role. But prominent in-depth qualitative or mixed-methods work, which is better placed to trace specific causal mechanisms in major instances of contemporary conflict, also finds weak support for the thesis that the violence in such

conflicts is primarily driven by identity. Indeed, some of these studies are extremely sceptical. John Mueller, for example, has influentially declared that "ethnic conflict" tends to be "banal," perpetrated mainly by petty criminals, gangsters and football hooligans for whom the overarching political objectives and narratives of the conflict are just so much rhetorical cover for plunder and other forms of self-interested criminal violence.[52] V. P. Gagnon's examination of the wars in Yugoslavia declares ethnic war to be a "myth," concluding that "there was virtually no evidence that the violence in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was the result of ethnic hatreds, despite the tenacity with which Western journalists clung and continue to cling to that story."[53] Like Gagnon, Stathis Kalyvas presents ethnic civil wars as far more instrumental and strategic in character than the image of passionate identitarian conflict suggests, and suggests that "actions 'on the ground' often seem more related to local or private issues than to the war's driving (or 'master') cleavage."[54] And a range of other qualitative case studies finds mere cultural difference between identities of limited importance in violence.[55] Even peaceful fractures of identity often prove to be driven by issues other than identity. There is evidence that some of the early, non-violent steps towards the breakup of Yugoslavia were more motivated by frustrations over the heavy redistribution of tax revenues between the different (and highly economically unequal) republics and related economic crises than by deep animosity between ethnic groups.[56] And surveys suggest that support for independence in the 2014 Scottish independence campaign was not driven primarily by perceptions of incompatibility between Scottish and British identity, but by economic issues and ideological differences with the Conservative UK government over welfare policy.[57] Again, Kalyvas's advice is well heeded: just because political conflicts occur *between* groups of differing identities, does not mean that identity is actually a key *driver* of the conflict.

Still, it is not the case that identity plays no role in contemporary political violence. Some of these more sceptical presentations go too far in dismissing the role of identity (and, indeed, other ideological phenomena) out of hand. Identities can exacerbate and intensify conflict. Wucherpfennig et al. find that civil wars in which one party sees itself as fighting on behalf of excluded ethnic groups tend to last considerably longer than other civil wars.[58] Despite the problems of his firm conceptual distinction between ideological and ethnic civil wars, Kaufmann still importantly finds that civil wars that have an ethnic quality are far more intractable than those which do not.[59] Weak social cohesion between groups also appears to increase the risks of terrorist violence.[60] Krain

tentatively concludes that ethnic fractionalization increases the severity of state mass murder (though not the chances of its onset), though he notes that states with large majorities and small minorities (rather than very divided states with many large groups) see the worst instances of mass killing.[61] And whilst Harff does not find measures of "divided societies" a good predictor of mass killing, she does suggest that "exclusionary ideologies", which reject the legitimate membership of some specific groups of society, are a key predictor.

We do need, then, causal accounts of the role of identity in political violence. But the upshot of my argument so far is threefold. First, accounts of the role of identity cannot simply ascribe causal weight to it whenever conflicts appear to be between distinct groups. Given the number of identities in the world, and the number of personal identities any individual could in principle attach salience too, such superficial patterns tell us very little about political violence—the overwhelming majority of lines of difference between individuals, after all, see no conflict at all.[62] Second, where identity is important, it operates through complex, contingent, and varying pathways, suggesting that there is little value in sweeping narratives about its 'contemporary' role. To the degree that the identitarian narrative amounts to pointing at various contemporary conflicts that seem to have some identity-based dimension, this would be possible in almost any period of modern history, from the national revolutions of the late 1840s; to the wars of extermination against the Native Americans; to the genocides and mass killings of the first half of the twentieth century against the Herero, Namaqua, Armenians, Pontic Greeks, Jews, Ukrainians, Kikuyu, Poles, Chinese and others; to the Balkan Wars, Arab–Israeli conflict, Eritrean War of Independence, Tamil rebellion, and dozens of other available armed conflicts. Gartzke's and Gleditsch's finding that "there is little evidence that [intercultural] conflicts have become more prevalent after the Cold War" looks rather unsurprising when we take stock of the vast range of superficially or genuinely identitarian conflict over history.[63] Third, when identity does play a role, it is as part of a broader matrix of ideological perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, commitments, meanings and motives, without which the links between identity and violence make little sense. It is the content of identities that matters for conflict, not just the existence of distributions of different identity labels, and that content is substantive and ideologically embedded.[64] Claims that conflict is 'no longer about ideology' rely on crude, narrow, and idiosyncratic conceptions of ideology that stymie efforts to understand the motivational complexity of violence.

The alternative approach to theorizing the links between identity, ideology, and political violence sketched here embraces the real-world complexity of these phenomena.[65] Parsimonious treatments of identity and ideology may be useful in certain circumstances, but tend to rest on superficial characterizations of individual conflicts gleaned from common-sense discourse that bear little relation to a contextually rich empirical reality. Whilst degrees of simplification are at the heart of all effective theory-building, the detailed identification of specific causal mechanisms linking identity to violence will generate more knowledge than sweeping and misleading single narratives about modern conflicts being "about identity."[66] Following from the discussion in part one, this approach starts with a number of plausible stipulations about identity:

> i) Identities (notions of individual or group selfhood) are components of broader ideologies (the distinctive systems of ideas that shape individuals' perceptions of their political and social world and their behaviour in that world).
>
> ii) Both identities and ideologies are mental phenomena—complex sets of information stored in memory that shape cognitive processing.[67] Given that there are not truly such things as 'group minds,' all talk of shared identities or ideologies represents something of an abstraction, but a productive and benign one. Just as every individual's way of speaking is unique, every individual's personal ideologies and identities are unique. But just as we can still productively talk about people speaking the same language when their ways of speaking are similar, so we can talk about people sharing ideologies or identities when their ways of thinking and their notions of selfhood are sufficiently alike to enable meaningful generalizations to be made about them.[68]
>
> iii) Roughly speaking, all components of ideologies can fulfil two different (though deeply interrelated) roles: a descriptive/interpretative role which conveys meaning, information, and purportedly factual beliefs about the world, and a normative/affective role which attaches felt evaluative valences to objects and actions in the world and imagined future worlds.[69] Such valences shape desires, motivations, interests and prescriptive (including moral) beliefs about what to do. Indeed, recent research in psychology and neuroscience demonstrates that without affective attachments to outcomes, objects

and actions, human beings face extreme difficulty in engaging in even the most basic acts of decision-making.[70] Recently, political science has begun to grapple with this, abandoning notions of an opposition between 'rational' and 'emotional' decision-making.[71]

iv) Individuals possess multiple notions of selfhood: familial, communal, class, ethnic, national, political, gender, religious, corporate, and so on. All of these are identities—identity is not limited to ethnic and national conceptions of selfhood. Such identities vary in content, affective strength and quality, social prominence, and context of relevance. Many may, at least most of the time, be fairly unimportant to the individual and other individuals in their society. But all can, in principle, be 'activated' as salient in a particular political context (a critical process), and such activation is primarily achieved through reference to broader ideological claims and notions that impute significance into the identity in question.

v) Identities can be self-identities or other-identities. That is, individuals possess notions of both their own selfhood and the selfhood of others as parts of their broader ideologies. Importantly, an individual's sense of the identities of others can diverge from those others' own sense of their identity. In other words, the subjectively felt and socially ascribed content and salience of individual identities do not need to line up—a society or group may care very strongly, for example, that an individual is a 'Jew' even if that identity has no salience for the individual themselves, and society's conception of what a 'Jew' is may bear little relation to the conceptions of those deemed to be 'Jews'.[72] Identities are not always self-generated and personal, they may be ascribed and even forcibly imposed.[73]

Building on this basic framework for thinking about identities, I suggest that we can better theorize how identity matters in political violence by identifying a number of distinct (though overlapping and mutually reinforcing) causal mechanisms through which identity encourages violence.[74] In order to emphasize the need to move away from crude pictures of identity conflict as rooted in 'ancient hatreds' or other portrayals of intense, fanatical, hate-filled violence, I discuss the mechanisms in a rough order of increasing affective strength, with only the last one or two mechanisms corresponding to such classic depictions of identitarian violence.

Large-scale political activities present substantial collective action and co-ordination problems from the perspectives of *both* leaders and followers. The former need to articulate appeals, ideas, and interpretations of social problems that effectively mobilize support, while the latter need to organize backing for or contestation of leaders they favour or oppose, advance collective action on issues of a local nature (which may not map onto élite concerns), seek participation in co-operative ventures (including institutions and established procedures) which appear to further their interests, and through all of these avoid an ennui-inducing sense of futility and political alienation. Ideologies provide rich repertoires for achieving such top-down and bottom-up mobilization, with identities typically the most prominent part of that repertoire.[75] Leaders try to induce comparable action from those who appear to share basic similarities, and ordinary individuals try to shape leaders' behaviour, tackle local issues, and seek out others like them, or institutions that appear open to them, in order to engage in collective action (though the degree of presumed correlation between particular *identities* and common *interests* is a key and contingent variable here). Leaders may also be able to use affirmations of their own identity as a way of generating trust and credibility in unstable information environments where populations need to choose who to believe, whilst lacking ways to carefully interrogate their reliability, further facilitating mobilization.[76]

A now extensive literature on democratization and nationalism rests on an awareness of these dynamics: when democratization (or possibly other forms of regime collapse) dislocates traditional channels of co-ordinated collective action, leaders seek to produce new co-ordinates for collective action by increasing the salience of those identities they prefer to mobilize around.[77] The critical choice of *which* identities to use should reflect two variables: a) the relative prominence, familiarity, and emotional resonance of extant identities in members of the social context in question, and b) the ideological preferences of those seeking to mobilize a population. Many socialist movements around the globe failed because of an ideologically-rooted determination to keep articulating appeals built around (largely European) class identities that made little sense in local contexts and eschewed more powerful national, communal, or religious identities on doctrinal grounds. Conversely, as already noted, the Soviet Union gained much mobilizing capital through nationalist appeals, disregarding the tensions these had with Marxism's internationalist theoretical doctrine.

There is no a priori reason why some sorts of identities should be always expected to be stronger than others. The fundamental weakness of Arab nationalism, after a brief heyday in the 1950s and 1960s, has persisted into the modern era.[78] As recent events remind us, religious identities have tended to offer far more powerful lines of mobilization and conflict in the Middle East, where the (rather distinctly) European story of manufacturing nations after the seventeenth-century wars of religion does not apply.[79] Indeed, in most of the post-colonial world, there is a weak general correlation between dominant identities and states' territorial boundaries, with state nationalism often lacking resonance and unable to triumph over longer-standing ethnic, communal, religious, caste, or political identities.[80] This is one reason why mobilization coordinates are not always limited to those within one's state, but can be directed at external actors—whether diaspora members, members of a contiguous ethnic group that crosses borders, or patron states like the Cold War superpowers.

II. Targeting Categories

Purposeful violence also requires conceptual schemas in its perpetrators' ideologies to sort out who violence is meant to be directed *against*.[81] Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay have influentially argued that mass killing tends to reflect the inability of states to successfully identify guerrillas with precision, making the extermination of a broad group the most effective military strategy.[82] One of the most common ways identities affect patterns of violence, therefore, is by addressing this targeting problem, and serving as simple concepts that specify apparently appropriate objects of violence. In parallel, Scott Straus emphasizes that as a form of group-selective violence, genocides are in an important sense not indiscriminate (and the point stands for all forms of group-selective violence). They involve violence perpetrated against particular individuals on the basis of their membership in certain groups, groups denoted by identity concepts deemed salient in perpetrators' ideologies.[83]

Often, the identity concepts used in the selective distribution of violence are embedded and long-lasting, but this is not always the case. Political violence in the Soviet Union, for example, was conducted against a wide range of identities, several of which were largely novel creations of regime ideology (such as 'kulaks' or 'Zinovievites') and some of which were more or less amorphous national groups reified by the regime.[84] In waging a campaign notionally aimed at America, in an effort to force it to stop killing Muslims and withdraw from the Middle East, Al Qaeda

and its various progeny organisations have used 'Western' identity as a targeting logic, frequently killing members of societies that cannot remotely be expected to influence American policy (though it should be remembered that the bulk of Al Qaeda violence has been targeted at fellow Muslims).[85] In trying to liberate Algeria from French occupation, the *Front de Libération Nationale* similarly targeted 'European' civilians as a contrasting category with Algerians.[86] And in World War II, British and American air forces frequently engaged in area bombings against cities because they were 'German' or 'Japanese,' with relatively low prioritization of the actual military significance (let alone civilian culpability) of the targets.[87]

Targeting categories rest on associational, collectivizing logics: whether collective punishment, the perception of groups as representing some sort of structural threat due to their racial, class, institutional, or other social position, or some other reasoning. They thus illustrate clearly the lethal power of collective labels or 'demonyms.' Once discourse becomes orientated around categories like 'Japs,' 'Gooks,' or 'the Soviets,' vast groups of people can be reified as a single collective actor, with members of that group seen as uniformly and equally blameworthy for whatever acts are attributed to 'them' (obviously this phenomenon runs through many of the mechanisms discussed here, not just targeting categories). Crucially, members of targeting categories may be attacked *with or without* intense affective animosity towards the members of the group. Often it may be the mere fact that violence against a particular identity is permitted by higher authorities that allows on-the-ground perpetrators to engage in violence against them for other reasons entirely. In other words, by being placed in targeting categories, victims can become targets of opportunity for violence driven by a panoply of different motives.[88] In Yugoslavia, for instance, Serb forces were relatively efficient in targeting the groups deemed by Serb leaders to be appropriate targets of violence. If Mueller is right that many perpetrators were opportunistic criminals rather than deeply convicted nationalists,[89] it would still appear that they often deployed the identity schemas articulated by Serbian élites in identifying which families and communities to target, plunder, and rape. So the fact that identities are used to co-ordinate the targeting of violence need not, and frequently does not, mean that hatred of that identity drives the violence at the level of direct perpetrators. However, nor does the lack of such hatred make the identity category causally irrelevant—far from it.

A third way that identity can influence patterns of violence is through more specific normative codes, standards, ideal self-images, and norms that are attached to specific identities, forming essential parts of the normative ideals espoused by broader ideologies. As argued throughout this paper, identities are ideationally 'thick,' involving a complex array of different notions, images, beliefs, and attitudes beyond a mere label. Importantly, almost all identities have a normative dimension—as part of being socialized into certain types of identity, individuals are socialized into the explicit and implicit codes of expected and valorized behaviour associated with those identities. Such codes of behaviour govern external social responses of praise and ridicule, and also shape the internal moral compass of individuals. Together, these generate potent drives towards certain forms of action so as to obtain positive moral self-identity.[90] These "virtue systems"[91] that inhere within identities are important building blocks of the moral order in any group or society, and powerful sources of legitimation by political actors (again, the aforementioned Cold War discourse of 'American values' is a classic example).[92]

In the justification of political violence, mobilizers frequently appeal to the normative codes within identities.[93] Violence can be made to look permissible and even desirable by appealing to those qualities valorized in the self-ideals individuals feel deep emotional pulls to approximate—appeals to 'loyalty,' 'manliness,' 'duty,' 'strength,' 'toughness,' 'courage,' and similar notions provide a particularly common forms of such "virtue-talk."[94] But identities are not all equally predisposed towards the sort of machoistic values and virtues that most easily facilitate violence. Some identities, those dominant, for instance, insides the sorts of hooliganistic gangs emphasized by Mueller in Serbian violence, vicious militia forces like the Interahamwe, conventional militaries, or especially brutal fundamentalist religious groups like the Islamic State, appear to heavily adulate violence and brutality. But other identities—those of more pacific religious denominations, humanitarian organisations, most civilians, many professional identities (like doctors), or nations or communities that strongly identify with peace—may generate radically different social and psychological responses to violence.[95] The normative content of dominant identities may thus be a crucial influence on the likelihood of violence. And like targeting categories and mobilization co-ordinates, virtue systems attached to identities can encourage violence even in the absence of deep, specific animosities towards those that end up being its victims.

Helen Fein has influentially deployed the concept of "the universe of obligations" to capture the important reality that, beyond a relatively small number of global cosmopolitans, most individuals have a (perhaps loosely defined) boundary on those to whom they perceive that morally regulated behaviour is due.[96] We can nuance this claim a little by recognizing that most groups do not have a single in-out moral universe, but obligation hierarchies. Though perhaps ultimately grounded in variables like behaviour (thus most societies place criminals in a lower level of due obligations in light of their crimes) and relationships (many feel stronger obligations to their family or local community in light of special ties),[97] such hierarchies tend to be schematized efficiently through identities—obligations owed to 'fellow Britons,' to 'party members,' 'felons,' or other labelled groups.[98] For most individuals, then, identities can be used to sort expanding concentric circles of decreasingly intense obligations. The intensely different affective weight placed on the deaths of, for example, fellow nationals, fellow members of what is seen as the 'civilized' world, and those in the chaotic 'uncivilized' world beyond suggest that moral hierarchies of obligation and concern remain very real even in relatively liberal and cosmopolitan societies that officially declare commitments to universal human rights.[99]

But these obligation hierarchies are not fixed and natural, they are ideological constructs. As such, critical moves can be made by ideological producers in attempting to re-shuffle the positions of some groups or individuals in the obligation hierarchy.[100] The successful spread of human rights norms rests at the micro-level on the development of legal procedures and ideological attitudes which flatten the hierarchy of obligations, with strong duties of moral treatment being extended beyond narrow communal, political, or ethnic groups to encompass at least a broader proportion of individual societies, and ideally humanity as a whole.[101] Conversely, violence can be legitimated by the steepening of obligation hierarchies, emphasizing obligations to certain identities—co-ethnics, communal kin, political allies, and so on—and dampening or eliminating felt obligations towards other identities. Though anti-Semitism was certainly extensive in Germany prior to Hitler's rise to power, the Nazis engaged in a vast propagandistic effort over the course of (especially the second half of) the 1930s to remould Germans' sense of moral obligations as tracking exclusive racial or national lines. As Hans Frank, Hitler's governor of occupied Poland, put it: "We will principally have pity on the German people only and nobody else in the whole

world."[102] Likewise, in their brief period in power, the Khmer Rouge vigorously sought to impose a moral order in which "the ideal new communist citizen would be able to 'cut off his or her heart' from the enemy who was 'not real Khmer.'"[103]

V. Victimhood

Like mobilization co-ordinates and normative codes, victimhood is another form of in-group identity process. Victimhood captures a range of ways in which individuals assert that their own identity is the target of violence (or other moral violations) by others, raising its salience.[104] It is widely recognized that by far the most dominant justification for political violence is the assertion of threats from others,[105] or assertions of crimes committed by others against the in-group.[106] By articulating such threats or crimes, mobilizers seek to raise the perceived salience of certain identities for those who hold them by telling audiences that it is on the basis of those identities that they are in danger or have been maltreated, in the process deepening lines of division with those other identities deemed to embody the guilty party.

Thus, shortly after the assassination of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, Mbonyumutwa Kayibanda, the son of former President Grégoire Kayibanda, announced via radio that: "[The Tutsi] are going to exterminate, exterminate, exterminate. They are going to exterminate till they alone remain in this country, so that the power their fathers have kept for four hundred years they themselves can keep for one thousand years!"[107] The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, often cited as laying the ideological foundations for Serbian violence in the 1990s, likewise affirmed that "[e]xcept for the period of the existence of the NDH [the Croatian fascist state established by Nazi Germany], Serbs were never so endangered as they are today."[108] In using such accusations to legitimate violence, there is thus a considerable degree of psychological projection going on in many assertions of victimhood, "leading to a situation," as Malešević observes, "where mass killers saw themselves as true victims."[109] Assertions that the in-group is the victim of huge threats or terrible crimes has been shown to consistently yield a number of psychological changes in audiences conducive to violence—producing, as Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley summarize, "an increased feeling of [in-group] togetherness [...] increased respect for leaders, increased idealization of in-group values, and increased readiness to punish deviates from in-group norms."[110]

The final and most affectively intense mechanism by which identities can influence violence is as an actual object of hatred. For a range of reasons, individuals can come to passionately oppose, abhor, feel disgust towards, or rage at those who are *perceived* as members of other groups divided by lines of relevant difference. But again, those lines of relevant difference are themselves ideological constructions injected with salience on the basis of certain reasons: they are produced by the actual thick ideological content of individuals' feelings about specific identities rather than just an irrational spontaneous hatred of those under a different label. Germans under the Nazis did not just hate Jews apropos of nothing, but absorbed a welter of ideological assertions about their subhumanity, criminal guilt in the German defeat in World War I, parasitical nature, participation in a global conspiracy, and so forth. Though some such ideas had been present in Germany for centuries, their intense dissemination by state propaganda and through tightly bound social networks in the post-World War I environment inculcated ideological shifts in attitudes towards Jews.[111] These ideas were causal, not mere window dressing on an unchanging and eternal German-Jewish hatred. Contrary to the narratives of Western media, politicians and some scholars,[112] members of different ethnicities in Yugoslavia, it is now well established, did not generally possess long-standing acrimonious relationships or mutual hate. Indeed, in a 1964 survey, 73 per cent of Yugoslavians sampled described relationships between ethnic groups as good, and in 1966 85.3 per cent of Croats and 81.7 per cent of Serbs showed only slight ethnic distance towards other Yugoslavian ethnic groups.[113] Regarding the Armenian Genocide, Gerlach reports, "a number of observers held that local Muslim–Armenian relations were good and changed only under the circumstances, or never, and many credible sources testify to local opposition to the persecution and killing."[114] Mass killings in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) in 1971 were superficially bound up with the struggle of Bengalis for independence from Pakistan. Again, however, prior polling does not reveal deep and long-standing identitarian cleavages behind the conflict. In a survey of East Bengali college students in 1964, only 29 per cent even called themselves Bengalis, and 74 per cent still identified as Pakistanis.[115] As one Bengali housewife stated after the violence of 1971, "I had never thought of people as Hindus or non-Bengalis or whatever, but all that had changed suddenly."[116]

This is an ideological change induced through 'hypernationalist rhetoric,' rumours of genocidal threats, hate speech, and other ideological productions that shift understandings of self- and other-identities.

These dynamics, again, are not peculiar to ethnic or national identity. Fundamentally the same sorts of hate-encouraging rhetoric and disseminatory strategies were deployed to whip up anger against kulaks in the Soviet countryside under Stalin, against perceived representatives of the bourgeoisie and corrupt establishment in China under Mao or Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, and against purported communists in mass killings in Indonesia in 1965–66.[117]

These mechanisms may not comprise an exhaustive set, but they define some of the major causal links between identity and violence. They should be underscored by two crucial points. First, for the first four of the six mechanisms, identities cannot be constituted as primary drivers of violence, but they do shape its patterning and may intensify it, ease mobilization for it, help expand the numbers who may participate in it, and/or expand its likely scope. They illustrate how identity can be a crucial part of the ideological dynamics of violence, but in a facilitative or ancillary fashion and not as its principal cause. Even for the fifth and sixth mechanisms—victimhood and group hatred—identities can be a mere exacerbating or facilitative factor. The degree to which they really lie 'at the heart' of the conflict is likely to be complex and to vary from individual to individual. This raises the second point—conflicts as a whole cannot simply be sorted into one or another of these six identitarian mechanisms. Violence is perpetrated by heterogeneous groups of individuals, who are not only likely to differ from one another in what role identity plays for them, but even as individuals who act from a complex interweaving of different motives.[118] Studies of the role of identity in individual conflicts need to occur within a theoretical framework oriented around such motivational diversity and complexity.

Conclusion: Identity and Political Violence in the Twenty-First Century

This paper has demonstrated that the identitarian narrative as commonly articulated and reproduced is unsustainable, generating crude, inaccurate, and conceptually and theoretically implausible understandings of contemporary political violence. But, as I have noted, the identitarian narrative gains its intuitive traction from some kernels of truth. Much remains unchanged in the long history of violent conflict, but the exact position of identity (and ideology more broadly) is not completely static. By recognizing the problems with the identitarian narrative described in Section I and working within the framework laid out in Section II, it is

possible to derive a much more plausible set of theoretical claims about what might be changing in the role of identity in the post-Cold War era and into the twenty-first century.

Still, our initial answer should be 'not much.' The causal mechanisms described in Section II rest on fairly basic social and psychological dynamics that can be found across democratic and authoritarian regimes, throughout the world's continents, and stretching back for much of recorded history. Frequently, various forms of the identitarian narrative suggest that globalization is bringing identity to the fore in conflict by undermining traditional structures of identity, loyalty, and political control.[119] But this seems to rest on a dubiously presentist perspective where the bright, easily visible, and fine-grained changes of our own time make past transformations seem comparatively dull and glacial. But traditional structures are always under assault by various forces and agents of change, and its far from clear that the end of the Cold War and present 'second wave' of globalisation puts more pressure on established identities than accelerating European colonization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the first wave of globalisation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or European breakdown, decolonization, and the spread of Cold War ideologies after the Second World War.

Still, what Kaldor's new wars thesis, in particular, may get right is that these past changes generally involved the centralization of military, political, ideological, and economic power—whether in the form of the European empires, Soviet- and American-led Cold War blocs, or nation-state regimes.[120] By contrast, largely because it occurs in a context where outright territorial annexation has been delegitimized and even weak or non-existent states are legally reified as bearers of sovereignty, the present wave of globalization has a critical fragmenting quality to it in many parts of the world (though not all—indeed economic globalization and technological advancement may strengthen the world's major powers and their governments).[121] In the context of erosive pressures on the state, the power of centralized ideological producers is undermined, increasing the utility of identity as mobilizing co-ordinates and obligation hierarchies, and increasing the number of actors who are able and willing to employ mobilization as a strategy.

Again, there is no principle reason why these identities need to be the sort of ethnic, national, or religious identities the identitarian narrative emphasizes. But the two variables that I have suggested may determine which identities are likely to be chosen to justify violence (first, the prominence and resonance of available identities, and second, the ideological interests of leaders) can explain why ethnic, national and religious identities appear to be in the ascendant. Rather than imbuing

such identities with new strength, the end of the Cold War removed the advantages of competing capitalist-communist labels in their role as mobilizing co-ordinates, targeting categories, virtue systems, obligation hierarchies, sources of victimhood, and objects of group hatred for several reasons.[122] Many users of these labels never were deeply committed to the fuller ideologies they were associated with in the first place. Yet, in a bipolar world, the capacity of these labels to mobilize external support from the superpowers was immense. And for those who *were* sincere believers (and there were many), the collapse of the Soviet Union vastly undermined the optimism and credibility of those sympathetic to communism, eroding the resonance of capitalist-communist divides in a world where this conflict seemed so visibly finished.

'Ideological differences' have not disappeared. Aside from the fact that all identity is ideological, visible and deep ideological divergences exist between major powers in the modern world: between secular liberalism and political Islam; between the approach of states beholden to the 'Washington consensus' and those of the 'Global South'; or between cosmopolitan humanitarians/'liberal crusaders'/advocates of the responsibility to protect, and nationalists/sovereigntists/authoritarian regimes. These ideological divides are frequently emblematized through identities. Hence, we hear of clashes between 'Western' and 'Asian' values, the 'West' and 'Islam,' or the 'first' and 'third' worlds. Of course, this use of identities as simple heuristic devices that embody thick ideological and cultural differences is nothing new. Again, 'communist' and 'capitalist' were also easy identitarian labels that subsumed deeper and more complex political worldviews.

Different identities do shape violence differently, but the relevant variables are not just about the ethnic or non-ethnic nature of the identity in question. Kaufmann suggests a distinction between ideological identities (which he views as "soft," i.e. easily changeable), religious identities (harder to change), and ethnicity (the hardest of all),[123] the implication being that ethnic identities lead to the most vicious and intractable conflicts. This is one reasonable inference, all other things being equal, but the rigidity of identities is not the only thing shaping their violence-intensifying capacity. The sheer size of groups matters, and in a non-linear manner. There are good reasons to believe that very small and rather large group labels can be particularly dangerous—the former because they are so vulnerable,[124] and the latter because they are more likely to span political borders, occupy patchworks of territories, and form a very expansive category of potential targets for violence (though *extremely* large groups might generate some deterrent effect for violence against them). Highly elastic identities (i.e., those with very unclear cri-

teria) can also be extremely dangerous, since they encourage perpetrators to 'cast the net widely,' and give huge freedom for both top-level and local organisers of violence to use such labels to eliminate whoever they choose.

For all these variables (malleability, size, elasticity) there are not fixed answers for ethnicity, nationality, religion, or any other sort of identity. Similarly, the content of identities— including their specific virtue systems, obligation hierarchies, and victimhood or group hatred narratives—is also highly variant. Globalization may have increased the gap between important political identities and states, while the collapse of the cold war may have decreased the dominance of capitalist-communist identities and somewhat increased religious, civilizational, ethnic, or regional identities. But above all else, these changes have resulted in the multiplication of available identities and of the centres of power seeking to deploy them. In this context, there is no use for totalizing narratives about identity. Our efforts to build knowledge of the role of identity in violence in the modern world require a more attuned mapping of the particular sorts of identity and the dominant identitarian mechanisms through which they are being used in individual conflicts. It requires attention to the content of identities, to causal complexity, and to equifinality in moving form identity to violence. Above all, it requires the integrated analysis of identity and ideology. ■

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Notes

[1] Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 3rd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012): 7.

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Free Press, 2002): 22.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (1996). See also: Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, "'Draining the Sea': Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare," *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): 381–2; Siniša Malešević, *Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 18.

[5] See also: Gregory Treverton, "The New Cold War: Iran Versus Saudi Arabia—How Far Will It Go?," *Prospect* 2014, 22 & 24.

[6] Leonie Huddy, "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory," *Political Psychology* 22, no. 1 (2001): 131–2 & 148; Philip L. Hammack, "Narrative and the Cultural Psychology of Identity," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 12, no. 3 (2008): 223 & 230–2; Manfred B. Steger, "Political Ideologies in the Age of Globalization," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, eds. Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 217; Teun van Dijk, *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach* (London: Sage Books, 1998):, 118–125; J. Christopher Cohrs, "Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict," in *Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict*, ed. L. R. Tropp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 56, 61, 67.

[7] Malešević, *Identity as Ideology*; Siniša Malešević, *The Sociology of War and Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 325-6.

[8] Huddy, "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory," 131–2, 148; Hammack, "Narrative and the Cultural Psychology of Identity," 223, 230–2; Steger, "Political Ideologies," 217; van Dijk, *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach*, 69–72, 118–125; Cohrs, "Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict," 56, 61, 67. See also: Jonathan Leader Maynard, "Rethinking the Role of Ideology in Mass Atrocities," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 5 (2014).

[9] Raymond Boudon, *The Analysis of Ideology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989): 24; Matthew Humphrey, "(De)contesting ideology: The Struggle Over the Meaning of the Struggle Over Meaning," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 8, no. 2 (2005): 229. For some influential efforts to clear up such definitional disagreement on ideology see: John Gerring, "Ideology: A Definitional Analysis," *Political Research Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (1997); Malcolm B. Hamilton, "The Elements of the Concept of Ideology," *Political Studies* 35 (1987).

[10] These are not the only criteria—they are derived from but do not exhaust those in: John Gerring, "What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences," *Polity* 31, no. 3 (1999).

[11] Robert Jervis, "Identity and the Cold War," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[12] D.L. Brandenberger and A.M. Dubrovsky, "'The People Need a Tsar': The Emergence of National Bolshevism as Stalinist Ideology, 1931–1941," *Europe-Asia Studies* 50, no. 5 (1998).

[13] Malešević, *Identity as Ideology*, 161-2; Jörg Baberowski and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, "The Quest for Order and the Pursuit of Terror: National Socialist Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union as Multiethnic Empires," in *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared*, eds. Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

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[15] Alex J. Bellamy, *Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age of Civilian Immunity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012):, 226-7; Paul M. Hagenloh, "'Socially Harmful Elements' and the Great Terror," in *Stalinism: New Directions*, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledge, 2000).

[16] Alexander Laban Hinton, "Why Did You Kill?: The Cambodian Genocide and the Dark Side of Face and Honour," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 57 (1998): 95 fn. 3.

[17] See: Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

[18]George Kennan, "The Long Telegram," in State Department (1946).

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[20] Ibid.

[21] On the origins of such themes, see: Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*.

[22] Jervis, "Identity and the Cold War," 22.

[23] Ronald Reagan, "President Reagan's Speech before the National Association of Evangelicals, Orlando, Florida, March 8th 1983," http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3409 (accessed September 15, 2014).

[24] Ibid.

[25] See, for example: John Weiss, *Ideology of Death: Why the Holocaust Happened in Germany* (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1997); Jacques Semelin, *Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide* (London: Hurst & Company, 2005); Robert Melson, "Modern Genocide in Rwanda: Ideology, Revolution, War and Mass Murder in an African State," in *The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective*, eds. Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jeffrey Haynes, "Al Qaeda: Ideology and Action," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 8, no. 2 (2005); James

D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000): 863.

[26] Malešević, *Sociology of War and Violence*, 189–90; Christian Gerlach, *Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 6–7.

[27] Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," 874.

[28] Bellamy, *Massacres and Morality*, 160-222.

[29] Gerlach, *Extremely Violent Societies*, 43. This seems true of the perpetrators studied in Joshua Oppenheimer's powerful film The Act of Killing, for example, who displayed a vigorous conviction (at least superficially) in the rightness of killing those labelled communists in Indonesia. Yet their ideological understandings of communists, though extant, were very much the messy, impressionistic conceptions of 'everyday' ideology, and not elaborate theory.

[30] See: Leader Maynard, "Rethinking the Role of Ideology"; Jonathan Leader Maynard, "Combating Atrocity-Justifying Ideologies," in *The Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges of Mass Atrocity Prevention*, eds. Jennifer Welsh and Serena Sharma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[31] See, in general: Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 2006); Malešević, *Identity as Ideology*; Malešević, *Sociology of War and Violence*, 181–3; Siniša Malešević, *Nation-States and Nationalisms* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013); Hammack, "Narrative and the Cultural Psychology of Identity"; Huddy, "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory"; Ronald Grigory Suny, *Why We Hate You: The Passions of National Identity and Ethnic Violence*, Berkeley Program in Societ and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series (Berkeley, 2004); Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity"; Alexander Laban Hinton, ed., *Genocide: An Anthropological Reader* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002): Part III; Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Identity and Conflict: Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 1 (2006): 61 & 78.

[32] Suny,*Why We Hate You*, 7–8; Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," 850 fn.12.

[33] Malešević , *Identity as Ideology*, 27–30; Hammack, "Narrative and the Cultural Psychology of Identity," 224-5.

[34] Hammack, "Narrative and the Cultural Psychology of Identity," 230.

[35] Gartzke and Gleditsch, "Identity and Conflict"; Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," 857–60; Malešević, *Nation-States and*

Nationalisms, 92–3. Contrary to, for example, Bruce Wilshire, *Get 'Em All, Kill 'Em* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006).

[36] See: Malešević, *Sociology of War and Violence*, Ch. 8 & 9.

[37] Suny, *Why We Hate You*, 36.

[38] Malešević, *Sociology of War and Violence*, 325–6.

[39] Though this is also an unhelpful schema, see: Jonathan Haidt, Jesse Graham, and Craig Joseph, "Above and Below Left-Right: Ideological Narratives and Moral Foundations," *Psychological Inquiry* 20, no. 2–3 (2009); Jonathan White, "Left and Right as Political Resources," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 16, no. 2 (2011); Jonathan Leader Maynard, "A map of the field of ideological analysis," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 18, no. 3 (2013): 314–16.

[40] Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Elisabeth Jean Wood, "Ideology in Civil War: Instrumental Adoption and Beyond," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (2014): 215. Though see also: Michael Freeden, "Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?," *Political Studies* XLVI (1998).

[41] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 3rd ed., 8.

[42] Ibid., 80-11.

[43] Suny, *Why We Hate You*, 22; John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000); Benjamin A. Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 16–22; Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity."

[44] See also: Malešević, *Sociology of War and Violence*, 64-5.

[45] Gerlach, *Extremely Violent Societies*, 260. See also: Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity."

[46] See the detailed interrogation of various forms of 'new wars' in Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer, "'New Wars' and Rumors of 'New Wars'," *International Interactions* 28, no. 2 (2002).

[47] Gartzke and Gleditsch, "Identity and Conflict," 54–5. The analysis controls for mere geographical proximity, which might otherwise have been thought to exhaustively explain this finding.

[48] Errol A. Henderson and Richard Tucker, "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 2 (2001). See also: Gartzke and Gleditsch, "Identity and Conflict," 56.

[49] Cited in: Malešević, *Nation-States and Nationalisms*, 92.

[50] Barbara Harff, "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 66–8; Valentino, *Final Solutions*, 16–22; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, "Draining the Sea," 394; Matthew Krain, "State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 3 (1997): 346, 351.

[51] Scott Straus, "Second-Generation Comparative Research on Genocide," *World Politics* 59, no. 3 (2007): 481.

[52] Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'."

[53] Valère Philip Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 178.

[54] Stathis N. Kalyvas, "The Ontology of "Political Violence": Action, and Identity in Civil Wars," *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 3 (2003): 475–6. See also: Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," 846.

[55] See: Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," 859-60, 868–72.

[56] Malešević, *Identity as Ideology*, 169-83; Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," 858.

[57] Severin Carrell, "It's the Economy Stupid: How Scotland's Voters Approach the Independence Vote," *The Guardian*, February 12, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/scottish-independence-blog/2014/feb/12/scotland-referendum-sirtom-hunter (accessed January 12, 2015).

[58] Sanín and Wood, "Ideology in Civil War," 216.

[59] Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions," 138–51.

[60] Institute for Economics and Peace, Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2014* (Sydney, 2014), 40-41.

[61] Krain, "State-Sponsored Mass Murder," 353.

[62] Malešević, *Identity as Ideology*, 159–61.

[63] Gartzke and Gleditsch, "Identity and Conflict," 55, 72–3.

[64] Russell Powell and Steve Clarke, "Religion, Tolerance and Intolerance: Views from Across the Disciplines," in *Religion, Intolerance and Conflict: A Scientific and*

Conceptual Investigation, eds. Steve Clarke, Russell Powell, and Julian Savulescu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 16–18.

[65] Gartzke and Gleditsch, "Identity and Conflict," 77; Kalyvas, "Ontology of Political Violence," 476. See also: Thomas Homer-Dixon et al., "A Complex Systems Approach to the Study of Ideology: Cognitive-Affective Structures and the Dynamics of Belief Systems," *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 1, no. 1 (2013): 341–4.

[66] Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," 874.

[67] See, in general: van Dijk, *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach*; Suny, *Why We Hate You*.

[68] See also: Homer-Dixon et al., "A Complex Systems Approach," 346–7.

[69] In some disciplines or paradigms, scholars argue that this distinction is considered false. See, for example: Raymond Geuss, *Philosophy and Real Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). I am aware of such claims but, whilst lacking space to enter into the debate here, consider them deeply misguided.

[70] Todd H. Hall and Andrew A. G. Ross, "Affective Politics After 9/11," 2–10; Suny, *Why We Hate You*, 3-5, 9-15.

[71] Rose McDermott, "The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science," *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 4 (2004); Hall and Ross, "Affective Politics"; Suny, *Why We Hate You*; Wendy Pearlman, "Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings," *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 2 (2013); Paul Thagard, "The Cognitive-Affective Structure of Political Ideologies," in *Emotion in Group Decision and Negotiation*, ed. B. Martinovski (Berlin: Springer, 2014 [forthcoming]).

[72] Gerlach, *Extremely Violent Societies*, 260.

[73] Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions," 143–4.

[74] Though of equal number, these mechanisms bear no one-to-one relation to the six justificatory mechanisms of mass killing I have identified elsewhere (though there are many points of overlap), see: Leader Maynard, "Rethinking the Role of Ideology." The mechanisms proposed here are a more targeted set eliciting the links between identity constructs and violence.

[75] See, in general: Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity."

[76] See also: Leader Maynard, "Combating Atrocity-Justifying Ideologies"; Leader Maynard, "Rethinking the Role of Ideology," 7–8.

[77] Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995); Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2000); Gagnon, *Myth of Ethnic War*, 188–9.

[78] Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," *Foreign Affairs* 57, no. 2 (1978).

[79] See: Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Suny, *Why We Hate You*, 15–21.

[80] Gartzke and Gleditsch, "Identity and Conflict," 61–2.

[81] Sanín and Wood, "Ideology in Civil War," 219.

[82] Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, "Draining the Sea."

[83] Scott Straus, *Making and Unmaking Nations: The Origins and Dynamics of Genocide in Contemporary Africa* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015 [forthcoming]): chapter 1. C. J. M. Drake makes the same point regarding terrorism, see C. J. M. Drake, "The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10, no. 2 (1998): 53-85.

[84] Wendy Z. Goldman, *Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin's Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); James R. Harris, "The Purging of Local Cliques in the Urals Region, 1936–7," in *Stalinism: New Directions*, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledge, 2000): 280.

[85] Haynes, "Al Qaeda."

[86] Drake, "The Role of Ideology in Terrorist' Target Selection", 60.

[87] Richard J. Overy, "'The Weak Link'? The Perception of the German Working Class by RAF Bomber Command, 1940–1945," *Labour History Review* 77, no. 1 (2012): 27; Bellamy, *Massacres and Morality*, 151.

[88] Kalyvas, "Ontology of Political Violence," 475–6, 483–7; Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," 868–72.

[89] Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'."

[90] Henri Tajfel, "Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour," *Social Science Information* 13, no. 2 (1974): 67–72; Cohrs, "Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict," 66; Sanín and Wood, "Ideology in Civil War," 219–220.

[91] Leader Maynard, "Rethinking the Role of Ideology"; Jonathan Leader Maynard, "Ideologies and Mass Violence: The Justificatory Dynamics of Deadly Atrocities" (Doctoral thesis in Politics, University of Oxford, 2014), 139–44.

[92] Huddy, "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory," 133–7, 143–5.

[93] Garrett O'Boyle, "Theories of Justification and Political Violence: Examples from Four Groups," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 2 (2002).

[94] Leader Maynard, "Ideologies and Mass Violence," 139–44. See also: Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," 869–70.

[95] Sanín and Wood, "Ideology in Civil War," 221.

[96] Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust* (New York: Free Press, 1979), 4.

[97] Jeremy Waldron, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 22, no. 1 (1993): 5–7; David Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

[98] Daniel Goldhagen, *Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity* (London: Abacus, 2010), 248–9.

[99] See: Gerritt Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

[100] Valentino, Final Solutions, 17 & 20; Alexander Laban Hinton, "Introduction: Genocide and Anthropology," in *Genocide: An Anthropological Reader*, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 5-6, 9-12; Christian Tileag, "Ideologies of Moral Exclusion: A Critical Discursive Reframing of Depersonalization, Delegitimization and Dehumanization," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 46, no. 4 (2007): 721–2; Donald G. Dutton, *The Psychology of Genocide, Massacres and Extreme Violence: Why 'Normal' People Come to Commit Atrocities* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 33 & 37.

[101] Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[102] Wolfgang Bialas, "Nazi Ethics: Perpetrators with a Clear Conscience," *Dapim: Studies on the Holocaust* 27, no. 1 (2013): 20.

[103] Hinton, "Introduction: Genocide and Anthropology," 15.

[104] Jervis, "Identity and the Cold War," 27-8.

[105] Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions," 142-5; Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil* (London: Rider Books, 2007), 11; Martin Shaw, *What is Genocide?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 86; Suny, *Why We Hate You*, 23–4.

[106] Suny, *Why We Hate You*, 30, 39–41; Hugo Slim, *Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War* (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), 139–43; Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," 864–7.

[107] Semelin, *Purify and Destroy*, 174.

[108] Eric D. Weitz, *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 195-6.

[109] Malešević, Identity as Ideology, 223–5; Susan Benesch, "Dangerous Speech: A Proposal to Prevent Group Violence," http://www.worldpolicy.org/susan-benesch (accessed October 15, 2012).

[110] Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley, *Why Not Kill Them All?: The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 65. See also: Hammack, "Narrative and the Cultural Psychology of Identity," 224, 233; Herbert C. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict," in *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, ed. I. William Zartman (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 83–6; Cohrs, "Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict," 60.

[111] Leader Maynard, "Ideologies and Mass Violence," Ch. 4; C. C. Aronsfeld, *The Text of the Holocaust: A Study of the Nazis' Extermination Propaganda, from 1919–1945* (Marblehead, MA: Micah Publications, 1985); Michael Burleigh, *The Third Reich: A New History* (London: Pan Books, 2001).

[112] For example: Goldhagen, *Worse Than War*, 211 or John Major as cited in Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 95.

[113] Malešević, *Identity as Ideology*, 176.

[114] Gerlach, *Extremely Violent Societies*, 115.

[115] Ibid., 125.

[116] Ibid., 175. See also: ibid., 161.

[117] Lynne Viola, "The Second Coming: Class Enemies in the Soviet Countryside, 1927–1935," in *Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives*, eds. John Arch Getty and Roberta T. Manning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Bellamy, *Massacres and Morality*, 237–259; Gerlach, *Extremely Violent Societies*, 22–47.

[118] Sanín and Wood, "Ideology in Civil War," 218; Chirot and McCauley, *Why Not Kill Them All?*, 20–44; Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 26–9; Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 38–43; Dutton, *The Psychology of Genocide*, 115–122; Scott Straus, "The Order of Genocide: The Dynam-

ics of Genocide in Rwanda," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 2, no. 3 (2007): 261; Lars Waldorf, "Ordinariness and Orders: Explaining Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 2, no. 3 (2007): 267; Michael Mann, "Were the Perpetrators of Genocide 'Ordinary Men' or 'Real Nazis'? Results from Fifteen Hundred Biographies," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 14, no. 3 (2000): 332–3 & 357–8; Kalyvas, "Ontology of Political Violence," 476 & 483.

[119] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 3rd ed., 3–14; Malešević, *Sociology of War and Violence*, 315-19.

[120] See also: Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, 4 vols., vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[121] Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998): 424; Peter Evans, "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization," *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (1997); Susan Strange, "The Defective State," *Daedalus* 124, no. 2 (1995).

[122] Brubaker and Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," 424–5.

[123] Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions," 141.

[124] See also: Krain, "State-Sponsored Mass Murder," 353.

Unrecognized States and the Enduring Power of Identity

Sophie Rodger

Scattered in small numbers around the world, unrecognized states are territories that have achieved de facto independence from their parent state, yet have failed to achieve legal recognition from the international community. Though they lack external sovereignty, these isolated entities have fostered remarkably strong internal sovereignty owing to the highly effective nation-building measures employed by élites. As Kolstø outlines, these efforts concern the "soft" aspects of state consolidation, such as the development of a common national identity among inhabitants through "symbols, propaganda, history writing, and the cultivation and "invention" of traditions and national customs."[1] In short, nearly every aspect of the lives of these unrecognized states is inextricably intertwined with the politics of identity. By examining the cases of Taiwan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, this paper explores the underappreciated role of identity in the unexpected endurance of these entities, charting how shifting perceptions of belonging have made these cold conflicts ever more intractable as time wears on.

Introduction

As Robert Jackson has noted, it is taken for granted today that the surface of the world is "portioned into territorially differentiated independent countries,"[2] and that the fluidity of previous international systems with their protectorates, mandates, and other kinds of overlapping sovereignties, has been replaced by an altogether more enduring stability. Since decolonization and the fall of the Soviet Union, it has thus become a world in which "there are states and there is little else."[3] The reality is considerably more complex, however, and there exist a number of territories that fall outside of this system. This paper focuses on one such group: those places scholars and policymakers understand as unrecognized states.

Sophie Rodger, "Building a Nation: Unrecognized States and the Enduring Power of Identity," *St Antony's International Review* 10, no. 2 (2015): 53–87.

Scattered in small numbers around the world, unrecognized states are territories that, through secession or state fragmentation, have achieved de facto autonomy from their parent state, yet have failed to achieve legal recognition from the international community. Despite insisting on a right to self-determination, the prospects of these entities are limited by the stronger principle of territorial integrity and the fierce resistance of the international community to admit new members into its fold. Unrecognized states thus exist "in the shadows of international relations," in a kind of limbo where the threat of renewed conflict is a defining feature of their existence.[4] Moreover, the traditional image of these entities as lawless havens for terrorist activities and black-market trading has tended to reinforce their status as the outcasts of international society. Yet in many instances this perception is overplayed or even palpably false: Somaliland can arguably boast the Horn of Africa's best functioning democracy and Taiwan has become one of the most prosperous entities in the world. Despite existing on the fringes of international society, then, many of these entities manage to survive and even develop.

While conventional wisdom has painted these enclaves as fleeting anomalies of no great consequence, the experience of places such as Taiwan (also known as the Republic of China, or ROC) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)—having survived for forty-three and forty years respectively—demands the revision of such an analysis, and an investigation into the conditions that underpin this clear ability to endure. In particular, this paper seeks to demonstrate how shifting perceptions of identity and belonging, cultivated through effective nation-building efforts and the simple passage of time, have made it progressively harder for parties to find acceptable solutions to these conflicts as communities have grown accustomed to living apart.[5]

Before proceeding, however, it is important to first distinguish unrecognized states from the many other entities that have partial international personality, such as associated territories (e.g. Puerto Rico), the British Crown Dependencies, or those autonomous areas guerrilla groups have carved out of their host states, such as that of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, or the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. What sets unrecognized states apart from these other anomalies in the international system?

While conceptualizing these entities slightly differently, most recent literature emphasizes the same four criteria in defining them. First, unlike the FLMN in El Salvador, they control most of the territory that they lay claim to (including its main city and key regions) and have managed to build some state institutions: they have "achieved a level of 'stateness"' underpinned by a degree of de facto domestic sovereignty."[6]

Moreover, the leadership is seeking to build further state institutions and demonstrate its legitimacy through processes such as elections. Second, unlike territories such as Puntland or Puerto Rico, these entities have demonstrated—though not necessarily consistently or universally—a clear desire for a separate existence. Third, in violating the principle of territorial integrity, the unrecognized state faces a rival claim to sovereignty and has not gained international recognition, or has at most been recognized by its patron state and a few others of limited influence. Finally, most authors agree that entities must have survived for at least two years in order to merit serious academic attention, thus excluding more ephemeral units that have quickly collapsed. Using these criteria, it is possible to compile a list of all unrecognized states to have emerged since 1945.[7]

Unrecognised state		Age (years)	Parent state	Population	
Katanga	(1960-63)	3	Congo	5,608,683	(2010)
Biafra	(1967-70)	3	Nigeria	13,500,000	(1967)
Eritrea	(1991-93)	2	Ethiopia	5,291,370	(2008)
Gagauzia	(1991-94)	3	Moldova	155,646	(2004)
Republika Srpska	(1992-95)	3	Bosnia	1,435,179	(2009)
Republika Srpska Krajina	(1991-95)	4	Croatia	430,000	(1994)
Chechnya	(1996-99)	3	Russia	1,103,686	(2002)
East Timor	(1999-2002)	3	Indonesia	1,066,582	(2010)
Anjouan	(1997-2002)	5	Comoros	259,100	(2003)
Kurdistan Iraq	(1991-2004)	13	Iraq	4,690,939	(2010)
Montenegro	(2000-2006)	6	Serbia-Montenegro	620,145	(2003)
Kosovo	(1990-2008)	18	Serbia	1,805,000	(2009)
Tamil Eelam	(1975-2009)	34	Sri Lanka	2,126,449	(2004)
Transnistria	(1990-)	24	Moldova	555,347	(2004)
Nagorno-Karabakh	(1991-)	23	Azerbaijan	134,862	(2005)
Abkhazia	(1990-)	24	Georgia	214,016	(2003)
South Ossetia	(1990-)	24	Georgia	72,000	(2010)
TRNC	(1974-)	40	Cyprus	257,000	(2006)
Somaliland	(1991-)	23	Somalia	3,000,000	(1997)
Taiwan	(1971-)	43	China	23,120,000	(1997)

Table 1: Unrecognized states since 1945.

Puzzling Endurance

While some view these entities as too few in number and too transient in their existence to merit serious academic attention, this paper argues

that many of these contested spaces are capable of exerting a substantial impact on international politics. Not only are unrecognized states at the heart of some of the most strategic regions in today's security environment, but they have also been involved in some of the twentieth century's deadliest conflicts. They also often have the potential to drag greater powers into conflicts, with president of the Brookings Institution, Strobe Talbott, warning in 2005 that "of all the potential flashpoints in the world today, none poses more of a threat to international peace than the Taiwan Strait."[8] Let us not forget, either, that Georgia and Russia went to war over South Ossetia in 2008.

Another reason to address this academic neglect is the consideration that we may also see the emergence of more of these enclaves in the future—a caution against the prevailing tendency to dismiss them as ongoing anomalies when we are arguably dealing with what Chorev has called a "proliferating reality."[9] With the UN Human Development Report of 2004 warning of "the rise of identity politics," and with about 5,000 ethnic groups inhabiting nearly 200 states (two-thirds of them having at least one "substantial minority," defined as an ethnic or religious group constituting at least 10 per cent of the population) it is unlikely that confrontations over identity will disappear.[10] This prognosis is supported by the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management, whose 2008 publication Peace and Conflict warned that "relatively few post-1945 self-determination conflicts can be confidently considered ended," with a number of these conflicts still raging throughout the world today.[11] As Geldenhuys has argued, it is certainly possible that several of these disaffected groups may yet secede from their existing states, with Azawad's declaration of independence from Mali in April 2012 demonstrating the inventory's potential to grow yet further.[12]

A final reason to make greater efforts to understand these entities is the observation that, while often dismissed as merely "a fleeting or temporary phenomena," many unrecognized states are defying scholarly predictions and enduring for some time.[13] While Kolstø acknowledges their "impressive longevity," for example, he argues that they are nonetheless "essentially transient phenomena" expected to disappear,[14] with Lynch also arguing that they seem "destined to collapse."[15] Caspersen likewise points to their "lack of long-term sustainability,"[16] while Geldenhuys argues that "contested statehood is an unnatural status that cannot indefinitely satisfy any of the main parties involved."[17] According to most analyses, then, the high price of non-recognition ensures that these entities cannot endure over the longer-term, with Miller concluding that

without international recognition, "a government's [...] likelihood that it will retain its position is remote."[18]

Barred from membership of state-only organizations such as the UN and unprotected by the norm of non-intervention (and thus vulnerable to forcible reintegration into the parent state at any time), it is clear why many have described the sustainability of unrecognized states in such gloomy terms. Yet, while survival has been short-lived for some of these territories, a number have endured for some *decades*—lifespans that are by no means negligible.

By examining the cases of Taiwan and TRNC—chosen for their status as the two longest surviving entities of the post-1945 period—this paper explores the important role of identity politics in the endurance of these contested spaces. While the analysis is not based on a hard core comparative approach and there are necessarily inevitable differences between the two cases, Taiwan and the TRNC are united by their continuing politically ambiguous status and their relatively similar experiences of nation-building projects. In particular, the paper examines how élites in both territories have sought to use history writing and the 'invention' of traditions and symbols to unite society behind the nation-building project, while also underlining the passage of time as another important factor influencing people's sense of belonging in both cases.

Taiwan

Unlike many unrecognized states, the Republic of China did not emerge from a process of secession, but instead owes its contested autonomy to revolutionary regime change in mainland China. The current Taiwan question thus has its origins in an earlier controversy that falls within a different conceptual frame—that of recognition of *governments*, with Beijing and Taipei's dispute between 1949 and early 1991 centring on the question of who legitimately ruled an undivided China.[19]

By the end of the Second World War, the ROC enjoyed a prominent position in international politics, becoming a founding member of the UN in 1945, and assuming one of Security Council's five permanent seats. With Japan's defeat it had also regained the important territories of Manchuria (occupied by the Japanese since 1931) and the island of Taiwan, which had been ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. Despite these improvements in its external position, however, the ROC faced deep internal division as civil war raged between Chiang Kai-shek's ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and the revolutionary forces of Mao

Zedong's Chinese Communist Party, eventually ending with the former's retreat to Taiwan in 1949.

While Mao's People's Republic of China (PRC) presented itself as the successor of the ROC, Chiang's KMT portrayed their position on Taiwan as only a temporary relocation following the communists' illegal seizure of power: still claiming to be China's only legitimate government, its stated policy until 1991 remained the recovery of the mainland from communist control. For the first two decades of the Cold War the international community sided with the ROC, but in 1971 the UN General Assembly reversed its position and approved Resolution 2758 "to restore all rights" to the PRC and to recognize its delegates as "the only legitimate representatives of China."[20] Chiang and his representatives were duly expelled, and the 'Taiwan issue' now became a domestic Chinese matter, with the international community largely accepting Beijing's claim that the island was a renegade province that would eventually return to the fold.[21]

Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has meanwhile changed dramatically. Following the death of Chiang Ching-kuo (Chiang Kai-shek's son) in 1988, Lee Teng-hui became the first native Taiwanese president and chairman of the KMT and subsequently set in motion an impressive process of political liberalization that resulted in the formation of opposition parties (most notably the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party), as well as the holding of free and popular elections. In a landmark shift, the government also ended its ban on economic and cultural exchanges with the mainland, with all parties having increasingly sought to abandon non-engagement with Beijing in favour of a more pragmatic approach to diplomacy.

The most significant change, however, was Lee's decision on April 30, 1991 to end Martial Law (the "period of national mobilization for suppression of the communist rebellion"), signalling Taipei's formal renouncement of its sovereign claim over the mainland. Instead, he now argued that the two sides of the Strait constituted "two legal entities in the international arena,"[22] and that "each [was] entitled to represent the residents of the territory under its de facto control" separately as a member of the UN.[23] It was thus only during the early 1990s that the question of an international status for the territory formally arose, with subsequent pronouncements from Taipei edging ever closer to an assertion of full independence, especially after the Democratic Progressive Party came to power under Chen Shui-bian in 2000.[24] According to a particularly bold pronouncement by Taipei's Mainland Affairs Council in 2006: "The ROC is an independent sovereign country [and] the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is that both sides across the Strait have no juris-

diction over each other."[25] Since the more accommodating KMT returned to power in 2008 Taipei's rhetoric has been more cautious, although President Ma Ying-jeou has been unwavering in his commitment to "the sovereignty, security and dignity of the ROC on Taiwan."[26]

A paradox has thus emerged since the late 1980s: what was once a social and economic no-man's land is now a "superhighway of cross-strait trade and travel,"[27] with over 40,000 Taiwanese companies making investments and employing ten million people in the mainland by 2005.[28] Yet politically and militarily the two sides remain locked in a stalemate of deep mistrust as significantly closer economic ties have failed to spill over into the political sphere. Moreover, in the face of Beijing's intransigence and occasional outright aggression, the drifting political imagination of Taiwan's people, who are growing increasingly sceptical to reunification, continues to put greater distance between the two sides.

Political relations between Beijing and Taipei since the early 1990s can thus be characterized as having reached a fragile equilibrium where, in the absence of a solution that satisfies both sides, both governments opt to maintain the status quo –understood in Taipei as "no unification, no independence, and no use of force."[29] The persistence of this deadlock is certainly perplexing: as an island of only 0.4 per cent of China's size and less than 2 per cent of its population, Taiwan has aptly been likened to David in the shadow of Goliath.[30] But as President Ma noted in an interview with the New York Times, as long as the cross-Strait region is peaceful and prosperous "neither government would think of changing this situation, since the price would be too high for either side to pay."[31] In addition to the damaging economic ramifications, for example, upsetting the balance for Taiwan would mean risking war (and almost certain defeat) with the mainland, while for Beijing a forced solution would mean a potential war with the US, and possible military occupation of an island of twenty-three million inhabitants hostile to its authority. There are a number of reasons why this enduring political deadlock persists, then, including the economic and military costs of altering the status quo. However, this paper focuses on an altogether more emotive explanation: the role of an increasingly strong 'Taiwanese consciousness' on the island in complicating the search for an acceptable settlement.

Nation-Building on Taiwan

Owing to the work of scholars such as Ernest Gellner (1964), Eric Hobsbawm (1990) and Benedict Anderson (2006), it is now widely accepted that the act of nation-building is an ongoing process of social con-

struction in which communities are artificially imagined. Unrecognized states provide particularly compelling evidence for this, with Kolstø noting how the leaders of these entities "strenuously try to foster a sense of common identity and destiny among the inhabitants of their territory," seeking to muster allegiance from the local population to prop up the entity's internal sovereignty.[32] Taiwan is no exception, with Stéphane Corcuff going so far as to describe the island as "a laboratory of identities" following significant efforts at nation-building since 1949.[33]

Following defeat at the hands of Mao and the Chinese communists, in 1949 the KMT and two million mainlanders fled to Taiwan, itself already home to six million Taiwanese Islanders (most of whom had never been to China) whose experience of Japanese colonial rule had just ended four years earlier.[34] The island thus became divided between the majority people who traced their ancestry to the early Chinese settlers that arrived on the island from the fifteenth century (today about 70 per cent of the population) and the minority whose families arrived in the 1940s (15 per cent). The rest were made up from ethnic Hakka and aboriginal groups.[35]

The urgent task for the KMT now became the invention of what Hsin-Yi Yeh has called a "Greater China" identity, in which Taiwan was defined as a model province of China that would rescue its fellow Chinese citizens from the clutches of the communist enemies. Over the next four decades, numerous élite-driven measures sought to foster this new identity and mobilise the population behind the KMT's mission of national unification. One of the most important initiatives was the government's attempt to control education, installing Mandarin Chinese as the official language (banning local dialects) and giving minimal time to studying the island's history, with courses instead focusing on the cultivation of 'Chinese' culture, national consciousness and patriotism.[36] Taipei's streets were meanwhile renamed after Chinese locations and statues of national figures such as Sun Yat-sen and heroic Chinese warriors were constructed in busy public spaces. Throughout these years, moreover, the media disseminated patriotic songs and slogans, and countless grand ceremonies were organized to celebrate national events.[37] In short, for nearly four decades martial law was used to enforce strict cultural policies and stifle any expression of Taiwanese identity as people on Taiwan were subjected to relentless Sinification projects by the KMT. As historian Chang Yen-hsien, curator of Taiwan's National Museum of History, remembered: "The result was to make Taiwanese people feel the presence of Chinese culture and the KMT at all times and places."[38]

These efforts enjoyed some success, but the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 and the election of Lee Teng-hui in the same year as the first

native-born president of the KMT government now saw Taiwan embark on a dramatically different course. Following Taipei's formal renouncement of its sovereign claim over the mainland in 1991, President Lee (and then Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008) began a new wave of nation-building aimed at imagining a new Taiwan, no longer defined as a province of Greater China but as a valid nation in itself with its own history and culture. Signalling this new course, Lee announced in 1996 that people who lived on Taiwan were all "New Taiwanese," implying that anyone (regardless of islander or mainlander status) was now a member of the nation if they identified with Taiwan.[39]

As in so many unrecognized states, one of the first tasks in Lee's nation-building project was to rewrite the island's history to underline its distinctiveness from China. While under Chiang Kai-shek Taiwan's history was presented as part of a 5,000-year Chinese history, Hughes and Stone observe that:

> The new chronology [promoted after 1991] is a mere 400 years, starting with the Portuguese naming the island 'Formosa.' The island is then presented as having gone through a 'tragic history.' Within the period the people of Taiwan have not been able to be 'masters of their home' until, that is, the coming of democratization.[40]

Moreover, while the Chinese nationalists of the post-1945 period presented Chiang Kai-shek as the 'saviour' of the Chinese people, after 1991 he was reinvented as a ruthless and corrupt authoritarian responsible for the deaths of countless Taiwanese people. Daniel Lynch meanwhile notes that the introduction in 1997 of the controversial "Know Taiwan" course in the first year of secondary school can be seen as further evidence of the élite's determination to reshape the identity of Taiwanese youth by moving away from the China-centric curriculum of the pre-1988 period. Not only do the new textbooks discuss the Japanese colonial period objectively and elevate the place of Malayo-Polynesian aboriginals in the island's history, but they also assert that "Taiwan's ethnic pluralism has produced a distinctive 'Taiwanese consciousness' and that the Taiwanese people have repeatedly demonstrated heroism over the centuries by resisting the imposition of authoritarian rule from abroad, especially from China."[41] As Li Chuan-hsin, a social studies teacher in Taipei's Xinpu National Elementary School, put it in 2004: "We don't teach that Taiwan is part of China anymore. We emphasize that we're Taiwanese now."[42]

In other measures, the teaching of Taiwanese (Min Nan) was introduced into primary schools and also encouraged during official occasions as well as on the airwaves and on television shows. New public holidays

were meanwhile created which aimed to celebrate or commemorate specific events unique to the island's history—February 28, for example, became "228 Accident Memorial Day" to remember the thousands of Taiwanese killed by the KMT government in 1947 when they protested against the military's abuse of an elderly woman. Many of the statues erected during the KMT's authoritarian years were also destroyed and streets were given new names in an attempt to erase overt connections to the Chinese mainland.[43] Hsin-Yi Yeh even notes that:

> In 2002, President Chen's government started to replace the terms 'China', 'Republic of China', and 'Taipei' with the term 'Taiwan' on official documents and in the names of Taiwan-registered organizations, companies, and public enterprises. In 2003, the Foreign Ministry issued a new passport with the word 'Taiwan' printed on its cover [...] In 2007 the name of Taiwan's official postal service was changed from the Chunghwa Post Co. to the Taiwan Post Co. [and] the Chiang Kai-shek memorial hall was renamed the National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall.[44]

Fearing the possible negative implications of China's spectacular economic accomplishments, with many expressing concern that it was only a matter of time before Beijing would act to end Taiwan's quasi-independence, architects of this nation-building project thus sought to sweep away the Greater Chinese identity. Residents were instead asked to imagine a new Taiwan that was no longer a peripheral outpost of a much larger entity, but a sovereign and autonomous nation in its own right. How successful have these attempts been, and with what consequences?

Changing perceptions of belonging on Taiwan

Scholars and policymakers have been following identity trends on Taiwan closely for over 25 years, with countless surveys revealing that while an overwhelming majority of Taiwan residents called themselves 'Chinese' in the late 1980s, this percentage has since fallen sharply with a rising proportion of residents now calling themselves 'Taiwanese.' Importantly, this rise has continued despite President Ma's attempts since 2008 to reiterate shared history, culture and identity across the Strait and roll back de-Sinification projects brought in under his two predecessors.[45] According to an ongoing survey conducted by the Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University in Taipei, for example, while 25.5 per cent of respondents identified themselves as 'Chinese only' when the survey was first conducted in 1992, this percentage has dropped to less than 4 per cent in 2014, with the number of people who consider themselves 'both Taiwanese and Chinese' also declining (from

46.4 per cent to 32.7 per cent) over the same period. The percentage of those identifying as 'Taiwanese only', meanwhile, has risen dramatically from a low of 17.6 per cent when the survey began to a high of 60.4 per cent in 2014.

Over the course of a generation, then, there has been a fundamental shift in how people on Taiwan view themselves. Though almost everyone is ethnic Chinese and speaks Mandarin, it is clear that, as time passes, people on the island are losing their sense of identification with the mainland as ever more identify as Taiwanese only. Philip Pan offers a small window into this profound shift among both older and younger people alike by recounting his conversations with two residents in 2004. Remembering the authoritarian pre-1988 period and contrasting it with the opening up of Taiwan since, Chen Yichun, a fifty-year old taxi driver in Taipei, remarked that "over the past 10 years, listening to campaign speeches, I realized the [Chinese] Nationalists had lied to all of us, and that I'm Taiwanese, not Chinese." On the other hand, speaking with little recollection of life before Lee Teng-hui's reforms, Shu Shennan, a twenty-year old business student in Kaohsiung, meanwhile considered his Taiwanese identity a natural and self-evident truth: "I was born in Taiwan, I live in Taiwan and I speak a Taiwanese language, so of course I'm Taiwanese, not Chinese. We have Chinese roots, but it would be weird if any of my friends said he was Chinese."[47] As more people grow up in a society with a strong Taiwanese identity, it seems likely that this trend will continue.



Figure 1 Trends in Core Political Attitudes Among Taiwanese, 1992-2014.[46]

A number of factors have driven this transformation, including the élite's de-Sinification projects examined above. The island's democratization has also been integral in allowing the population greater liberty to question their history and culture in ways that were previously forbidden. As Lin Mun-lee, director of Taiwan's National Palace Museum, observed: 'As Tawian has become democratic, we have become more aware of our surroundings and our history [...] there has been an explosion of vitality in the development of Taiwanese culture.'[48] The role of Beijing should also be noted, particularly its military threats which have served to alienate many. This was evident after the Strait crisis of 1995–1996, for example, during which China fired missiles near the island and conducted several naval and amphibious assault exercises to express anger at President Lee's visit to America. Figure 1 shows the result: the sharpest yet increase in the 'Taiwanese' identification line and an equally dramatic fall in dual identification. Finally, the simple passage of time has ensured that those with the strongest ties to China who travelled to the island in the 1940s have become a smaller proportion of the population.

For all of these reasons, people on the island have increasingly come to regard themselves as having a unique history, culture, and identity and feel considerable pride in their democratic evolution since 1988. It is thus reasonable to assume that this trend makes unification more difficult, with Taiwan's people being unlikely to give up their highly-prized autonomy after decades of self-government. This matters because, owing to the island's democratic status, any solution to the current impasse must necessarily meet with the approval of a majority of Taiwan's population first. As President Clinton asserted in 2000, the US (as an important guarantor of peace across the Strait through the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act) insisted, "that the issues between Beijing and Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the People of Taiwan."[49] Chen Shui-bian likewise used his second inaugural address of May 2004 to announce that: "In the future the ROC and the PRC can seek to establish relations in any form whatsoever so long as there is the consent of the 23 million people of Taiwan."[50] More recently, President Ma has also reiterated that "the future of Taiwan shall be decided commonly by the people of Taiwan."[51] Since the island's democratization in the late 1980s, then, the task of finding a mutually acceptable settlement has been complicated by the fact that the people of Taiwan now have a powerful seat at the negotiating table, constraining the options of the party leaders in Taipei who compete for their votes. As Richard Bush has thus noted, "Taiwan's democratic system provides a veto over initiatives on mainland policy that do not have broad support"—so it does not bode well for the prospects of a future settlement that support among Taiwan's population for

Beijing's proposed 'one country, two systems' formula (*à la* Hong Kong) has never approached 50 per cent.[52]

The consequences of changing identities on Taiwan

While there remains an island-wide consensus against the 'one country, two systems' formula, it is important to note that the ascendance of a distinctive Taiwanese identity has not automatically translated into a strong popular demand for formal independence. Rather, the results of another survey conducted by the same Election Study Center in June 2014, which asked 9978 islanders about their views on independence, shows that only 23.8 per cent of respondents desire immediate or delayed independence (up from 11 per cent in 1994). Even less (10.2 per cent) seek immediate or delayed unification (down from 20 per cent in 1994), while 24.9 per cent seek the status quo indefinitely and 33.9 per cent seek the status quo for the meantime but then a decision later. Figure 2 below illustrates how these preferences have trended over time, but the most recent results alone offer a telling verdict: a substantial majority favours the persistence of the status quo for the time being.

Rather than wanting the government to pursue full independence from the mainland, people on Taiwan thus prefer flexibility towards China in order to ensure the island's continued prosperity. Contrary to the assumptions of scholars such as Geldenhuys who point to the costs of non-recognition as being too high for these entities to persist, then, opinion polls demonstrate that for Taiwan and its people the status quo is eminently tolerable and, when relations are friendly with Beijing, even comfortable. Despite the island's lack of formal recognition, indeed, Taiwan's people enjoy significant prosperity, boasting one of the world's largest economies by PPP as well as considerably more international personality than any other unrecognized state.[53] Moreover, with 40 per cent of Taiwan's total exports destined for China in 2011 and their two-way trade totalling almost 170 billion USD, it is clear to most Taiwanese that maintaining the peaceful status quo and stable trade relations with the mainland is crucial if the island is to enjoy continued economic success.[54] There are thus powerful economic considerations that discourage risky moves towards independence.

The trend toward greater 'Taiwanese consciousness', then, has not evolved into an urgent political demand for Taiwan independence and more assertive policies toward the mainland as many commentators had feared.[56] At the same time, however, Shelley Rigger is correct to note that "support for unification has declined precipitously and shows little sign of rebounding."[57] Here, the insight of Su Chi, a senior mainland affairs

official in the KMT, is perhaps instructive, characterizing the dilemma as a heart versus head issue: while in their hearts people on the island are proud Taiwanese who resent China's threats, their heads keep them from making a formal break with the mainland that could start a war.[58]



Figure 2. Shifting views on independence and reunification, 1994–2014.[55]

In short, the pragmatism of people on Taiwan combined with the growing strength of 'Taiwanese consciousness' on the island suggests that a political settlement with China will be increasingly difficult to achieve. Economic ties and great power politics can only bring the two so close: until the islanders feel a much stronger identification with the mainland—politically, socially, and culturally—then Taiwan and China seem likely to remain disunited for some time.

Northern Cyprus

Identity is at the heart of the Cyprus problem too, which, having been on the agenda of the UN Security Council for over forty years, has also proved to be one of the world's most intractable conflicts. While independence from Britain in 1960 brought the island's two communities, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, tentatively together, it was not long before the fragile compromise broke down, later resulting in the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the northern part of the island. This divide remains today, with multiple attempts at reaching

a political settlement having broken down owing to the deep sense of distrust that continues to exist between the two communities.

A history of discord

In examining how the two communities on Cyprus became separated after independence, it is important to note that the seeds for this conflict were sown during British colonial rule in the early twentieth century. Becoming increasingly dissatisfied with British control and viewing themselves as one people with mainland Greeks, tensions grew from the 1920s as the Greek Cypriot community became increasingly vocal in its desire for union with Greece ('*enosis*').[60] By the 1950s this demand had grown in strength under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios III, with Greek Cypriot dissatisfaction reaching such levels that the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) began to violently pursue independence from Britain. EOKA also began targeting Turkish Cypriots, many of whom sought the partition of the island into Greek and Turkish zones ('*takism*'). Spurred on by Britain and supported by Turkey, they formed the Turkish Resistance Organization in November 1957, with clashes between the two organizations resulting in an eruption of intercommunal violence. [61]



Figure 3. Map of Cyprus.[59]

In 1959 an opportunity for compromise arose when the British renounced sovereignty over Cyprus, resulting in a series of negotiations between Greece, Turkey and Britain at two conferences in February 1959. Explicitly ruling out *enosis* and *takism*, the London–Zurich accords saw

the parties agree on a basic structure for the new independent Republic of Cyprus (RoC), established on 16 August 1960 as a bi-communal state with consociational power-sharing between its two constituent communities.[62] In addition to the "Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus," which provided an outline of the essential provisions of the constitution, the conferences also produced two other key documents. The first of these, the Treaty of Guarantee, charged Britain, Greece, and Turkey with overseeing the independence, security, and territorial integrity of the island, while the Treaty of Alliance allowed Greece and Turkey to station 950 and 650 troops respectively on the island.

Representing a grand compromise on both sides, few on the island were jubilant about the new constitutional arrangement, with the *Economist* observing that "probably no people in history have viewed their independence with less enthusiasm than the Cypriots."[63] Constituting 80 per cent of the population, the Greek Cypriots felt that the cause of *enosis* had been betrayed and that too much had been conceded to their numerically-weaker Turkish Cypriot counterparts (18 per cent), resulting in an unworkable and undemocratic minority veto government.

With both communities clashing over multiple issues in the early days of independence, tensions reached a head on November 30, 1963 when the Greek Cypriot leadership proposed thirteen amendments to the constitution, seven of which would have involved changing the constitution's basic (supposedly unalterable) articles.[64] Proposing to strip the president and vice president of their veto powers and to abolish the requirement for separate majorities for the passage of certain laws, President Makarios' amendments would have eliminated the bi-communal nature of the Republic and set the stage for a centralized unitary state with only minority rights for the Turkish Cypriots. Rejecting the proposals and having lost faith in the will of their Greek Cypriot counterparts to make the power-sharing arrangements work, the Turkish Cypriot leadership withdrew all officials from the organs of government. Intercommunal violence then erupted throughout the island, killing thousands and forcing over 30,000 Turkish Cypriots to flee to enclaves in the north.[65] Anxious to protect the blockaded Turkish Cypriot community, and worried by Turkish threats to invade unless attacks against the Turkish Cypriots stopped, in early 1964 the UN deployed the UNFICYP peacekeeping force to the island.[66]

While from a Turkish Cypriot standpoint the RoC ceased to exist after the Greek Cypriot leadership's illegitimate power-grab, the Greek Cypriots (and the international community) rejected this view and instead carried on as usual, with the Supreme Court approving the actions of the (now Greek Cypriot-only) House of Representatives to amend the

country's constitution. Meanwhile, from December 1963 the Turkish Cypriots governed themselves under the leadership of a thirteen-member General Committee headed by Vice President Küçük, which was later transformed into the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration (PCTA), and was to remain in place until the provisions of the 1960 constitution were re-enforced.[67]

With the two communities now living largely separately, the Cyprus problem intensified in 1967 with the advent of military dictatorship in Greece and growing Greek interference in the internal affairs of the island. It was not until 1974, however, that things reached crisis point when, on July 15, the Greek Cypriot National Guard staged a coup to oust the Greek Cypriot government and extend Greek military rule to Cyprus. Turkey quickly intervened militarily, invoking its rights under the Treaty of Guarantee to secure the perimeter of an area between Kyrenia and Nicosia and broker a ceasefire. After attacks continued against the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, however, Turkey launched a second invasion to extend its control from 3 to 37 per cent of the island's territory in the north, leading to the implementation of an UN-monitored buffer zone (the 'Green Line') and the current partition of Cyprus.

The events of 1974 thus ensured the political and demographic separation of the two communities as 140,000 Greek Cypriots fled south and 60,000 Turkish Cypriots sought refuge in the Turkish-protected North.[68] The following year, moreover, the PCTA declared itself the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC), with Rauf Denktaş elected as president. While this proclamation in 1975 presented the TFSC as a constituent member of a future federated Cyprus, 1983 saw the North go a step further in declaring its independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Importantly, however, the Turkish Cypriots were eager to ensure that the establishment of the TRNC would not preclude a bi-communal settlement of the Cyprus problem, with the declaration stipulating that "the proclamation of the new State will not hinder, but facilitate the establishment of a genuine federation."[69] For Denktaş, only a declaration of independence would oblige the Greek side towards a settlement based on a bi-communal partnership under a bi-zonal federal system: "if we did not assert our right of statehood as free people" he later explained, "I saw no reason why the Greek Cypriots should accept us into a partnership. The world had to see that we existed."[70]

A litany of failed negotiations

Since the partition of the island in 1974, a variety of negotiations have aimed to solve the Cyprus problem, from the High-Level Agreements

of 1977 and 1979, to the UN efforts in the mid-1980s under Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in the early 1990s under his successor Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and in 1999–2004 under Kofi Annan.[71] Despite the significant international energy devoted to reaching a comprehensive settlement, however, and despite the commitment of both communities to a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal republic since 1977, a solution has remained elusive for over forty years.

For the sake of space, this paper focuses on the failure of the 2002–2004 Annan Plan, widely held to represent "the best chance Cypriots have ever had to reunify their country."[72] This renewed drive for a settlement resulted from the EU's agreement to begin accession negotiations with the RoC in 1998, as well as its decision the following year to recognize Turkey as a candidate for membership. In light of the unique set of circumstances that had emerged ripening the deadlock for a resolution (including evolving Greek–Turkish rapprochement), proximity talks were held in 1999 and 2000 between Denktaş and the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides, but ended abruptly with a Turkish Cypriot walkout in 2000.[73] Under an increasing sense of urgency with the deadline for the RoC's EU accession approaching (and with the international community preferring that a *reunited* Cyprus should join the EU in May 2004), the talks were relaunched at the end of 2001 and by November 2002 the UN team presented a first draft of the Annan Plan. The product of some 300 meetings and comprising 182 pages of main articles and finalized laws, the document represented "by far the most detailed and comprehensive attempt to advance a federal solution on Cyprus [since 1974]."[74]

In terms of its content, the Annan blueprint outlined the creation of a federal state with two constituent units: the Greek community in the south, and the Turkish Cypriots in the north, whose proportion of the island's territory would also be reduced from 37 to 28.5 per cent. Constitutionally, these constituent units would enjoy considerable autonomy, although issues of foreign relations, federal finance and monetary policy, citizenship, and immigration would be reserved for the federal government. Not only would the Treaty of Guarantee remain intact, moreover, but the UN peacekeeping force would also remain on the island to monitor the new design's implementation. Finally, having a single international personality, the redesigned United Cyprus Republic would be a fully-fledged EU member.

The Annan Plan went through five revisions, all of which were rejected by the immovable Denktaş. Despite failing to reach any final agreement on the text, however, considerable international pressure pushed the parties to allow Annan to put his own definitive version ('An-

nan V') to a vote, with both communities holding separate referenda on April 24, 2004.[75] In a startling turnaround, 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots accepted it, while 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots voted 'no.' To the international community's dismay, a divided Cyprus entered the EU on May 1 and, despite four decades of persistent international efforts to bring about a settlement, Northern Cyprus continues to exist in a state of international illegitimacy.

The Greek Cypriot 'No' Vote: Distrust of 'the Other'

Just as it is in the interests of both Taiwan and China to break the cross-Strait deadlock, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots had excellent incentives to accept the Annan Plan. For the latter, reunification would mean an end to the North's international isolation and its dependence on Turkey which had become increasingly unpopular; and would also allow Turkish Cypriots to gain from the many privileges of being citizens of an EU member state. Further, it would secure the North's equal status with the south while ensuring the ability to fully assert their Turkish identity. For Greek Cypriots, meanwhile, acceptance of the settlement would have delivered many of the benefits that it has sought for decades: the country's reunification, the return of a large portion of territory, the return of most displaced persons to their homes, the demilitarization of the island to the levels of the Treaty of Guarantee in 1960, and the halting of immigration from Turkey.[76] Instead of accepting the solution, however, Greek Cypriots chose to maintain the status quo after an unexpected plea by President Tassos Papadopoulos for a "resounding rejection" of the Plan.[77]

In analysing the 'no' vote, observers have emphasized the electorate's inadequate preparation for the decision, the highly imbalanced media coverage received by the 'no' campaign, and the lack of objective information disseminated about the Plan's articles. While these factors are certainly important, the scale of the rejection suggests a more convincing explanation lies in Greek Cypriot fears that the substantive disagreements between the two communities regarding security, property, territory, and constitutional and governance issues had not been adequately addressed—or had been addressed in ways that favoured the Turkish Cypriots. In short, ample survey data suggests that the real root of the Greek Cypriot 'no' vote was a deep-seated distrust of the other community, and of Turkey—often regarded as one. According to a poll conducted by a Greek Cypriot news channel on the day of the referendum, for example, 75 per cent of respondents who voted against the Plan listed concerns about security as being their primary motivation for voting 'no.'[78] In his 2004 UN Secretary-General report, Annan likewise

noted the paramount importance of "lingering Greek Cypriot concerns about security and implementation of the plan" based on "historic distrust of Turkish intentions" in explaining their rejection of it.[79]

At the heart of the security dead lock are essentially two different interpretations of the roots of the Cyprus problem. Bitterly remembering the experience of 1974 when the island was 'invaded' by Turkey, Greek Cypriots identify this moment as the beginning of the conflict, and thus favour an entirely demilitarized island with all foreign troops withdrawn, and with a UN-mandated international force keeping the peace. For Turkish Cypriots, however, Turkey's 1974 intervention is viewed as a necessary "peace operation."[80] For them, the roots of the conflict are instead found in 1963 in the Greek Cypriot leadership's assault on the 1960 constitution and the resulting intercommunal violence that pushed them to cluster for safety in small northern enclaves.[81] Turkish Cypriots thus favour the extension of the rights of the Guarantor Powers and their stationing of large troop contingents on the island to protect against Greek Cypriot domination. As Annan characterized it: "while Greek Cypriots fear the Turkish Goliath, the Turkish Cypriots fear the Greek Cypriot Goliath."[82]

While the Turkish Cypriot community was reassured by the high degree of security that was provided for them within Annan V, many Greek Cypriots felt that their concerns were insufficiently addressed. In particular, Faustmann notes that the continuation of Turkey's guarantor powers was the main motive for the Greek Cypriot 'no,' with the latter fearing that the permanent presence of 650 Turkish troops was included in the Plan to safeguard Turkey's interests in controlling the island.[83] As Papadopoulos warned in his April 7 broadcast "[through the Annan Plan] Turkey's pursuit to control and dominate Cyprus has been fully met".[84] Moreover, many Greek Cypriots had serious concerns over the settlement's implementation; fearing that, while their side would deliver on all concessions on the day of the agreement's execution, there were no safeguards that the Turkish Cypriot side would uphold their commitments. In contrast to the immediately effective Greek Cypriot concessions, the main benefits for them—the handover of territory, the reduction in Turkish troops, and the gradual return of refugees—would be implemented over periods of three years, fourteen years, and eighteen years respectively.

Another substantive issue on which the two communities are at odds is that of property and territorial adjustments. While Greek Cypriots desire a solution based on freedom of movement and settlement and the right of displaced persons to return to their homes, Turkish Cypriots argue that the distrust between the two sides and the need for security

means that property claims should be liquidated by a global exchange and compensation scheme, and that freedom of movement and residence should be strictly controlled.[85] On the issue of territorial adjustment there is an equally large divergence of opinion, with Greek Cypriots arguing for substantial adjustments (given the disproportionate amount of territory currently controlled by the north, and their wish for displaced persons to be able to return to their homes under Greek Cypriot administration). The Turkish Cypriot side is meanwhile highly resistant to significant changes: citing the considerable passage of time during which people have long settled down, the north speaks only of the most minor adjustments along the buffer zone, effectively ruling out any substantial transfer of territory.[86]

Finally, disagreements over constitutional and governance issues have also served to underpin the dead lock. Concerned that Turkish Cypriot veto powers would bring the political system of a united Cyprus to a standstill, the Annan negotiations saw the Greek Cypriot leadership pursue a free-standing federal government with participation of both communities in decision-making, but with representation based on population ratios. The Turkish Cypriot leadership resisted such proposals, however, with Denktaş expressing concern that "the only relationship with the Turkish Cypriots that the Greek Cypriots are prepared to entertain is a relationship of domination."[87] Being the minority community, the north has thus consistently favoured a setup that reserves very few competences for the centre (while insisting on numerical equality and consensus decision-making with respect to these), and instead allows for relatively autonomous constituent states to ensure the maintenance of their separate status and identity. Fearing Turkey's ability to intervene in the political decisions of the island via the Turkish Cypriot leadership, however, most Greek Cypriots wish to retain as much authority as possible at the centre.



Figure 4. Preferences regarding strong federal government versus strong constituent states.[88]

It is clear, then, that deep-seated fear and distrust of "the other" leads both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots to take opposite positions on all key substantive issues that divide them, which makes concluding a settlement a decidedly difficult task. As touched on above, these fears stem from the very different memories and narratives each community has constructed about the island's highly contested past.

Constructing National Narratives

As in Taiwan where the rewriting of the island's history and the introduction of school courses such as the "Know Taiwan" module during the 1990s have been used to construct a national narrative that highlights Taiwan's difference from China, the writing of history has also played a significant role in the entrenchment of the Cyprus problem. In particular, the different interpretations held by the two communities about the island's past, which have served to reinforce monolithic constructions of the Self and Other, are nowhere better exemplified than in school textbooks.[89] For Greek Cypriots, for example, the history of Cyprus has been taught as an extension of the history of Greece, with all school books employing the term Cypriots (*Kyprioi*) as equivalent to Greeks (*Ellines*) throughout.[90] The Ottoman period is meanwhile presented in exclusively negative terms, with Turks appearing as a hostile and expansionist people, while the period of intercommunal violence of the 1960s is given little attention at all, with the Turkish Cypriots nonetheless held responsible as the 'mutineer Turks.' As Papadakis notes, the 1960s are "presented as a period of aggression by the 'Turks' against the 'Greeks' and shown as a period of mostly 'Greek' suffering," with the events of 1974 presented as a "barbaric Turkish invasion."[91]

Until 2004, Turkish Cypriot textbooks displayed an equally strong brand of ethnic nationalism with the island's history presented as an integral part of Turkish history, and the Ottoman period glorified as a time of progress during which the Turks rescued the Greek Cypriots from Venetian oppression.[92] The events of 1963–1974 receive most attention, and are presented as a time of terrible cruelty during which the Greek Cypriots tried to eradicate Turkish Cypriots from the island. The suffering of the former is ignored, while 1974 is described as a 'Happy Peace operation' when the 'Heroic Turkish Army' came to safeguard their kin on Cyprus. Papadakis thus concludes that "both approaches are monoethnic and ethnocentric; both reject the conceptualization of Cyprus as a multicultural and multiethnic space in the past and the present." [93]

In other ways, too, élites have sought to forge a sense of belonging within society that has tended to exclude the other side and deny

common ground. As part of the state-building project in the north, for example, the symbolic presence of Turkey can be strongly felt through the sight of its flag emblazoned on the hills, the adoption of Turkish street names, the many public portraits and statues of Atatürk, and the continued celebration of its official holidays.[94] It should be noted, too, that these efforts (pursued most vigorously under Denktaş) at stressing the unity of Turks on Cyprus with those in Turkey bear a striking resemblance to the measures enacted under the KMT to stress Taiwan's oneness with China before the arrival of Lee Teng-hui. Other statues meanwhile celebrate specifically Turkish Cypriot heroes such as Dr Fazıl Küçük, the first recognized leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community, while the important date of July 20 is annually marked with Peace and Freedom celebrations that remember the 1974 intervention.

In short, in both Taiwan and the TRNC society has been wedded to the nation-building project through the invention of traditions, as holidays, ceremonies, statues and the selective use of the historical past have all been used by local authorities "as a means to legitimize their present claims to statehood' and cement a unified sense of belonging within each territory."[95] In both cases, moreover, the role of leaders (Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan and Rauf Denktaş in Northern Cyprus) has been crucial in driving this process forward and monopolizing the official discourse.

Being Cypriot

Given the construction of two deeply divergent historical narratives of Cypriot history, it is perhaps unsurprising that a 2011 report by *Cyprus 2015*—a civil society peace-building initiative that conducts thousands of cross-border interviews and dialogue events—found that "trust is a scarce commodity when contemplating coexistence" and that identity issues, including perceptions of the 'other' community, remain the most significant obstacle to compromise and reconciliation.[96] A measure of progress is being made, however: since 2004, for example, educational reforms brought in under the pro-reunification Republican Turkish Party (CTP) have seen the TRNC adopt a new approach to teaching history—one that emphasizes shared suffering and cultural interactions as well as highlighting the divisions that exist within the two communities to give a more nuanced understanding of the island's history and people. In doing so, the new textbooks attempt to break down unhelpful constructions of each community as either 'enemy' or 'victim' and instead examine the role of nationalism and British policies in driving apart two peoples who otherwise coexisted peacefully and shared many similari-

ties. Moreover, the period 1963–1974 no longer receives disproportionate attention and while the Greek Cypriots still receive a larger portion of blame, their suffering is no longer ignored. In short:

> No single meaning or lesson, such as 'Cyprus is Turkish/Greek' or 'the past shows that people can/cannot not live together,' can now be derived from history as presented in the new Turkish Cypriot books. This means that the future is no longer presented as historically determined, but is left open as a political choice. [97]

This important change has come about as a result of the increasing discontent felt by many Turkish Cypriots towards Denktaş' stiflingly close relationship with Turkey that seemed to smother the north's autonomy and obliged it to accept thousands of settlers from Turkey since 1974 who have been given houses, jobs, and citizenship in return for their relocation. According to Sonan, the deep disaffection felt by many Turkish Cypriots towards these 'uncivilized' immigrants from Anatolia—who they mistakenly fear will soon make them a minority in their own land and ensure Turkey's continued dominance over the North through their voting power—has led Turkish Cypriots to "prioritize the 'Cypriot' dimension of their identity' in order to set themselves apart and assert a sense of cultural superiority."[98] The rallying cry for opponents of Denktaş in the early 2000s thus became "Cyprus belongs to Cypriots" in a strong rejection of his divisive claim of 1995 that "there is no such thing as a Turkish Cypriot," only Turks who live on Cyprus.[99] While Denktaş could not accept the idea of a distinct Turkish Cypriot identity, Cyprus 2015's 2011 report makes clear that many in the TRNC disagreed: 62 per cent of survey respondents acknowledged the dual nature of their identity, and only 20 per cent expressed stronger Turkish identification.



Figure 5. Sense of Cypriotness.[100]

Like Sonan, Hatay has thus argued that "a 'Cypriot' identity has taken shape in reaction to immigration" in the North—but this tentative optimism must be tempered by present realities.[101] According to the same

survey, only 18 per cent of Turkish Cypriots prioritize their Cypriot identity (compared to 48 per cent of Greek Cypriots) while 75 per cent remain loyal to the notion of 'Turkey as motherland,' despite their impatience with settlers and Ankara's perceived meddling in their politics. This, coupled with the findings of their numerous interviews with Turkish Cypriots on the ground, leads the report's authors to conclude that "a new 'Cypriot' identity has not been created" and that "forging an inclusive identity will take considerable effort when we analyse how Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots currently identify themselves."[102]



Figure 6. National and cultural identity (Turkish Cypriots).[104]

As in Taiwan, moreover, the simple passage of time complicates the search for a settlement, as both communities have become accustomed to living apart. For Greek Cypriots, in particular, there seems little reason to exchange the comfortable status quo for the uncertainty of power-sharing with the Turkish Cypriots, with one participant noting "we have got used to this way of life." [105] While part of this hesitancy stems from uncertainty over what a settlement would entail, mutual mistrust between the two communities remains crucial. In particular, ambivalence (or outright opposition) to reunification is especially strong among young Greek Cypriots who have known nothing but partition, demonstrated by figure 7.



Figure 7. Intended vote in a future referendum by age group (Greek Cypriots).[106]

Figure 8 meanwhile illustrates Turkish Cypriot future voting intentions, with the authors of the report noting that while the Turkish Cypriot youth had voted by a very large majority in favour of reunification in 2004, the experience of disappointment and disillusion since then has seen their enthusiastic support for such a settlement diminish considerably. In all age groups, however, there is a clear tendency towards voting 'no' in a future referendum.



Figure 8. Intended vote in a future referendum by age group (Turkish Cypriots).[107]

For both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, then, the simple passage of time and the continuing importance of identity issues, including deeply ingrained fears of the other community, make the conclusion of a mutually acceptable settlement increasingly difficult to achieve. Not until these fears are adequately addressed and a sense of trust is built between people on either side will a settlement become imaginable. For the island to be reunited, however, this must happen sooner rather than later, with more and more young people showing a growing resistance, or at least ambivalence, to finding a settlement.

Conclusion

As Caspersen and Stansfield have noted, unrecognized states are frequently born out of conflict, exist in volatile parts of the world, and crucially lack the protection provided by norms of non-intervention.[108] While these considerations have led many scholars to predict their swift collapse, however, it is clear that a number of these territories are surviving for considerable periods of time. In exploring this seemingly perplexing ability to endure, this paper has sought to examine the underappreciated role of identity politics in entrenching the status quo.

While much of the existing literature has focused overwhelmingly on dynamics at the élite-level,[109] this paper has focused attention on the need to listen to local voices and acknowledge the important ways in which domestic politics and opinion play a significant role in the persistence of these 'cold' conflicts. Taiwan's leadership, for example, is constrained in its negotiating position by growing 'Taiwanese consciousness' on the island and majority opinion that prefers to maintain the island's current de facto autonomy. As Steve Tsang has thus concluded, "the most important factor that determines whether there is war or peace between China and Taiwan is the domestic politics of the two sides."[110] While this overlooks the important contribution of additional factors (examined in detail elsewhere), Tsang's conclusion reinforces the central argument of this paper: that domestic public opinion and identity politics matter a great deal in explaining the persistence of unrecognized states.

They matter most obviously because the democratic status of these entities requires that any settlement must be acceptable to the wider population, endowing 'the people' with a veto over any proposed solution at the ballot box. In an unusual twist in the Cyprus problem, in 2004 it was majority opinion within the Greek Cypriot democratic system that served to maintain the status quo and ensure the persistence of the TRNC—a particularly intriguing development given the literature's tendency to focus on the unrecognized entity as the traditional settlement spoiler. Since the opening of the Green Line in 2003, however, as well as the disappointing outcome of the referendum the following year, survey data and the work of anthropologists such as Rebecca Bryant have shown that the mood is changing in Northern Cyprus, as more Turkish Cypriots turn away from supporting a reunification settlement. After over forty years of separation, many are beginning to confront the reality that life in the villages and homes that were left behind has changed; moved on. Whereas the border opening and the 2004 referendum were supposed to bring the island's two communities closer together, Bryant and others have found that these recent milestones seem instead to have driven them further apart.[111] As time wears on, identities have become hardened on both sides, with bitter memories of violence, loss and betrayal continuing to undermine the hope of building vital trust between the two communities. As in Taiwan, many have simply got used to living apart, with little or no recollection of life before the status quo.

Greater understanding of how these stalemates play out at a popular level and, in particular, the salience of identity politics, necessarily holds important implications regarding their settlement. First and foremost, it suggests that any solution must take account of present realities on the ground and incorporate an acceptance of the fact that these territories

have enjoyed extensive autonomy for decades. A return to the status quo ante will not satisfy a population that has enjoyed years of self-rule, especially among the growing number who have known nothing else. It also suggests the need for a package of measures to support and sustain the settlement process such as economic and security-based provisions, alongside vital confidence-building measures throughout society to build trust and promote dialogue between communities that have grown apart. Only then can unhelpful monolithic constructions of the Self and Other be broken down; without movement towards reconciliation, insecurities over the threat of the other community will continue to complicate negotiations.

In Taiwan's case, Beijing must also play its part before a settlement is conceivable. It is clear that threats and aggressive action only serve to increase resistance to reunification and harden a sense of difference between Taiwan residents and those living on the mainland. It is also clear that few on the island are willing to contemplate reunification unless China undergoes a process of democratization. As Lai Chung-Chiang, a prominent lawyer on Taiwan, recently noted: "If you ask Taiwanese people whether they want to give up their democracy because of economic benefits from China or China's military threat, most people would say no."[112] Commenting on the pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong in 2014, President Ma similarly suggested that China must become democratic, beginning with Hong Kong, if it is to win back Taiwan, noting that: "doing this [...] would be strongly welcomed by the people of Taiwan [and] such a course of action would be a huge boost for the development of cross-strait relations."[113] In short, until the people on Taiwan feel a greater sense of identification with the mainland, a settlement seems remote.

In a world in which the right to self-determination has attained such powerful appeal among different groups of people, the relevance of our object of study is likely to endure for some considerable time to come. As James Mayall argued in 1990, "the unprecedented attempt to bring history to an end, at least as far as the territorial division of the world is concerned, seems unlikely to succeed," with the continuing salience of identity politics in states throughout the world ensuring that the inventory of unrecognized states may grow yet further.[114] At base, the survival of these entities for decades is a reality that scholars can no longer ignore; not only must the implications of this observation be fully investigated, but academics and policymakers must also now urgently consider how best to accommodate these territories within the larger goals of international order, justice, and human rights. ■

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Notes

[1] Pål Kolstø, "The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States," *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 6 (2006): 730.

[2] Robert Jackson, *Sovereignty: The Evolution of an Idea* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007): 150.

[3] Dov Lynch, *Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004): 18.

[4] Nina Caspersen, *Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System* (Cambridge: Polity, 2012): 2.

[5] For a fuller investigation into the survival conditions of unrecognized states, see Sophie Rodger, *Why Do De Facto States Persist in the International System?*, unpublished thesis (Oxford University, 2013).

[6] Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield, "Introduction: Unrecognized States in the International System," in *Unrecognized States in the International System*, Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield, eds. (London and New York: Routledge, 2011): 3.

[7] Given the inherently complex nature of these entities, however, this inventory should be considered neither definitive nor indisputable.

[8] Strobe Talbott, "Foreword," in Richard Bush, *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005): ix.

[9] Matan Chorev, "Complex Terrains: Unrecognized States and Globalization," in *Unrecognized States*, Caspersen and Stansfield eds., 32.

[10] UN Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World* (New York, 2004): 1–2.

[11] Cited in Deon Geldenhuys, *Contested States in World Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 3.

[12] Geldenhuys, *Contested States*, 3.

[13] Ian Spears, "States-Within-States: An Introduction to Their Empirical Attributes," in *States-Within-States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era*, Paul Kingston and Ian Spears, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): 28.

[14] Kolstø, "Sustainability and Future," 735.

[15] Lynch, *Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States*, 141.

[16] Caspersen, *Unrecognized States*, 16.

[17] Geldenhuys, *Contested States*, 237.

[18] J. D. B. Miller, "Sovereignty as a Source of Vitality for the State," *Review of International Studies* 12, no. 2 (1986): 79–80.

[19] Brad Roth, "The Entity That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Unrecognized Taiwan as a Right-Bearer in the International Legal Order," *East Asia Law Review* 4, no. 1 (2009): 101.

[20] Resolution 2758 (XXVI) adopted by the 1967th plenary session of UN General Assembly on October 25, 1971.

[21] A handful of countries nonetheless continued to conduct official diplomatic relations with the RoC rather than the PRC.

[22] Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, *Explanation of Relations Across the Taiwan Strait* (July 5, 1994).

[23] ROC statement on "The Case for Taipei's U.N. Representation," September 17, 1993.

[24] Roth, "The Entity That Dare Not Speak Its Name," 102.

[25] Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, The Government's Position Paper on Ma Ying-jeou's Stance about "Taiwan's Pledge of not Seeking Independence in Exchange for China's Commitment of Not Using Force against Taiwan" (November 3, 2006).

[26] President Ma Ying-jeou, "New Year's Day Celebratory Message," January 1, 2009.

[27] Bush, *Untying the Knot*, 27.

[28] David Kang, *China Rising: Pease, Power, and Order in East Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007): 96. According to the RoC Government Information Office's *Taiwan Yearbook* (2012), mainland-bound investment exceeded 10 billion USD in 2011–2012, while between 1987 and 2011 islanders have made more than sixty-six million visits to China.

[29] President Ma Ying-jeou's "Inaugural Address," May 20, 2008. Beijing nonetheless insists that a final solution cannot be delayed indefinitely.

[30] We-Chin Lee, "Field of Dreams: An Overview of the Practice and Study of Taiwan's Foreign Policy," *Issues & Studies* 40, vol. 3–4 (2004): 140.

[31] President Ma Ying-Jeou interview with the *New York Times*, January 5, 2012.

[32] Kolstø, "The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States," 730.

[33] Stéphane Corcuff, "Introduction: Taiwan, a Laboratory of Identities" in *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*, ed. Stéphane Corcuff (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2002).

[34] Hsin-Yi Yeh, "A Sacred Bastion? A Nation in Itself? An Economic Partner of Rising China? Three Waves of Nation-Building in Taiwan After 1949," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 14, no. 1 (2014): 209–10.

[35] Philip Pan, "New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan: Culture Shifting Away from Mainland China," *Washington Post* (January 2, 2004).

[36] Christopher Hughes and Robert Stone, "Nation-Building and Curriculum Reform in Hong Kong and Taiwan," *The China Quarterly* 160 (1999): 978.

[37] Hsin-Yi Yeh, "A Sacred Bastion?," 214.

[38] Chang Yen-hsien cited by Daniel Lynch, "Taiwan's Self-Conscious Nation-Building Project," *Asian Survey* 44, no. 4 (2004): 518.

[39] Hsin-Yi Yeh, "A Sacred Bastion?," 216.

[40] Hughes and Stone, "Nation-Building and Curriculum Reform,".986.

[41] Lynch, "Taiwan's Self-Conscious Nation-Building Project," 516.

[42] Cited in Pan, "New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan."

[43] Hsin-Yi Yeh, "A Sacred Bastion?," 218.

[44] Ibid., 218.

[45] For further detail, see Hsin-Yi Yeh, "A Sacred Bastion?"

[46] Election Study Center, *Trends in Core Political Attitudes Among Taiwanese, 1994–2014* (Taipei: Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University, 2014).

[47] Pan, "New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan."

[48] Ibid.

[49] Remarks made by the President to the Business Council, February 24, 2000.

[50] Presidential Office of the Republic of China, "President Chen's Inaugural Address: Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan" (May 20, 2004).

[51] Speech of President Ma Ying-jeou at the Extraordinary Session of the Kuomintang 17th National Party Congress on November 22, 2008.

[52] Richard Bush, *At Cross Purposes: U.S.–Taiwan Relations Since 1942* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2004): 244. The 'one country, two systems' formula has been offered by Beijing for three decades and would give Taiwan home rule but reserve for the PRC the status of exclusive sovereign and the right to represent China in the international community.

[53] In addition to its membership of the WTO (as the 'Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu'), the Asian Development Bank (as 'Taipei China') and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (as 'Chinese Taipei'), Taiwan is also represented in dozens of other inter-governmental organizations and subsidiary bodies.

[54] *Taiwan Yearbook 2012*, 112.

[55] "Changes in Unification / Independence Stances of Taiwanese, 1994–2014," Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University in Taipei.

[56] See, for example, Ted Galen Carpenter, *America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[57] Shelley Rigger, "Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and Taiwanese Nationalism," Policy Studies no. 26 (Washington, DC: East–West Center, 2008): 57.

[58] Cited in Pan, "New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan."

[59] Taken from International Crisis Group "The Cyprus Stalemate," 31.

[60] International Crisis Group "The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?" *Europe Report* 171 (March 8, 2006): 1.

[61] Eugene T. Rossides, "Cyprus and the Rule of Law," *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce* 17, no. 1 (1991): 31.

[62] Ibid., 1.

[63] Cited in Geldenhuys, *Contested States*, 173.

[64] C. H. Dodd, "From Federated State to Republic: 1975–1984," in *The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus*, ed. C. H. Dodd (Huntingdon: Eothen, 1993): 7.

[65] ICG, "The Cyprus Stalemate," 1.

[66] Pegg, *International Society*, 102.

[67] Robert McDonald, "The Problem of Cyprus," *The Adelphi Papers* 29, no. 234 (1988): 15.

[68] ICG, "The Cyprus Stalemate," 2.

[69] TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Public Relations Department.

[70] Ibid.

[71] ICG, "The Cyprus Stalemate," 2.

[72] *Report of the UN Secretary-General* (May 28, 2004 (S/2004/437)): 95.

[73] *Report of the UN Secretary-General* (April 1, 2003): 5.

[74] ICG, "The Cyprus Stalemate," 3.

[75] *Report of the UN Secretary-General* (May 28, 2004): 2.

[76] Ibid., 83.

[77] Cyprus News Agency, "Address to the Cypriots by President of the Republic Tassos Papadopoulos, on April 7, 2004, regarding the referendum of 24 April 2004" (April 8, 2004).

[78] Cited in Hubert Faustmann, "The Role of Security: Perceptions of Advantage and Disadvantage," in *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann, eds. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009): 224.

[79] *Report of the UN Secretary General*, 28 May 2004, Summary, 84.

[80] Michalis Michael, *Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History* (2011), 33.

[81] Robert Rotberg, "Cyprus After Annan: Next Steps Towards a Solution," *World Peace Foundation Report* 37 (2003): 5.

[82] *Report of the UN Secretary-General* (April 1, 2003): 20.

[83] Faustmann, "The Role of Security," 229. In a poll conducted for the Greek newspaper *Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia* on April 16, 2004, the unilateral right of Turkey to intervene topped the list of the most negative aspects of the Annan Plan with 33.4 per cent.

[84] Cyprus News Agency, "Address to Cypriots."

[85] Report of the UN Secretary-General (April 1, 2003): 22.

[86] Ibid., 21.

[87] Álvaro de Soto, "Can Cyprus Be Solved?" *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 24, no. 4 (2012): 405.

[88] Reprinted from Lordos et al., *A People's Peace in Cyprus: Testing the Options for a Comprehensive Settlement* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009). Response to the question: 'Do you prefer a strong federal government or strong constituent states?'

[89] These different interpretations of the past can also be seen by comparing the national narratives presented by Nicosia's two Museums of National Struggle, one of which documents the island's history from a Greek Cypriot perspective and the other documenting it from a Turkish Cypriot standpoint. See Yiannis Papadakis, "The National Struggle Museums of a Divided City," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17, no. 3 (1994).

[90] Yiannis Papadakis, "Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Schoolbooks on the History of Cyprus," *History & Memory* 20, no. 2 (2008): 132.

[91] Ibid., 134.

[92] Ibid., 136

[93] Ibid, 136–7.

[94] Daria Isachenko, *The Making of Informal States: Statebuilding in Northern Cyrus and Transdniestria* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 69.

[95] Ibid., 173.

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The Ups and Downs of Regional Identity Politics

A Glance at Latin America[1]

Bettina Schorr

Since Latin America´s independence from colonial rule in the nineteenth century, the topos of a distinct Latin American identity has been widely articulated by Latin American intellectuals and policymakers. Yet, since Latin American independence hero Simón Bolívar enunciated it for the first time, considerable variation regarding the political salience of the discourse surrounding this distinct regional identity can be observed. The contemporary era is no exception. After a quiescent period in the 1990s, regional identity politics were strongly revived in the 2000s by key political leaders in South America, particularly by Hugo Chávez from Venezuela. This was followed by a recent decline in regional identity discourses. Against this background, this article explores two questions: first, what explains the emergence and salience of regional identity politics in Latin America, and, second, what are the reasons for the recently observed decline in regional identity politics? In doing so, it will contribute to a better understanding of the causes and dynamics of regional identity politics in Latin America.

Introduction

Since Latin America became independent from Spain and Portugal in the nineteenth century, the *topos* of a distinct Latin American identity has been widely articulated by Latin American intellectuals and policymakers. Yet, considerable variation regarding the political salience of the discourse surrounding this distinct regional identity can be observed. This discourse arguably originates from South America's independence hero, Simón Bolívar. Ever since he first expounded ideas about a unique Latin American identity in 1815, the discourse has vanished and re-emerged time and time again. The contemporary era is no exception. After a quiescent period in the 1990s, regional identity politics were strongly revived in the first years of the new millenium. Its most popular promoter was Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, who—drawing

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explicitly on Bolívar—propagated not only a common Latin American identity, but also the need to build a strong and sovereign Latin America that stands up against external influence.

For some years, Chávez's discourse on regional identity and unity resonated with many, particularly within South America. To differing degrees, Leftist governments across the continent adopted his identity-based narrative. At the same time, communication and co-ordination among these respective governments increased, existing regional schemes were strengthened or reinvigorated, and new ones were created. Although the discourse remained strong for several years, it has recently become less prominent. Regional identity politics now appear on the decline.

While regionalism and regionalization in Latin America have received much attention from political scientists, the same cannot be said of regional identity politics. Although both are tightly connected—the articulation and development of a political regional identity seems to be a major component of regional integration processes—variation in these processes throughout Latin America suggests that they emerge and decline independently of one another. Though efforts at regional integration have taken place across the continent since the 1960s, regional identity politics nonetheless vary in both content and intensity. Thus, scholars must try to understand what makes actors politicize a regional identity at some times and not at others.

Moreover, while identity is often invoked in order to explain politics, studies that conceive of identity politics and identity as a dependent variable are lacking. This article addresses this gap and, in doing so, explores promising lines of inquiry for framing subsequent research on regional identity politics both in Latin America and elsewhere. It is organized around two questions: first, what explains the emergence and salience of regional identity politics in Latin America, and, second, what are the reasons for the recently observed decline in regional identity politics?

The subject of this study is thus the political emergence and decline of Latin Americanism as a discourse about a particular region—its members and its characteristics—as well as the politics to be derived from its distinct identity. It focuses on the actions of the principal actors involved in the emergence and decline of the last wave of Latin American regional identity politics.

The paper proceeds as follows: the first part introduces "identity" and "regional identity politics" as the central concepts of the study and explains the theoretical assumptions on which the subsequent analysis is based. By drawing on insights from International Relations theory, foreign policy analysis, and ethnic competition theory, it develops a frame-

work for the study of the dynamics of regional identity politics. The next section offers a brief historical overview on Latin American regional identity politics in order to create a preliminary understanding of their dynamics. The following chapters then present an analysis of the factors that led to the emergence and the subsequent decline of the last wave of regional identity politics on the continent. The article finishes with a brief summary and some concluding remarks on the topic of regional identity politics.

Regional Identity Politics in Latin America: A Theoretical Approximation

Since the social sciences went through their "cultural turn" in the 1970s (IR followed a bit later), identity has often been invoked to explain politics.[2] Generally, the term 'identity' is understood as an expression of ideas about membership within a social group.[3] Most works on the topic stress that identities are socially constructed. Indeed, reference to the constructed character of identities is by now "commonplace among social scientists," and as such is no longer the subject of any serious academic debate.[4] Yet, few authors make explicit what they mean by saying that identities are constructed. Laitlin and Fearon underline two aspects of identity that can be "under construction": the membership rules that define "who is in and who is out" and the content of any given identity that determines what it means to be a member of a certain group in terms of the political, cultural, behavioural, or sometimes even phenotypic characteristics associated with that particular identity. In defining these two dimensions, identity constructions always entail the establishment of a social boundary between 'us' and the 'other,'[5] providing a system of orientation for self-reference for individuals and groups.[6]

The fact that identities are socially constructed points to another important feature: their potentially shifting nature. Given that political identities are produced and reproduced through human action and speech, they are not static, but can and do change over time. That means, as Stuart Hall puts it, that any specific identity is always a positioning of a 'self,' versus others, *in a particular historic moment, dependent on a specific social and political context.*[7]

Notwithstanding the impressive body of work on the relationship between identity and politics, the relevant literature offers no single definition on the term "identity politics." Strikingly, few authors bother to provide any definition at all.[8] Aggestam, working from an IR perspective, is an exception. She defines identity politics as "the articulation of a

particular set of ideas about political community that policy makers and other political actors use and draw on to mobilize a sense of cohesion and solidarity."[9] This definition can be adapted and utilized to understand regional identity politics. Drawing from Aggestam, then, "regional identity politics" would refer to the articulation of ideas about a particular region that is declared to constitute, for historical reasons, a political community sharing cultural features and a common identity. Regional identity politics, as identity politics in national and local contexts, serve to legitimize specific policies.

This paper asks why and when do political leaders engage in regional identity politics? Or, in other words: when will they seek to promote a specific regional political identity and when will such a discourse become salient as an underpinning for regional politics?

In order to provide an answer to these questions, it is useful to draw upon insights from ethnic competition theory that aims to explain the politicization of ethnic identities in local and national settings. Academics who work within this theoretical line emphasize agency and strategy, along with competition between differing ethnic groups, as central factors in identity-based mobilization and politicization processes. In so doing, they combine both constructivist and rationalist ideas; circumventing the oft-supposed dichotomy between the two approaches. Ethnic competition theory acts on the assumption that identities are consciously constructed and articulated in order to invoke social cohesion and support.[10] In this regard, ethic competition scholars broadly concur with Aggestam's definition of political identity. They further emphasize that the mobilization of any given ethnic identity is the result of intergroup struggles over economic or political resources. In order to mobilize cohesion and group support for specific policies, actors may resort to the politicization of identities and consequently the 'othering' of their competitors.

Hence, the theory suggests that the decision to politicize an ethnic identity reflects, as Bell puts it in a frequently quoted statement, "a strategic choice by individuals who, in other circumstances, would choose other group memberships as a means of gaining some power and privilege."[11] Arguments about interested actors that "start the fire" can also be found in IR. When explaining norm diffusion in international settings, Finnemore and Sikkink stress that (identity) constructions can be strategic.[12] Fabbri makes similar claims with respect to regional integration: Actors construct identities and conform to norms established in this process because it helps them obtain what they want.[13] These assumptions push the role of "ideational entrepreneurs" (or "norm entrepreneurs," as Finnemore and Sikkink call them) to the forefront of analysis. In addi-

tion to ideational entrepreneurs, Finnemore and Sikkink emphasize the importance of organizational platforms that empower actors and give them the opportunity to spread new ideas to others.[14]

As previously mentioned, ethnic competition theory highlights the role of competition as a force promoting identity politics. On a regional scale, such competition is arguably most linked to hegemonic politics or struggles for hegemony and theories of regional integration have found hegemony and hegemons to be central factors in explaining regionalism.[15] Hegemons can mould regional orders in at least two ways: firstly, they can lead regional integration, either in order to form a platform from which to project their own power globally or to assert hegemonic control in that region.[16] Second, they can exert hegemonic pressure on other states within the region, encouraging them to band together in order to balance this hegemon.[17]

A last point must be made. As liberal foreign policy analysis contends, foreign policy remains, to a certain degree, dependent upon domestic factors.[18] In particular, it must align with interests and with policy aims of national élites. Insofar, it is to expect that politics pursued in the name of a specific regional identity must match these domestic interests. Consequently, regional identity politics are likely to decline when national actors perceive there to be means of achieving their policy goals other than regional co-operation, or when their policy goals change.

In light of these considerations, a framework for the analysis of regional identity politics in Latin America must include the following considerations. First, regional identity politics emerge in a context of regional competition. Given the dominant role of the United States in Latin America, it can be expected that the relationship between the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere is crucial to the development of Latin American regional identity politics. Second, regional identity entrepreneurs frequently propagate the idea of a regional identity (and create regional institutions) in order to either exert hegemony over the region or as a platform from which to project their power globally.

Regional identity politics will increase in salience when several regional leaders converge toward the aim of balancing the hegemon. If this strategic convergence is followed by increased co-operation, the creation of organizational platforms and opportunities that can be used to promote a regional identity, then regional identity politics will rise in prominence: In order to demonstrate cohesion and authenticity to both domestic actors and the wider international public, regional leaders must partly adopt the identity narrative. On the other hand, balancing and regional identity politics must be backed by foreign policy relevant domestic actors.

Analogously, regional identity politics decline when either the need or the will to engage in this balancing diminishes or when shifts in the domestic policy landscape occur, often as a result of internal factors (e.g., new political priorities, new heads of state), or external developments that change the incentives and perceptions of groups relevant to foreign policymaking.

Latin American Regional Identity Politics in Historical Perspective

Since Latin America's independence from Spain and Portugal, regional identity politics—in the sense of the articulation of a distinctive Latin American identity that excludes the United States and Canada and stresses a unique Latin American culture and history—have waxed and waned. Yet, even in waning they never left a regional identity vacuum. Rather, the Latin American regional identity was always in competition with another alternative political regional identity: Pan-Americanism. This alternative identity encompassed not only the Latin American states but also the states of North America, bound together by a common history of settler colonialism. This alternative identity encompassed not only the Latin American states but also the states of North America. The comparative salience of one identity or the other has been dependent upon two factors: first, the state of the relationship with countries in North America (mainly the United States) and Europe (albeit to a lesser degree); and second, particular local stimuli and initiatives.[19]Since its inception, Latin Americanism was consciously conceptualized as a means of balancing the powerful North and stabilizing a chronically unstable region.[20] In other words, competition over the region has always been a driver for regional identity politics.

Historical examples abound: Simón Bolívar, the Venezuelan founding figure of Latin Americanism and the man responsible for the "myth of Latin America's natural unity and the ultimate aim of restoring it," sought to secure Spain's recognition of the former colonies' independence and to protect the region from the rising powers in the North. This motivation was also very much present in Brazil, where political leaders tended to stress the particularities of their nation as a former Portuguese colony: As the Monroe Doctrine (1821) crystallized US hegemonic aspirations in the Western Hemisphere, Brazil's élite began to emphasize the commonalities with "*nuestra América*" ("our America").[22]

In the 1880s, eager to shake off the on-going influence of Europe in Latin America, the US began to emphasize Pan-Americanism in their

relationship with the region. It convened the First Inter-American Conference held in Washington (1890) and there established the Pan-American Union. However, the Spanish–American War (1898), combined with heavy-handed US interference in the Caribbean and the Philippines, severely disrupted the Pan-American project and instead triggered a new wave of Latin Americanism highly critical of "US imperialism." This movement became known as *hispanismo* because of its strong emphasis on cultural unity. Not surprisingly, Spain attempted to capitalize on the moment in order to strengthen their own influence in the region. Yet, by the 1930s Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy (1933) and the general sense of post-Second World War euphoria had led to a revival of Pan-American ideas. This "high point in Pan-Americanism"[23] eventually led to the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948.

Later, when Washington initiated the Cold War rollback policy that triggered several interventions in Latin America, this trend once again reversed itself and Latin Americanism overtook Pan-Americanism as the salient discourse on regional identities. It was in this context that the first wave of Latin American integration unfolded under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC). To many, as Fawcett explains, this incipient integration "had an emotional appeal as an independence movement, it reinforced the notion of parity: of dealing with the United States as an equal."[24] Consequently, regionalism expanded in terms of institutions, members, activities, and functions.[25]

With the end of the Cold War quickly advancing economic globalization once again encouraged both stronger hemispheric and sub-regional co-operation. Along with trade issues the Pan-American discourse revived. "Open regionalism" became the strategy of the moment referring to market-driven integration schemes aimed to provide a framework in which countries could more competitively integrate themselves into the world economy and that were "open" to non-member states.[26] This movement gave rise to a series of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements both among Latin American states themselves, as well as between Latin America and the United States and Canada.[27] Additionally, the United States advanced plans to establish a continental free trade zone, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

From this point up until the current day, tug of war between Pan-Americanism and Latin Americanism has continued and is reflected in the competition between open and closed regionalism. The most recent "open moment" vanished and since the turn of the century, Latin Americanism has managed a particularly powerful return propagated by key South American leaders. It was followed recently by a decline in regional identity politics.

Explaining the Most Recent Wave of Latin Americanism

Hemispheric Background: The United States, the Pink Tide, and the Latin American Commodity Boom

The rise in the salience of a Latin American regional identity propagated by Latin American leaders that occurred during the 2000s unfolded in a context that was characterized by three factors: neglect of the region by a US administration that was preoccupied with other parts of the world; a political shift to the Left in almost all of South America and a few Central American countries (the so called "pink tide"); and an unprecedented economic boom based on rising commodity prices. As a result, opportunities and incentives for both stronger regional cooperation and identity politics increased.

As previously noted, the United States' foreign policy posture toward Latin America throughout the 1990s was centred upon the vision of a pan-American free-trade initiative. The "Enterprise for the Americas" was officially launched during the first summit of the Americas in 1994 in the form of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).[28] However, the FTAA met with great resistance both in Latin America and the United States. The US Congress refused to grant President Clinton the "fast track" procedure due to perceived threats to domestic business and manufacturing. Meanwhile, some Latin American states, namely Brazil and its allies in Mercosur (as well as Venezuela), refused to accept the terms promoted by the United States and citizens' organizations throughout the continent mobilized against the project. Ultimately, conflicting interests between North and South complicated the negotiation process and eventually led to a stalemate: By 2003 it became apparent that the FTAA was unfeasible.

During that period, the United States also significantly adjusted its foreign policy stance towards Latin America. Following the 9/11 terror attacks, the United States neglected its trade-based approach toward the region in favour of a more security-based approach that, to many, invoked memories of the Cold War era. This resulted in two significant changes for US policy towards Latin America: first, security concerns supplanted economic issues as the United States' top priority in the western hemisphere. Second, as the United States concentrated resources upon the Middle East, Latin America's comparative importance in the United States' foreign policy portfolio waned.[29] As a result, the responsi-

bility for relations with Latin America was delegated to political hardliners within the State Department's middle management.[30] Far from the radar of high-level diplomatic sensitivity, these officers often assumed a confrontational stance toward Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, and other Leftist governments perceived as threat to US interests in the region.

This shift towards a more heavy-handed approach to dealing with political adversaries, in combination with reports about US war crimes in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay, resulted in a wave of anti-US sentiment in the region. This firstly gave legitimacy to those Leftist leaders (most notably Hugo Chávez) who made anti-American harangues a routine part of their political performances, therein raising their profiles and aiding their political agendas. Secondly, the lack of US attention towards the region opened a window of opportunity for the pursuit of autonomous regional projects, including those with significant identity-based components.

Latin America's "pink tide," or Left turn was in large part related to this turn away from the United States.[31] Beginning in 1998, when crisis-ridden Venezuelans elected Hugo Chávez as their president, Leftist presidents assumed office in almost all South American nations:[32] Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva, the leader of the Workers' Party, in Brazil (2003, followed by Dilma Rousseff in 2011); the Peronist Néstor Kirchner in Argentina (2003, followed by his wife Cristina Kirchner in 2007); Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay (2005, followed by José Mujica in 2010); union leader Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006); moderate Socialist Party leader Michelle Bachelet in Chile (2006–2010, and again from 2014 to the present); Leftist economist Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007); and former bishop Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (deposed by a coup in 2012 and succeeded by a conservative government). By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, only Colombia and Peru had not joined the continent's pink tide.[33]

Despite large differences in both political content and style, these Leftist presidents shared several common characteristics. They rejected the market-driven policies that had previously dominated their respective countries and strengthened the role of the state in economic affairs. Many also enacted pro-poor and more generous welfare policies and, most importantly, all shared a critical stance toward the United States.

Finally, Latin America faced extraordinarily good economic conditions in the 2000s. The region experienced high, robust, and continual economic growth as a result of a global commodity boom. Demand from rising powers in Asia, particularly China and India, helped increase the prices of Latin American commodities, doubling the continent's primary exports in the space of just a few years.[34] As a result, new economic and

political allies—such as China, India, Russia, and Iran—helped balance the United States' influence in the region and make up for possible economic losses incurred as a result of strained relations with Washington.[35]

The Identity Entrepreneur: Hugo Chávez

Venezuela's president, Hugo Chávez, not only set the stage for this pink tide, but also became a central factor in the 'new' regionalist dynamics that took off in the 2000s—including the re-emergence of Latin American regional identity politics.[36] Chávez acted as an identity entrepreneur who used a variety of means to propagate this discourse and to mobilize support for regional political projects.

Chávez rooted his political programme in an ideology that reclaimed Venezuelan independence hero and popular idol Simón Bolívar as its leading figure (hence its name, Bolivarianism or *bolivarianismo*). What exactly constituted Bolivarianism as an ideology remains contested.[37] In a general sense, however, it refers to a particular style of political thinking and activism that aims at the creation of a sovereign Venezuelan state and a free and equal Venezuelan society with an emphasis on economic redistribution and the provision of social goods. Since veneration for Bolívar was already widespread in Venezuela, policies and discourses that claimed to embody the 'spirit' of Bolívar resonated strongly with the general public.

Chávez's political project, much like Bolívar's before him, was not contained to Venezuela, but was designed to shape the entire region of Latin America. Like Bolívar, Chávez sought to forge a Latin American union under Venezuelan leadership, held together by a common Latin American identity and capable of both providing wealth to its people and repelling US influence in the region.[38] While at first Chávez's foreign policy did not vary much from that of past Venezuelan governments, the failed coup against him in 2002 acted as a major turning point.[39] In the period that followed, Venezuela intensified its international engagement. Based on the perception that the United States—which had more or less openly supported the coup—was a threat to his government, Chávez actively searched for strategic alliances with like-minded states in order to build a support network and help secure his own position.[40] Power, autonomy, security, influence, and the quest for a multipolar order became the keystones of his regional approach.[41] To start with, Chávez strengthened ties with Cuba: In 2004 both governments signed into law a regional integration framework, called the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (*Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América*, ALBA), comprised of a series of 'barter deals' (namely oil for doctors).[42]

This framework was conceived as part of a containment strategy against US hegemony in the region and sought to undermine the FTAA. ALBA also aided Chávez in exporting Bolivarian ideas to other parts of the region by providing a regional platform for ideological influence. Since its establishment, seven additional countries have joined the alliance: Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saint Lucia. Suriname was admitted to ALBA as an observer country in 2012.[43]

In addition to creating ALBA, Chávez pursued a threefold political strategy in order to spread his message and propagate his political vision throughout Latin America. First, he connected with several of the most active Latin American social movements. For example, he met with representatives of the Argentinean *piqueteros*, the Brazilian *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra*, and the Ecuadorian indigenous organization CONAIE (alongside Fidel Castro) and offered support for their aims. He also established links with one of the most important (because of its geographic reach from Canada to Argentina) umbrella associations for civil groups opposing the FTAA, the *Alianza Social Continental* (ASC).[44] Furthermore, he made sure to actively participate in major civil society gatherings; such as the World Social Forums and the "counter summit" in Mar de la Plata in 2005, an event parallel to that year's official hemispheric presidential summit.

Second, Chávez supported a wide swath of leftist parties' and candidates' campaigns against neoliberal and US-friendly conservative rivals in other Latin American countries. The most prominent example is Evo Morales and his MAS party in Bolivia, which received extensive funding from Venezuela. Chávez is also said to have supported the (unsuccessful) 2006 campaign of Ollanta Humala in Peru, the successful 2007 campaign by Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Daniel Ortega's equally successful 2007 presidential campaign in Nicaragua. Needless to say, once in office, all of these politicians became close Venezuelan allies.

This latter point is closely related to the third dimension of Chávez's strategy: the forging of strong alliances with like-minded leaders in the region. His quest for allies went along with a more forceful projection of the Bolivarian identity discourse throughout the region. It became the ideological underpinning of his political project, legitimating his interests by connecting them to the region's unique historical legacy. In this sense, regional identity politics were employed to foster solidarity between Venezuela and other Latin American states in the name of a shared identity and common destiny in order to assure Venezuelan leadership over the region while cementing opposition to the United States.

A shared identity was not the only incentive for other states to join Venezuela. Indeed, it is not without cause that Chávez's foreign policy within and beyond ALBA has often been referred to as "oil diplomacy." Unsurprisingly, for many states in the region, Venezuela proved an attractive ally as a result of the significant material resources it was able to provide, particularly in the form of heavily subsidized oil.[45] Moreover, Venezuela's sizeable oil revenues, which peaked in the last decade due to the region's commodity boom, allowed for extensive monetary transfers and other forms of assistance to "friendly" countries, such as to those committed to bolstering ALBA members' energy infrastructure or to purchasing Argentinean debt.[46] In fact, Venezuela rapidly became one of the major donors in Latin America, with macro-aid programmes (existing or proposed) totalling US$5.5 billion in 2010–11.[47] Through aid commitments and oil shipments, Chávez managed to create dependencies and loyalties that helped assure his regional support base. Identity politics played a role here as well: they provided an explanation and a justification for Venezuelan political preferences, while at the same time smoothing existing power asymmetries by promoting an image of multiplying partnerships.

Parallel Initiatives: Brazil, Argentina and Mercosur

Chávez's endeavours coincided with other regional initiatives, particularly those promoted by Brazil in order to counter-balance the effects of US influence in Latin America, enhance regional integration, and help generate a multipolar global order.[48] Together with its aspiration to become an international leader, these were longstanding aims of Brazilian foreign policy that several governments had worked to achieve for more than three decades.[49] Beginning in the 1970s, Brazil began a slow but steady warming of relations with its neighbours in order to gain support for its global goals "at home." In particular, Brazilian efforts targeted Argentina, which had long been its most fervent rival in South America. In 1991, after the return of both nations to democracy, Brazil and Argentina founded Mercosur, the Common Market of the South, as a sub-regional trading bloc.[50] Uruguay and Paraguay also later joined the initiative.

Brazilian efforts to build regional co-operation received fresh impetus in the presidency of Lula da Silva, who took office in 2003. President Lula postulated a "region first" approach that declared regional integration a national priority.[51] This turn toward regional goals partially reflected the fact that South America had come to be seen as a natural sphere of influence by Brazilian élites. The aim was to consolidate re-

gional markets and build a stable and cohesive regional block that would support Brazil in international negotiations and help it achieve its global objectives.[52] . At the moment, this was especially important with regard to the FTAA process, where some US-favoured provisions (such as export restrictions for agricultural products) were perceived as a threat to Brazil's interests.

In 2003, Argentina—the other major player in South America—saw the victory of the left-wing Justicialist Party's Néstor Kirchner. Kirchner assumed office in the aftermath of a major economic and political crisis that reached its peak with the country's economic breakdown at the end of 2001, causing a default on debt of 82 billion USD in sovereign bonds in 2002. Kirchner's political priorities were to regain badly eroded presidential power and, on the international level, to bring Argentina back into the South American fold. In order to increase the country's autonomy from its international creditors, Kirchner distanced Argentina from the United States and rebuilt ties with other South American nations.[53]

Lula and Kirchner shared certain common strategic goals and ideological assumptions, including a critical stance towards the United States and a (rhetorical) affinity for their own region. At the same time, both were actively searching for allies that would support them in their respective national and regional policy goals. As a first step in this direction, they decided to strengthen their bilateral partnership and to relaunch Mercosur, which had languished since the late 1990s as a result of the region's economic crisis.[54] In 2003, both nations signed the Consensus of Buenos Aires, which generated a strategic alliance to reanimate regional trade and foster multilateralism. This relaunch precipitated both an institutional deepening and an expansion of Mercosur's membership in the years that followed.[55] The Brazil–Argentina axis was also decisive in the ultimate suspension of the FTAA because of its decision to negotiate "en bloc."[56] Although both governments later strengthened ties with Venezuela, the idea of a common Latin American identity propagated in the above processes was still a far cry from the regional identity politics promoted by Hugo Chávez.

The Spread of Regional Identity Politics: Strategic Convergence and Multiplied Platforms

The political shifts that both swept Leftist presidents into office throughout Latin America, and initiated their gradual strategic convergence, provided the backdrop for the spread and intensification of regional identity politics. Chávez saw the political developments in South America as an opportunity to enhance the regional support base for his

political plans.[57] Brazil and Argentina, meanwhile, engaged with Chávez on the basis of shared strategic interests and a certain degree of ideological affinity. Each country also had particular national interests that spurred an alliance with Venezuela. Lula needed to get Venezuela "on board" with his own regional and global projects and hoped to "tame" Chávez's radicalism by involving him in regional integration schemes. Argentina, meanwhile, had an incentive to befriend Venezuela in order first to obtain Venezuelan aid, and, second, to counter Brazil, which it continued to perceive as a rival despite the two countries' strengthened collaboration.[58] In addition, by allying with Venezuela, Kirchner appealed to his pro-Chávez political support base: anti-Americanism and South American solidarity resonated strongly with a major segment of his left-wing electoral base and in some sectors of his government.[59] In the case of Bolivia and Ecuador, who joined the alliance in 2006–07, ideological reasons also provided a strong underpinning for the rapprochement with Venezuela. Still, both countries also had important material incentives to collaborate with Chávez: both sought to reduce their dependency on the United States and needed Venezuelan resources to accomplish this goal. To this day, Bolivia remains one of the major recipients of Venezuelan aid. In sum, ideological affinities and shared strategic objectives combined with discrete national interests spurred greater Latin American co-operation under the regional identity umbrella Chávez constructed.

Once Kirchner and Lula took office, Chávez began to meet regularly with them (and was later joined by other Leftist presidents, especially those from Bolivia and Ecuador). As a result, Latin American "presidential diplomacy" increased and countless other bilateral and multilateral meetings took place, giving birth to co-operation agreements in many different issue areas, but predominantly energy policy.[60] Kirchner, Lula, and the other leaders also adopted Chávez's strategy of participating in major civil society events. Furthermore, two more regional integration schemes were established in the subsequent years: in 2008, based on a Brazilian initiative, the Union of South American Nations (*Unión de Naciones Suramericanas*, UNASUR) was launched with the objective of promoting regional integration.[61] Three years later, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (*Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños*, CELAC) was created. CELAC, backed primarily by Brazil and Venezuela, was designed as an alternative to the Organization of American States (OAS), often perceived as an instrument of US hegemony in Latin America. Chávez's Bolivarian rhetoric was very audible during both of the summits (in Cancún, Mexico, in 2010 and in Cara-

cas, Venezuela, in 2011) that decided upon, and then launched, CELAC as a new regional body.[62]

Lastly, Venezuela also made inroads into Mercosur and became an accession state in 2006.[63] For Chávez, this move was based on a political calculus: he believed that membership of Mercosur might allow him to influence decision-making within the trading block, thereby radicalise it in line with his Bolivarian programme and "decontaminate it of neoliberalism."[64]

As a result of this intensified co-ordination and co-operation, the number of opportunities and organizational platforms through which regional leaders met multiplied. Chávez's presence in all of them facilitated a spread of his discourse and thus led to other countries' gradual adoption of Latin American regional identity politics. Consequently, the overall salience of regional identity politics increased. This was particularly true of Bolivia and Ecuador, but also, to a degree, of Brazil and Argentina. It should, however, be noted that that even when Chávez's influence was at its peak, there were several countries in the region—namely Colombia, Chile and Peru—who never engaged in Chávez's discourse and maintained an ideological commitment to free trade, as well as their alliance with the United States (although they did participate in regional integration projects). Unsurprisingly these countries have played a major role in moving Latin America away from the ideas of Chávez and his Latin American identity politics in recent years.

Latin American Identity Politics in Decline

Regional identity politics as promoted by Chávez reached its peak in the mid-to-late 2000s. Since then, they have declined. This is not to say that intra-regional communication has decreased—summit diplomacy is still alive and well—or that regionalism has been abandoned as a political strategy. What has changed, however, is the tone of these meetings and the discourse of current leaders: the emphasis of a distinctive Latin American identity has declined. The reasons for this shift can be found both in shifting priorities in Latin America and a change in United States' strategy towards Latin America.

The United States: Shift of Strategy

Although Latin America was considered a low priority on the US foreign policy agenda in the past two decades, Washington never limited itself to the status of an observer in the western hemisphere. Given the

defeat of the FTAA and Latin America's increased bargaining power, the United States adapted to the winds of change in the region. Eager to maintain its influence and to weaken Latin American cohesion, the US government capitalized on schisms in the sub-regional block and began signing bilateral trade agreements with select countries even before the FTAA was definitively taken off the agenda.[65] Free trade agreements were signed with Chile, Peru, and Colombia (which went into force in 2002, 2009 and 2012, respectively). Washington also established free trade agreements with the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (which went into force between 2006 and 2009. The framework is known as DR-CAFTA: Dominican Republic-Central American Free-trade agreements).

To tighten its "counter-offensive" following the failure of the FTAA, Washington initiated an alternative regional project in 2005 and launched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), dubbed "the most important market focused mega-regionalist counter offensive, post-the FTAA."[66] The TPP constituted a classic free trade agreement among twelve countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam). Its main objectives, as stated by the United States, were to enhance trade and investment among partner countries; promote innovation, economic growth, and development; and support the creation and retention of jobs.[67]

Latin America: Continuing National Divergences

Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico all joined the TPP.[68] As a bloc within this new arrangement, these countries also created the Pacific Alliance (*Alianza del Pacífico*, AdP) in 2011 with the intention of deepening co-operation among members, forging closer relations with the Asia-Pacific region, and strengthening members' bargaining power relative to China. The alliance has got off to a fast start: in the first two years, it convened six presidential summits that delivered concrete road maps toward members' objectives. This is in considerable contrast to the diffuse declarations of intent that tend to result from many other regional institutions' meetings. The alliance effectively eliminated most tariffs on intra-alliance trade, began integrating national stock markets, and created new educational exchanges. Because of its perceived economic potential, members' high growth rates, and its demonstrated efficiency, AdP attracted other countries from across the world: Panama and Costa Rica enjoy observer status and are expected to become full members

in the near future.[69] Other observers include Uruguay, Guatemala, Australia, Canada, Spain, Germany, New Zealand, and Japan.

However, AdP also created divisions in the region, undermining much of the harmony, mutual identity, and solidarity discourse propagated by many South American leaders. This is because AdP essentially constitutes a return to the open regionalism dominant in the 1990s and a movement away from the ideology Chávez and his followers promoted in the region. Both in the western hemisphere and elsewhere, therefore, it is perceived as a geopolitical counterweight to ideological and political trends in Leftist South America. As such, within Latin America, it has contributed to a discursive shift away from regional identity politics *à la* Chávez and towards an emphasis on the benefits and opportunities of trade and globalization. In so doing, it has also revealed that Latin America's Leftist governments have diverging interests: while Bolivia's Evo Morales and Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro denounced the alliance as a "new imperialist offensive against the region," both Leftist Uruguay and Paraguay expressed their intentions of becoming members.[70] Likewise, Brazil publicly stated its wish to reach a free trade agreement with AdP by the end of 2014.[71] Finally, Chile—the only country to be a member of both Mercosur and AdP—declared its intention to act as a bridge between the two.[72]

The positioning with regard to AdP is not the only issue that currently strains relations in South America and undermines claims of a unified regional identity. Among the members of newly created or reinvigorated regional institutions, big differences and even major conflicts exist because of increasingly divergent national interests.[73] One of the deepest fault lines runs between Argentina and Brazil who regularly spar over the high degree of protectionism introduced by Cristina Kirchner's government, which affects Brazilian exports, and over the fact that Argentina is delaying a free trade agreement between Mercosur and the EU that Brazil would like to see rapidly concluded. These conflicts are partly spurred on by the two countries mutual suspicion. Argentina arguably continues to perceive Brazil as a threat due to its size and economy. Consequently, it seems to have never abandoned its strategy of trying to contain its larger neighbour and prevent it from achieving hegemony within the region.[74] This objective is perhaps most transparent in Argentina's consistent refusal to support Brazilian aspirations of becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council and to back Brazilian candidates for executive positions in international organizations.[75]

Brazil, for its part, often tends to treat Argentina as a minor partner. Argentina's political instability and economic problems, as well as its perceivably "disloyal" behaviour in international negotiations, causes

mistrust and anger amongst many of Brazil's political élite.[76] Likewise, Mercosur has come to be viewed as a burden, leading to demands within Brazil to minimize dependence on a "troublesome region."[77] As a consequence, Brazil has shifted the focus of its foreign policy away from South America and towards the global stage and limited its engagement in the region to merely any preventing "damage that could spill over its borders or stain its international image as a regional pacifier."[78] UNASUR, which Brazil originally created to ensure its zone of influence in South America, is also losing appeal due to ongoing ideological conflicts, mainly between itself and Venezuela.[79] This last point hinges on a more general schism between Brazil and Venezuela that impacts regional politics: although rhetorically united, both compete for regional leadership by advancing very different political visions.[80]

Other Mercosur countries are in trouble, too. Uruguay has provoked criticism from other countries within the trading bloc because of its close trade relations with the United States and its openness to a free trade agreement with Washington (for which several protocols are already in force). Argentina and Uruguay are meanwhile engaged in a dispute over pulp mills that function on the River Uruguay. In 2014 Argentina even engaged in reprisals against Uruguay: it stopped its exports from transiting through Montevideo, while Uruguayan exports to the Argentine market were delayed by customs in Buenos Aires. Both moves caused Montevideo significant economic losses. To compound the difficulty, when invoked, Mercosur was unable to settle the dispute.[81] Moreover, Mercosur associate members Chile and Bolivia are enmeshed in an ongoing territorial dispute over a part of the Chilean coast that once belonged to Bolivia. Until recently, Venezuela and Paraguay were similarly involved in a prolonged disagreement regarding Venezuela's possible inclusion as a fully-fledged Mercosur member. These internal rivalries and conflicts affect Mercosur's general performance. The reform process has stalled and its economic attainment remains modest. The latest meetings have been delayed. Consequently, it is widely perceived as slow and ineffective; and as suffering from persistent sovereignty bias.[82]

Both resulting from, and driving, these conflicts and disputes are changes in the foreign policy orientation of some states, often coinciding with changes in leadership. In particular, Cristina Kirchner in Argentina and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil have shifted the focus of their governments away from foreign policy in order to address pressing domestic concerns.

Perhaps the most important cause of the decline in regional identity politics that came to prominence in the mid 2000s has been, however, the loss of its principal promoter, Hugo Chávez, who died of cancer in

2012. His successor, Nicolás Maduro, is far from the charismatic and inspiring leader his predecessor was, and now faces a huge social and economic crisis at home. Additionally, declining oil prices have had a disastrous effect on Venezuela's economy and increasingly prevent it from complying with its international and regional obligations (particularly within ALBA). It would therefore not be surprising if its level of regional engagement continued to drop in the years to come.

Conclusion

Regional identity politics in Latin America have exhibited a great deal of variation since they first emerged in the nineteenth century. Using the last wave of regional identity politics in the mid-to-late 2000s as an empirical starting-point, this article aimed to uncover the motives that induced regional leaders in Latin America to define their demands in terms of "who they are." Furthermore, it sought to identify the factors that caused regional identity politics to decline. Such an approach is promising because, though identity is often used as an explanation for politics, studies that conceive of regional identity politics as a dependent variable are lacking.

In order to approach regional identity politics in Latin America theoretically, the study drew on ethnic competition theory and on different insights from IR regarding international norm diffusion, regional hegemonic politics, and the domestic determinants of foreign policy. Using this base, it developed a framework for the analysis of the emergence and decline of regional identity politics.

The framework holds that both external as well as internal factors must be considered when explaining the dynamics of regional identity politics in Latin America. With regard to the former, regional competition in general and US politics in particular play an important part in incentivizing and disincentivizing the creation and maintenance of a regional political identity. Regarding the internal factors, it is assumed that the emergence of regional identity politics depends on the activism of an identity entrepreneur, as well as on a strategic consensus on key policy issues across the region. The framework further suggests that the increased co-operation that results from this strategic convergence will serve to multiply the organizational platforms and thus the opportunities for regional identity politics. Finally, in order to demonstrate political cohesion to both domestic actors and the wider international public leaders partly adopt the identity narrative.

Analogously, the salience of a regional identity declines when strategic convergence erodes or when changes occur in domestic political circumstances. These can be caused by both internal factors (e.g. the emergence new political priorities or new heads of state) or external developments that shift the incentives and perceptions of foreign policy actors.

The role of regional competition in general, and of US politics in particular, in shaping the dynamics of regional identity politics in Latin America was demonstrated by the brief historical overview at the beginning of the article. However, the analysis of the last wave of regional identity politics revealed two further factors as decisive in the emergence and spread of regional identity discourses: first, Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez acted as an identity entrepreneur and pushed for the diffusion of identity-based politics throughout Latin America. Second, strategic convergence between Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina, later joined by other South American states (chiefly Bolivia and Ecuador), formed the basis for the spread of regional identity politics. This strategic convergence facilitated co-operation and allowed for the proliferation of organizational platforms and thus opportunities to politicize a regional identity. In addition, it led to other actors' partial adoption and dissemination of Chávez's identity discourse in a show of cohesion, unity, and authenticity.

The South American case also reveals that divergent interests often persist despite the emphasis on regional identity and solidarity. Yet, in this case these difficulties were temporarily eclipsed by strategic objectives and masked by a discourse propounding a regional identity. When internal and external contexts changed, however, these divergent interests returned to the fore and led to a decline in regional identity politics. In other words, the drivers behind the regional dynamics of South America in the mid-to-late 2000s were the political and economic interests of the countries in question which were facilitated through the employment of a discourse which stressed a distinct regional identity. This is not to say that Chávez, Lula, Kirchner, and others did not share common assumptions about regional identity and the politics to be derived from it. Rather, variation in the degree of identity politics within the last decade confirms that identity was not the main factor in determining foreign policy. When it became apparent that concrete national gains had not materialized from the identity-based political approach towards the region, actors began to defect, attracted by new incentives. Furthermore, given the lack of real progress in terms of integration, the identity discourse lost both its appeal and apparent authenticity.

When explaining the decline of regional identity politics, Brazil's strategic shift from the regional to the global level must be recognized as crucial. So, too, were the United States and its allies within the region; namely Colombia, Peru, and Chile. With the establishment of the Pacific Alliance, which propagated a vision of regional integration different from that pursued by the major Southern Cone members, a new dynamic emerged. Moving away from a focus on regional identity, these countries emphasized instead the benefits of free trade, openness, economic and entrepreneurial merits, and globalization. The significant economic benefits that have emanated from AdP have also fuelled desire for more global co-operation and thus detracted from campaigns that propagated "closed regionalism". This does not mean that references to a Latin American community or identity have vanished altogether from public discourse. Rather, the content of the identity construction has changed and its comparative importance within the discourse has declined.

Against this backdrop, it is interesting to note that regional identity politics are not necessarily linked to regional collective identifications "on the ground." As the World Value Survey shows, for example, Latin Americans' identification with their region has been almost constant in the last several years.[83] This article problematizes the relationship between regional identity politics and regional integration in a more general sense. It confirms that both are tightly connected, but to a certain degree function independently from one another—and may even be in conflict at a given moment in time. The concept of a regional identity can spur or accompany politics that aim at (further) co-operation and integration (including the erection of new institutions and the extension of their membership). Yet, this does not automatically translate into "real" integration. Rather, as Malamud and Gardini suggest, regional identity politics may lead to the contrary: in establishing new and exclusive regional boundaries, regional identity politics are likely to lead to fragmentation.[84] The result, then, is "many coexisting and competing projects with fuzzy boundaries" that actually prevent further integration.[85] Furthermore, as AdP bluntly illustrates, integration can take place without a narrowly defined regional identity. In this sense, it will be interesting to observe if regional identity discourses will surface again in the future and what form they will take. In any case, with Bolivarianism, Latin America enjoys a unique identity-based founding myth that can be activated when leaders deem it advantageous to do so.

Finally, in stressing that discourse about a regional identity can be used to mask particular national interests or hide persisting discrepancies, this article contributes to discussions regarding how to deal with the problem that states can "lie" about their identities. Further research

on the causes of such "lying," particularly the connection to domestic politics, would help scholars better understand the dynamics related to regional identity politics. The same holds for further investigations of identity politics in other world regions. ■

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Notes

[1] The author would like to thank the editors of this themed issue, Molly McParland and Katharine Brooks, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their many helpful comments and suggestions. Likewise, special thanks go to my colleague Dr. Paul Talcott for his support.

[2] For the concept's use in International Relations, see Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Michael Barnett, "Culture, Strategy, and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 1 (1999): 5–36; Thomas Banchoff, "German Identity and European Integration," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 3 (1999): 259–289; Thomas Risse et al., "To Euro or Not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (1999): 147–187; Shibley Z. Telhami and Michael Barnett, eds., *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). For an overview of the state of identity approaches within the discipline of IR, see Juliet Kaarbo, "Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Back to Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas," *International Studies Review* 5, no. 2 (2003): 155–202.

[3] James D. Fearon, "What is Identity (As We Now Use the Word)?" unpublished manuscript (Stanford: Stanford University); Lisbeth Aggestam, "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy," *ARENA Working Papers* 8 (Oslo: ARENA Centre for European Studies, 1999).

[4] James D. Fearon and David D. Laitlin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identities," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000): 847.

[5] Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); Andreas Wimmer, "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 113, no. 4, 970–1022.

[6] Marc Howard Ross, "Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[7] Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," in *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*, ed. Jonathan Rutherford (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990).

[8] But see Fearon and Laitlin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identities," 848.

[9] Aggestam, "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy."

[10] Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*; Susan Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Fearon and Laitlin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identities"; David Cunningham, "Mobilizing Ethnic Competition," *Theory and Society* 41, no. 5 (2012): 505–525.

[11] Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change," in *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975): 171.

[12] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917

[13] Claudia M. Fabbri, "The Constructivist Promise and Regional Integration: An Answer to 'Old' and 'New' Puzzles—The South American Case," *CSGR Working Paper no. 182* (Coventry: Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick, 2005).

[14] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 899.

[15] See Louise Fawcett, "Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism," *International Affairs* 80, no. 3 (2004): 444–445; Andrew Hurrell, "Hegemony and Regional Governance in the Americas," in *Regionalism and Governance in the Americas: Continental Drift*, Louise Fawcett and Monica Serrano, eds. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); and Rick Fawn, "'Regions' and Their Study: Wherefrom, What For and Whereto," *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 1 (2009): 25–30.

[16] Fawcett, "Exploring Regional Domains," 444.

[17] Fawn, "'Regions' and Their Study," 27.

[18] Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–553.

[19] Louise Fawcett, "The Origins and Development of the Regional Idea in the Americas," in *Regionalism and Governance in the Americas: Continental Drift*, Louise Fawcett and Monica Serrano, eds. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 30.

[20] Ibid, 32.

[21] Andrés Malamud, "Mercosur Turns 15: Between Rising Rhetoric and Declining Achievement," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18, no. 3 (2005): 421.

[22] Celso Lafer, "Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future," *Dædalus* 129, no. 2 (2000): 211.

[23] Fawcett, "The Origins and Development of the Regional Idea in the Americas," 36.

[24] Ibid., 39.

[25] Fabbri, "The Constructivist Promise and Regional Integration," Pía Riggirozzi, "Region, Regionness and Regionalism in Latin America: Towards a New Synthesis," *New Political Economy* 17, no. 4 (2012): 6.

[26] Fredrik Söderbaum and Björn Hettne, "The Future of Regionalism: Old Divides, New Frontiers," in *Regionalistion and Global Governance: The Taming of Globalization*, Andrew F. Cooper et al., eds. (New York: Routledge, 2008): 71.

[27] Victor Bulmer-Thomas, *Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Political Economy of Open Regionalism* (London: University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies, 2001). Two of the most important agreements in this sense were the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Mexico, the US, and Canada, which came into force in 1994, and the Common Market of the South (Mercado Común del Sur, better known as Mercosur) in South America, created in 1991.

[28] Tussie, "Latin America," 174.

[29] Walt Vanderbush, "The Bush Administration Record in Latin America: Sins of Omission and Commission?" *New Political Science* 31, no. 3 (2009): 337–359; R. Guy Emerson, "Radical Neglect? The 'War on Terror' and Latin America," *Latin American Politics and Society* 52, no. 1 (2010): 33–62.

[30] Ibid., 38.

[31] On Latin America's 'Left turn,' see Maxwell A. Cameron and Eric Hershberg, eds., *Latin America's Left Turns: Politics, Policies, and Trajectories of Change* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010); Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts, eds., *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011); and Steve Ellner, "The Distinguishing Features of Latin America's New Left in

Power: The Chávez, Morales, and Correa Governments," *Latin American Perspectives* 39, no. 1 (2012): 96–114.

[32] Barry Cannon and Peadar Kirby, eds., *Civil Society and the State in Left-Led Latin America: Challenges and Limitations to Democratization* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2012): 12.

[33] Guyana has been governed by the left-wing People's Progressive Party since 1992. The 'pink tide' was less intensive in Central America, where Left presidents assumed office in Honduras (Manuel Zelaya, 2006–2009), Nicaragua (Daniel Ortega, elected in 2007), and El Salvador (Mauricio Funes, 2009–2014).

[34] Hans-Jürgen Burchardt, "Extractivismo y trabajo," in *Desprotegidos y desiguales – ¿Hacia una nueva fisonomía social?*, Hans-Jürgen Burchardt and Fernando Groisman, eds. (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2014): 35–55; Hans-Jürgen Burchardt, *Logros y contradicciones del extractivismo. Bases para una fundamentación empírica y analítica* (Buenos Aires: Nueva Sociedad, 2014).

[35] Rhys Jenkins, "Latin America and China: A New Dependency?," *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 7 (2012): 1337–1358.

[36] Mario E. Carranza, "Clinging Together: Mercosur's Ambitious External Agenda, Its Internal Crisis, and the Future of Regional Economic Integration in South America," *Review of International Political Economy* 13, no. 5 (2006): 8.

[37] Enrique Krauze, "Hugo Chávez and Venezuela: A Leader's Destiny," http://opendemocracy.net /article/hugo-chavez-and-venezuela-a-leader-s-destiny (accessed September 9, 2014). For a discussion of the ideational underpinnings of Bolivarianism, see Richard Gott, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution* (London and New York: Verso, 2005): 91–110.

[38] Gott, "Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution"; Hugo Chávez and Marta Harnecker, *Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution: Hugo Chávez Talks to Marta Harnecker* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2005); Barry Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution: Populism and Democracy in a Globalised Age* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2009).

[39] Edmundo González Urrutia, "Las dos etapas de la política exterior de Chávez," *Nueva Sociedad* 205 (2010): 163; José Briceño Ruiz and Miriam Gomes Saraiva, "Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela," *Foro Internacional* 50, no. 1 (2010): 56; Daniel Flemes and Leslie Wehner, "Drivers of Strategic Contestation in South America," *GIGA Working Paper no. 207* (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2012): 22.

[40] Diana Tussie, "Hemispheric Relations: Budding Contests in the Dawn of a New Era," in *Inter-American Cooperation at a Crossroads*, Gordon Mace et al., eds. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010): 35.

[41] Briceño and Gomes, "Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela," 56.

[42] Josette Altmann, "New Forms of Integration: ALBA Institutions and Mechanisms," in *Inter-American Cooperation at a Crossroads*, Gordon Mace et al., eds. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Paul Kellogg, "Regional Integration in Latin America: Dawn of an Alternative to Neoliberalism?" *New Political Science* 29, no. 2 (2007): 187–209.

[43] Gerry Strange, "Consolidating the Pink Tide? The New Developmental Regionalism in Post-Neoliberal South America," https://www.academia.edu/7461390/Consolidating—the—Pink—Tide—The—New—Developmental—Regionalism—in—Post-Neoliberal—South—America (accessed September 9, 2014).

[44] The ASC was created in 1999 to fight the US version of FTAA and to support regional integration with ideas and input from civil society (Verónica de la Torre, "De las alternativas para las Américas, de la Alianza Social Continental, a la Alternativa Bolivariana," in *Argumentos* 22, no. 59 (2009): 187–214).

[45] The Caribbean states, for instance, receive subsidized oil in the framework of Petrocaribe (Norman Girvan, "Is ALBA a New Model of Integration? Reflections on the CARICOM Experience," *International Journal of Cuban Studies* 3, no. 2–3 (2011): 157–180).

[46] Venezuela bought new Argentinean bonds worth US$2.4 billion in 2005 in order to stabilize the Argentinean economy during the breakdown of that year (Riggirozzi, "Region, Regionness and Regionalism in Latin America," 13).

[47] Ibid.

[48] Briceño and Gomes, "Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela," 57; Andrés Malamud, "A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy," *Latin American Politics and Society* 53, no. 3 (2011): 4; Lafer, "Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy"; Gelson Fonseca Jr., "Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy," *Global Governance* 17, no. 3 (2011): 375–397.

[49] It was not least due to its global aspirations that Brazil developed the most advanced diplomatic service on the continent (the Ministry of Foreign Relations, sometimes known as Itamaraty, after the location of its headquarters): Briceño and Gomes, "Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela," 36.

[50] Fabbri, "The Constructivist Promise and Regional Integration."

[51] Briceño and Gomes, "Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela," 37. In doing so, Lula continued to pursue

a strategy initiated by his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who had launched the South American Presidential Summits (the first of which took place in 2001).

[52] Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times: The Quest for Autonomy from Sarney to Lula*, trans. Leandro Moura (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009): 81–100.

[53] Flemes and Wehner, "Drivers of Strategic Contestation in South America," 13–14.

[54] Carranza, "Clinging Together," 808.

[55] Strange, "Consolidating the Pink Tide?" Following the Buenos Aires Consensus, a series of new regional institutions were created, such as the Technical Secretariat (2003), a permanent Court of Appeals (2004), the Mercosur Commission of Permanent Representatives (Comisión de Representantes Permanentes del Mercosur, CRPM), the Advisory Forum on Economic and Social Matters, the Permanent Review Tribunal (Tribunal Permanente de Revisión, TPR), and the Mercosur Parliament (ParlaSur) (Tussie, "Latin America," 176). Furthermore, in 2005 a redistributive structural convergence and cohesion fund (Fondo para la Convergencia Estructural del Mercosur, FOCEM) was created (Mahrukh Doctor, "Prospects for Deepening Mercosur Integration: Economic Asymmetry and Institutional Deficits," *Review of International Political Economy* 20, no. 3 (2013): 525–6). Mercosur also extended its membership. After its relaunch, the organization's associate membership was expanded to include Peru (2003), Ecuador, and Colombia (2004). Venezuela became a member in 2012 and Bolivia is currently negotiating full membership.

[56] Diana Tussie, "Latin America: Contrasting Motivations for Regional Projects," *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 1 (2009): 184.

[57] Briceño and Gomes, "Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela," 53.

[58] Ibid., 54.

[59] Ibid., 44.

[60] On Latin American "presidential diplomacy," see Federico Merke, "The Primary Institutions of the Latin American Regional Interstate Society," *Documento de Trabajo* no. 11 (Buenos Aires: Departamento de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de San Andrés, 2011): 24, and Andrés Malamud, "Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Underpinnings of Mercosur: An Empirical Examination," *Latin American Research Review* 40, no. 1 (2005): 139–164.

[61] Detlef Nolte and Leslie Wehner, "UNASUR and the New Geopolitics of South America," paper prepared for the XXIII World Congress of Political Science in

Madrid, July 8–12, 2012, http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper—10836.pdf, accessed September 3, 2014): 10.

[62] Chávez stated in Mexico that "[…] we have revived the dream and project of Bolívar." In Caracas, even Mexico's President Felipe Calderón declared in his inaugural speech that "Bolívar's idea is still in force and is common to us all Latin American and Caribbean peoples" (see Rebecca Jarman, "Venezuela 05/12/2011," http://www.pulsamerica.co.uk/2011/12/05/venezuela-this-week-50/, accessed January 13, 2015).

[63] In fact, the process began much earlier, with President Rafael Caldera in the 1990s. At the same time, Chávez left the CAN (Comunidad Andina de Naciones), criticizing it for its closeness to the US (Briceño and Gomes, "Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela," 53).

[64] Cited in Jason Tockman, "Chávez, Morales Seek Transformation of MERCOSUR Trade Bloc," http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2187 (accessed November 30, 2014).

[65] Tussie, "Latin America," 179; Nicola Phillips, "The Politics of Trade and the Limits to US Power in the Americas," in *The Political Economy of Hemispheric Integration: Responding to Globalization in the Americas*, Diego Sánchez-Ancochea and Kenneth C. Shadlen, eds. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 153.

[66] Strange, "Consolidating the Pink Tide?," 21.

[67] See http://www.ustr.gov/tpp

[68] Chile was an original signatory, while Mexico and Peru are still negotiating the terms of their inclusion.

[69] Detlef Nolte and Leslie Wehner, "The Pacific Alliance Casts Its Cloud Over Latin America," http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/gf—international—1308.pdf (accessed September 3, 2014).

[70] Cited in America XXI, "Latin America: Evo Morales and Nicolas Maduro Defend the Region's Union," http://links.org.au/node/3386 (accessed January 13, 2015).

[71] See MercoPress, "Brazil Wants to Speed Mercosur/Pacific Alliance Free Trade Understanding," http://en.mercopress.com/2014/07/25/brazil-wants-to-speed-mercosur-pacific-alliance-free-trade-understanding (accessed January 13, 2015).

[72] See MercoPress, "Chile Ready to Act as a 'Bridge' Between Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance," http://en.mercopress.com/2014/08/27/chile-ready-to-act-as-a-bridge-between-mercosur-and-the-pacific-alliance (accessed January 13, 2015).

[73] Briceño and Gomes, "Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela," 60.

[74] Ibid., 43.

[75] Malamud, "A Leader Without Followers?" 9–10.

[76] Briceño and Gomes, "Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela," 48.

[77] Malamud, "A Leader Without Followers?," 8; Briceño and Gomes, "Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela," 55.

[78] Malamud, "A Leader Without Followers?" 19–20.

[79] Ibid., 8.

[80] Sean Burges, "Building a Global Southern Coalition: The Competing Approaches of Brazil's Lula and Venezuela's Chávez," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (2007): 1343–1358; Tussie, "Latin America."

[81] See MercoPress, "A Frustrated Mujica Calls for a Readjustment of Mercosur Legal Framework," http://en.mercopress.com/2014/01/13/a-frustrated-mujica-calls-for-a-readjustment-of-mercosur-legal-framework (accessed January 13, 2015).

[82] Doctor, "Prospects for Deepening Mercosur Integration," 526.

[83] See World Values Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp (accessed January 13, 2015).

[84] Andrés Malamud and Gian Luca Gardini, "Has Regionalism Peaked? The Latin American Quagmire and Its Lessons," *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* 47, no. 1 (2012): 119–120.

[85] Tussie, "Latin America," 170.

Venezuela and the US

A Question of Status Misperceptions

Isabella Hermann

In order to understand the deterioration of US–Venezuelan relations, which began with the election of Hugo Chávez, one must recognize the existence of a fundamental disagreement over the nature of Venezuelan identity between the US and Venezuela. Prior to Chávez, the relationship between the two countries can be described as strategic friendship. A look at the speeches of the most prominent Venezuelan presidents of the time reveals that Venezuelan identity was discursively constructed as a stable liberal democracy which respected human rights and could rely on a responsible leadership that not only aimed to make the country a democratic vanguard in Latin America, but also a reliable friend of the US and a stable supplier of oil. US presidents responded well to this construction of Venezuelan identity, guaranteeing Venezuela's membership in an imagined prestigious club of US-led Western and Western-style democracies. Both the US and the Venezuelan élite held on to these desirable representations of Venezuelan identity even in the 1990s when Venezuela experienced tremendous social, economic, and political decline. Partially as a result of these severe problems, Hugo Chávez was elected as Venezuela's president in 1998. He undertook a program of identity reformation wherein the previous political era of friendship with the United States was delegitimized and an alternative, supposedly 'authentic' Venezuelan identity—as a revolutionary social democracy which resisted US hegemony—was propagated. However, the US's own re-evaluation of Venezuelan identity bore little resemblance to the internal Venezuelan perspective. Instead, they perceived the new Venezuela of Chávez as Leftist, undemocratic, authoritarian, and unstable, and thus no longer as part of its imagined 'club.' This article argues that it was this incompatibility of identity perceptions that led to the profound mistrust between the US and Venezuela as each interpreted the actions of the other through mutually incompatible identity lenses.

> No, we are not extremists, what happens is that the world is waking up, and people are rising up everywhere, I have the feeling, Mister Imperialist Dictator, that you are going to live as if in a nightmare the rest of your days, because no matter where you look at we will be rising up against the U.S. imperialism. They call us extremists, since we demand total freedom in the world, equality among the peoples, and respect for sovereignty of nations. We are rising up against the Empire, against its model of domination.[1]

Isabella Hermann, "Venezuela and the US: A Question of Status Misperception," *St Antony's International Review* 10, no. 2 (2015): 117–140.

Hugo Chávez's rant before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2006, in which he referred to the then President of the United States as the "devil" has now achieved considerable notoriety. It is but one example, however, of how, after Hugo Chávez's election as president of the petro-state Venezuela in 1998, the previous relationship between Venezuela and the US deteriorated immensely. Another prominent example of this relational impairment is Venezuela's destructive role in the US backed negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas, which finally broke off in 2005. Consequently, Venezuela's behaviour is generally perceived by the US as uncooperative, provocative, and even antagonistic.[2] Unfortunately, neither the election of Barack Obama as US president in 2008, who aspired to reconfigure the relations between the US and Latin America, nor the election of Nicolás Maduro as Chávez's successor after his death in 2013, has seen the relationship between the countries improve.

This article asks two questions: why did Venezuela under the Chávez government behave so provocatively towards the US, and why does it continue to do so even after Chávez's death, under the presidency of Nicolás Maduro? Much of the prevailing political discourse within the US adopts the assumption that the deterioration in relations can be explained by Chávez's own erratic and unstable personality.[3] This argument is clearly unsatisfying, however, as besides not providing us with any serious analytical insights into Chávez's actions, it is manifestly contradicted by the success of the *chavismo* phenomenon and its political objectives within Venezuela and Latin America more broadly. An alternative argument, that Chávez portrayed the US as a common enemy in order to distract the Venezuelan people from internal problems has some merit, but fails to explain why the population of Venezuela was so receptive to this message. A more sophisticated hypothesis is to be discerned in the soft balancing approach, which holds that less powerful states often try to balance against more powerful ones in non-military ways. According to this theory, the foreign policy of Venezuela towards the US could be understood as a strategy to attempt to frustrate US policy objectives in order to pursue its own interests.[4] A soft balancing perspective might be complemented by an approach that construes Venezuela's provocative performance as a deliberate and strategic step to pave the way for a broader multipolar transformation of the region.[5] Yet, to a greater or lesser extent all of those approaches fail to incorporate the underlying social context of the US–Venezuelan situation. They do not address the motives and political claims behind Venezuelan behaviour that reaches beyond ruthless strategic power aspirations by means of provocation. Moreover these arguments fail to take into account where this uncoop-

erative behaviour had come from after forty years of friendly relations between the two countries. It is the aim of this article to fill this gap in understanding Venezuelan confrontational behaviour up to the present and, in so doing, to serve as a constructive addition to aforementioned explanatory concepts.

Understanding Venezuela's behaviour, which comprises both rhetoric and action, means that we first ought to explore the country's identity before concentrating on presumed Venezuelan interests. This addresses to the fundamental question of how the deterioration of US–Venezuelan relations was possible. Drawing from the social psychological concept of 'respect' within International Relations, I argue that a perception of disrespect plays an important role in the *chavista* foreign policies of Venezuela towards the US. Thus, in the era of strategic friendship between the two countries, prior to the election of Chávez, the Venezuelan political élite felt respected by the US. Upon the election of Chávez, however, a change in US policy engendered strong feelings of having been disrespected on the part of the Venezuelan political élite. It is the argument of this article that it was this perceived disrespect accorded to Venezuela by the US that led it to engage in defiant and retaliatory behaviour.

I begin with a short account of the theoretical literature on the concept of 'respect' and the broader work on social status and identities; as well as the methodological approach used to track identity constructions. The second part of this article will present the evolution of the 'Westernized' Venezuelan identity within presidential discourse prior to Chávez's tenure, noting the affirmative reactions of the US. It then outlines the reconstruction of Venezuelan identity after Chávez's election. Based on the resultant alter-identity of Venezuela constructed by the US, the third part of this article provides insight on the current identity and status clash between the US and Venezuela and posits this clash as the underlying reason for the current strained relationship. The article concludes that after Chávez's election the US started to interpret assertive and confident Venezuelan policies—which it had previously tolerated—in a much more negative way. It is clear, therefore, that a disagreement on the identity and status of Venezuela is crucial to understand the current relationship crisis.

Searching for Identity Representations

For actors within the international arena to feel 'respected' by another actor means that they believe that their status, as perceived by themselves, is recognized by the other actor and that they are accorded the kind of

treatment, privileges and benefits due to their social status. Social psychology suggests that when an individual actor perceives that her own subjectively defined social status rank is not being adequately considered by others, this generates a feeling that she is being 'disrespected' and can incentivize that person to retaliate with defiant behaviour ranging from verbal protest to violent retribution.[6] State actors represented by their political élites construct various identities that define the status of their countries in the social order of the international system. In this sense, then, these subjective identities can also be described as self-defined status markers. However, the self-constructed status markers and the resulting social position of a country do not necessarily correspond to the social ranking of this country in the minds of other countries. This article argues that during the time of strategic friendship between the US and Venezuela (in the so-called "Punto–Fijo era")[7] both countries conceived of Venezuela as a member of the Westernized US-led club of democracies and thus enjoying a position of high social status. Chávez, however, sought to remake Venezuelan identity as a beacon of Bolivarian values in Latin America. As such, he continued to perceive Venezuela as possessing a high social status, but one defined by a Bolivarian social hierarchy. The US, by contrast, perceived the changes in Venezuela to mean that it was now becoming a Leftist and authoritarian state and consequently of severely diminished social status in the international community.

Lene Hansen's work on the discursive construction of identities in the international sphere seeks to provide a model for understanding this process.[8] In her model, Hansen presupposes that identities are constantly reconstructed and adjusted: they therefore do not exist pre-socially but only as non-objective representations of the world. Moreover, the model demonstrates that discourses construct 'self' identities in a process of juxtaposition and differentiation to a perceived 'other.' Therein, the identity of an actor is constructed via two mutually influencing ways: firstly via positive linkages of certain identity representations of the actor herself in a web of corresponding meaning and signs, and secondly in a process of differentiation against another actor as 'other.' Discursive identity constructions and 'othering' processes are of relevance because they justify, legitimize, and encourage certain foreign policies. It is this model that is utilized by this paper in tracing the process of identity contestation between the US and Venezuela.

Prior to 1998, Venezuela's political system constituted a stable two-party system with the parties *Acción Democrática* (AD) and *Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente* (COPEI) alternatingly seizing power. The three most influential Venezuelan presidents from the period 1959 to 1998 were Rómulo Betancourt (AD, 1959–1964), Rafael

Caldera (COPEI, 1969–1973, 1994–1998), and Carlos Andrés Pérez (AD, 1973–1977, 1989–1993) and it is the discourse of these three Presidents that is taken by this paper to embody the discourse of the Punto–Fijo era. The documents evaluated within this paper were selected on the basis of their official status, relevance, and extent to which they could be considered representative of the president in question's political stance. It is for this reason that the documents chosen were primarily inaugural addresses, speeches on the anniversary of Venezuelan independence, and speeches given before international bodies such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN. These documents were analysed in order to discern what kind of 'identity' the authors believed Venezuela possessed and what its 'status' should be viewed as. This paper also analyses speeches made by US presidents on those occasions when they discuss Venezuela; primarily on official visits to the country. In analysing this discourse this paper traces the evolution of Venezuela's identity and status, both internally understood and as perceived by the US up to the point of Chávez's election.[9] The second part of the paper analyses the speeches of Hugo Chávez and his US counterpart from his election until his death. The analysis concentrates mainly on the first two years of Chávez's presidency during which time the new "Bolivarian" constitution was adopted and the presidential election of 2000 was celebrated, often described as the constitutive or moderate stage of Chávez's presidency.[10]

Constructing Identity Representations

Understanding Venezuela as an Exceptional Country

With the political pact of Punto–Fijo[11] in 1958 and the resulting constitution of 1961, a relatively stable two party system was created in Venezuela leading analysts to begin speaking of the country as "a strong and effective democracy" and "one of the few stable competitive political orders in Latin America."[12] Along with its abundant oil resources, Venezuela appeared to have overcome the difficulties typically encountered by the Latin American states, such as poverty, instability, military autocratic rule or class conflicts, through responsible leaders and stable institutions.[13] For the US, whose main foreign policy concerns were to stop the spread of communism and tackle unstable regimes and coups in Latin America, Venezuela was seen as an island of stability, a reliable ally and supplier of oil, or simply put, a "political darling."[14] This rela-

tionship reached its zenith in the so-called "golden age" of the 1970s, when the oil boom brought more money into 'Saudi Venezuela' than ever before. Venezuela seemed to have been able to achieve strong bilateral relations to the US without neglecting its own interests on the domestic and international levels. As a result, successive Venezuelan presidents actively promoted their country as a role model for Latin America; a beacon of democracy and human rights within the continent.[15] Similarly, "United States presidents singled out Venezuela to speak for the region and to serve as a link between the United States and the rest of the Hemisphere."[16] This notion of Venezuelan uniqueness and difference is commonly known as the 'Venezuelan exceptional thesis' or 'Venezuelan exceptionalism.'[17] Perceived as a moderate ally and reliable partner of the US, Venezuela was never exposed to direct US interventions during the Punto–Fijo era.[18]

The speeches from this period demonstrate that Venezuelan presidents propagated Venezuelan identity representations with markers of high social status; indicating belonging to a Westernized, US-defined democratic club. Rómulo Betancourt, within his speeches, made frequent references to a 'democratic' Venezuela, based upon the 'consent of the people' and in so doing, attempted to distance the 'democratic' Venezuela both from its authoritarian past and from other Latin American countries that were still ruled by military dictatorships. In particular, authoritarian 'others' that he frequently made reference to were the Cuban Communist regime and their, frequently violent, ideological allies within Venezuela.[19] Betancourt also adopted a firm policy position, known as the Betancourt Doctrine, of severing all diplomatic ties to any government that had come to power through a coup d'état or corrupt elections. As a result, Betancourt broke off relations to several Latin American governments that had come to power through undemocratic means and also attempted to oust them from the OAS.[20]

By the beginning of the 1970s, the threat of a communist insurgency within Venezuela had waned considerably and Venezuela began to reorient itself within the international community towards greater involvement and solidarity with the Third World movement. Condemnatory references towards other Latin American countries were gradually tempered by the Presidents of this era: Rafael Caldera and his successor Carlos Andrés Pérez. However, despite distancing themselves from the Betancourt Doctrine during their respective first terms, both Presidents nonetheless maintained the idea of Venezuelan exceptionalism and continued to propagate the image of Venezuela as a Westernized liberal democracy. For example, in his inaugural address, Caldera spoke of "social and political peace," "fecund convergence to the democratic plurality"

and "the promotion of man, through liberty."[21] Because of its "demonstration of civic maturity and institutional strength" he argued that Venezuela would be perceived "as one of the nations with the highest right for a great progress."[22] During the course of his visit to the US in June 1970 he addressed the US Congress and spoke of Venezuela as a country "which maintains today, with unbroken decision and inexhaustible faith, the democratic system."[23] Building on his predecessors, Pérez perpetuated the idea of Venezuela as a fully functional and consensual Western-style democracy. He began his inaugural address of March 1974 with praise for the democracy "which already is the irrevocable marker of the course of Venezuela" and "consolidated in the national conscience."[24] At the end of his speech he assured his audience that he would continue with the policies of the government of "the illustrious Venezuelan Rafael Caldera" who would leave the government to him "with clean hands":[25] particularly remarkable words if we consider that Caldera was from the oppositional political party.

However, by this time another set of ideas had already emerged within the discourse of Venezuelan presidents: the belief that Venezuela should be considered a leader not only of Latin America, but of the Third World movement more generally. To this end, their speeches can also be seen to be discursively bringing about alliances with other developing countries and, in some ways, rejecting the "imperialism" of the US and its allies. This discourse emerged during the presidency of Caldera but it was in the presidency of Pérez during the oil boom of the 1970s that this line of discourse became most prominent. In Caldera's speeches, although he does make consistent references to developing world solidarity, he still refers to the US as an important partner. For example, in his aforementioned speech before the US Congress he denounced the injustice and inequality between the developed and developing world but also argued for a system of international social justice led by "the great people" of the US.[26] He also, however, criticized the discriminatory treatment of Venezuela meted out by the US over the preceding decade, as the importance of Venezuelan petrol to the US had progressively decreased.[27] Caldera demanded "just, non-discriminatory treatment" from the US; but on the basis that this was essential for the US to remain a "neighbour and a friend."[28] Throughout the speech Caldera referred to the US as a partner for Venezuela and emphasized the need for a "truthful and durable friendship" and for "new, vigorous and fruitful hemispheric relations."[29]

Pérez moved this discourse in a more assertive direction. In a press conference not long after his inauguration, he stated that the country would not join any international ideological block or adhere to the limi-

tations of any internationally imposed dogma.[30] Answering a question on the possibility of a Latin American Organization that would exclude the US, he replied that turning a blind eye to the US would not be the right approach, but rather Venezuela should "demand the treatment and the relationship of friendship."[31] Although Venezuela was a beneficiary of US commerce, Pérez complained, not only in the name of Venezuela but for Latin America as a whole, "that [the US's] conduct on many occasions is not marked by respect and by the rights we merit and possess as countries of Latin America."[32] In November 1976, Pérez spoke before the UNGA on the need for a new economic order that should make world peace possible. Therein, he accused "the great powers" of being "directly responsible, in the past and the present, [for] international injustice and the wars throughout history" and of having been discriminatory in their application of the principles "of liberty, of independence, of equality of men [...] of democracy, of progress, of culture."[33] Yet, Pérez clarified that he was expressing these words "without hostile intentions against any nation."[34] Even in the most assertive addresses of Pérez, the developed world and the US were referred to as partners in the development process of the Third World. Despite seeking to criticize US policy, therefore, it is clear that both Caldera and Pérez were committed to maintaining Venezuela's membership of the "Western democratic club."

In presidential visits between the two countries—which took place regularly at this time—US presidents demonstrated clear signs of according Venezuela a high status. The first US president ever to visit Venezuela, John F. Kennedy, described the country as "one of our sister Republics in this hemisphere."[35] Moreover, in their joint statement Kennedy and Betancourt confirmed the "irrevocable friendship" of their two countries, their mutual "respect for human rights" and "the effective practice of representative Democracy," and the "confidence that freedom will prevail in all American countries."[36] When President Nixon invited Caldera to the White House in 1970, he welcomed him with the words that "we have one of the longest relationships of peace and friendship with your country as with any country in the world."[37] According to Nixon, what was even more important to him than the commercial relations between the US and Venezuela was the mutual adherence of the two countries to common values. The objectives Caldera had mentioned in his inaugural address—peace, human understanding, liberty, and justice—were, according to Nixon, the same as the values the US believed in, and the same he wanted for the Americas, and "what both of us want for the world."[38]

Welcoming Pérez to the US in July 1977, President Jimmy Carter used similar language, including reiterations of all of the status markers that Pérez utilized to justify the high status position of '*la gran Venezuela*.' Carter began his speech by proclaiming his approval of Venezuela's democratic commitment, saying that the country "has earned the great admiration of all those who believe in freedom and in the open, democratic processes of government." He continued by stating that Venezuela had a "firm and unswerving commitment to the proposition that the people of a nation should be the ones with universal suffrage and complete participation in an open and free electoral process to choose the leaders of that country."[39] He also extolled Pérez's "commitment to the basic principles of human rights, individual freedom, and liberty" and asserted that his "influence has extended far beyond the borders of his beautiful and great nation."[40] Carter's dinner toast also engaged in positive affirmation of Perez personally: "Venezuela is represented by a man who epitomizes the finest aspects of our own country's hopes and dreams and aspirations and ideals."[41] He stated that he believed there was now "an opportunity to draw ourselves together in the friendliest and most persuasive and personal way;" in a "relationship of complete mutual admiration and total equality."[42]

Maintaining an Exceptional Identity

The late 1980s were a time of severe economic crisis for Venezuela, which accumulated immense foreign debt as a result of plummeting oil prices. Pérez was elected for a second term as Venezuelan president in 1988 and served from 1989 to 1993. In 1992, Chávez attempted to seize power through a coup d'état but was unsuccessful. Pérez nonetheless failed to complete his five years term as in 1993 he was indicted on charges of corruption. In office, Pérez initiated what has been termed the "great turnaround" (*"la gran viraje"*), that saw the implementation of a liberal structural adjustment programme—the so-called *"paquete"*—on the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund. This involved abolition of many state subsidies and cuts to welfare programmes. These policies contrasted sharply with his pre-electoral manifesto and thus were seen by many of the electorate as a betrayal. As a consequence of the abolition of state subsidies, prices of petrol and other essential commodities soared. A key trigger for social unrest was the doubling of bus prices in order to meet rising operational costs. This measure served as the last straw for a population that had been experiencing severe economic decline and in February 1989, crowds poured onto the streets in what became known as the *Caracazo*. The response of the government

was brutal and hundreds of civilians lost their lives in clashes between protestors and the military.[43]

In spite of these traumatic events, Pérez's address on the 178th anniversary of Venezuelan independence five months later showed no change of rhetoric regarding Venezuela nor any recognition that the country's violence against its own citizens had threatened its status within the world. However, Pérez did make reference to the economic and social challenges that Venezuela was facing. Seeking to distance his current policies from blame for the crisis, he criticized the habits of public and private consumption resulting from the "easy wealth" in the 1970s—even though, rather ironically, he was President for a significant proportion of that time—stating that these attitudes did "not at all correspond to the real Venezuela."[44] Pérez argued that, as a consequence, Venezuela had become "accustomed to a state whose fundamental mission was to redistribute income instead of stimulate production."[45] The state's inability to continue in this role had led to a "rhetoric of indignation"[46] that was fundamentally misplaced. Perez maintained that the crisis required a readjustment of the expectations of the population, rather than any fundamental changes and that Venezuela should still be "proud" of its democracy.

After Pérez's impeachment in early summer 1993, and the brief rule of two interim presidents, Caldera was elected for a second term in December 1993. Serving his full term from 1994 to 1999 until Chávez was inaugurated, Caldera was unable to improve the precarious situation of the country. In his last speech before the Congress at the end of January 1999, Caldera stated that in this last term he had realized that the "depth of the crisis was much greater than thought," resulting in a situation in which he not only had to deal "with a profound economic crisis but also with a political crisis, a social crisis and a moral crisis."[47] However, Caldera also argued that he believed in the "democratic vocation of the Venezuelan people" and was still convinced that the values enshrined by the "excellent Constitution,"[48] of 1961 were sufficient to ensure the future of Venezuela. Thus, even though he had partially reformed the Constitution, he argued "its validity for almost forty years is [a] reason for pride of [those] generations which through a dedicated and tenacious fight achieved [...] an excellent fundamental Charter which has had the longest duration in Venezuela."[49] Such language demonstrates his desire to maintain the claim that, in spite of events, Venezuela should still be considered a stable democracy, and thus still a member of the prestigious democratic club.

In the presidential meetings between Venezuela and the US at this time it is possible to discern some tension in the relationship both as a

result of the economic and political crisis Venezuela was undergoing and the state's brutal response to protestors; which had called into question its status as a democratic country that respected human rights. However, the US continued to use the positive status markers that had been the norm in the previous decades. For example, when Pérez visited the US in April 1990, George Bush welcomed him with "great honour" as "the leader of one of South America's oldest democracies and one of Latin America's most respected statesmen."[50] Similarly, in October 1997 the Caldera government put strong effort into persuading Clinton to visit during the course of a general tour of Latin America. Although Venezuela's exceptional status was now endangered, this last official visit of a US President to Venezuela displayed once again all the usual markers of a perceived high Venezuelan status. Upon arriving in Venezuela, Clinton began his remarks with "Saludos, amigos. It is good to be in Venezuela,"[51] before moving to a discussion of his vision of free markets and prosperity for the region. Although he acknowledged the challenges facing Venezuela, he stated that he still believed it was "a model to the world that democracy, open markets and cooperation can deliver blessings to all our people."[52] Venezuela should therefore be considered "a driving force in this quiet revolution" within the region, despite "weathering difficult challenges."[53] Clinton concluded that the "strength you find in Venezuela's diversity is indeed an inspiration to every nation in our hemisphere,"[54] reaffirming Venezuela's status as a value-leader in the region.

Although Venezuela's own actions had called its status in the international community into question, both Venezuelan and US presidents were careful to maintain a discourse that continued to legitimize the narrative of Venezuelan exceptionalism. While there was of course no possibility for the presidents to deny the existence of a crisis, they continued to reaffirm the significance of Venezuela's stable democratic tradition and avowed respect for human rights. Venezuela's actions during this period did not, therefore, result in a significant depreciation of its status in the bilateral relationship with the US. Rather, within presidential discourse, the US continued to accord it the respect due to a high status member of the international community and a member of the Western democratic club of nations.

Identity Reconstruction of Venezuela by Chávez

During this same time period, however, other actors were contesting this narrative, most notably Hugo Chávez. Riding a wave of popular discontent over a reality that was so fundamentally at odds with current

presidential rhetoric, Chávez began propagating an alternative vision for Venezuela which included proposals for a new "Bolivarian" constitution based on greater social rights and enhanced executive powers. He also contested the prevailing narrative of Venezuela's history and called into question the already dubious claims of Venezuelan exceptionalism; arguing that the policies of the Punto–Fijo period were in fact primarily responsible for the desperate situation of the country. In the narrative espoused by Chávez, the previous hundred years of Venezuelan history were characterized as a time of "sinking into a disaster," the period from 1950 described as "the blackest period of Venezuelan republican history,"[55] and the most recent years as witnessing "political degeneration."[56] At the same time as demonizing the Punto–Fijo system, Chávez also explicitly spoke of Venezuelan history and destiny as being intrinsically related to the experience of other Latin American countries. Thus, after having been elected, Chávez "did much to puncture the myths surrounding Venezuelan exceptionalism" and "[m]ost important, his fiery nationalism reaffirmed Venezuela's status as a Latin American nation and rejected the importation of values, culture, and models from the United States."[57] Despite the fact that at this initial stage Chávez's discourse towards the US was not overly aggressive, he forcefully distanced himself from the "Americanization" of Venezuela.[58]

In addition to this repositioning of Venezuela away from the US and closer to an identification with other Latin American countries, Chávez also promoted himself as a new archetype of what it meant to be Venezuelan. Chávez was the first president since the Punto–Fijo period who did not belong to the Creole upper class. With his mixed mestizo ancestry, including Spanish, Indian, and African roots, he differed significantly in his appearance from Western-styled politicians like Rómulo Betancourt or Carlos Andrés Pérez. He therefore epitomized the political programme of *chavismo*, both politically and personally. Chávez sought to reconstruct what it meant to be Venezuelan in his own image; with those who were outside the dominant élite being spoken of as the "real" Venezuelans, the "people" ("*el pueblo*"). In official speeches, Chávez also used colloquial language, clearly implying that he was directing his words and policies towards those who had been neglected before and asserting that he exemplified "the tremendous and wonderful beat of the Venezuelan people."[59] In doing so, Chávez styled himself not only as the primary representative of the people and their hero, but as a manifestation of them in one man. According to this logic, Chávez saw *himself* as the very first step towards the achievement of a "real" Venezuela.

The *chavista* discourse thus also gave prescriptions as to the ideal Venezuelan leader and, in so doing, told a different narrative of the Ven-

ezuelan past prior to the pact of Punto–Fijo in 1958. Prior to Chávez's election, the time from 1830—when Venezuela first became independent—until 1935—when the dictatorial rule of Juan Vicente Gómez was ended by his death—was generally seen as a time of "uninterrupted strong man (or 'caudillo') rule."[60] Chávez sought to discursively rehabilitate these early Venezuelan leaders, in particular Cipriano—a military revolutionary who ruled Venezuela as president from 1899 until 1908—who he spoke of as merely a nationalist trying to unite the country. Chávez also sought to rehabilitate some of the Venezuelan rebels who had supported Castro, such as his own great-grandfather, Pedro Pérez Delgado (popularly known as "Maisanta"), referring to them as having "the same history, the same *patria*, the same dream"[61] as himself.

Most importantly, Chávez centred his idea of Venezuelan identity upon a social interpretation of the ideas of Simón Bolívar, the Venezuelan "*libertador*" who played a key role as military and political leader in the successful Hispanic American struggle for independence. For example, in his address to the constituent national assembly charged with writing the new Bolivarian constitution, Chávez emphasized the importance of Bolívar, "who returns with his clear vision, with his sword drawn, with his word and doctrine,"[62] to Venezuela's past and its present. The 'Bolivarian revolution' was construed as a return to 'true Venezuela.' Citing Simón Rodríguez, Bolívar's mentor, Chávez argued that "[w]e cannot go on copying models. This is one of our tragedies. Our methods of government need to be original ones. Our institutions have to be original ones."[6] Thus, Chávez presented a new identity for Venezuela, one centred upon himself, his *chavismo* ideology and a resurrection of the ideas of Simón Bolívar. Chávez's Venezuela was no longer a member of a club that included Western countries, it was a Latin American nation whose history, present, and future lay with the rest of the continent. In so doing, he sought to change the status of Venezuela from one of the least prominent members of the most prestigious club to that of a revolutionary leader of the continent. Venezuela, to the mind of Chávez, would thus grow in importance and stature, not diminish.

Identity Clash Between the US and *Chavista* Venezuela

As previously discussed, prior to Chávez's election, the Venezuelan-US relationship was characterized by consistent demonstrations of friendship, including frequent official visits, and expressions of support and respect. Since Chávez's election, however, there have been no official US

presidential visits to Venezuela nor any other exclusive bilateral meeting between Hugo Chávez, or his successor Nicolás Maduro, with any US president, despite Venezuela's attempts to secure one. Even by June of 1999, when Chávez made his first visit to the US as elected president of Venezuela, hoping for a meeting with Clinton, relations had deteriorated to such an extent that he was denied any opportunity to meet the US president.[64] Given that Chávez spoke before several institutions and organizations—including the Council on Foreign Relations, VenAmCham, and the New York Stock Exchange—where he assured those present of Venezuela's openness to foreign investment, it is reasonable to believe that the purpose of his visit to the US was one of goodwill and an attempt to secure continued positive relations.[65] The refusal of Clinton to meet with Chávez, in light of the much more favourable treatment afforded to previous Venezuelan presidents, was therefore a considerable slight.

Chávez travelled again to the US in September 1999 but was once again denied a meeting with Clinton, even though, according to numerous sources, "Chávez undoubtedly wanted it."[66] The US Ambassador to Caracas is reported to have been begged by the Venezuelan government to arrange such a meeting, but to no avail.[67] Thus, the actions of the US upon these occasions were clearly aimed at purposely ignoring Chávez and must therefore be considered a deliberate slight. The US made it clear to Venezuela that it no longer considered it "worthy" of preferential, or even respectful, treatment.

The US media also altered its approach to Venezuela after Chávez's election. For example, during the crisis that preceded Chávez's election, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* continued to write favourable reports on Venezuela, describing it "as one of Latin America's most prosperous and stable democracies"[68] or as a "country with a 30-year history of stable democratic government and the highest income levels on the continent."[69] Phrases such as being "relatively stable," "democratic,"[70] and "South America's wealthiest democracy"[71] were commonplace.

By contrast, during the course of news coverage on the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998, the *New York Times* wrote an editorial in which they observed that the traditional parties would now have to defend Venezuelan democracy[72] demonstrating early scepticism about Chávez's commitment to democracy. In the first six months after Chávez had assumed office, the language and tone of the US media towards him only grew more hostile. He was variously described as a "populist leftist," "firebrand," and "Venezuela's rambunctious president," while his policies were deemed to comprise "anti-American elements."[73] These phrases later developed into "strongman" and "megalomaniac."[74] The narrative within the American press was therefore clear; the Punto–Fijo

was viewed as a time of functioning democracy and Chávez as a threat to its positive legacy.

Despite clearly demonstrating his intention to snub Chávez, Clinton's language and tone in his public expressions of concern was initially quite reserved.[75] In his congratulatory letter to Chávez upon his victory in 1998, he wrote that he hoped that "reforms promised by Chávez during the campaign [could] be carried out in a democratic manner."[76] Other US officials, however, were much clearer with their statements than the President. According to the *Washington Post*, warnings were issued against Chávez "that any breakdown in democratic rule or the adoption of radical economic measures would quickly cause a US reassessment of a traditionally strong relationship" since Venezuela's oil reserves made "stability in Venezuela a strategic US interest."[77] Concerns were also expressed that Chávez would exploit his avowed fight against corruption "to assume near dictatorial powers, curtailing freedom of expression and the independence of the courts," or that he would "honour promises to stop payments on Venezuela's US$22 billion foreign debt, and reverse key privatization initiatives in the state's petroleum industry." [78]

The election of George W Bush marked a further deterioration in relations between the US and Venezuela. As the US government perceived that their fears about Chávez were being realized, Bush's language towards him became openly condemnatory, including referring to him as a "demagogue,"[79] while Donald Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defence, even compared him to Hitler.[80] This change in language signified a dramatic turn away from the previous era of respect and friendship. References to common values and shared destiny were replaced by open condemnation and blatant insults. The manner in which the US treated Venezuela made it clear that it now perceived Venezuela's status within the international community to have been significantly depreciated and, as such, no longer worthy of the respect previously accorded it. How then to explain the difference in Venezuela's self-perception of its status within the international community and the US's perception? The first explanation is that at the point of Chávez's election, the two countries began working with different understandings of the meaning of democracy. Within Venezuela, Chávez's narrative on the nature of democracy centred it upon serving the social interests of the people. In his understanding of democracy, it was legitimate for the state to assume significant powers as long as it used these powers in a way that furthered social interests and economic equality. This contrasted sharply with the US's more libertarian and individualistic interpretation of the meaning of democracy. In rejecting 'liberal' principles such as limits to presidential power or the exclusion of the military from democratic politics

within the new Constitution, Chávez moved Venezuelan democracy in a direction that pulled it away from the US ideologically.[81] Moreover, when discussing the issue of human rights, Chávez explicitly deprioritized individual freedoms in favour of a greater focus upon the provision of social services, also in tension with the US view on the comparative importance of individual liberties against social welfare.[82]

Similarly, the US and the Venezuelan governments took very different views on the legitimacy and likely effectiveness of Chávez's policies, deemed 'populist' by the US. From the perspective of Chávez, and indeed much of the Venezuelan population, his policies cut down the benefits of a formerly privileged élite and used the money from the oil industry to instead fund social projects directed to marginalized sectors of society. Within these formerly excluded groups, many saw Chávez as a "political saviour."[83] For the US, however, Chávez's policies were characterized by a "discourse that relies on the idea of a popular will and a struggle between 'the people' and 'the élite'"[84] a narrative they rejected outright. For the US, a liberal-democratic model with a clear neoliberal economic orientation was the only form of democracy that was perceived as legitimate.

For many of the people of Venezuela, Chávez's policies corrected for some of the democratic deficit experienced during previous decades, where existing 'democratic' institutions had failed to provide solutions for the economic and social problems of the majority of Venezuelan society.[85] For many Venezuelans, and certainly for Chávez, therefore, his policies moved Venezuela in a more 'ethical' and 'democratic' direction, which from their perspective should have raised Venezuela's status in the club of democratic nations. For the US, however, the nature of Chávez's policies, even when validated by a democratically obtained popular mandate, rendered Chávez's Venezuela *less* democratic and thus led to a diminution of its status within the international arena.

The extent to which the US's hostile view of Chávez's policies was a result of their Leftist nature should not be understated. This is evidenced in the fact that other 'populist' Latin American presidents, such as the former Peruvian president, Alberto Fujimori, whose policies pursued an "orthodox neoliberal economic model," but were nonetheless still 'populist' did not receive comparable disapproval from the US.[86] Therefore, it is clear that the economic radicalism of *chavismo* and the open rejection of neoliberal policies—which was seen as a "serious obstacle to international capitalism in Venezuela, and possibly South America"—might be the "true reason for the countless accusations of authoritarianism against Chávez."[87]

This observation suggests that the US's criteria for ranking the quality of a country's democracy is not based upon an objective standard but rather by measuring the extent to which that countries politics and policies mirror its own. Thus, during the Punto–Fijo era, the discontent of the populace with the policies of the Venezuelan government were considered irrelevant to the quality of Venezuela's democracy. Rather, because the policies of the era mirrored those of the US, Venezuela was endowed with an 'exceptional' status by the US and considered the Latin American ideal. It was Hugo Chávez's move away from the US, rather than any specifically 'authoritarian' traits, therefore, which led to a devaluing of its status.

Conclusion

In reconstructing Venezuelan identity through strenuously distancing his government from the Punto–Fijo era and promoting a social model of democracy that drew on the ideas of the Bolivarian revolution, Hugo Chávez believed himself to be elevating the status of Venezuela within the international community. However, from the US viewpoint, his politics and policies led to a sharp devaluing of Venezuela's status. It is the argument of this paper that, since Chávez's early discourse did not engage in a concrete radical negative 'othering' of the US, that the change in the US perception occurred independently from, and prior to, Venezuela's negative retaliatory behaviour towards the US. Rather, it was due to the subjective manner in which the US judged the democratic value of Venezuela and the subsequent status re-evaluation.

This paper also argues that this initial 'status disagreement' is the underlying reason for a change of perceptions and a later change of real policies between the two countries. At the beginning of Chávez's presidency, when Venezuelan policies towards the US were still moderate, the US nonetheless interpreted certain Venezuelan foreign policies, such as revitalizing OPEC and strengthening ties with Cuba, as a manifestation of Chávez's ill intention towards it. However, many of those policies closely resembled the stance of Carlos Andrés Pérez in the 1970s who was also committed to a strong OPEC and initially re-established relations with Cuba. *Chavista* foreign policy was initially not actually very different from the policies of Pérez but was interpreted very differently by the US. During the time of Pérez, Venezuela was perceived to be part of the US "club" and its actions were thus viewed through the lens of a presumed friendship. After Chávez's election, these same policies were

viewed through the lens of having been enacted by an authoritarian and, therein, threatening, state.

It is only after 2004—after it was was officially disclosed that the US had supported those opposition groups that launched a coup attempt against Chávez in 2002 and later fought for a recall referendum to remove Chávez from office in 2004—that actual policy changes on the part of Venezuela towards the US become evident. It was also at this time that Chávez's language towards the US took on a markedly hostile tone. His behaviour from this point is therefore best understood as retaliatory action to previous instances of disrespect from the US towards Venezuela.

Despite the existence of strong economic and political incentives to repair ties, the relationship between the US and Venezuela remains strained and difficult today. It also currently looks unlikely to improve within coming years. If the US were to recognize, however, the extent of responsibility it bears for the worsening of relations that occurred in the early 2000s, this might be the first step towards a much-needed reconciliation. ■

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Notes

[1] Hugo Chávez, "Statement by H. E. Hugo Chavez Frias, President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, at the 61st United Nations General Assembly," http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/pdfs/venezuela-e.pdf (accessed January 13, 2015).

[2] In the words of Venezuela experts Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold, "[n]o other Latin American country other than Cuba under Fidel Castro has targeted the United States as explicitly and insistently as has Venezuela under Chávez." See Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold, *Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chávez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2011): 103

[3] Jerrold M. Post, "El Fenomeno Chavez: Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Modern Day Bolivar," Counterproliferation Papers Series no. 39 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 2007).

[4] Javier Corrales, "Using Social Power to Balance Soft Power: Venezuela's Foreign Policy," *The Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (2009); Corrales and Penfold, *Dragon in the Tropics*, 98ff; Carlos Romero and Javier Corrales, "Relations between the United

States and Venezuela, 2001–2009: A Bridge in Need of Repairs," in *Contemporary US–Latin American Relations: Cooperation or Conflict in the 21st Century?*, Jorge I. Domínguez and Byung-Kook Kim, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2010).

[5] Günther Maihold, "Foreign Policy as Provocation: Rhetoric and Reality in Venezuela's External Relations under Hugo Chávez," SWP Research Paper (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2009).

[6] Reinhard Wolf, "Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition," *International Theory* 3, no. 1 (2011): 126.

[7] The democratic period from 1958 until 1998 is generally referred to as "Punto–Fijo era" or "Punto–Fijo system," in reference to the place where an official pact was made between the major non-communist parties of Venezuela ending the ten year dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez.

[8] Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

[9] Especially with regards to US–Venezuelan relations, the respective presidents "set the tone, transmit global messages, and play a symbolic role that mirrors the true state of relations between nations," see Janet Kelly and Carlos A. Romero, *The United States and Venezuela: Rethinking a Relationship* (New York: Routledge, 2002): 88–91.

[10] Nikolaus Werz, "Die Außenpolitik: Vom Demokratieexport zur 'Außenpolitik Der Völker'," in *Venezuela Heute: Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur*, Andreas Boeckh et al., eds. (Frankfurt: Vervuert Verlag, 2011): 375; Werz, "Venezuela," 166ff; Steve Ellner, *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008): 110.

11 The Punto–Fijo Pact was a formal arrangement arrived at between representatives of Venezuela's three main political parties in 1958 (*Acción Democrática*, COPEI, and *Unión Republicana Democrática*) for the acceptance of the 1958 presidential elections, and the preservation of the rising democratic regime.

[12] Daniel H. Levine, "Venezuela Since 1958: The Consolidation of Democratic Politics," in *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Latin America*, Juan José Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978): 82.

[13] Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinkerv Salas, *Venezuela: Hugo Chávez and the Decline of an "Exceptional Democracy"* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007): xiii; Dick Parker, "Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution as Seen Through Foreign Eyes," *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 87 (2009).

[14] Terry Lynn Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela," *Latin American Research Review* 22, no. 1 (1987): 63.

[15] Carlos Romero, "The United States and Venezuela," in *The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela*, Jennifer McCoy and David J. Myers, eds. (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004): 134.

[16] Louis W. Goodman et al., *Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995): 3.

[17] The term "Venezuelan exceptional thesis" or "Venezuelan exceptionalism" was introduced by the academic Steve Ellner at the end of the 1980s. He tried to critically subsume under one term the agreement by US and Venezuelan politicians and scholars alike that the country was totally different from other Latin American countries regarding the high level of stability and democracy. Steve Ellner, "Venezuela: No Exception," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 23, no. 1 (1989); Steve Ellner, "Introduction: The Search for Explanations," in *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict*, Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger, eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

[18] Kelly and Romero, *The United States and Venezuela*, 2f.

[19] Rómulo Betancourt, *Selección de Escritos Políticos, 1929–1981* (Caracas: Fundación Rómulo Betancourt, 2006): 356; Rómulo Betancourt, "Por la Democracia, el Desarrollo Económico y la Libertad en la América Latina," in *Hacia América Latina Democrática e Integrada*, ed. Rómulo Betancourt (Madrid: Taurus Ediciones, 1969): 238.

[20] Kelly and Romero, *The United States and Venezuela*, 19; Darlene Rivas, "Patriotism and Petroleum: Anti-Americanism in Venezuela from Gómez to Chávez," in *Anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean*, ed. Alan McPherson (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006): 102–04.

[21] Rafael Caldera, *Discurso del Presidente de la República: Dr. Rafael Caldera en el Acto de la Toma de Posesión del Cargo* (Caracas: Cromotip, 1969): 3f.

[22] Ibid., 13.

[23] Rafael Caldera, *El Bloque Latinoamericano* (Caracas: Oficina central de información de Venezuela, 1970): 203.

[24] Carlos Andrés Pérez, „El Pais Frente a Sus Realidades," in *Manos a la Obra. Textos de Mensajes, Discursos y Declaraciones del Presidente de la República*, ed. Carlos Andrés Pérez (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1977): 7.

[25] Ibid., 25.

[26] Caldera, *El Bloque Latinoamericano*, 209.

[27] Here, Caldera referred to the Reciprocal Trade Agreement (*Tratado de Reciprocidad Comercial*) with the US from 1939 (amended in 1952) whose terms and conditions had caused a relative decrease in Venezuelan oil deliveries to the US.

[28] Caldera, *El Bloque Latinoamericano*, 207.

[29] Ibid., 212.

[30] Andrés Pérez, *Manos a la Obra*, vol. 1, part 1, 51f.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Carlos Andrés Pérez, "Nuevo Orden Económico es Esencial para la Paz Mundial. Discurso Pronunciado en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas," in *Discursos de Carlos Andrés Pérez, Presidente de Venezuela, en su Gira al Exterior: 15-XI al 1-XII-1976: ONU, Roma, Vaticano, Londres, Moscú, Ginebra, Madrid, Lisboa* (Caracas: Imprente Nacional, 1977): 12.

[34] Ibid., 11.

[35] John F. Kennedy, "Remarks Upon Arrival at Maiquetia Airport, Caracas, Venezuela," http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8486&st=Venezuela&st1= (accessed January 13, 2015).

[36] John F. Kennedy, "Joint Statement Following Discussions with the President of Venezuela," http://www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/publicpapers/1961/jfk510—61.html (accessed January 13, 2015).

[37] Richard Nixon, "Remarks of Welcome to President Rafael Caldera of Venezuela," http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2526&st=Venezuela&st1= (accessed January 13, 2015).

[38] Ibid.

[39] Jimmy Carter, "Visit of President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela: Remarks of the President and President Perez at the Welcoming Ceremony," http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7736&st=Venezuela&st1= (accessed January 13, 2015).

[40] Ibid.

[41] Jimmy Carter, "Visit of President Perez of Venezuela: Toasts of the President and President Perez at a Dinner Honoring the Venezuelan President," http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7738 (accessed January 13, 2015).

[42] Ibid.

[43] Margarita López Maya, "Zur Geschichte Venezuelas," in *Venezuela Heute: Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur,* Andreas Boeckh et al., eds. (Frankfurt: Vervuert Verlag, 2011): 38; Bernard Mommer, "Subversive Oil," in *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict,* Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger, eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003): 31.

[44] Carlos Andrés Pérez, *Discurso con Motivo de los 178 Años de la Firma del Acta de Independencia. Caracas, 5 de Julio de 1989* (Caracas: Oficina central de informacion de Venezuela, 1993).

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Rafael Caldera, *Selección de Discursos del Quinto Año de Gobierno 1998–1999,* vol. 5, part 1 (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1999): 604.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid., 633.

[50] George H. W. Bush, "Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela," http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=18416&st=Venezuela&st1= (accessed January 13, 2015).

[51] Bill Clinton, "Remarks on Arrival in Caracas, Venezuela," http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53395 (accessed January 13, 2015).

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Hugo Chávez, "Aló Presidente, No. 1," in http://www.alopresidente.gob.ve/materia—alo/25/1530/?desc=alo—presidente—1.pdf (accessed January 13, 2015).

[56] Hugo Chávez, "Discurso en el Paseo de los Próceres," in http://www.retoricas.com/2010/05/discurso-victoria-hugo-chavez.html (accessed January 13, 2015).

[57] Ellner and Tinker Salas, *Venezuela,* 10.

[58] Judith Ewell, *Venezuela and the United States: From Monroe's Hemisphere to Petroleum's Empire* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996).

[59] Hugo Chávez, "Discurso del Presidente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez Frías, con Motivo del Acto Conmemorativo de los 100 Años de la Revolución Restauradora," in *1999 "Año de la Refundación de la República": Selección*

de Discursos del Presidente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez Frías, ed. Ministerio del Poder Popular del Despacho de la Presidencia (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1999): 189.

[60] Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, "The Venezuelan Exceptionalism Thesis: Separating Myth from Reality," in *Venezuela: Hugo Chávez and the Decline of an "Exceptional Democracy,"* Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, eds. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007): 10.

[61] Chávez, "Discurso del Presidente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez Frías, Con Motivo del Acto Conmemorativo de los 100 Años de la Revolución Restauradora," 195.

[62] Chávez, "Discurso del Presidente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez Frías, con Motivo de la Instalación de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente," 280.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid., 89.

[65] Chávez did not even complain about the United States' previous refusal to issue him a visa following his 1992 coup attempt.

[66] Kelly and Romero, *The United States and Venezuela*, 90.

[67] Ibid., 90.

[68] Mark A. Uhlig, "Venezuela Mostly Quiet after Protests," *New York Times*, March 2 (1989).

[69] Eugen Robinson, "As Venezuela Cleans up, Debt Jitters Spread," *Washington Post*, March 5 (1989).

[70] *New York Times*, "Venezuela Crushes Army Coup Attempt," February 5, (1992).

[71] Tod Robberson, "Venezuela Still Edgy: Will There Be Coup No. 3?," *New York Times*, December 3 (1992).

[72] *New York Times*, "Venezuela's Electoral Revolt," December 8 (1998).

[73] Ellner, "Introduction: The Search for Explanations," 22; Nikolaus Werz, "Chávez en la Prensa Europea y Estadounidense," *Revista Venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales* 7, no. 2 (2001).

[74] Barry Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution: Populism and Democracy in a Globalised Age* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009): 137–38.

[75] Lowell R. Fleischer and Michael A. May, "Venezuela Alert: Chavez Landslide Leaves Unanswered Questions," *Hemisphere Focus* 6, no. 5 (1998).

[76] Ibid.

[77] Douglas Farah, "U.S. Warns Incoming Venezuelan President; Radical Political or Economic Measures Could Sour Relations, Chavez is Told," *Washington Post*, December 10 (1998).

[78] Ibid.

[79] George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/nss2006.pdf (accessed January 13, 2015).

[80] Fox News, "Rumsfeld Likens Chavez's Rise to Hitler," http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/02/03/rumsfeld-likens-chavez-rise-to-hitler (accessed January 13, 2015).

[81] Romero, "The United States and Venezuela," 131.

[82] Fernando Casado Gutiérrez, *Introducción a los Derechos Humanos Desde una Perspectiva Bolivariana y Revolucionaria* (Caracas: Fondo Editorial de la Asamblea Nacional Willian Lara, 2013).

[83] Julia Buxton, *The Failure of Political Reform in Venezuela* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001): 233.

[84] Kirk Hawkins, "Populism in Venezuela: The Rise of Chavismo," *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 6 (2003): 1137.

[85] Derham, "Special Section," 193; Buxton, *The Failure of Political Reform in Venezuela*, 2.

[86] Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, 137.

[87] Ibid., 13

Jus Contra Bellum in the Modern States System

Observations on the Anomalous Origins of the Crime of Aggressive War

Anatoly Levshin[1]

When was the launching of aggressive war made a crime under international law? The importance of accurately dating this transformation is sharply revealed in the sheer scope of chronological disagreement among scholars of international criminal law on this point. This disagreement revolves primarily around the role played by the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, adopted in 1945, in criminalizing aggressive war. While some scholars argue that sufficient empirical evidence exists confirming the Charter as the instrument of criminalization, others note that the conspicuous lack of any observable implications of criminalization in the wake of the Nuremberg Trials proves that the Charter did not alter the legal status of aggressive war. I believe that this disagreement points to a deeper anomaly in the historical record. Both positions enjoy limited empirical corroboration, but neither can satisfactorily account for those pieces of evidence upon which the other draws for primary support. Furthermore, because they are proposed as mutually exclusive alternatives, the issue of mixed empirical support also means that neither can be true. In this paper, I explore this anomaly and argue that it results from a prior theoretical commitment to what I term the assumptions of non-monotonicity and bivalence. Rejecting these assumptions empowers us to strike a theoretical compromise that can faithfully accommodate what otherwise appear to be glaring inconsistencies in the historical record. The paper reaches the conclusion that the crime of aggressive war was, indeed, born in 1945, but that it was only much later that it finally became what, on these assumptions, we could recognize as a fully realized norm.

Anatoly Levshin, "*Jus Contra Bellum* in the Modern States System: Observations on the Anomalous Origins of the Crime of Aggressive War," *St Antony's International Review* 10, no. 2 (2015): 141–167.

When was the launching of aggressive war made a crime under international law? The Judgement of Nuremberg famously described aggressive war as a malum in se:

> War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent States alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of whole.[2]

However, to assert that the launching and prosecution of a war of aggression are essentially evil acts and that, therefore, they have always been criminal under international law, is to obscure the history of law with ahistorical normative valuations. Stefan Glaser is guilty of this mistake when, in enquiring whether *jus ad bellum*, or those rules of international law governing recourse to war, had at all changed since the founding of the modern states system, he asserts: "[w]e do not think so. In fact, from medieval canon lawyers, up to Grotius and Vattel, international law has strived to distinguish between cases where the use of force was legal and those where it was not."[3] Such ahistoricism is tempting and, perhaps, even comforting, but it overlooks the vast change in the legal character of war which occurred over the course of the twentieth century.

From the late seventeenth century and until the outbreak of the First World War, the right of war, or *compétence de guerre*, remained the distinctive mark of sovereign power. International law permitted states to wage war freely in pursuit of their political goals, and war was widely recognized as a legitimate instrument of sovereign will.[4] It was only in the final decades of the nineteenth century that the "pacificist" view that wars could only be legitimately waged in self-defence gained broad support, effectively marginalizing the norm of the unrestricted *compétence de guerre*.[5] The pre-eminence of the pacificist view was especially evident in the increased use of arbitration through the second half of the nineteenth century. Robust legal norms curtailing the right of war soon followed. The Third Hague Convention of 1907 established a legal procedure for the declaration of war, and the Bryan Treaties, first proposed by the American Secretary of State William Bryan in 1913, refined this procedure by requiring compulsory arbitration and a mandatory one-year cooling-off period to avert immediate recourse to arms. However, these developments did nothing to challenge the presumption of the legality of aggressive war. It was in the following thirty years that this presumption finally collapsed, and jus ad bellum was thereby transformed into jus contra bellum. The change was swift. In 1919, at the Paris Peace Confer-

ence, the possibility of criminalizing aggressive war was contemplated by the supreme executives of the four great powers for the first time in the history of the modern states system. In 1920, the Covenant of the League of Nations imposed further restrictions on the right of war. In 1928, the Kellogg–Briand Pact placed the right of war beyond the legal capacity of states. The criminalization of aggressive war marked the culmination of this progression, but dating this last step is no easy task.

Two rival answers to the question of the temporal origins of the criminalization of war permeate the scholarly literature: at the London Conference on Military Trials in 1945 or at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in Kampala, sixty-five years later. In this paper, I attempt to adjudicate between these competing views. This problem is more difficult than it may at first appear, for the opposition between the two views conceals a troubling anomaly in the historical record. Both answers enjoy limited empirical corroboration, but neither can satisfactorily account for those pieces of evidence upon which the other draws for primary support. Furthermore, because the two answers are proposed as mutually exclusive alternatives, the issue of mixed empirical support implies that neither answer can be true. This anomaly has not yet received adequate attention in the scholarly literature, and it is the primary purpose of this paper to explore it at length.

The paper is divided into three core sections. The first section will outline the terms of the anomaly and examine the empirical evidence commonly adduced in support of the two rival positions. The second section will then propose one way of resolving the anomaly by showing that tracing the origins of the crime of aggressive war in a manner that is faithful to the seemingly incompatible aspects of the historical record, requires us to move beyond our conventional assumptions about the development of international norms. I will argue that the crime of aggressive war was, indeed, born in 1945, but that it was not until 2010 that it finally became what, on these conventional assumptions, we could recognize as a fully realized norm. The third section will then explore, in a preliminary and suggestive manner, some of the possible causes responsible for putting the crime of aggressive war on such a heterodox path of development. Causal explanation is not the primary goal of this paper, and I will not seek to provide a definitive explanation of these unusual circumstances. My intention is merely to paint a brief historical sketch that may aid the reader in better grasping the anomaly and facilitate subsequent research on this question.

I

Two rival views on the origins of the crime of aggressive war prevail in the scholarly literature. The first view espouses what we may term the conventional narrative: namely, that the crime of aggressive war was born in the summer of 1945, and that the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg was the certificate of its birth. Yoram Dinstein articulates this view in his classic work *War, Aggression, and Self-Defense*: "the criminalization of aggressive war in a treaty in force was attained only in the aftermath of World War II, upon the conclusion of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to an Agreement done in London in 1945."[6] Cornelis Pompe similarly honours the Agreement as "the first international penal charter,"[7] while Hans Kelsen concurs that "the rules created by this Treaty and applied by the Nuremberg tribunal, but not created by it, represent certainly a new law, especially by establishing individual criminal responsibility for violations of rules of international law prohibiting resort to war."[8] This is the prevalent view in the fields of international history, political science and international criminal law.[9] It also embodies the aspiration of those observers of the Nuremberg Trials who saw in them an opportunity to deliver international relations from the perils of ruinous interstate rivalries and atavistic militarism into the security of enlightened supranationalism.[10]

Opposed to this narrative, we find the revisionist view that the London Charter and the Nuremberg Trials were nothing more than aberrant measures designed by the victorious powers to punish their defeated foes—certainly not harbingers of transformative and reciprocally binding legal principles. As Kirsten Sellars puts it, for example, "[the] experiment with crimes against peace proved to be an historical anomaly, born of the peculiar circumstances of the closing phase of the Second World War."[11] Gerry Simpson strikes a similar chord: "crimes against peace are controversial precisely because the use of force in international relations *remains a sovereign prerogative* that sovereigns are understandably unwilling to entirely disavow."[12] On this view, it was not until the Review Conference in Kampala, nearly sixty-five years later, that the international community transformed the launching of aggressive war from a merely unlawful act into a criminal act. As William Schabas put it, writing in 2005, "it should seem obvious enough that ongoing work aimed at plugging the hole in the Rome Statute is to a large extent an exercise in the progressive development of international law, rather than in its codification, one of *lex feranda* rather than *lex lata*."[13] In recent

years, the revisionist view has gained considerable attention in the study of international criminal law but has yet to percolate into related fields.

For the purposes of this paper, the disagreement between these two points of view is less interesting for its scholastic value than for an anomalous discrepancy in the historical record which it reveals. The conventional and revisionist narratives are formulated as incompatible alternatives and must, therefore, draw on incompatible pieces of evidence for empirical confirmation. The difficulty is that, on this particular matter, the historical record appears to point in two contradictory directions simultaneously. Both narratives enjoy limited empirical corroboration, but neither can plausibly account for those pieces of evidence upon which the rival narrative draws for support. While the historical record corroborates the conventional narrative by allowing us to identify the London Charter as the instrument of criminalization with reasonable confidence, it also undercuts that narrative by failing to reveal any meaningful antecedents or repercussions of criminalization in that earlier historical period. However, if we accept this absence of observable implications as evidence against the conventional narrative and choose, instead, to trace the criminalization to the Review Conference in Kampala, our position is similarly weakened by the existence of positive evidence which points to the summer of 1945 as the date of criminalization. Neither the conventional nor the revisionist narrative affords us an adequate grasp of the totality of the relevant portions of the historical record. Furthermore, because the two narratives claim exclusive validity and, therefore, cannot be true simultaneously, the premise of mixed empirical support necessarily means that neither narrative is true on its own terms. This is what we may call, for ease of reference, the paradox of the origins of the crime of aggressive war or, more simply still, the radical paradox.

Let us flesh out the terms of this paradox in greater length. Consider, first, the evidence in favour of the revisionist narrative. If we suppose, *ad arguendo*, that the London Charter was the instrument of criminalization, then we should expect to find significant changes in the rhetoric and conduct of states consistent with that transformation in that historical period. Indeed, even slight changes in norms regulating recourse to war can produce reverberations reaching far beyond the domain of war. This is because, in relations among states, as among individuals bereft of effectual governance, the possibility of war remains a necessary consequence of their anarchic condition.[14] For Joseph de Maistre, it was an axiom of history that "war is, in a certain sense, the habitual state of mankind, which is to say that human blood must flow without interruption somewhere or other on the globe, and that for every nation, peace is only a respite."[15] While the macabre implications of Maistre's view can

be disputed, his emphasis on the ubiquity of war remains, regrettably, beyond reproach. It is precisely due to this ubiquity that norms governing recourse to war as an instrument of political power are commonly thought to exert profound influence on the broad contours of the entire institutional edifice of the international community.[16] In any case, the criminalization of aggressive war can hardly be dismissed as a minor transformation. Whether it occurred in 1945 or 2010, it not only reaffirmed that states no longer possessed an unrestricted *compétence de guerre*, that ultimate and jealously guarded prerogative of sovereign power, but, further, exposed rulers to the possibility of criminal punishment for violations of this prohibition.[17] However, searching for observable implications of the criminalization on the assumption that it occurred in 1945 yields few meaningful findings. Three points merit notice in this regard.

First, the extraordinary selectivity displayed by the victorious powers in drafting the arraignment article at the London Conference, tailoring it to the wrongs of their defeated foes and, thus, exculpating their own inequities by the mere fact of its definitional narrowness, was already a telling indication that no meaningful effort would be undertaken subsequently to transform this legal innovation into a general rule of conduct. Article Six of the London Charter expressly restricted the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal to the subjects of the European Axis powers, while the adopted definition of crimes against peace restricted the Tribunal's focus still further, as Simpson rightly notes, to instances of premeditated aggression mounted by "a state captured by a vicious cabal of conspirators intent on regional or global domination."[18] Schabas's uncompromising assessment of the hypocritical uses to which the Allied powers put the related concept of crimes against humanity reaches a similar conclusion: "[it] was a careful, cynical choice intended to insulate the four 'great' powers from criminal liability for the racist, colonialist, and repressive policies of their own regimes."[19] Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that the San Francisco Conference on International Organization, which concluded shortly before the signing of the London Charter, considered and quietly discarded the possibility of treating the launching of aggressive war as a criminal rather than merely an unlawful act.[20]

In the course of negotiations in London, Robert Jackson, head of the US delegation, expended considerable effort to prove, against the opposition of his Soviet counterpart, General Iona Nikitchenko, that the criminality of aggressive war ought to be construed as a general principle of conduct. He justly observed:

> I should think that our definition would sound pretty partial if we are defining an act as a crime only when it is carried out by the Axis powers. That is what I have in mind: If it is a good rule of conduct, it should bind us all, and if not, we should not invoke it at this trial. It sounds very partial to me, and I think we would get great criticism from it.[21]

It is a subtle irony that the final formulation of the arraignment clause, in its restrictive application to the European Axis powers, as well as the rejection of the principle of the criminality of aggressive war at San Francisco altogether obscured this admonition, reaffirming, instead, that in world politics, "the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel."[22]

Second, war did not wither away in the wake of 1945, and state leaders have since shown little fear of criminal prosecution in commencing wars of aggression; nor, for that matter, have their enemies proved alacritous to threaten them with such prosecution.[23] The new norm remained very much confined to the margins of practical politics in the wake of the Second World War, exercising no measurable influence over the conduct of states and, until the end of the Cold War, subsisting largely in the writings of jurists and historians. As Jonathan Bush notes, "throughout the period, the potential applicability of the criminal law to interstate aggression plainly had no relevance in the outside world."[24] To be sure, civil activists undertook several attempts to hold political leaders accountable by drawing on the discourse of crimes against peace, of which the Russell–Sartre Tribunal on the intervention of the United States in the Vietnamese Civil War was, perhaps, the most notable.[25] However, such attempts at discursive entrapment proved few in number and, ultimately, ineffectual in their cumulative effect on the conduct of high politics.[26] In the capitals of the great powers, the scathing attitude to the very suggestion that their prerogative to wield the sword in defence of vital national interests could, even in principle, be subject to supranational oversight, was succinctly articulated by the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson: "law simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power—power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty."[27] It is difficult to imagine a more truculent rebuke of the very concept of *jus contra bellum*.

Third, the criminalization was preceded by a startling absence of domestic and international negotiations regarding the political desirability and costs of creating the new norm. Instead, the topic remained firmly within the purview of legal committees and conferences organized by the victorious powers to settle the narrow question of war crimes.[28] It is difficult to explain how such a radical norm could have developed

without, at the very least, due calculations of its expected utility by the great powers. To be sure, norms can develop in the absence of deliberate planning, but it strains credulity to suppose that powerful states would have proved willing to relinquish what they then saw as their supreme prerogative to the haphazard whim of custom and unintended consequences. It is far more reasonable to conclude that the victorious powers admitted the criminality of aggressive war for the sole purpose of punishing defeated enemy leaders and officials but did not earnestly contemplate extending its applicability more broadly. The cumulative effect of these three observations is uncompromising. Supposing that aggressive war was criminalised in 1945 draws us seemingly inexorably to the conclusion that what was one of the greatest transformative moments in the history of the modern states system appeared to have left few immediate impressions on the dynamics of that system.

The striking lack of observable implications of the criminalization in that historical period certainly lends support to the revisionist narrative and may even incline us to the conclusion that aggressive war did not become a crime until 2010. This conclusion, though tempting, would be injudiciously precipitate, since considerable positive evidence exists confirming the London Charter as the instrument of criminalization. To begin with, it was the London Charter that introduced the concept of crimes against peace into the lexicon of international law—not the Paris Peace Treaty of 1919, the Kellogg–Briand Pact of 1928, or the Kampala Amendment. Furthermore, the London Charter *is* widely acknowledged as the instrument of criminalization in international practice. We find this genetic attribution in Resolutions 95 and 177 of the General Assembly of the United Nations as well as in the national statutes and military codes of some of the great powers.[29] For example, the US Department of Defence revised its Field Manual on land warfare in 1956 to acknowledge the criminality of aggressive war.[30] Ian Brownlie argues that such widespread adherence indicates acceptance of "the Nuremberg Charter as a source of general international law."[31]

Perhaps the most convincing piece of evidence confirming the London Charter as the instrument of criminalization can be found in longitudinal changes in patterns of public discourse. Before 1945, proposals to criminalize aggressive war were widely viewed as quixotic and impractical. The justificatory burden lay with proponents of criminalization, and it was incumbent upon *them* to demonstrate the unacceptability of a permissive *jus ad bellum*. Consider, for example, the protracted exchange that took place between US Secretary of State Robert Lansing and the French jurist Ferdinand Larnaude, both delegates to the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Pen-

alties to the Paris Peace Conference, over the course of the plenary sessions in the spring of 1919. Larnaude, adamant to punish the ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II for initiating the First World War, insisted that "the premeditated, carefully prepared commencement of hostilities" be recognized by the Commission as an international crime.[32] Lansing objected, remarking that while states had "no moral right" to wage "a wanton war,"[33] existing law admitted *compétence de guerre* as an unrestricted sovereign prerogative: "the essence of sovereignty [is] the absence of responsibility."[34] When Larnaude contended that "the legality of a premeditated war should not be admitted,"[35] Lansing sternly rebuked him, making liberal use of the established legal axiom:

> The Commission should not stagger at *the truth*. A new doctrine advocated by a very few men should not be permitted to change *the standing rule of the world* [...] [A] war of aggression ought to be declared to be a crime against international law but this had never been done and the paragraph should therefore stand as drafted.[36]

Larnaude eventually conceded that "the right of going to war was admitted,"[37] but insisted that the article of arraignment be preserved to "emphasise the new sensibility of mankind" regarding the moral unacceptability of aggressive wars.[38] Lansing summarily dismissed his appeal: "the Commission should not let public opinion enter the question at all."[39] Established presumptions are difficult to overturn, and it is remarkable how easily Lansing was able to extinguish the force of Larnaude's proposal by exposing its inconsistency with accepted legal premises.

This discursive situation remained almost entirely unchanged until the final years of the Second World War. When, in 1944, the British Attorney General, Sir Donald Somervell, reasoned that the launching of aggressive war "is not a war crime or a crime in any legal sense," he was merely expressing what was still, even at that late date, a common and uncontroversial view.[40] That view found an eloquent formulation in *War Criminals: Their Prosecution and Punishment*, a popular work published by the Harvard criminologist Sheldon Glueck in 1944. In the book, Glueck proposed an international tribunal to be instituted by the Allied powers at the end of the war in order to try enemy leaders for their crimes. After a cursory enumeration of possible charges over which the proposed tribunal would possess jurisdiction, Glueck expressly refused to treat the launching of aggressive war as a criminal act. His proposed programme, Glueck emphasized,

> is not intended to include the "crime" of flagrantly violating solemn treaty obligations or conducting a war of aggression [...] [To] prosecute Axis leaders

> for the crime of having initiated an unjust war, or having violated the 'sanctity of treaties,' would only drag a red herring across the trail and confuse the much clearer principle of liability for atrocities committed during the conduct of a war, be it a just or an unjust one.[41]

Even as late as 1944, Glueck's position accorded well with those of most other scholars and practitioners.

However, the justificatory burden shifted entirely onto the opponents of criminalization in the wake of the London negotiations. As Bush puts it,

> It is notable how many mouths gave lip-service to the Nuremberg charge of aggressive war. Outside of Germany and Japan, the only public opposition to the criminality of aggressive war seemed to come from lawyers working for the clemency of convicted Germans [...] Everywhere else, there was only automatic endorsement of "Nuremberg" in general and the criminality of aggressive war in particular.[42]

The case of Glueck is particularly instructive in this regard. Having explicitly rejected the criminality of aggressive war in *War Criminals*, he then reached the opposite conclusion in *The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War*, published only two years later: "[During] the present century a widespread custom has developed among civilized States to enter into agreements expressive of their solemn conviction that unjustified war is so dangerous a threat to the survival of mankind and mankind's law that it must be branded and treated as criminal."[43] Although the change in Glueck's position was probably largely an artefact of the work that he performed for the US prosecutorial team at Nuremberg, it was, nevertheless, representative of a broader and equally rapid transformation in public discourse. Jackson, in his reflections on the political impact of the Trials, neatly captured the magnitude of that change: "[no] one can hereafter deny or fail to know that the principles on which the Nazi leaders are adjudged to forfeit their lives constitute law—law with a sanction."[44] If the revisionist narrative were correct, we would not expect such an immense and rapid change in patterns of public discourse to coincide so neatly with the signing of the London Charter. After all, a mere manifest of victors' justice can hardly be expected to accomplish such a transformation.

When was the crime of aggressive war born then? Considerable evidence exists to support both the conventional and revisionist narratives, entangling extant chronologies of the crime's origins into the radical paradox. This is a crucial point which has not yet received adequate attention in the scholarly literature. Researchers investigating the

criminalization have proven content to overlook the anomalous inconsistencies in the historical record and provide evidence corroborating only their preferred narrative. It may even appear tempting to dismiss the radical paradox as a conceptual problem produced by absence of adequate empirical evidence rather than a genuine historical anomaly. Could we not resolve the paradox by procuring more data in support of one or the other narrative? I do not believe that we could, and it bears emphasis that this suggestion fundamentally misunderstands the character of our present difficulties. Even if it proves possible to accumulate a preponderance of evidence in support of one narrative against the other, such an imbalance would not in the slightest diminish the strength of the paradox as long as some evidence remains to support the weaker narrative. Because the conventional and revisionist narratives are formulated in exclusive terms, neither can be accounted true so long as there remain anomalous facts in the historical record that cannot plausibly be subsumed within its chronological ambit.

The radical paradox results from this surprising fact that the historical record favours both the conventional and revisionist narrative, a fact that common sense stubbornly demurs to accept on grounds of their logical incompatibility. Common sense does not brook the possibility that the crime of aggressive war could have emerged multiple times in one century, unless we further suppose that the two births were separated by a temporary death—a possibility expressly contradicted by the evidence for the conventional narrative. Common sense demands singularity of origin. Unfortunately, history has not proven obliging in meeting this demand. It points us in two contradictory directions at once, directing our gaze first to London and then to Kampala, and, thus, frustrates our attempts to pinpoint the origins of the crime of aggressive war to a single temporal location. Confronted by the obduracy of empirical evidence, however, we would do well to ask whether it is not our common sense that is at fault. After all, historical anomalies are not objective givens but merely discrepancies between empirical evidence and established theoretical expectations.

In the following section, I propose to outline a tentative solution to the radical paradox by framing it as a theoretical problem and demonstrating how unspoken theoretical assumptions undergirding the conventional and revisionist narratives are directly responsible for its production. We will begin by establishing the more general point that it is insensible to consider the emergence and evolution of norms in an abstract manner detached from prior theoretical considerations.

II

Tracing a norm's origins, development, acceptance or decay is an empirical exercise guided by the steady hand of theory.[45] For it is theory which delineates the ceaseless stream of political behaviour into these conceptual categories in the first place, specifying, for example, exactly when a norm can be said to have emerged, how a norm evolves, or what it means for a norm to develop until it reaches the point of acceptance. Consider, for example, the question of evolution. Drawing on the burgeoning literature on international norms, we can expect the evolutionary trajectory of most norms to follow one of two well-trodden paths.[46] Some are products of human design—they are sculpted by visionary entrepreneurs in response to the exigencies of social need or opportunities for personal advantage and, with the sustained assistance of powerful groups, they gradually penetrate and become assimilated into the very fabric of international conduct.[47] Others are products of human action undertaken in the service of custom rather than deliberate foresight. These latter norms evolve "more casually and more imperfectly," to borrow David Hume's incisive formulation, as chance contributes its even share to their eventual constitution.[48] Now, the notions at the heart of these complimentary heuristics—norm entrepreneurs, penetration and assimilation, and unintended consequences—are essentially theoretical categories. They empower us to venture beyond our immediate sensory environment to experience and apprehend a political universe rich in intangibles, but they also limit us in our engagement with that universe to particular, often quite narrow, domains.[49]

The choice of theoretical framework for the analysis of a particular empirical problem ought to be governed by the pragmatic considerations of suitability and utility.[5o] After all, theories that either tortuously twist evidence to make elementary sense of it, or purchase little explanatory power at the price of exorbitant simplifications, can hardly be considered appropriate. Instead, scholars should strive to attain a reflective equilibrium between the explanatory possibilities afforded by available evidence, on the one hand, and the explanatory focus of their chosen theoretical framework, on the other.[51] This point commands crucial importance, since even ostensibly descriptive statements about the evolution of international norms are laden with unspoken theoretical assumptions. Unconscious attachment to such assumptions, perhaps owing to unreflective deference to academic convention, can contribute to perilous distortions of the historical record whenever the pragmatic criteria of suitability and utility are violated.

Returning to the case of the criminalization of aggressive war, it is precisely such attachment to what we may term the assumptions of non-monotonicity and bivalence that entangles the conventional and revisionist narratives into the radical paradox.[52] On the non-monotonic view, states are assumed to be consistent in their normative commitments and, furthermore, they are assumed to maintain that consistency by summarily repudiating older norms clashing with their new commitments. Bivalence encourages scholars to think of the development of norms in terms of crisp thresholds of acceptance. On this second assumption, the existence of a norm at any given point in time is conceptualized as an elementary binary category—it is either accepted by the relevant political community or it is not. In effect, bivalence assumes that the development of a norm can be conceptualized as a unidimensional process in which a gestating norm must first accumulate sufficient support before it reaches a specified threshold and can then considered accepted by the community. The combination of non-monotonicity and bivalence restricts the range of admissible trajectories of a norm's development to cosmetic variations on the familiar scenario of rival norms succeeding each other in gradual temporal succession, of which at most one is recognized as accepted by the community at any one point in time. This scenario may well afford an appropriate heuristic for the study of some historical questions, but it is not uniformly applicable.[53]

Non-monotonicity excludes the possibility of what may be viewed as politically haphazard or schizophrenic behaviour in which a state, or, possibly, a group of states, upholds two or more seemingly inconsistent norms at the same time. For example, a state may simultaneously commit itself to inconsistent norms if its leadership finds it possible to assign different functions to those norms and, in thus insulating their mutually contradictory effects, extinguish much of the tension between them. Alternatively, an inconsistent normative posture may be the product of two or more national bureaucracies devising conflicting solutions for organizing co-operation with foreign partners. Bivalence excludes the possibility that a norm can be realized only partially, that it may enjoy some, but not all, of the effects commonly associated with inveterate norms, and that, therefore, its progress cannot be assessed on a unidimensional scale with a crisp cut-off. For example, a norm may be favoured by vocal national constituencies that, although not sufficiently powerful to ensure its acceptance at the national level, can at least restrain their government from committing itself to the opposite normative principle. Or a norm may be entrenched in the bureaucratic procedures and legal codes of the very same states that refuse to endorse it publicly in international forums.[54] These examples are not intended to exhaust

the range of complexity revealed by rejection of non-monotonicity and bivalence. They are meant only to convey the point that some meaningful historical scenarios are not captured, and some even distorted, by theoretical frameworks that rely on these assumptions.

In the case of the criminalization of aggressive war, it is precisely non-monotonicity and bivalence that stymie our efforts to date the crime's origins by generating misleading theoretical expectations which are unwarranted by the empirical parameters of this particular historical problem. Upon relinquishing these assumptions, it is possible to acknowledge that, in a certain important sense, the crime *was* created in 1945. Witness its enmeshment in the bureaucratic procedures and legal codes of some states and the United Nations during the first decade of the Cold War, or the remarkable fact that almost no national political leader has openly contested the criminality of aggressive war since the Nuremberg Trials. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that the San Francisco Conference on International Organization expressly refused to incorporate the principle of the criminality of aggressive war into the Charter of the United Nations and, instead, reaffirmed the weaker norm of the prohibition of aggressive war as the organizing principle of the post-war world order. That fateful decision strongly shaped the subsequent impression that the doctrine of the criminality of aggressive war, enshrined in the Nuremberg Principles yet bereft of meaningful foundation in customary law, was, at best, an optional adjunct to the far more minimalist system of *jus contra bellum* developed in the Charter of the United Nations. It was only sixty-five years later that most states finally mustered the political will to commit themselves to the construction of a supranational infrastructure that, at last, institutionalized the formerly nebulous rule of criminality in a concrete political setting.

This is a complicated historical narrative that does not fit well in the conventional mould of non-monotonicity and bivalence. However, the proper conclusion to be drawn from this lack of fit is not that the crime of aggressive war was not born in 1945 but, rather, that our theoretical assumptions are inadequate for comprehending the unusual circumstances of its birth in their entirety. This conclusion effectively dissipates the historical anomaly at the heart of the radical paradox. By illuminating a developmental trajectory passing between the Scylla of non-monotonicity and the Charybdis of bivalence, it emancipates us from the imperative to consider the conventional and revisionist narratives as mutually exclusive possibilities. We are left at liberty to acknowledge that the crime of aggressive war was, indeed, born in 1945 and became a fully realized norm within the next decade, at least along the dimensions of bureaucratic and legal enmeshment. After all, it was the Lon-

don Charter that introduced the criminality of aggressive war into the lexicon of international practice and established the precedent for subsequent engagements with the concept of crimes against peace. That first experiment was certainly imperfect, and we cannot overlook the pivotal role played by the realpolitik ingredients of cynicism and hypocrisy in making it possible. Nevertheless, it bears emphasis that such imperfections do not detract from the authenticity of the legal transformation ushered in by the London Charter. Of course, the new criminal rule had to await Kampala to become what, on a strictly non-monotonic and bivalent view, we may recognize as a fully realized norm. But this means only that, until that time, the crime of aggressive war endured a twilight existence. For those sixty-five years, it was, in the words of T. S. Eliot, "neither living nor dead"—a victim of the political convenience of the victorious powers whose collusion in London effectively condemned it to straddle the line between political oblivion and fully-fledged acceptance for decades.[55]

III

Throughout our discussion in the previous section, we assumed that the heterodox developmental trajectory of the crime of aggressive war was, in part, the result of political compromises reached in London. In this section, I should like to suggest some preliminary reasons in defence of this assumption. It may be objected that it would be more plausible to consider that heterodox path an unintended consequence of contradictory bureaucratic choices made by the Allied Powers in the course of the Second World War. In the United States, for example, the tasks of punishing war criminals and designing the post-war international order were assigned to the Department of Defence and the Department of State, respectively. Working within this bifurcation, norm entrepreneurs favouring the criminalization of aggressive war, such as William C. Chanler, John J. McCloy, Edward Bernays, Robert Jackson, and, most notably, Secretary of War Henry Stimson were able to establish the principle of the criminality as a cornerstone of the American war crimes programme.[56] The Department of State adopted a different normative approach. Initial plans for the reconstruction of the international order after the war were proposed by the Informal Political Agenda Group, which consisted of Cordell Hull, then Secretary of State, Leo Pasvolsky, Isaiah Bowman, Sumner Welles, Norman Davis and Morton Taylor, in December 1943. Hull, weary of the refusal of the Senate to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations because it appeared to threaten its

ability to exercise its constitutional prerogatives, was careful to maintain a minimalist position on the illegality of aggressive war. Predictably, the Informal Political Agenda Group did not consider the question of the criminality of aggressive war, nor was it added to the Department of State's programme at a later date.[57] Could we not conclude that such bureaucratic bifurcation is already a sufficient explanation for the inconsistent posture assumed by the United States, at least, in promoting the criminalization of aggressive war in London while quietly discarding that very same principle in San Francisco?

The logic of bureaucratic bifurcation certainly provides a partial explanation for the unusual circumstances of the birth of the crime of aggressive war, but we must keep in mind that those circumstances were also the direct consequence of strategic collusion by the victorious powers, especially the Soviet Union and the United States. After all, the conduct of negotiations in London was closely supervised by the highest executive authorities of the Allied Powers, and the question of whether the launching of aggressive war could be treated as an international crime was one of the most significant and enduring points of contention between the delegations.[58] The political significance of this question was simply too great—few remained blind to the fact that the outcome of the negotiations was bound to send shockwaves reaching far beyond the narrow issue of war crimes—for those leaders opposed to the criminalization of aggressive war to consign the outcome of the negotiations to the rhetorical skill of their representatives. As we shall see in a moment, this was especially true of Joseph Stalin, who personally monitored the negotiations and issued direct orders to Nikitchenko to reject any proposed formulation of the legal charges which could be construed as an endorsement of the criminality of aggressive war in general terms.

Indeed, throughout the negotiations, the Soviet delegation insisted on restricting the scope of the proposed charge to attempts at "aggression against or domination over other nations carried out by the European Axis in violation of the principles of international law and treaties."[59] This insistence faced vigorous opposition from Jackson, who, as we have already seen, refused to treat the criminality of aggressive war as anything other than a reciprocally binding principle enjoying general applicability: "[i]f certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against ourselves."[60] But that is precisely what the Soviets opposed. They saw the London Conference as a vehicle for institutionalizing a set of legal principles on the basis of which enemy leaders could be indicted, not as a

forum for laying the normative foundations of the post-war international order.[61]

Bureaucratic bifurcation alone was not sufficient to allay the worry of the Soviet leadership that the London Conference would not be used to criminalize the launching of aggressive war through the backdoor. This point is lucidly conveyed in a confidential telegram sent by Vyacheslav Molotov, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, to Stalin on July 25, 1945. Broaching the matter of Jackson's position on the legal status of aggressive war, Molotov noted:

> We believe that these unduly vague formulations make it possible to proscribe as international crimes military operations conducted in self-defence against aggression. As we know, in the course of the last war, our and Anglo-American troops invaded Germany, but that act cannot, from any reasonable point of view, be described as an international crime. *We believe that it would be possible to accept these formulations only on the condition that they are amended to specify expressly that they apply only to instances of fascist aggression.*[62]

Later that day, Stalin received another confidential telegram on this matter from Andrey Vyshinsky, former Procurator General of the Soviet Union. Vyshinsky reported that, with respect to Jackson's insistence on treating the launching of aggressive war as an international crime, "we have given our delegation express orders to reject" his position. Stalin's approval of Vyshinsky's order is recorded in the margins of the telegram, in pencil.[63]

It would be erroneous to conclude that this reluctance to endorse the criminality of aggressive war in general terms was driven solely by the cynical egotism of a totalitarian dictator who was himself responsible for authorizing the Soviet invasions of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland in 1939. In 1945, the sheer novelty and far-reaching implications of the criminalization project, both in terms of implied sovereignty and uncertainty costs, meant that few policymakers, whether in the Soviet Union or elsewhere, were willing to consider it earnestly, even under the narrow rubric of war crimes. In this regard, the intellectual ancestry of proposals to criminalize the launching of aggressive war is quite brief and sparse, dating merely to the first decades of the twentieth century.[64] After all, in the years before the First World War, international law did not restrict states in their ability to exercise the right of war, and such licentiousness was sure to leave an indelible imprint on the institutional imaginations of contemporary thinkers and policymakers.[65] The criminalization of aggressive war had only been attempted once before, in 1919, and, at that, in such a haphazard manner that the still-born endeavour left the criminalization project largely discredited as a hope-

lessly quixotic design.[66] A few telling examples drawn from the foreign policy circles of Britain and the United States may help to illustrate the point.

In 1944, the United Nations War Crimes Commission launched an enquiry into the question of whether the launching of aggressive war constituted an international crime. One of the Commission's most prominent members, Bohuslav Ečer of Czechoslovakia, had previously answered this question in the affirmative in his report to the London International Assembly.[67] Ečer defended these conclusions before the Commission and his minority report "On Whether the Preparation and Launching of the Present War can be Considered a 'War Crime'" secured the support of the Commission's chairman, Lord Robert Wright.[68] Seeking clarification of the position of his government on this question, Sir Cecil Hurst immediately cabled London for instructions. Frank Roberts of the Foreign Office, in his brief response to Hurst, showed little patience for what he saw as Ečer's legalistic adventurism. The Moscow Declaration of 1943 already provided for the trial of enemy leaders, Roberts reasoned. "[As] these criminals will include those who planned and launched the war, it would seem unnecessary to enlarge the conception of 'war crimes' in a way which at any rate *involves the probability of political and legal controversy*," the telegram concluded tersely.[69] Upon learning of Hurst's enquiry, Sir William Malkin, Roberts' superior, dismissed the whole matter as "a frightful waste of time" and a mere "outburst of dialectics."[70]

Sir Arnold McNair, whose dogmatic opposition to Ečer on the Commission effectively dead-locked further discussion of the matter by that body, similarly noted: "however desirable it may be *de lege feranda* to take steps which will enable Governments in future to punish the procuring [*sic*] of aggressive war as a criminal act—I do not consider that *de lege lata* a judge would hold that the effect of the [Kellogg–Briand] Pact was to make it a criminal act."[71] The same conclusion was reached by the US Office of the Judge Advocate General in a draft paper entitled "Is the Preparation and Launching of the Present War a War Crime?," published on December 18, 1944.[72] In sum, even as late as 1944, the institutional imaginations of Allied policymakers remained too heavily constrained by the operational presumptions of the permissive *jus ad bellum* which had existed before 1914, for them to contemplate, quite apart from prior strategic misgivings, the possibility, let alone desirability, of a supranational criminal jurisdiction over matters of war and peace.[73]

Returning to the negotiations in London, we can now assess the role that strategic co-ordination by the victorious powers played in putting the principle of the criminality of aggressive war on such a hetero-

dox trajectory of development. Recall that the Soviet delegation did not oppose—indeed, it expressly endorsed—treating aggressive war as an international crime within the rubric of war crimes. It was Jackson's attempt to extend the new criminal rule beyond the confines of this rubric and transform it into a universal rule that occasioned the incessant objections of the Soviet delegation. The final formulation of the charges that we find in Article Six of the London Charter clearly reflects the concerns and preferences of the Soviet delegation. Although it is not clear what prompted Jackson to acquiesce in such a compromise after days of obdurate disagreement, it is surely telling that his acquiescence followed immediately in the wake of Stalin's and President Harry Truman's negotiations in Potsdam, which concluded on August 2, 1945. Available records of their discussions contain only brief mentions of the London Conference.[74] However, in light of the fact that Stalin personally monitored the negotiations in London, it is not implausible to suppose that Truman offered him assurances that Jackson's position did not reflect a tacit commitment on the part of the United States to establishing the criminality of aggressive war as a general and reciprocally binding rule of conduct. It is possible that the two leaders agreed to endorse this new principle within the narrow rubric of war crimes on the supposition that doing so would not constitute a general endorsement of it, fully aware that the San Francisco Conference on International Organization had already rejected it.

IV

I began this enquiry into the temporal origins of the crime of aggressive war by surveying two prevalent responses to this question. These responses, which I termed the conventional and revisionist narratives of the crime's origins, are often formulated as incompatible alternatives. Throughout the paper, my primary purpose has been to problematize this dichotomy, to show that both narratives can contribute to our understanding of the crime's origins, and to expose the perils of formulating them in such starkly exclusive terms. The historical record provides limited empirical corroboration for both narratives. Thus, rigid attachment to the exclusivist view that only one of them can be true necessarily implies that neither is true. This is the essence of what we have termed the radical paradox, which, as I have sought to demonstrate, is not an immanent artefact of the historical record but, rather, of an incongruity between that record, on the one hand, and the assumptions of non-monotonicity and bivalence undergirding the exclusivist view of the two

narratives, on the other. Rejecting these assumptions empowers us to strike a theoretical compromise that can faithfully accommodate what previously appeared to be glaring anomalies in the historical record. The consequent realization that the crime of aggressive war was, indeed, born in 1945, but that it was not until 2010 that it finally became what, on these assumptions, we could recognize as a fully realized norm, effectively dissipated the radical paradox.

Exploring this paradox was the central purpose of the present paper. A broader, complimentary purpose has been to offer a general introduction to the subject, much neglected in political studies, of the changing legal character of war. Few empirical studies venture beyond crude caricatures of the chronology of *jus ad bellum*, while prominent theoretical surveys ignore it altogether by conceptualizing war in ahistorical terms as nothing more than the breakdown of 'normal' politics. Such neglect certainly is surprising. At least for students of structural realism, institutionalism, and certain other rationalist approaches, the unspoken assumption appears to be that changes in the legal character of war are simply epiphenomenal to their primary quantities of interest—incidence and effects of wars. The continued neglect of this subject by scholars of the English School, who have otherwise shown great interest in tracing the historical changes of the fundamental institutions of the international society, is more difficult to explain. If this paper does nothing more than bring some of the fascinating prospects offered by this neglected line of enquiry to the attention of these and other scholars, it will have succeeded. ■

Notes

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[2] Cited in Yoram Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defense* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 128 (emphasis added).

[3] Stefan Glaser, "The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and New Principles of International Law," in *Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial*, ed. Guénaël Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 67.

[4] An excellent illustration of this fact can be glimpsed from a relevant provision in the US War Department Field Manual approved by the US Chief of Staff on April

25, 1914. The manual unequivocally pronounces that "the law of nations allows every sovereign Government to make war upon another sovereign State" (US War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, *Rules of Land Warfare* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1914)): 25. For a general overview of the evolution of *jus ad bellum* in the modern states system, see Ian Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); Dinstein, *War, Aggression, and Self-Defense*, 65–133; Cornelis Pompe, *Aggressive War: an International Crime* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1953); or Page Wilson, *Aggression, Crime and International Security: Moral, Political, and Legal Dimensions of International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2009).

[5] I borrow the term "pacificism" from Martin Ceadel, *The Origins of War Prevention: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1730-1854* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[6] Dinstein, *War, Aggression, and Self-Defense*, 126.

[7] Pompe, *Aggressive War*, 192.

[8] Hans Kelsen, "Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law?", in *Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial*, ed. Guénaël Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 275.

[9] This was also the view of Ian Brownlie, of course; see Brownlie, *International Law*, 188–94. An early critique of this view can be found in Georg Schwarzenberger, "The Judgment of Nuremberg," reproduced in *Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial*, ed. Guénaël Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 178.

[10] Eugene C. Gerhart, *America's Advocate: Robert H. Jackson* (New York: Bobbs–Merrill Company, 1958): 307–31, 455–68; Robert H. Jackson, "Nuremberg in Retrospect: Legal Answer to International Lawlessness," reproduced in *Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial*, ed. Guénaël Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 354–71; and Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948): 584–91.

[11] Kirsten Sellars, *'Crimes against Peace' and International Law* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 259.

[12] Gerry J. Simpson, *Law, War and Crime: War Crimes Trials and the Reinvention of International Law* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007): 152 (emphasis added).

[13] William A. Schabas, "Origins of the Criminalization of Aggression: How Crimes Against Peace Became the 'Supreme International Crime'," in *The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression*, Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi, eds. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004): 19.

[14] The classic statement of this point can be found in Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): 86–90. Noel Malcolm's insightful *Aspects of Hobbes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004) offers a balanced interpretation of Hobbes's position. Most memorable recent restatements are probably Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946): 191–201 and Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010): 88–128.

[15] Joseph de Maistre, *Considerations on France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 23.

[16] Carl Schmitt famously operationalized this point in terms of the relationship between the underlying structure of the global nomos and the institution of war in that nomos (*The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum* (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2006): especially 140–68 and 259–80). This is also a central theme in his later work *Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political* (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007). For a statement of this point less laden with strong metaphysical assumptions, consider instead Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002): 178–93.

[17] For a general discussion of the concept of criminalization, see Nicola Lacey and Lucia Zedner, "Legal Constructions of Crime," in *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) or Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, *Principles of Criminology* (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1955): 8–13.

[18] Simpson, *Law, War and Crime*, 149.

[19] William A. Schabas, *Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War Crimes Tribunals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 5.

[20]United Nations War Crimes Commission, *History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948): 185–87.

[21] Robert H. Jackson, *Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945: A documentary record of negotiations of the Representatives of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Culminating in the Agreement and Charter of the International Military Tribunal* (Washington, DC: Division of Publications, US Department of State, 1949): 336.

[22] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972): 402.

[23] Jonathan A. Bush, "The Supreme Crime and Its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime of Aggressive War," in *Columbia Law Review* 102, no. 8 (2002): 2387–95, especially 2392; Simpson, Law, War and Crime, 144–47.

[24] Bush, "The Supreme Crime," 2392.

[25] *Ibid*, 2393.

[26] For a general discussion of the concept of 'discursive entrapment', see Andrew Hurrell, "Norms and Ethics in International Relations", in *Handbook of International Relations*, Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, eds. (London: Sage, 2002): 145.

[27]Cited in Elliott L. Meyrowitz, "What Does Law Have to Do with Nuclear Weapons?", in *Michigan State University–DCL Journal of International Law* 9, no. 1 (2000): 305.

28 Sellars, 'Crimes against Peace', 47–112; Arieh J. Kochavi, *Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998): especially 201–29; and Bradley F. Smith, *The Road to Nuremberg* (London: André Deutsch, 1981).

[29]For a general overview of these instruments, see Brownlie, *International Law*, 188–94 or Dinstein, *War, Aggression, and Self-Defense*, 129–30. For examples of bureaucratic enmeshment and legal internalization of the criminality of aggressive war in national rules and laws, see Brownlie, *International Law*, 187–88.

[30] Provision 498 of the Manual, under the heading "Crimes under International Law", reads: "Any person, whether a member of the armed forces or a civilian, who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment. Such offenses in connection with war comprise: a. Crimes against peace", US Department of the Army, *FM 27-10, Department of the Army Field Manual: The Law of Land Warfare* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1956): 178.

[31]Brownlie, *International Law*, 191.

[32] The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), FO 608/245, Document 3, 153.

[33] Ibid, 189.

[34] Ibid, 191.

[35] Ibid, 250.

[36] Ibid (emphasis added).

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid, 239.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Kochavi, *Prelude to Nuremberg*, 100.

[41] Sheldon Glueck, *War Criminals: Their Prosecution and Punishment* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944): 37–38.

[42] Bush, "The Supreme Crime," 2389.

[43] Sheldon Glueck, *The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946): 26.

[44] Cited in Kelsen, "Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial", 274.

[45] Cf. Adam R.C. Humphreys, "The Heuristic Application of Explanatory Theories in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 2 (2010): 259–65.

[46] For a general discussion of norm development, see James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989) or Antje Wiener, *The Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and International Encounters* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[47] For the classic statement of this view, see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.

[48] David Hume, *Essays, Moral, Political and Literary* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985): 39. This view prevails especially in the tradition of enlightened conservatism, of which Hume, Maistre and Edmund Burke are admirable exponents who require no introduction. A succinct statement of this view can be found in Friedrich Hayek, *Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967): 96–105.

[49] Cf. Norwood R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961): 271–84 and John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: Penguin, 1995): 1–58.

[50] Norwood R. Hanson, *Perception and Discovery: An Introduction to Scientific Inquiry* (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper and Co., 1970): 64.

[51] I borrow the concept of the 'reflective equilibrium' from John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971): 20.

[52] I believe these assumptions are implicit in mainstream models of norm development, such as Beth A. Simmons's functionalist theory of commitment, developed in *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 64–80; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink's theory of transnational advocacy networks in *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998): 10–16; Wayne Sandholtz's model of norm cycles, in "Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules Against Wartime Plunder," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (2008): 101–12; or Alexander Wendt's thesis of international cultures in *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 246–368. Richard M. Price's work on the chemical weapons taboo affords one notable exception to this trend (*The Chemical Weapons Taboo* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997): especially 8).

[53] I borrow this taxonomy from the study of formal logic, in which the term 'bivalence' denotes the metaphysical assumption that atomic propositions and well-formed formulae admit of two exclusive Boolean states, truth and falsehood. Bivalence is the cornerstone of classical logical systems, and its prevalence in the study of human reasoning is partly a reflection of its undeniable utility for the investigation of certain common empirical problems. However, reification of this assumption to the status of a metaphysical certainty can hamper our ability to reason about vague conceptual boundaries or dynamic systems that change in gradual increments. This point runs exactly parallel to our present discussion, and it may aid the reader in grasping the direction of my argument. The sorites paradox offers a useful example of an intuitively flawed syllogism whose invalidity is obscured by bivalence. Consider a finite heap of grains. Suppose that we remove one grain from the heap and observe that the heap is not appreciably diminished by this reduction. It is valid to conclude that a heap of grains is no less a heap for the loss of a single grain. However, this conclusion is no longer sustainable if we choose to iterate it recursively for as many times as there are grains in the heap, yielding the patently false conclusion that a heap is no less a heap for the loss of its final grain. As John Nolt puts it, "early in the sequence of inferences these premises lead to conclusions that are either wholly true or approximately true. But as they are used to draw conclusion after conclusion, the conclusions become less and less true so that by the end of the sequence we arrive at a conclusion that is wholly false" (*Logics* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1997): 421). In a certain sense, the paradox itself is entirely the product of a prior commitment to bivalence, which stipulates that every proposition is as true or false as any other and, so, occludes the possibility that consecutive applications of *modus ponens* can preserve truth only partially. Therefore, one way of solving the sorites paradox is to reject bivalence and allow for suitable gradations of truth. This strategy, implemented in infinite-valued logics, reconciles our intuitions and formal results by specifying that each recursive application of a sorites syllogism should diminish the truth of its conclusion by a corresponding margin. This solution is instructive as it reminds us that some conceptual problems are products not of objective givens but, rather, of the theoretical frameworks through which we perceive those givens.

[54] Andrew Hurrell denotes these possibilities "bureaucratic enmeshment" and "legal internalization", respectively, and they can be taken as evidence of a norm's acceptance in a given political society. See his "Norms and Ethics," 145–6.

[55] This particular line is taken from T. S. Eliot's enchanting poem *The Waste Land*, reproduced in *Selected Poems* (London: Faber and Faber, 2002): 42.

[56] Some of the most excellent sources on this topic are Bush, "The Supreme Crime"; Kochavi, *Prelude to Nuremberg*; and Smith, *The Road to Nuremberg*. See also Gary Jonathan Bass, *Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000): 149–81.

[57] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of The United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940–1945* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1958): 220–24.

[58] The question of the legal status of aggressive war was a central topic of discussion for at least five of the fifteen sessions for which transcripts are provided in Jackson's report (Documents XXXVII, XLII, XLIV, XLVII, and LI in Jackson, *Report*).

[59] As stated in "Redraft of Definitions of 'Crimes', Submitted by Soviet Delegation, July 23, 1945," reproduced as Document XLIII in Jackson, *Report*, 327.

[60] Ibid, 330.

[61] For a general review of the Soviet position, see Sidney S. Alderman, "Negotiating on War Crimes Prosecutions, 1945", in *Negotiating with the Russians*, Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, eds. (New York: World Peace Foundation, 1951): 49–98 and George Ginsburgs, *Moscow's Road to Nuremberg: The Soviet Background to the Trial* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996).

[62] Cited in Natalya Lebedeva, *SSSR i Nurnbergskiy Process: Neizvestnye i Maloizvestnye Stranitsy Istorii* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi Fond "Demokratiya", 2012): 211 (emphasis added, my translation).

[63] Ibid, 210.

[64] Refer to sources listed in note 3.

[65] Cf. Quincy Wright, "Changes in the Conception of War," *American Journal of International Law* 18, no. 4 (1924): 755–67.

[66] The definitive statement on this subject is James F. Willis, *Prologue to Nuremberg: Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 1982). For a more concise treatment, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, "World War I: 'The War to End All Wars' and the Birth of a Handicapped International Criminal Justice System," *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 30, no. 3 (2002): 244–91.

[67] Ečer's report is reproduced as Document 1 in *Archives of the Holocaust: An International Collection of Selected Documents, v. 16, ed.* George J. Lankevich (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990).

[68] TNA, TS 26/67, 3–9.

[69] TNA, LCO 2/2976, Document C15349 (emphasis added).

[70] TNA, FO 371/39007, Document C15349.

[71] TNA, TS 26/69, Document C43, 4.

[72] The paper is reproduced as Document 26 in Bradley F. Smith, *The American Road to Nuremberg: The Documentary Record 1944–1945* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981): 78–84.

[73] To be sure, the interwar period did witness a blossoming of theoretical contributions to the criminalization project. Vespasian Pella, Robert Phillimore, Édouard Descamps, Nicolas Politis, Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, Megalos Caloyanni and Hugh Bellot were among the most distinguished jurists of the interwar period who developed the theoretical groundwork for the criminalization project. Curiously, Phillimore, Politis, de Vabres, Caloyanni, and Bellot did not make any proposals to the League of Nations bearing on criminal law. Pella only consulted the League on the subjects of money laundering and harmonization of domestic penal codes. It is reasonable to speculate that this lack of practical engagement contributed to the hesitancy of Allied policymakers in dealing with proposals for the criminalization of aggressive war.

[74] A transcript of their discussion on war crimes can be found in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945*, v. 2 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1960): 525–57.

Assembled Development

Moving Beyond Intersectionality in Development Studies

Paul Kramer

Feminists originally deployed intersectionality to expose the deep disjunctures between white and black women's lives in late twentieth-century America. Notably, Patricia Hill Collins argued that any analysis of gender or sexuality must also account for that category's relationship with the distinctive historical and cultural implications of race. More recently, Development Scholars and practitioners have begun incorporating gender and sexuality, as well as geographic, racial, ethnic, and other oppressions, into 'matrices of domination' that purportedly allow us to understand and plan for difference. But intersectionality is not without its shortcomings. The subject is forced to reside within a pre-existing site of difference, wherein a specifically Western framework governs non-Western ontologies. Using a range of examples to explore the pros and cons of the intersectional approach, this article argues that the Deleuzian notion of 'assemblage' provides a more sophisticated means of understanding marginalized subjectivities. In so doing, it considers a future wherein assemblage supplants intersectionality as the preferred method of involving development-subjects in their own interventions.

Introduction

Academics of Development Studies, concerned with interdisciplinary analyses of socio-economic change in the developing world, increasingly incorporate intersectionality frameworks into their analyses of Third World subjects. Unique to this discipline, the purpose of this academic foregrounding of identity is to have tangible impacts on the efficacy of international development interventions. Black American feminists originally evolved the concept of intersectionality in the 1970s in order to reveal how their multiple categories of identity resulted in unique, intersecting styles of oppression in the US legal system.[1] Now, development academics and practitioners claim that intersectionality is a novel approach to better comprehend the layered nature of peoples' iden-

Paul Kramer, "Assembled Development: Moving Beyond Intersectionality in Development Studies," *St Antony's International Review* 10, no. 2 (2015): 168–191.

tities in their post-colonial countries of inquiry.[2] They propose that the differences between women, women of an ethnic minority, and women of an ethnic and sexual minority (and so forth) must be articulated and planned for separately if global development programming wishes to design meaningful socio-economic interventions. This approach is not without its limitations. In this essay, I plan to delineate the boundaries of intersectionality. Intersectionality, I argue, assigns a debilitating 'victimhood' status to its subjects. Using examples examining development programs and dissident sexualities, I will further the notion that the problems intersectionality attempts to resolve can and should be complemented by means of the 'assemblage' framework.[3]

I begin by historicizing the usage of intersectionality. Here I show how academics across disciplines use the term, highlighting why it has been so impactful. I then focus on its contemporary usage within Development Studies—and praxis—to suggest that intersectionality opens interventions to certain blind spots. Through case studies, I propose there has been a neglect of the non-discursive, the material, and the contingent, all of which are particularly vital categories to the success of socio-economic growth. I focus on the problem of queer subjects in developing countries in particular. The material bodies that are not apparent in intersectional accounts, I will argue, can be materialized through the toolkit offered by assemblage. I end by proposing what such a program might look like, using examples from Latin American de-colonial studies. While this essay stresses the significance of an assemblage approach for Development Studies in particular, I believe that a rethinking of the centrality of intersectional critiques is increasingly relevant across disciplines.

Locating Intersectionality Within Development

In the early 1970s, the Combahee River Collective developed the notion of 'interlocking oppressions' to account for the experiences of black women in America. Their 1979 essay, "A Black Feminist Statement," provided the foundation for expanding on this notion throughout the 80s.[4] The essay was reprinted in a number of collaborative texts central to black feminism, including, *All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women's Studies*[5] and *Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology*.[6] Since then, intersectionality has remained the dominant framework by which feminists scholars and queer theorists approach the layers of marginalization which coexist within subjects and characterize their social relations. Feminists deployed intersection-

ality to expose the deep disjunctures between white and black women's lives in the United States. Moraga and Anzaldúa's *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color* brought together a number of disparate voices in its attempt to show how radically the hardships of women of colour differed from those of white, middle-class women.[7] Audre Lorde's seminal book, *Sister Outsider*, represented one of the first expressions of the intersectional concerns of black lesbian women.[8] In *Inessential Woman*, Elizabeth Spellman explores middle-class white Feminism's ability to gloss over the distinct problems faced by Jewish or black women, for example.[9] Notably, Patricia Hill Collins argued that any analysis of gender or sexuality must also account for that category's relationship with the distinctive historical and cultural implications of race.[10] The term has permitted both scholars and activists to arrange class, gender, sexuality, geographic, racial, ethnic, and other oppressions in matrices of domination, which purportedly allow us to truly understand difference, or, otherness.

It was in "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics," that Crenshaw proposed intersectionality as an alternative to categorical conceptions of discrimination in the law. The term was foremost an attempt to expose how problematically gender and race operated as categories within the US legal system. Crenshaw argued that the codification of anti-discrimination laws in the 1960s actually enabled certain kinds of discrimination against black women. In the contemporary era, intersectional appreciation of compounding marginalities have moved well beyond academic writing and into policy making, health care, social services, and civil society. The positive impact of this body of literature proves its importance in its longevity and wide uptake by many marginalized groups of people.

Since its initial conceptualization, a number of scholars have taken issue with the political impact of the term. Jasbir Puar and Rey Chow both remain unconvinced that the marginal subject is politically productive, especially when it is used to multiply marginalities via intersectionality.[11] Elizabeth Grosz argues that intersectionality fails to account for the physical relationships between bodies.[12] Roderick Ferguson expresses concern over the tendency for intersectionality-based analyses to establish fixed subjecthoods as a "positivist errand" in an attempt to supposedly reveal the truth of being a minority.[13] Development Studies, I will show, must avoid these less productive trends by incorporating assemblage into its ontology.

Development Studies scholars adopted intersectionality, as scholars and practitioners have argued it to be a useful tool in comprehending the

unique problems faced by discrete populations in third world countries. Academics needed a way to approach identity in terms of third world subjectivities compounded by poverty, racial difference, caste, gender, and sexuality. Especially within the legalese of development programming, intersectionality provides one way for scholars to complicate international social interventions. Notably, when global bodies have attempted to provide generalized solutions to women's condition across borders, intersectionality enables academics to critique these programs' efficacy.[14] Such analyses attempt to come to more thorough understandings of who the objects of development programs *are*. I will argue that this is problematic, especially given the different socio-cultural gap between the black feminist usage of the term and its contemporary, postcolonial deployment.

The corpus of intersectional studies within Development Studies continues to grow unabated. Here I will detail some of the ways it is being used before engaging in my critique. In "Gender Mainstreaming in a Development Project," Donna Baines uses an ethnographic account to reason for intersectional approaches to gender mainstreaming within development organizations:

> [...] by promoting gender separately from sexual orientation, class, race and anti-colonialism, the performance of gender mainstreaming in this development project acted as a mask for organizational policies that exacerbated gender injustice and the re-establishment of unequal relations of class, race and sexual orientation at home and abroad. These axes of domination never exist in isolation from each other. Developing more sophisticated ways of analysing axes of oppression, in their connectedness, helps to explain how oppressions are held in place as well as how they might be resisted and transformed.[15]

She continues by exploring how certain relations might interact with each other: an individual might utilize their class background to dislodge oppression on the gender front; race, gender, heterosexism, and colonialism are mutually inflecting and make it difficult to make headway against any of these individual categories. Similar studies include Elaine Unterhalter's work on the education-related Millennium Development Goals, wherein she argues that gender, poverty, and access to education are mutually inflecting sites of power relations.[16] Another example is Leila Harris' paper on water scarcity in south-eastern Turkey.[17] Harris argues that water-related development challenges result in unique burdens for those who reside at the intersections of the categories of gender, ethnicity, and landlessness. These are just a few instances where intersectionality has made inroads into Development Studies.

In development practice and policy, intersectionality is being incorporated into a range of programmes—especially in bodies such as the United Nations Development Program and the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). The most recent CSW conference resulted in a document demanding intersectional understandings be developed before practitioners plan for violence against women in marginalized communities.[18] A UN Women Fund for Gender Equality evaluation of the "Dalit Women's Livelihoods Accountability Initiative" in India proposes that programs must be evaluated in terms of the "complex, intersectional issues in women's rights."[19] A document released by the Women's International Coalition for Economic Justice contends that the Durban World Conference Against Racism "linked racism to gender, poverty, and denial of woman's human rights," and criticized the UN's Millennium Development Goals for ignoring "an intersectional analysis of multiple oppressions due to gender, race/ethnicity/caste, class, sexual orientation, age, and national origin."[20]

The 2013–2014 UN Development Assistance Framework for Nepal praised the UN Country Team's "Intersectional Framework and Programming Tool on Gender Equality, Social Inclusion, and Human Rights," claiming "this framework recognized that, although the issues of human rights, gender equality and social inclusion are sometimes considered as separate, they are in fact interdependent and overlapping."[21] A 2013 speech by UN Women Acting Executive Laskhmi Puri on the topic of the trafficking of women claimed that women at the margins are predisposed to becoming victims of trafficking: "Whether these causes lie in the rule of law ruling women out, injustice, or the marginalization of women, such as indigenous women, migrant women or women who have been sexually abused, widowed, abandoned, or divorced, this intersectional discrimination also prepares the ground for being victims of trafficking."[22]

I argue that, in its current incarnation, intersectionality is used in both study and practice as little more than a maturation of earlier, Western-styled modes of essentializing the subject.[23] Where development aid proposes to be mapping more subtle identity positions, I believe it forms knowledge around 'authentic victimhoods'—that is, who can be identified at the corner of the most intersections possible. It reinforces, but does not dismantle, normative identity constructions of who counts as oppressed. While intersectionality may prove useful in highlighting some of the blind spots of development programs, the drawbacks are multiple and must be carefully weighed before implementing these approaches.

I am not advocating for the outright end of all intersectional approaches, nor attempting to diminish the significance of early intersectional research. However I think that we need to accept these intersectional category groupings as a form of what Gayatri Spivak names "strategic essentialism."[24] That is to say, there are times at which it is important to 'essentialize' identities in order to come together for a specific cause, and to acknowledge the artificiality of such essentializations. Crenshaw and Lorde used intersectionality to essentialize the differences between black women and middle class white women during their time to make headway in civil rights law. This battle to gain recognition for minority women within mainstream feminism won significant advancements in its initial formulation as a critique of anti-discrimination law, but to suggest a simple translation of intersectional categories onto a multiplicity of foreign cultures and unknowable identity categories is, at its worst, a colonialist endeavour.

To maintain essentialist identity standpoints will not be beneficial especially for long-term development growth. Although intersectionality was initially important to conceiving of the limits of 1980s feminist thought, it is increasingly used indiscriminately "as shorthand to diagnose difference rather than being able to articulate [difference] as a conceptual frame arising out of particular historical and activist contexts,"[25] as some of the above literature in development practice shows. It acknowledges that we must attain a more subtle understanding of the interactions between oppressions that inhabit any given subjecthood. It does not, however, recognize that the creation of knowledge about these intersections is highly contrived. In other words, intersectionality's weakness lies in its privileging of ontologies over performativities. It permits us to talk of identities deterministically: people are rendered collections of essences, which enables development practitioners and academics to form and expand knowledge as it pertains to these categories.

For instance, the commonly iterated notion that straight men are the perpetrators of violence, whereas gay men need to be empowered as the victims, makes gay men even worse off.[26] We have already decided which categories of identity are oppressed and what it means to be that configuration of person. There is, then, something *essentially* different between people fitting within these categories in terms of degrees of marginalization. Therefore, to plan for 'men' makes little sense if it does not consider the defined discrepancies between straight and gay, black and white, able-bodied and disabled, and other binaries. It seems necessary to define every single possible divergence of power between and within identity categories. This results in solidifying ideas of what it means to exist in opposition to another identity. At the end of

an intersectional analysis, we are meant to believe that although subjects are complicated, they are nonetheless victims—victims in terms we can readily comprehend. Anthony Anghie argues that the way colonial rulers created knowledge about Third World identities is strikingly similar to the (racialized) knowledge furthered by the global development regime.[27] I argue that intersectionality—the establishment of representations of marginal subjects—in and of itself does not offer a way out of this dilemma. The result of this is development programming that emphasizes negatively constructed subjects, which, created by discourse alone, leaves absent the space for physical bodies.

Thinking within intersectional frameworks forces development practitioners to make judgments about who fits in where and about which aspects of a person will benefit to what degree. Any of an endless number of configurations of outliers will be left out. Men who are victims of domestic violence wrought by their male partners will fall outside the traditional anti-domestic violence rhetoric. We are equally unable to consider figures like the upwardly mobile Dalit politician, Mayawati, whose low caste seemingly situates her at odds with her own economic and political fortune.[28] Intersectionality fails to account for these outliers, especially when they contradict our preconceived notions of necessarily being oppressed. But this is the *modus operandi* of the approach: intersectionality wants to know, "what does it mean to be this constellation of identity categories?" But, especially when we are concerned about development practice, claiming that there is an integral meaning behind an identity is benign pandering at best and debilitating Westernization at worst. Questioning what it *means* to be at the intersection of any of these categories is politically irrelevant. A more actionable, intelligible question is: "what do these corporealities *do*?" [29]

I have three concerns in particular. First, just as Mohanty warned against the hegemony of a certain, Western perspective of Third World women, we must extend this critique to how intersectionality upholds overlapping categories. Being Muslim, or disabled, or an ethnic minority does not represent singular subjectivities. People laying at those intersections could also not be seen to exist within a coherent grouping. I argue that it may be important to essentialize in order to make concrete goals (e.g. the attainment of recognition that black feminists initially sought when they established intersectionality). However there is a risk of solidifying these new categories, bringing us back to 'square one': a new social grouping is framed (e.g. black, impoverished, women), but the most oppressed of that group goes unaccounted (e.g. black, impoverished, refugee, women). Wholesale promotion of intersectionality would lead

us to believe the process should continue again and again. I argue this factionalism risks hampering the original intentions of the framework.

Second, the limits of intersectionalities seem to be artificially defined by what Western eyes see as oppressed. While they readily incorporate marginalized sexualities and ethnicities into their approach, there are an unlimited number of other factors that contribute to one's subject position. Ex-convicts, people who have been gravely ill for long periods of time, heavily indebted students, and other categories seem randomly not worthy of the cause. Identity categories which are transient, yet meaningful, do not fit within the solidifying practices of subjectivity that intersectionality depends upon. Those enabling intersections which reside within development subjects (perhaps analogous to the problem of the "creamy layer" of backward castes in India) are rarely accounted for in these frameworks.[30] This is because intersectionality only emphasizes oppressions, not complicities. We are therefore ready to speak of how disadvantaged subjects are, but unwilling to explore the possibility that they might participate in neo-liberal, misogynistic, or homophobic acts.

Furthermore, as outsiders, our own contribution to the production of discourses surrounding Third World subjects must be taken into account as something that is never neutral. Western inquiries into developing populations shape those very populations, or intersections of inquiry. An example of this might be the assumptions laden with the highly Western notion of being 'gay.' When academics have applied this concept to non-Western subjects, critics have received this reduction as a form of cultural imperialism.[31] Therefore to talk about the problems of being gay and an ethnic minority in a development context may have a range of unforeseen outcomes. Planning for gays may mean people begin to identify as gay at the expense other forms of identifying, while those who cannot mobilize the Western gay identity for themselves are left out.[32]

Finally, I argue intersectionality signals a return to the search for the native, authentic, victim subject.[33] There is a strong appeal in the development world for 'victim talk,' and intersectionality effectively furthers the possibilities for victim talk. As shown above, it is increasingly common for development to highlight its capacity to plan for the most marginalized populations—the intersectionality of being a poor, ethnic minority woman being perhaps the most sought-after positionality in the field. Some might argue that it is necessary for Development to group people this way in order to lobby donors for funding and provide coherent, targeted planning. However, the endless bifurcation of the world into non-victims and victims is regressive. As Minow contends,

> To purchase the image of the victim is to purchase the opportunity to be

> privately moved by images of victims and their suffering, but to do nothing about it. The stories of victims are attractive because they arouse attractive emotions. Possessing some aspect of victims' lives can engender a sense of one's capacity to respond, whether or not that capacity is exercised in any practical way. Perhaps even more profoundly, though, victimhood is attractive in the sense that it secures attention in an attention-taxed world. Victims can get on the agenda, the evening news, and the agenda, the evening news, and the gossip circuit-victims get time. This of course is a precondition for any response, including sympathy or help.[34]

Although Minow explores the problem of victimhood in Western law, there are clear analogies to the way development renders subjects knowable by means of intersectionality. Ever dependent on the sympathy of donors, volunteers, and aspirational academics, development requires the production of victim-subjects to draw attention and allocate resources. It is then no wonder development finds intersectionality such a useful tool: it is possible to create ever-more marginalized subjects, wherein essentialist knowledge creation is hidden under the guise of "account[ing] for the multiple and simultaneous effects of systems of oppression."[35]

Toward "Assembled" Development

Having explored the origins, expansion, and limits of intersectionality, I now introduce assemblage as a possible conjunctive framework to push the discursive toolkit of intersectionality into the material problematics of development. We should focus not just on the way victims are created by technologies of knowledge, but on uncovering the material processes which produce unique subject positions. This refers to the concept of "assemblage," as introduced by Deleuze. "Categories—race, gender, sexuality—are considered as events, actions, and encounters between bodies, rather than as simply entities and attributes of subjects."[36] This allows us to step outside of our preconceived understandings of, for example American gay identity, allowing for spatially and temporally relevant analyses of subject positions. By analysing the genealogical precedents which 'assemble' subjectivities, we can more subtly account for undefined and non-Western identites, move beyond victim talk, and acknowledge the unlimited, expansive, and sometimes complicit discourses which inform subjects' lives. This represents a divergence from the intersectional approach: intersectionality is interested in uncovering the uniqueness behind being increasingly marginal. Assemblage does not believe there is merit in identifying new, essential meanings beneath subjectivities. It

instead wants to inquire into the material processes constituting identities, and then understand what kinds of properties emerge from materially constituted bodies. It acknowledges that social phenomena come together and fall apart, can be guided by conflicting mentalities, and that all actors have power as they transform development to meet their own goals.[37]

I will first explore the ways assemblage operates with the example of queer personhood in a development context. An assemblage is defined as a whole constituted by material and expressive heterogeneous parts. Many social phenomena can be considered in terms of assemblage: from individuals to social movements to nation-states. Being a gay man or a lesbian woman, for example, is an assemblage. Gay as an identity is a socially constructed process, which has resulted in material forms of exclusion, unique affects, and particular cultural signifiers. Being gay, however, is not reducible to any single one of these components. Walking in a gay pride parade does not make a person gay: but that along with a string of other acts (coming out of the closet, gay sex, having gay friends, employing queer slang, etc.) does assemble gay identities.[38] The particularity of these component acts for each individual cannot be uniformly generalized across subjects, which means that being gay means something quite unique to each individual. Being a gay man or a lesbian woman is the unique, emergent property which results from the totality of the historically delineated components. Properties of the whole assemblage are not reducible to component parts, and the historically contingent nature of these processes precludes enduring, essential identities. For example, it makes little sense to consider blackness and queerness and disability as if there was something enduring about each of these formations—instead, it is pertinent to discuss what historical processes create these social categories and how they shape peoples' lives.

The component acts of one assemblage operate with other assemblages in unique ways. If a gay couple from New Zealand purchases tickets for a gay cruise to Fiji, we might now start considering the overlaps between gay subjectivities, "pink" dollars as flows of global capital, and Fijian military regimes. Thus assemblages can be understood in their relations of exteriority (to other assemblages). Conversely, intersectionality is characterized by relations of interiority: the component parts which construct intersectional identities are themselves constructed by the very relations they have with other parts in the whole. This suggests that there is a pre-existing set of conditions that applies to certain configurations of identities. However, scholars have argued that it is the institutional cultivation of reductivist 'knowledge' about Third World identities which renders them vulnerable to culturally, socially, and economically

damaging development aid practices.[39] But if we accept the constructed nature of identities—allowing that an identity can never be fully defined by its relations alone—then discussing the attributes of a category of person becomes moot. Just as it would be impossible to isolate 'gay identity' as a category from the subjects' historical/social context, it is pointless to speak of gayness and blackness as mutually inflecting referents divorced from personhood. Instead, let us talk about what acts constitute these subjects and what emerges when these component acts are brought together. Then we can start to empirically analyse the encounters between dominant and subordinate sexualities—as well as with other hegemonic frameworks, like neo-liberalism or patriarchy. Two relevant case studies will elucidate this point.

The first study is entitled "Capably Queer: Exploring the Intersections of Queerness and Poverty in the Urban Philippines" by Ryan Thoreson. Thoreson promotes intersectionality as a tool to approach the ways being sexually dissident shapes the lives of the urban poor in the Philippines. The study has little precedent and demands our attention, as there has been a dearth of scholarly inquiry given to queer lives in development practice.[40] Notably, the World Bank does not advocate for sexual minorities' rights in their countries of intervention and the Millennium Development Goals refrain from promoting sexual rights. Thoreson explains that development interventions will only follow after empirical research on queer populations is conducted. He believes locating queer people in terms of urban poverty can situate them within the proper development context. His interviews draw out the experiential dimensions of poverty in terms of employment, empowerment, safety, dignity, and meaning and value in his respondents' lives—in an attempt to measure the unique problems faced by people who are both queer and impoverished. For example, in terms of "dignity," the author found that sexually dissident persons felt most marginalized when they could not occupy/perform their roles intelligibly for the community. Queer men felt the highest amounts of discrimination when they did not behave effeminately, or if they looked overly masculine, or when they worked outside of traditionally female employment (beauty parlours, entertainment, flower arranging, etc.). The author argues that their poverty *in terms of* their queerness compounds their marginalisation: if they could afford to look more like what a queer person should look like, then they would gain greater acceptance. Or if they had better access to "queer" employment, they would feel more fulfilled and recognized by the community. Thoreson concludes that queerness and poverty inflect each other in unexpected ways, which have constraining consequences for Third

World subjects. He calls on development organizations to recognize the needs of queer populations to reduce their poverty.

I argue that Thoreson's study, guided by intersectionality, is laden with fixed presumptions about identity, which hampers the usefulness of its concluding prescriptions. Thoreson takes for granted the nature of what it is to be queer in the urban Philippines. He specifically speaks in terms of *bakla* (men attracted to men who dress as women) and *tomboys* (women who have sex with women and dress as men) and the difficulties these groups face when are restricted (by poverty) to perform their social roles: "The pressure to be *successfully* and *intelligibly* queer was a recurring theme, as was the ways that poverty thwarted or limited their capacity to do so."[41] However, his respondents overwhelmingly agreed they felt free to express themselves and exercise agency in their own lives, but they fell within the realm of specific material goals. They identified finding a stable job, supporting their family, having children and starting their own family, having a good income, becoming rich, owning a house, and so forth. These goals, centred on reproduction within the family unit, are heteronormative. There is, then, an unspoken complicity between the informants' heteronormative social demands and the integration of queers that the author advances. The respondents' desire to "perform" their gender for society in terms of heteronormatively-mandated legibility exemplifies the restrictedness of "queer" as an identity construct.

Thoreson's study confirms my points made above. First, intersectionality attempts to create knowledge about exponentially oppressed, static social categories. Here, Thoreson defines queer, urban, Third World subjects, whose poverty makes it impossible for them to express their sexuality. I question whether this grouping of people does indeed reflect a cohesive community subjectivity. If it does, then we are presented with a new entity that demands the same examination of intersectionalities given to the dominant population. Between the queer urban poor of Manila, everyone will not be equally oppressed: disabled people within this group will have unique problems (so too will migrants, or those who are do not belong to the dominant ethnic group). The author does not define why these identity categories alone constitute a cohesive social grouping that demands scrutiny. Next, the confines of intersectionalities are arbitrary and reflect Western-consciousness. Although Thoreson explains that there are range of "kinds" of sexuality in the Philippines, he readily deposits them all under the heading of "queer" and it is not clear if *tomboys* and *bakla* and lesbians are all to be understood within as facing the same issues of representation and security. Why these categories are chosen at the expense of others remains unclear. Finally, victim-

hood rhetoric hamstrings the agency of the subject. It forecloses a more complicated discussion on whether or not the kinds of power relations these subjects find themselves within make them complicit with less-than-desirable heteronormative and/or neo-liberal trends.

What is absent from this discussion is the genealogical formative social components which construct *bakla* and *tomboys* as identities in the first place. How did we arrive at the point where a *bakla* person has to emulate cis-femininity[42] in all its socio-economic iterations (including norms of feminine beauty and employment-type)? Thoreson does not inquire into why their demands and acts conform to social expectations of acceptable gender performance. The point is that fulfilling these demands via development interventions will fail to liberate them from the constraints of dominant rationalities of governance. We have already seen similar articulations of development fail in the early years of Women in Development inclusion.[43] In the 1970s, after Boserup wrote *Woman's Role in Economic Development*, the notion that egalitarianism could be achieved when employers stopped discriminating against women gained traction.[44] However, without considering the social frameworks which shape and conduct women's lives, women's position in the workforce saw no improvement.

Simply providing targeted economic mobility will not lift queer people out of their marginalized positions. We must also undo the complicities between queer lives and dominant frameworks of patriarchy and heterosociality. Queers in the urban Philippines are highly dependent upon the family unit for recognition and economic status: what would it look like if they were not? I argue that we could support the development of queer lives outside of heteronormativities. This demands an evaluation of the various stakeholders interested in manipulating these assemblages. We could consider how the state enforces marginally acceptable positionalities for queers and ask ourselves how we might lobby against those policies. How does religion govern queer lives? Can the introduction of specific markets be said to be queer-friendly, or do market rationalities contradict our goals as queer people? When we start to analyse specific acts of 'queerness,' only then can we really start to understand how queer peoples' conduct is governed—and how these assemblages interact with other dominant frameworks.

We can unravel some of the guiding rationalities behind development's treatment of queer lives in the context of Thoreson's recommendation to expand 'empowerment' for his respondents. His interviews suggested that 67.5% of queer people believe they are personally responsible for improving their lives, 18.75% suggested parents are responsible,

and the remainder believed broader forces, such as God or the government were responsible. Thoreson advises:

> A challenge for development practitioners...is to find ways to empower queer populations by targeting them for development interventions—from access to education to job and skills training to microfinance—while recognizing that these may be most rewarding when they are not purely self-interested pursuits.45

Thoreson concludes that the compounded (or intersectional) experience of poverty and being queer has led to the unique situation wherein queer people's empowerment is tied to social and familial recognition of their contributions. Development programs which attend to the social/recognition aspect of empowerment—as well as to reducing poverty—will be most successful in bettering queer lives.

However, there is a great risk here of reading programs of microcredit or empowerment as apolitical and desexualized processes. Kathleen Staudt explores how various development organizations have employed a language of empowerment. However, given how little leverage women have in these societies and the patriarchal nature of these institutions, empowerment has had little effect.[46] Keating et al. describe how microcredit marks a form of "accumulation by dispossession" as a gendered process, which renders women especially vulnerable to strict loan repayment terms, the broadening of global capital's financial base, and an orientation away from a collective focus on welfare to the exchange of commodities. Academics of international relations propose we must remain wary of the tendency for organizations of global governance to hide significant political acts behind the language of techno-bureaucratic management.[47] When the World Bank and other international bodies champion "best practices" and "good governance" by means of microcredit programs, we must consider the 'governmentalities' that shape these assemblages—whether they be neo-liberal, neoconservative, patriarchal, or heteronormative.[48] This allows us to explore their interactions with other assemblages, such as those of marginal sexualities. We can begin to see how forces that seemingly 'empower' queer lives might be simultaneously supporting its oppression in other ways.

Amanda Lock Swarr and Richa Nagar's essay, "Dismantling Assumptions: Interrogating 'Lesbian' Struggles for Identity and Survival in India and South Africa" further illustrates the usefulness of an assemblage rather than intersectional perspective on third world identities in Development Studies. The essay considers the ways both Development Studies and feminist theory have failed to accommodate the lives of queer women in the Global South. On the one hand, Development Stud-

ies scholars proclaim that homosexuality only exists among privileged subjects, when people are not embroiled in everyday struggles and can afford to explore their sexualities. Alternately, Development Studies simply doesn't recognize homosexualities as relevant to issues of women's socio-economic empowerment.[49] Feminist theorists, however, have been more successful at theorizing the complex contextually constructed rationalities behind sex/gender systems, but feminist frameworks shy away from the issues of resource access and mobilisation significant to women of the development world.[50]

Like Thoreson, Swarr and Nagar propose that intersectionality is a necessary framework within which to structure our understanding of marginal third world identities. Recalling Mohanty,[51] the authors argue that one cannot speak of intersecting oppressions in isolation. However, the authors propose that intersectionality needs to move beyond simply identifying the various social categories a subject may fall within. Rather intersectionality needs to be "extended:"

> Extending intersectionality [...] necessitates that we reconceptualize difference as constituted and (re)configured in relation to place-specific struggles over rights, resources, social practices, and relationships—including sexual and emotional intimacies—that people enter into with or without labels.[52]

This need to "extend" intersectionality speaks to the deficiencies of intersectional approaches in favour of assemblages. When feminist theorists and Development Studies academics use intersectionality to abbreviate and essentialize difference, certain identity groupings are rendered invisible—especially identities that do not ascribe to the established categories we retain in the West. The "extension" of intersectionality the authors suggest makes known the contextual nature of identities, the fact the identities may not even be recognized as such by the people they describe, or that there might be conflicting complicities and ruptures between these identitarian frameworks. Swarr and Nagar explain the inability for lesbianism to be politically, historically, or geographically neutral, especially where Western, white, middle-class lesbianism is taken as the referential goal for subjects' identities.[53]

Swarr and Nagar demonstrate an important shortcoming in the way Development Studies conceptualizes queer subjects. In invoking intersectionality, the authors point to the discursive problem of how we talk about, conceptualize, and create notions of (de)sexualized Third World subjects: the authors provide evidence of the compounded difficulties that queer women have in terms of their class. As such, any project

seeking to alleviate their financial burden must also account for the way sexuality operates in this context.

Simply pointing to this intersectionality is significantly important, yet incomplete: the discursive does not operate outside of, or hold privilege over the material. For example, if we followed intersectionality's prescriptions to discuss and plan for women of dissident sexualities in the Global South, we run the risk of calling them lesbians and guiding their cultural practices by Western guidelines of what lesbians ought to be. That is to say, we might prescribe development interventions meant to address both poverty and lesbian recognition, such as integration into markets, to help them become more like our own notions of what (Western) lesbians need or want. However, such an intervention would fail to account for the deleterious collusions between middle class Western lesbian lifestyles and the marginalization of outlier practices—a politics which Lisa Duggan calls "homonormativity:"

> [...] it is a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption.[54]

It is then in the interest of neo-liberalism to permit a space for a very specific, demobilized kind of lesbianism—one which does not threaten, but contributes to the production of global capital. For example, a theoretical microfinance scheme which targets 'lesbians' would operate on a number of assumptions. First, it has predefined the identity of its constituents, creating a space for an acceptable identity and marginalizing others—both sexually and economically. Second, it incorporates them into systems of global capital, where sexuality is permitted as long as it serves the interests of the market. Finally, it proposes that queer individuals are responsible for their own successes and failures (if they work hard enough and can abide by the terms of loans and other forms of disciplining). However, governmental/institutional heteronormativity persist to keep them marginalized, especially in privileging the heterosexual family unit.[55] Intersectionality runs the risk of glossing over the connections between sexual identity in its Western configuration, global economies, and the rationalities guiding them.

Assemblage, on the other hand, makes these relationships explicit. It does not presuppose identities, but rather asks, "how do these bodies act?" Instead of attempting to locate lesbians in a development context, assemblages want to know how people self-identify. It asks to what extent they act within the scope of the dominant framework of acceptable

sexual conduct. It demands a definition of those material or expressive acts which constitute their selfhood: how people behave, express solidarities, and propose that their identities are legitimate.[56] It simultaneously asks, "how sharp are the boundaries?": while in some cases women of dissident sexualities might express themselves solely in anti-normative actions, others might express their sexualities in concomitance with neoliberal capitalist economies. It therefore allows us to see how marginalized positionalities sometimes work together and support dominant frameworks. It is only from this contextually relevant perspective that we can start looking at directions for intervention and change.

If I were to speculate about what an assemblage approach to development would look like, it would first and foremost destabilize essential identity categories. It would look at the issues shared by many different kinds of people, from very local to international levels, ask why they have the interests they have, and look for instances of overlap as points of departure for mobilization. Planning based upon similarities in peoples' actions, instead of supposedly shared identities, is key. An intersectional approach considers which categories a subject falls into and what that means for them in terms of oppression. An assemblage approach understands that any act that occurs within a development programme will have to attend to whether or not it remains complicit with dominant ideologies—and that this process is forever ongoing. It acknowledges that power manifests itself not within subjects, but through what those subjects do.

In the Thoreson case, for example, an assemblage approach would move beyond normatively identifying the attributes of (poor, queer, postcolonial) subjects. It could recognize that the introduction to markets and microfinance may empower queer people, but it would ask about microfinance's guiding interests: what kind of people are in control of microfinance, what are their presumptions about queer lives, are queer people simply an untapped market, are there moral limits to what is acceptable for queer people to finance, and so forth. One of the strongest arguments for the assemblage approach is that it recognizes that the task is never finished: there isn't simply some quota of people to be empowered. Instead, assemblage continuously asks questions and anticipates change. It constantly looks for shifts in the guiding rationalities of the endless number of actors involved, including development practitioners, theorists, businesspeople, state officials, and development subjects themselves. All of these are involved in negotiating the scope and efficacy of development programmes. There is therefore a fundamental shift: while intersectionality frames oppressors against the disenfranchised, assemblage wants to know what motivates every specific material and

expressive act of all involved actors—knowing that these interactions themselves cause constant, unforeseen change.

I turn to a case study that exemplifies the utility of assemblage in a development context. In "Indigenous Cosmopolitics in the Andes,"[57] Marisol de la Cadena argues that Western colonial knowledge upholds clear boundaries for what can be politically relevant and what falls outside politics. Indigenous practices, the environment, the inhuman, and other categories are all subordinate to the Western, masculine human subject. The author employs the notion of "equivocation" to reconcile the distance between these worldviews. Equivocation, she argues, is the commitment to avoiding a singular, crystallized perspective on any event. For example, our notion of nature and an indigenous notion of nature are unlikely to correspond. However, acknowledging the separateness of our knowledge shows where knowledge is being privileged and to what end. It also illuminates possibilities for complicity amongst regimes of knowledge: because no single way of knowing is complete (or privileged), it permits unlimited opportunities to contend with "other" kinds of knowledge. This ambiguity and open-endedness is, as I have already argued, the political crux of an assemblage-centric paradigm. Finally, the assemblage permits a movement away from representation entirely: even if our notions of nature cannot correspond, the acts of what we do in nature are meaningful.

De la Cadena's case study illustrates a political body, constituted by indigenous communities, politicians, activists, and others, as an assemblage. She explores the local resistance to the establishment of a mine in a religiously and culturally significant Andean mountain range. Environmentalists and the Left protested that the mine would negatively impact land-based livelihoods in the region. However, the indigenous population protested that the "earth-being" that is the mountain range would simply not allow mining there. The author's informants, including NGO and state-officials, consider it their duty to respect the earth-beings—or their people would incur inexplicable accidents and hardship. While the movement could simply be read as another pushback against neo-liberalism, such a discourse subsumes an incongruent epistemology into a neo-liberal duality of capitalism against folk politics:

> This appearance of indigeneities may inaugurate a different politics, plural not because they are enacted by bodies marked by gender, race, ethnicity, or sexuality demanding rights, or by environmentalists representing nature, but because they bring earth-beings to the political, and force into visibility the antagonism that proscribed their worlds.[58]

In acknowledging the "equivocation," multiple perspectives are not only permissible, but they are politically capable. The environmentalists and urban Left act in assemblage with the indigenous movement in protesting the mining operations. No group is defined in any kind of colonialist discourse. There is no need to essentialize the indigenous population's culture, people, or desires. Instead, there is a material assemblage of bodies (including the inhuman earth-beings) oriented toward the act of protesting the mine.

Claudia de Lima Costa asserts the concordance between decolonial "equivocation" alongside the growing base of materialist feminist scholarship: "It is through our concepts—always equivocations—that we know the world. However, the world also acts in the formation of our concepts, moulding and limiting them, with material/real consequences."[59] De Lima Costa correctly points out that intersectionality and its discursive formulations cannot be discarded. There is "intra-activity" (to use Karen Barad's term)[60] between the way we talk about subjects and how discourse mediates and is mediated by the acts, desires, and physical relations of the subject. An appreciation of the assembled subject, therefore, exposes dominant socio-natural formations, while showing how they are connected to other life-worlds—none of which are equivalent. If intersectionality describes the way we represent subjecthood, and the assemblage accounts for the material components of bodies, then decolonial equivocation permits our worlds to connect transnationally without privilege.

Conclusion

The purpose of this essay was to critically consider intersectionality's place in Development Studies. I argued that intersectionality assumes that difference precedes and defines identity. At its worst, intersectionality risks essentializing Western categories of identity onto Third World subjects and supports relations with hegemonic frameworks. Assemblage, however, makes these complicities recognizable. It incorporates categories that are not immediately visible by focusing not on what identities mean, but what they do. Assemblages allow us to move away from strict binaries between straight and queer, woman and man, and rich and poor, by showing that the components which constitute these identities are not exclusively dissenting, but also converge with dominant and other formations in unplanned ways.[61] ■

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Notes

[1] Bell Hooks chronicles a genealogy of the Black women's oppression in *Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism* (Boston: South End Press, 1981): 51–87.

[2] Alison Symington, "Intersectionality: A Tool For Gender And Economic Justice, Facts and Issues," http://www.awid.org/content/download/48805/537521/file/intersectionality—en.pdf (accessed June 27, 2014).

[3] I use "dissident" as a catch-all term to refer to any non-normative sexual practice.

[4] Combahee River Collective, "A Black Feminist Statement," *Off Our Backs* 9, no. 6 (1979): 6–8.

[5] Gloria Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith, *All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women's Studies* (Old Westbury: Feminist Press, 1982).

[6] B. Smith, *Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology* (New York: Women of Color Press, 1983).

[7] Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa, *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color* (Watertown, MA: Persephone Press, 1981).

[8] Audre Lorde, *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches* (Trumansburg: Crossing Press, 1984).

[9] Elizabeth V. Spelman, *Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988).

[10] Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment* (New York: Routledge, 2000).

[11] Jasbir Puar, "'I Would Rather Be a Cyborg Than a Goddess': Becoming-Intersectional in Assemblage Theory," *PhiloSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism* 2, no.1 (2012): 49–66; Rey Chow, *The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press: 2006).

[12] Elizabeth Grosz, *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994).

[13] Roderick Ferguson, "Reading Intersectionality," *Trans-Scripts* 2 (2012): 91–98.

[14] An example: the United Nation's Millennium Development Goal 3: 'Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women' faces scrutiny in: Zubia Mumtaz, et al., "Maternal Deaths in Pakistan: Intersection of Gender, Caste, and Social Exclusion," *BMC International Health and Human Rights* 11 (2011): 1–6, as well as in Dina M. Siddiqi, "The Politics of Sexuality, Morality and Human Rights in the Making of the MDGs," *Arrows For Change* 16, no. 1 (2010): 4–5.

[15] Donna Baines, "Gender Mainstreaming in a Development Project: Intersectionality in a Post-Colonial Un-Doing?" *Gender, Work & Organization* 17, no. 2 (2010): 119–149.

[16] Elaine Unterhalter, "Poverty, Education, Gender and the Millennium Development Goals: Reflections on Boundaries and Intersectionality," *Theory and Research in Education* 10, no. 3 (2012).

[17] Leila M. Harris, "Water Rich, Resource Poor: Intersections of Gender, Poverty, and Vulnerability in Newly Irrigated Areas of Southeastern Turkey," *World Development* 36, no. 12 (2008): 2643–2662.

[18] Jo Baker, "Report on the Online Discussion on Eliminating Violence Against Women and Girls," http://www.unwomen.org/ffl/media/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2012/10/Online-Discussion-Report—CSW-57%20pdf.pdf (accessed October 1, 2013).

[19] Gana P. Ojha, "Evaluation of UN Women Fund for Gender Equality Economic and Political Empowerment Catalytic Grant Programme: 'Dalit Women's Livelihoods Accountability Initiative,' India," http://www.unwomen.org/ffl/media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/en/FGEProgrammeEvaluationGenderatWorkDSSIndia.pdf (accessed October 1, 2013).

[20] Carol Barton et al., "Civil Society Perspectives on the Millennium Development Goals," http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/poverty-reduction/poverty-website/civil-society-perspectives-on-the-mdgs/Civil%20Society%20Perspectives%20on%20the%20MDGs.pdf, (accessed October 1, 2013).

[21] "United Nations Development Assistant Framework for Nepal 2013-2017," 2012, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/nepal/docs/legalframework/UNDP—NP—UNDAF%202013-2017.pdf, (accessed October 1, 2013).

[22] "Laksmi Puri Underlines Urgent Need to Take More Courageous and Decisive Action Against Human Trafficking," May 14 2013, http://www.unwomen.org/co/news/stories/2013/5/lakshmi-puri-underlines-urgent-need-to-take-action-against-human-trafficking, (accessed October 1, 2013).

[23] This argument is rooted in Mohanty's work on early feminist theory's understanding of non-Western women. See: Chandra Talpade Mohanty, *Feminism With-*

out Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).

[24] Gayatri Spivak, "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography," in Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean, *The Spivak Reader* (London: Routledge, 1996): 214.

[25] Jasbir Puar, Ben Pitcher, and Henriette Gunkel, "Q&A With Jasbir Puar," http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2008/05/02/qa-with-jasbir-puar/ (accessed May 20, 2013).

[26] Michael Kaufman, "Building a Movement of Men Working to End Violence Against Women," *Development* 44, no. 3 (2001): 9–14.

[27] Antony Anghie, "Decolonizing the Concept of Good Governance," in *Decolonizing International Relations*, ed. Gruffydd Jones Branwen (Toronto: Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

[28] P. V. Narasimha Rao, "A Miracle of Democracy," http://archive.tehelka.com/story—main39.asp?filename=Ne100508a—miracle.asp (accessed 1 October 2013).

[29] The term corporeality emphasizes the physical relationships between subjects, their acts, and the tangible processes 'governing' them. Jasbir Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).

[30] For example, minority wives of famers with irrigated land vs. wives of farmers with unirrigated land; or minority children of military officers. See: Pradipta Chaudhury, "The 'Creamy Layer': Political Economy of Reservations," *Economic and Political Weekly* 39, no. 20 (2004): 1989–1991.

[31] Joseph A. Massad, *Desiring Arabs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

[32] Tarik Bereket and Barry Adam, "Navigating Islam and Same-Sex Liaisons Among Men in Turkey," *Journal of Homosexuality* 55, no. 2 (2008): 204–222.

[33] Ratna Kapur, *Erotic Justice* (London: The Glass House Press, 2005).

[34] Mary Minow, "Surviving Victim Talk," *UCLA Law Review* 40, no. 6 (1993): 1411–1445.

[35] Doug Meyer, "An Intersectional Analysis of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) People's Evaluations of Anti-Queer Violence," *Gender & Society* 26, no. 6 (2012): 849–873.

[36] Puar, "I Would Rather Be a Cyborg Than a Goddess."

[37] 'Governmentality' is Foucault's conception of the practices by which subjects are governed. Power is not enacted by sovereign decree, but by the establishment of

knowledge about the subject and techniques which act upon that knowledge. For a thorough discussion on the application of governmentality frameworks to contemporary political dilemmas, see William Walters, *Governmentality: Critical Encounters* (London, Routledge: 2012).

[38] David Halperin, *How to Be Gay* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012).

[39] Susan Ilcan and Anita Lacey, *Governing the Poor: Exercises of Poverty Reduction, Practices of Global Aid* (Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill–Queen's University Press, 2011).

[40] For a general overview of the status of queer Development interventions, see: Susie Jolly, "Queering Development: Exploring the Links between Same-Sex Sexualities, Gender, and Development," *Gender and Development* 8, no. 1 (2000): 78–88. One (of very few) specific examples about how development aid impacts upon queer lives is found in Marcia Oliver's work. See Marcia Oliver, "The US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief: Gendering the Intersections of Neoliberalism and Neoconservatism," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 14, no. 2 (2012): 226–246.

[41] Ryan Thoreson, "Capably Queer: Exploring the Intersections of Queerness and Poverty in the Urban Philippines," *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities* 12, no. 4 (2011): 507.

[42] "Cis-gender" refers to individuals whose perception of their gender matches their birth sex.

[43] Eva Rathgeber, "WID, WAD, GAD: Trends in Research and Practice," *The Journal of Developing Areas* 24, no. 4 (1990): 26–43.

[44] Ester Boserup, *Woman's Role in Economic Development* (Brookfield, VT: Gower 1986).

[45] Thoreson, "Capably Queer," 502.

[46] Kathleen Staudt, "Engaging Politics: Beyond Official Empowerment Discourse," in *Rethinking Empowerment*, Jane L. Parpat et al., eds. (London: Routledge, 2002).

[47] William Walters, "Some Critical Notes on 'Governance,'" *Studies in Political Economy* 73 (2004): 27.

[48] Mitchell Dean, *Governing Societies: Political Perspectives on Domestic and International Rule* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[49] Amanda Lock Swarr and Richa Nagar, "Dismantling Assumptions: Interrogating 'Lesbian' Struggles for Identity and Survival in India and South Africa," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 29, no. 2 (2004): 491–516.

[50] Gale Rubin, "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex" in L. Nicholson, *The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory* (London: Routledge, 1997): 27–62; Swarr and Nagar, "Dismantling Assumptions," 494.

[51] Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses," in *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, Chandra Talpade Mohanty et al., eds. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991): 51–80.

[52] Swarr and Nagar, "Dismantling Assumptions," 496.

[53] Ibid, 496.

[54] Lisa Duggan, *The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy*. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2003): 50.

[55] Barbara Cruikshank, *The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subject* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

[56] Manuel de Landa, *A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity* (New York: Continuum, 2006).

[57] Marisol de la Cadena, "Indigenous Cosmopolitics in the Andes: Conceptual Reflections Beyond 'Politics,'" *Cultural Anthropology* 25, no. 2 (2010): 334–370.

[58] de la Cadena, "Indigenous Cosmopolitics in the Andes," 346.

[59] Claudia de Lima Costa, "Equivocation, Translation and Performative Intersectionality; Notes on Decolonial Feminist Practices and Ethics in Latin America," *Anglo Saxonica* 3, no. 6 (2013): 90.

[60] Karen Barad, "Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 28, no. 3 (2003): 801–831.

[61] Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*, 205.

Recognizing Recognition in Donor–Recipient Relations

Clara Braungart

Though bilateral aid partnerships have gained increasing attention in the field of international development, most scholarship on Sino–African relations remains focused on narrow outcomes such as resource distribution. Drawing on Honneth's theoretical insights, this article moves away from strict normative judgments of aid relations' results by exploring how 'recognition' shapes the very processes of cooperation. The example of Sino–Malawian collaboration reveals that respect and humiliation significantly shape policymakers' understanding of, and participation in, development programs. Decision-makers' perceptions of the ways in which particular projects affect their nation's status on the world stage, of the degree to which aid programs involve civil society as opposed to policy elites, and of the extent to which foreign funding encroaches upon sovereignty all mould the contours of aid relationships—thereby helping determine their success. This analysis hence shows that, when evaluating the strength and effectiveness of aid partnerships, researchers and practitioners should more closely examine not only material changes within a recipient country, but the symbolic dimensions of collaboration as well. This article makes further contributions by introducing novel empirical data on Chinese cooperation with Malawi and by deploying this evidence to hone existing theoretical frameworks of recognition.

Introduction

> "If I've learned one thing covering world affairs, it's this: The single most underappreciated force in international relations is humiliation."[1,2]
>
> —Thomas L. Friedman

Even the most carefully designed development programs can result in humiliation or misrecognition. Donor–recipient relations in the context of development co-operation are, by their very nature, characterized by power imbalances. In recent years, such power asymmetries have be-

Clara Braungart, "Recognizing Recognition in Donor-Recipient Relations," *St Antony's International Review* 10, no. 2 (2015): 192–219.

come prominent in discussions regarding the growing ties between the People's Republic of China (PRC/China) and many African countries. Scholars' assessments of Sino–African relations have pointed to forces including ongoing exploitation, empowerment, re-balancing, and neo-colonialism. This paper uses primary data from Malawi to explore the nexus of two of these debates: those surrounding donor–recipient relations and those regarding Sino–African collaboration.

Sino–Malawian co-operation informs these discussions in two ways. On the one hand, it provides a rich source of evidence for an analysis of donor–recipient relations through the lens of recognition. In recent years, analysts' understanding of power imbalances in development collaboration has led to a wide acceptance of the principles of partnership and ownership within the field. Using the theory of recognition enhances scholars' and practitioners' awareness of the unintended consequences of "well-intentioned redistributive policies,"thus uncovering the normative dimension of partnership. [3] Empirically applying recognition theory also helps sharpen the concept of recognition itself.

On the other hand, examples drawn from Sino–Malawian co-operation help unfold Sino–African relations more broadly. Malawi is one of the least developed countries in the world, with a 2013 Human Development Index (HDI) value of 0.414—ranking the country 174th out of 187 nations globally.[4] This so-called recipient country began an ambitious partnership with the PRC after agreeing to a wide range of infrastructure deals in 2008, including the construction of a parliament building, a conference center, a stadium, a university, and a road from Karonga to Chitipa. Despite providing a valuable baseline for scholarly investigation, however, Sino–Malawian co-operation has hardly received any attention from the social scientific community. This article aims to close this gap by analysing Malawian expert perspectives on the package deal.

This article asks the following question: to what extent does an analysis of Sino–Malawian relations from a recognition perspective provide insights complementary to those produced by the partnership approach that currently dominates development debates? Following a brief overview of the current state of research on Sino–African relations, I introduce this article's conceptual framework, which uses Axel Honneth's theory of recognition to decode donor–recipient relations in development co-operation. Thereafter, this article discusses recognition's relevance to wider development debates and politics by analysing semi-structured interviews conducted with Malawian NGO representatives and civil servants during the months of February and March 2013. A critical discourse analysis of these discussions sheds light on the various understandings of recognition that color experts' perceptions of Chinese development aid.

Over the past decade, scholars have paid close attention to the PRC's rise on the global development stage. There exists a large body of academic literature on "China in Africa."[5] Studies place a heavy emphasis on China's quest for natural resources such as crude oil.[6] Several African countries indeed control abundant reserves of crude oil, precious metals, and other minerals. Many nations, including Sudan, Angola, and Zambia, have exported increasingly important quantities of such resources to the PRC in recent decades.[7]

Academic debates on Sino–African co-operation approach the content of this relationship from various angles, though predominantly with respect to economic growth, development goals, and human rights abuses. Scholars attempt to discuss Chinese engagement in African countries by evaluating the former's qualitative impact on the continent. In terms of economic consequences, the export of African resources, import of Chinese goods, and impact of Chinese loans are widely discussed.[8] With respect to human rights, matters relating to arms trading, peacekeeping, labour conditions, and the Chinese principle of non-interference dominate the scholarly field.[9]

Though scholars' theoretical assessments regularly diverge, most share a proclivity for normative analyses of China's role on the African continent. They hence mainly ask themselves how researchers can assess China's impact in developing African states and investigate how to identify the most 'desirable' outcomes of Sino–African co-operation.

Most studies reject the popular classification of China as a neocolonial power.[10] While some analysts decry China's responsibility for human rights abuses, environmental degradation, and trade imbalances, the majority continues to stress African leaders' responsibility for the domestic outcomes of bilateral agreements.[11]

Many researchers further argue that global rebalancing occurs as a function of East-South partnerships that challenge western dominance in processes of development, economic co-operation, and globalization. From this perspective, "the rise of emerging societies is a major turn in globalization and holds significant emancipatory potential. North-South relations have been dominant for 200 years and now an East-South turn is taking shape."[12] Some scholars similarly underline that fresh opportunities for African countries evolve because new actors, ideas, and practices arise in the wake of China's expanding international ambitions.[13]

Only the most recent publications on Sino–African relations move away from this narrow focus on the impacts of Chinese engagement. In doing so, they more critically assess the forms and content *of* China's role as a collaborator, shifting attention to the ways in which development assistance engages and alters African civil society,[14] African governments' agency,[15] and African citizens' and policymakers' perceptions of partnership.[16] Certain scholars also concentrate on the implications Sino–African relations hold for European countries' strategic interests in the region. Christine Hakenesch, for instance, tries to shed light on European co-operation with Ethiopia by comparing EU and Chinese policies toward the country.[17]

This article contributes to these more recent debates on Sino–African relations. On the one hand, it focuses on African and, more precisely, Malawian perspectives on development partnerships by interrogating how a recipient country's policymakers experience and evaluate collaboration with China. On the other, this article discusses the ways in which such insights allow for new understandings of donor–recipient relations more broadly. In so doing, it highlights the important role the very process of development co-operation plays in shaping its long-term success.

Development…

Development is a broad concept imbued with a variety of meanings. In a general sense, development can be understood as "a matter of reshaping and improving people's living conditions, through economic, political, and social processes."[18] Post-development and post-colonial perspectives have enhanced scholarly awareness of top-down practices that exclude local people and their knowledge of specific community needs. The most recent international agreements on development, namely the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Rome Declaration, and the Paris Declaration, partly incorporate these insights.[19] They mirror a two-pronged shift in the field of development: on the one hand, social development has become the focus of assistance packages; on the other, principles of partnership and recipient-country ownership widely permeate the political arenas in which co-operation takes place.

The MDGs include the goal of creating a "global partnership for development," mainly via increased trade and access to finance. More recently, the Paris Declaration and its rejoinders in Accra and Busan have signalled policymakers' interests in re-casting donor–recipient relations in order to improve aid effectiveness. The principles of ownership and alignment emphasize mutual responsibility: donors must take explicit steps to support "partner countries' national development strate-

gies, institutions, and procedures."[20] These agreements form a consensus around the notion that partnership should foster aid efficiency.

Barnes and Brown argue that partnership requires that two entities establish an equal relationship. In their eyes, only even footing allows recipient countries to effectively bring their development needs and suggestions to the fore. The authors point out that the term partnership has a dual meaning. It is mainly understood in an instrumental way: if aid recipients are genuinely perceived as partners, they are expected to take more responsibility for the development of their country, hence rendering aid more effective. Additionally, partnership has a moral component that "allows the impression that partnership is about transforming power relations in a positive and socially just fashion." Distributive justice and deliberative public reason are hence the most important normative criteria for partnership.[21] Nevertheless, the instrumental component of partnership remains most prominent in contemporary debates.

The term "partnership" is often used to describe donor–recipient relations. Eriksson Baaz, among others, argues that partnership is the dominating discourse in development studies and practice. However, this does not imply that relations between recipients and donors have become more equal.[22] The question of what partnership should look like and how to build it up remains underrepresented in development debates.[23] In order to extend this discussion, this analysis incorporates Honneth's theory of recognition.

…and Recognition

Why use recognition as a lens through which to understand donor–recipient relations? Donor–recipient relations are often framed as development partnerships. Despite the increasing importance of partnership, however, few scholars critically reflect on its form and content. Honneth argues that political recognition is key to achieving equitable and sustainable relations between states. By shedding light on recognition's various drivers and manifestations, this framework allows for a more nuanced perspective on donor–recipient relations.

As Volker Heins points out, discussions on global justice mainly concern themselves with the distribution of resources while neglecting the "danger of harming people's sense of self."[24] Theories of global justice indeed usually plead for resource transformation. Unfortunately, such perspectives barely take the effects of donors' actions on recipients' identity and autonomy into account.[25] Nancy Fraser attempts to remedy this shortcoming by conceptualizing justice as the distribution of three categories of goods: material resources, recognition (as a legitimate actor),

and representation (in the form of opportunities for participation).[26] She stresses that discussions about global justice or development co-operation that focus on the allocation of physical resources ignore less tangible, though no less important facets of justice. Partnership-based academic approaches to development hence make increasingly clear that aspects of recognition and procedural justice should play a more prominent role scholarly analyses.

There are several approaches to recognition within the field of International Relations. Bartelson provides an overview of these various conceptions, differentiating between political, legal, and moral recognition. International Relations scholars have long upheld the importance of a state's legal recognition within the international community as a measure of the power of sovereignty.[27] However, this formal understanding "only scratches the surface of the recognition phenomenon and particularly a political actor's quest for self-esteem."[28] There hence exists a need to conduct empirical studies of recognition in international relations so as to better grasp the concept's various dimensions.

Bartelson's categories of political and moral recognition go beyond the mere legal acceptance of a state. He points out that moral recognition "start[s] out from a presumption of equal moral worth when discussing the relationship between different communities or cultures."[29] He underlines how "moral recognition" is connected to matters of justice as well as identity."[30] To Bartelson, Honneth is one of the key proponents of "moral" recognition.[31] The connection between justice and identity matters makes "moral recognition" highly relevant to the analysis of donor–recipient relations.

Honneth tries to systematize the notion of recognition.[32] Using Hegelian principles, he develops a systematic overview of the means by which to understand recognition. According to Honneth, Hegel's vision of the concept springs from an individual's self-consciousness and independence—one must temper or neglect certain personal desires in order to recognize other human beings.[33] Honneth thus uses this view of recognition to develop a concept of social justice that reaches beyond materialism.

Some International Relations scholars attempt to deploy this basic insight to analyse inter-state acknowledgment and respect.[34] Honneth's later work engages these studies by questioning the extent to which inter-state relations can be explained by countries' drive for self-assertion alone. He argues that states not only strive for self-assertion, but for recognition as well.[35]

When elaborating a theory of inter-state recognition, Honneth adapts terminology derived from psychological approaches to interper-

sonal acknowledgement.[36] To Honneth, the main difference between the two levels of analysis lies in the role of state actors. Governments work to fulfil political responsibilities, but do not possess attitudes, feelings, and needs in the way individual actors do.[37] He shows, nevertheless, that the concept of interpersonal recognition can be transferred to inter-state recognition because any person who identifies with and/or represents a country will at least partially feel recognized or humiliated on its behalf.[38]

Honneth differentiates between two forms of recognition when it comes to inter-state relations: legal and political/diplomatic recognition.[39] Legal recognition relies upon definitions inscribed in international law and refers to the formal process by which a state is accepted as part of the international community. This form of recognition only requires a basic awareness of a state's existence. The second—and more fundamental—form of recognition describes the actual processes by which states gain international acknowledgement. Political recognition takes place if a government willingly decides to co-operate with another government toward a positive and productive end. Honneth does not shy away from the normative dimension of this type of recognition. He points out that political recognition can be used to improve state relations in both the short and the long-term.[40] He further notes that political recognition finds its root in a citizenry's legitimate expectations that their leaders' foreign policy decisions will engender international respect.[41]

There are different ways in which political recognition plays out in inter-state relations. First, symbolic manifestations, such as the implementation of metaphors, historic rituals, and gestures play a role. These symbolic acts express respect for a country's achievements and an awareness of its population's collective identity. Second, recognition reveals itself through the direct and outspoken acknowledgement of achievements by another country's head of state. Third, countries can make explicit demands for recognition on the global stage. Such requests hardly ever occur, however, because public claims for recognition risk being interpreted as a show of dependence and weakness.[42]

When it comes to theorizing interstate relations, Honneth points out how important it is to not only consider policymakers' goals of wealth, welfare, and self-assertion, but to also take into account the *processes* by which government actors strive to expand their country's international profile. These processes are guided by public expectations that leaders will take a political community's collective identities into consideration.[43] Honneth underlines how difficult it is to specify the 'we' of a population, which remains a hypothetical, rather than empirical, variable based on a set of random and assumed expectations forming collective narratives.

Nevertheless, he argues that scholars must grapple with these narratives because they serve as the legitimizing force behind foreign policy choices.[44]

Wolf and Haacke shed light on a broader utilization of the theory of recognition. Wolf explicitly refers to the field of development studies. In his eyes, development co-operation generally consists of a push for equality in terms of possession and rights. Development policy hence evokes pointed expectations of recognition while taking place in an environment of asymmetric interdependency.[45]

Wolf highlights that Honneth too narrowly focuses on the recognition of rights, achievements, and features. From his perspective, actors also strive for respect as independent entities, regardless of whether of not they can deliver proof of discrete achievements.[46] For this reason, Wolf uses the term "respect" rather than recognition. Wolf underlines that taking an actor seriously requires that others treat his or her needs seriously.[47] Wolf's criticism hence widens analysts' understanding of the ways in which states strive for appreciation as self-determining actors.

Wolf raises another problem regarding the ontology of respect/recognition in IR. He points out that respect/recognition might not be identifiable as an independent factor driving state leaders' actions because it also features an instrumental dimension. In effect, an actor's quest for respect can be connected to a desire for material benefits. This criticism also applies to the empirical study of recognition—how can recognition be demarcated from other state interests if policymakers' various goals are interconnected?[48] Though researchers can never fully resolve such analytical quandaries, they must nevertheless be wary of them.

The concept of recognition also raises broader questions about power asymmetries in the realm of development studies. As mentioned above, recognition traces back to Hegel. His account uses the master–slave relationship to illustrate how persons struggle for recognition in their respective roles. For Hegel, a person can only claim autonomy once others recognize him or her.[49] Analysts must therefore investigate whether or not recognition might lead to the reproduction of hierarchies and power imbalances.

Linking the theory of recognition and donor–recipient relations

Certain key concepts should play a role in an empirical analysis of donor–recipient relations using the theory of recognition. First, recognition is understood as a possible guiding principle for interstate interaction that, if applied, allows for reconciliation and trust-building processes. It is important to differentiate between legal and political/diplomatic rec-

ognition. When discussing political recognition, two subcategories arise: the acknowledgement of particular achievements and the recognition of sovereignty more generally. With respect to achievements or features, analysts must carefully examine the broader historical and political context in question. Does public opinion provide narratives about experiences of humiliation that may favour certain foreign policy positions over others? If so, which sort of humiliation is involved? Finally, which discourses and discursive practices provide insights into the connection between a drive for materialist goals versus recognition?

In contrast to an instrumental understanding of donor–recipient relations, the theory of recognition emphasizes the question of how to achieve desirable inter-state relations, which includes any symbolic aspects accompanying equitable collaboration. The recognition lens places a focus on trust-building and on the establishment of co-operative relations. On the interpersonal level, Honneth argues that genuine recognition implies actions and thus takes material injustice into account.

Both material and non-material (i.e., symbolic, procedural, and identity-based) factors impact the construction of equitable interstate relations in the development sphere. Yet, the question of how to achieve a balanced donor–recipient dynamic is rarely tackled from both angles at once. Analysing how recognition plays out in development co-operation between the PRC and Malawi, by contrast, allows for an exploration of the extent to which legal, material, symbolic, procedural, and identity-based recognition factors shape the development of effective donor–recipient relations.

Since Honneth refers to narratives with regard to recognition and humiliation, discourse analysis provides an appropriate tool through which to examine relations between China and Malawi. Identifying and understanding the markers of political recognition involves analysing how a specific population creates meaning when approaching inter-state collaboration.[50] Specifically, Critical Discourse Analysis, using methods developed by Fairclough and Chouliaraki, undergirds this article's investigatory framework.[51]

As previously mentioned, equating the views of Malawian state representatives with those of their constituents poses methodological difficulties. As a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population (e.g. Chewa, Lomwe, Yao, Tumbuka, Ngoni, Ngonde),[52] it is difficult to put forth a single narrative or national identity that encompasses all Malawians. However, this article explicitly focuses on inter-state relations. It does not claim to include all relevant possible groupings of Malawians, even if some may be more cohesive than the nation-state. Malawi has been an independent polity for over fifty years and has acted as such in the

international sphere. Even in cases where Malawians primarily identify with a particular ethnic or religious group, one can assume they simultaneously maintain a certain degree of affinity with the nation-state, especially with regard to international affairs.

The selection of interviewees followed qualitative criteria.[53] In order to obtain insights from persons informed about both development policies and Sino–Malawian relations, I focused on experts in two sectors: Malawian civil servants who work in ministries related to co-operation or development matters and representatives of Malawian development NGOs. Both groups have a detailed understanding of the country's development and political landscapes. Their expertise provides the basis for a discussion of the theoretical problem of recognition in donor–recipient relations by relating it to the specific case of Chinese infrastructure projects.[54]

Though there exists some risk that these interviewees' opinions might only reflect the views of Malawian élites, their positions nonetheless stand at the interface of formal government institutions and the public interest. Each expert holds insights into the ways different elements of civil society translate their desires into government intervention in the domestic and global arenas. As such, discourses arising in their statements are likely to adequately reflect the beliefs of a broader group of Malawians.[55]

Chinese infrastructure projects in Malawi

Sino–Malawian relations were established on December 28, 2007 and co-operative projects were officially launched in early 2008.[56] At that time, Malawi ended diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC). In order to foster its "one-China" policy, the PRC does not establish diplomatic ties with countries who consider the ROC an independent state.[57]

The collaboration materialized in the form of an ambitious package deal that consisted of an agreement to take over the construction of both the Karonga–Chitipa road and the parliament building, which had been started by the ROC. The PRC also agree to construct a new stadium, a conference center accompanied by a five-star hotel, and a university. With the exception of the stadium, each of these projects is now complete. Their total cost stood at approximately 291 million USD.[58]

The PRC financed the construction of the parliament building (40 million USD) as a grant. It was completed in June 2011 by the Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group Co., Ltd. (AFECC), also known as the *Sogecoa* company.[59] The building is located in the capital of Ma-

lawi, Lilongwe. The road from Karonga to Chitipa, in northern Malawi, was also paid for through a grant of around 11.5 million USD.60 It was finished in June 2012.

The other three projects were funded by concessionary loans from the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank).[61] The conference center, five-star hotel, and presidential villas required a budget of 95 million USD. However, only 92.5 million USD were offered as a loan by Exim Bank. The rest was advanced as a loan by the Shanghai Construction group in charge of the project (int. 16). The conference center and hotel are currently operated by Sunbird hotels, which runs two other properties in Lilongwe. To this day, the government has not approved an operator to take full charge of the conference facilities (int. 16).

Sogecoa completed the construction of the University of Science and Technology in Thyolo (Southern Region of Malawi) in 2012 at a cost of 80 million USD.[62] The stadium's construction only began in 2012 and is not yet finished. The 65 million USD project is also being undertaken by *Sogecoa* (int. 19).

Sogecoa has played a major role in the realization of the projects agreed upon in the 2008 package deal, taking responsibility for three out of the five projects. The company is also involved in oil exploration in Lake Malawi. In 2012, it acquired a license for oil exploration from the Malawian government without completing the formal application required of all other potential candidates.[63] This move cemented several analysts' impressions that the 2008 agreement included certain additional, non-transparent conditions. Unfortunately, such information currently remains classified and is unavailable to researchers.

Malawian and Chinese co-operation has also blossomed beyond the initial package deal. The most recent publication on foreign aid by the Malawian government states that the PRC has become an increasingly important donor, providing the country around 96 million USD in 2010–2011 alone.[64] In that year, only four donors exceeded the PRC's contribution: USAID (125 million USD), the World Bank (124 million USD), the British DfID (110 million USD) and the EU (97 million USD).[65]

Discourses on Recognition

Legal Recognition

Malawi's sovereignty plays a major role in shaping discourses on legal recognition. Sovereignty can be understood as "absolute control [by the

government] of a territory in a legal sense."[66] This ideal-typical definition implies the possibility that a government acts independently and is accepted as a self-determining actor in the international community.[67] Several authors refine this conception by pointing to sovereignty as more akin to a spectrum. Williams, for example, argues that a mere focus on territorial integrity risks ignoring more subtle forms of intervention or influence by other states.[68]

Launch of diplomatic relations

Many interviewees refer to the establishment of Malawi's and the PRC's co-operation. Malawi ended diplomatic relations with the ROC (Taiwan) in order to co-operate with the PRC (mainland China) beginning in 2007.[69] The interviewees do not reflect upon this matter very much, but mention it as a natural occurrence in Malawi's history (int. 10, 18, 9, 2). Their answers reflect a self-evident understanding that Malawi is a sovereign state free to agree to diplomatic relations with other governments. Hence, there is no doubt about legal recognition as such.

Aid conditionality

The sovereignty discourse can also be found in interviewees' assessment of China's aid policies. Almost all of the participants refer to the fact that China did not impose political conditions on Malawi as part of its aid package. A chief economist in the Ministry of Development provided the following answer when asked to compare Western and Chinese aid:

> China; they do not demand any conditions for their aid [...]. It means they are giving you freedom. [...] So this aid with no conditions can [...] maybe aid a developing country more (int. 17).

His argument follows the logic that it is most effective for a state to stay true to its own decisions than it is to follow others' prescriptions. The official therefore understands sovereignty as the right of a government to make decisions autonomously.

China's non-interference policy means that Malawi is taken seriously as an independent actor at home and on the world stage (int. 19, 20, 21, 17, 13, 12, 11, 6, 2; partly by 5, 9). Several interviewees characterize the partnership as "simplified and straight forward" (int. 21), "empower[ing]" (int. 13), and "for the people" (int. 12). Some interviewees also underline how conditions accompanying aid create problems for developing countries (e.g., int. 13, 2). Overall, the experts' answers

show that China's non-interference expresses recognition that Malawi is a sovereign state.

Support of projects without funding from Western donors

Many interviewees point out how China enables projects that would not be supported by other donors (int. 18, 12, 7, 4, 3). The Director of the Ministry of Finance's Debt and Aid Division puts this as follows:

> The main comparative advantage that I see with the Chinese aid is that the Chinese are willing to go into areas where very few other cooperate partners are willing to go and that is in infrastructure (int. 18).

As pointed out by Deborah Bräutigam, dominant development approaches focus on social improvement.[70] This is reflected in interviewee 18's response. He argues that there is an absence of donor support for infrastructure projects, despite Malawi's clear need for them. In his eyes, China more firmly embraces Malawi's development goals. This again implies the recognition of Malawi's sovereignty: China takes the needs that Malawi detects seriously and does not question their origins. A principal economist at the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development reinforces this point by referring to the Paris Declaration:

> Then you say, okay if you are giving us aid without preconditions, then that's what we need. Why, because that is [...] somehow in line I think with the Paris Declaration. Because what you are saying is: every country has to develop its own strategy and the donors have to be there simply to support, what the recipient country feels is good for them (int. 7).

To many interviewees, this commitment signifies a powerful recognition of Malawi's over strategic decision-making authority.[71] The majority thus perceives China as a donor supportive of their country's agency.

Following Honneth, legal recognition only asks whether diplomatic ties exist between two states and whether the international community formally acknowledges the state. In Malawi's case, there is no doubt that these criteria are satisfied because the country actively decided to work with the PRC as opposed to the ROC. Moreover, though Honneth pays little heed to legal recognition,[72] the interviews show that sovereignty is far more than a simple marker of existing diplomatic ties. Aid conditionality and funding targeted toward certain projects are perceived to interfere with Malawi's decision-making power. As a result, donors continually risk undermining sovereignty as a result of the very nature of their activities.

In the field of International Relations, state sovereignty has been the focus of many debates. According to Nye, state sovereignty refers first to a government's legal control over a territory. However, actual control can be effectuated in multiple ways.[73] If defined in a wide sense, intervention "refers to external actions that influence the domestic affairs of another sovereign state."[74] Nye thus also argues that more intangible forces, such as speeches and economic aid, represent soft forms of intervention. Williams reinforces this point, noting that states often explicitly interfere with other polities' sovereignty through the use of development aid.[75]

Williams's and Nye's reflections on sovereignty and intervention help elucidate a more nuanced vision of the concept with respect to donor–recipient relations. State sovereignty is a sensitive issue, especially in the realm of development co-operation. Colonialism and persistent structural inequalities remain immense obstacles when it comes to establishing equitable donor–recipient ties. Malawian decision-makers value China's non-interference precisely because they perceive political interference as a threat to self-determination.

Interviewees' statements about Western dominance further support this argument. Sovereignty appears at constant odds with political dynamics beyond Malawi's reach. In 2011, for instance, several donors, including the World Bank, the EU, Great Britain, the African Development Bank, Germany, and Norway, decided to reduce budgetary support for Malawi in response to the country's human rights record.[76] After the government changed hands in 2012, the country's links with the donor community once again improved. Malawi's new president, Joyce Banda, implemented structural reforms that convinced donors such as Germany to reinvest in the country.[77] Though Malawi's relationship with donors is now on the mend, however, the volatility policymakers experienced in the past several years has made them wary of the ways external political constraints can encroach upon sovereign decision-making.

Political recognition

Three discourses arise in connection to the recognition Malawi receives for discrete policy achievements or features: modernization, internationalization, and prestige.

Modernization

Modernization theory can be summed up as a view of societal progress born from economic growth and integration, technological advance-

ment, and efficiency. A statement by a principal economist at the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development succinctly reflects the notion of progress embodied in this discourse: "by the end of the day we want to see Malawi go forward" (int. 7). This idea recurs in several other interviewees' statements. In their eyes, Malawians must "move out from where we are to the next level" (int. 10) and "cannot live the past life" (int. 6).

This notion of progress is mirrored in more concrete explanations about economic growth, efficiency, and technological innovation. The head of an NGO points out, "[w]hat they have built is modern technology. It's high, it's good" (int. 11). Just as interviewee 11 equates 'high' with 'good', the majority of the interviewees positively connects new Chinese-backed projects with various levels of progress (int. 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12). Efficiency is perceived to play a major role on the road to modernity. On the one hand, many interviewees praise the realization of infrastructure projects for "moving at very fast pace" (int. 18, cf. 19, 4). On the other, they emphasize that the projects have drastically improved the efficiency of everyday tasks, particularly with respect to the time saved when traveling from Karonga to Chitipa. In interviewee 4's words, "11 hours to 2.5 hours: is that not development?" (cf. int. 3, 4, 5, 11, 14, 17). Overall, most interviewees follow a similar line of reasoning with regard to modernization: technological changes spurred by Chinese projects are necessary because they address a need for progress and efficiency.

Criticism of the projects' quality does nevertheless surface. Several interviewees transfer generalized experiences with Chinese products to the durability of the completed infrastructural improvements (e.g., int. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 20). Interviewee 7, for instance, notes "they are not durable, but you still have a new thing." Certain interviewees likewise criticize a focus on urban infrastructure that largely ignores the country's widespread rural poverty (int. 2, 5, 9, 11, 13, 14, 20). Nonetheless, nearly all interviewees continue to appreciate the overall progress reflected by the projects. Newness is closely associated with progress, such that even supposedly slipshod buildings are treated as a positive step forward.

Internationalization and prestige

Though less immediately striking than the modernization discourse, notions of internationalization and prestige also permeate interviewees' statements. Several point to the new buildings' beauty and to the significant changes infrastructure projects have brought to Lilongwe:

> In terms of the capitals [i.e., capital cities in Africa] Malawi is almost the last

> in terms of beauty. So when the Chinese have built the new things, people are happy to say now: our capital is coming up! We want to be compared with other countries (int. 12).

This interviewee equates the word "beauty" with progress ("coming up"), a value believed to be measurable ("be compared", "almost the last"). The statement reflects a desire for increased pride in the capital and for Malawi to be favourably "compared with" other countries. According to this line of reasoning, beauty denotes progress, which further implies external recognition (int. 14, 12, 11, 9, 13).

The terms "beauty" and "magnificence" are mentioned numerous times (int. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 14, 20). These positive attributes refer to the projects' visual qualities. An NGO co-ordinator states "Lilongwe is our capital. So if our capital city is seen as beautiful, it's the pride of the country" (int. 13). He points out that it is important to have visible signs of status in the capital "when someone comes in a foreign country." The interviewees hence value prestige as a driver of international recognition.

The confluence between prestige and international recognition is also reflected in the interviewees' emphasis on Malawi's internationalization. The director of the Debt and Aid Division of the Ministry of Finance states that Malawi was the "only country in the region which did not have a proper international conference center, but now we do have one and we can now host international meetings, we can now host head of states" (int. 18). The conference center is thus perceived to contribute to Malawi's global profile. Several interviewees mention the fact that their country recently hosted Southern African Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU) meetings (int. 4, 14, 16). Overall, interviewees appreciate that influential international actors are now more likely to visit Malawi.

These statements bring to light significant overlap with the modernization discourse. The parliament, the conference center, and the stadium are lauded as beautiful, adding to Malawi's prestige and helping cement the country's place in the global community. The modernization discourse constitutes the benchmark for this assessment: the more projects bolster efficiency, technological change, and economic growth, the better they symbolize Malawi's progress. The changes, in other words, are believed to reflect achievements leading to international recognition.

Counter-discourses on dependency and social development do arise. Several interviewees mention the continued prevalence of rural poverty in order to criticize certain aspects of Chinese infrastructure investments. To them, incorporating Malawians into the construction process

for employment purposes remains of great importance. Still, interviewees more highly value construction projects' end products and their modernizing powers. Progress remains paramount. Increased prestige, such as that gained through the erection of modern buildings, helps interviewees feel recognized and worthy of lasting respect.

Humiliation: discourses on power-imbalance

Several experiences of humiliation also play a role in interviewees' lines of argumentation, namely: non-transparent processes; Malawi as a non-powerful actor/Least Developed Country (LDC); and domination by western nations.

Non-transparency

Two undercurrents color interviewees' view of non-transparency in development aid partnerships. First, interviewees criticize citizens' lack of involvement in project management. Second, many participants express concerns about the future of co-operation with China. As an NGO director notes:

> Because the executive does that and there is no proper communication to the local level, to the ground—so everyone can be aware. The impact is that we might end up with a lot of infrastructure that have been done by the Chinese without our full involvement (int. 9).

According to this view, co-operation only takes place at the governmental level, as the word 'executive' implies. The majority of the population has little 'involvement' and hence almost no agency with respect to the direction of development initiatives. In effect, decisions are often made without proper information campaigns or direct voter consent. This criticism reflects a belief that governance be based on—and visibly include—civil society.[78] Other interviewees share this concern (int. 14, 6). Though they remain in the minority, these experts point out a crucial dimension of the recognition–humiliation nexus. Just as in other African countries, development negotiations in Malawi mainly take place without the involvement of Parliament (int. 2).[79] Centralized decision-making processes hence tend to exclude the people's representatives. The public's lack of participation in decision-making processes can be perceived as humiliating for the Malawian population.

Several interviewees share another worry about non-transparency (int. 2, 5, 9, 11, 20). A chief legal officer at the Ministry of Foreign Af-

fairs reflects: "what is it these guys are getting from us [?] [...] It could be people at top government level are aware of that but I'm not" (int. 2). Though this officer was present in negotiations pertaining to the construction of the parliament building and conference center, he points out that the contracts themselves remain sealed. He hence expects Malawi to follow an asymmetric path similar to those of other African countries that have co-operated with China—one marked by resource extraction and exploitation. Interviewee 9, for instance, brings up *Sogecoa*'s involvement in oil exploration in Lake Malawi. Legitimate concerns exist that drilling will have negative economic and environmental consequences that most Malawians cannot yet foresee. This uncertainty engenders a degree of humiliation: because citizens, and even some high-ranking policymakers, remain uninformed about such developments, their concerns cannot be taken seriously (or are likely to simply be ignored).

Vulnerability

Statements about Malawi's status as a small state and an LDC also reflect power imbalances. As a principal economist at the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development points out, "[i]n case you are a country that is *so much* looking for aid, you have a case where there are no preconditions, then it's good for you" (int. 7, emphasis added). The interviewee depicts Malawi as a powerless actor in need of significant help. Other interviewees echo his account of Malawi's incapacity to act independently. The country is generally described as being "poor" (int. 12, 6), in need of outside "assistance," "aid," or empowerment (int. 4, 7, 11). On the one hand, this discourse on state vulnerability serves to legitimize the need for foreign grants and loans. On the other, it has a connotation of humiliation because Malawi's government and population are depicted as powerless in the absence of external support. This reinforces the asymmetry between donor and recipient because it suggests that Malawian agency is only possible with outside help.

Domination by Western countries

Only a few interviewees explicitly criticize Western supremacy in Malawi. "But for the [W]est we find, there's nothing they do apart from squeezing you," interviewee 12 remarks. A chief economist in the Ministry of Development provides a more nuanced depiction of this power dissymmetry. He refers to "problems accessing your markets, for instance in Europe" (int. 16). Malawi thus feels weak in the face of Western policy. Nevertheless, the discourse on humiliation by Western supremacy

does not dominate the interviews. Instead, such comments reflect a more general understanding that Malawi remains a minor actor on the international stage. This applies to Sino–Malawian co-operation just as it applies to Malawian collaboration with the West.

This point applies to the analysis of humiliation's manifestation in a broader sense as well. The discourses drawn upon in the interviews do not relate to narratives of active humiliation. Instead, they describe an overarching narrative that views Malawi as a somewhat vulnerable and powerless state. While this assessment of power imbalances mainly concerns interstate relations, the interviewees also mention élitism in the political system: only very high-level governmental officials remain fully informed of and included in decision-making processes.

Recognition vs. redistribution

The above discourse analysis examines recognition as a factor in international relations. It is thus mainly concerned with symbolism and matters of identity as they relate to development assistance or global justice more broadly. Drawing on a basic understanding of development as "a matter of re-shaping and improving people's living conditions, through economic, political and social processes," this article's critics will most likely question the policy relevance of recognition for development. Do symbolism and a country's perceived partnership status actually matter in a field dealing with concrete issues such as poverty, water quality, and food security?[80] Might focusing on recognition simply lead to the consolidation of unequal power relations?

Honneth counters this line of criticism with two arguments. First, he points out that the aim of recognition is always to increase the recipient country's autonomy.[81] Second, he argues that mere symbolic action is not credible if it is not later translated into material changes.[82]

With respect to the notion of a possible trade-off between an LDC's material needs and recognition, the interview data proves Honneth's contention correct. All of the interviewees highlight the economic and social benefits of the projects alongside their symbolic impact. They refer to an increase in foreign investments, greater higher education availability, and heightened institutional democratization. In a parallel vein, the sub-discourse on rural poverty echoes criticisms that existing projects only marginally tackle material goals. The interviewees' assessments reflect this tension between recognition versus redistribution. One can therefore argue that both aspects are important for development co-operation. Indeed, both are accredited to the package deal.

These findings also implicitly answer the question about whether or not recognition consolidates power imbalances. By remaining aware of both Malawi's material needs and its desire for recognition, the interviewees actively distance themselves from the promulgation of such asymmetries. Their critical evaluation of both aspects proves there exists a realistic possibility of transforming power relations between the country and its foreign partners. Following Honneth's argument that recognition fosters autonomy, increased international recognition may encourage politically-engaged segments of Malawian society to speak out against injustices tied to development aid. Here too, the empirical material provides guidance. Several interviewees, for instance, criticize present power imbalances and non-transparency. Of course, this empirical observation does not prove a causal relation. There is no evidence to assume that recognition alone pushes policymakers to raise concerns and work against power abuses. Nonetheless, the interview data does not prove the contrary either. There is thus no reason to conclude that recognition consolidates power imbalances. In order to prove this criticism right or wrong, a more focused empirical analysis would need to be performed.

In donor–recipient relations, (mis)recognition and redistribution are inevitably intertwined. Therefore, it is very difficult to clearly distinguish these two factors from one another. Mere symbolic recognition, which does not imply action, does not create a relationship built on genuine trust and respect. Pure material redistribution, meanwhile, can be interpreted as paternalistic action reinforcing power asymmetries.[83]

Conclusion

This article proposes an alternative approach to the analysis of Chinese engagement in African countries and discusses the relevance of emerging donors' strategies when moulding new relations with recipient nations. Sino–Malawian co-operation serves as a useful case in the search for insights into this evolving domain. Though this article underlines both positive and negative dimensions of the relationship, it aims to move away from strict normative judgments of the outcomes of development partnerships by focusing on the ways in which recognition shapes the very *processes* of co-operation. Overall, this analysis reveals that both recognition and humiliation significantly affect policymakers' understanding of and participation in development programs.

The application of recognition theory reveals that a range of sensitive issues mould the contours of donor–recipient relations. Three, in

particular, come to light: visible progress or prestige, transparency, and sovereignty. The discourses on prestige, internationalization, and modernization draw attention to two points. On the one hand, they reveal the need to engage with recipient countries' views and narratives. Understanding the criteria by which recipient countries evaluate development projects (e.g. modernization theory in Malawi's case) may clarify their policy perspectives and thereby improve bilateral relations. On the other hand, it may be necessary to envision development in terms more nuanced than poverty reduction or resource transformation alone. Symbolic aspects of development also matter: the prestige that Chinese-backed projects afford reflects progress in the eyes of most interviewees. These projects hence display additional symbolic value by heightening international recognition. As recipients gain political respect and recognition, the risk that aid projects will engender feelings of humiliation may diminish.

Second, the discourse on transparency points out that involving civil society to the greatest possible extent remains of paramount importance to the public and to policymakers. This is especially true with respect to the provision of information. Transparent and accessible development processes send a signal to the population at large that partnership affects not only élites' interests, but those of average citizens as well.

Third and finally, the discourse on sovereignty highlights the connection between a partnership approach to development and interference in recipient countries' sovereignty. This discussion already plays a role in development debates. If practices such as the imposition of aid conditions take place, sovereignty becomes an important point of discussion for donor–recipient relations. However, since development co-operation, like all interstate relations, inevitably involves some degree of interference with sovereignty,[84] this is not an easy issue to resolve. Symbolic manifestations of political recognition thus take on increased importance because they help defray the effects of sovereign infringement.

On a more general empirical level, this review provides exploratory insights into Sino–Malawian co-operation that will likely prove useful to future scientific research on Sino–African relations. The theory of recognition uncovers two methodological hurdles that require closer examination: the difficulty of accurately defining the recognized group and that of operationalizing recognition and humiliation.

On a theoretical level, this article combines the recognition perspective with debates on partnership approaches to development. This strategy has obvious shortcomings. On the whole, however, Honneth's approach proves to be of value for development scholars. In addition to acknowledging more traditional legal and material forces pointed to in

the field of International Relations, it allows for a broader understanding of global justice by unearthing symbolic, procedural, and identity-based factors important to the construction of bilateral partnerships. The analysis shows that both of the categories into which these factors can be regrouped—redistribution and recognition—play a role in shaping Sino–Malawian relations. Keeping this broader conception of development assistance in mind may lead to the establishment of more equal and productive relationships in the future. ■

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Notes

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[2] Thomas L. Friedman, "The Humiliation Factor," *New York Times* (November 9, 2003).

[3] Volker Heins, "Realizing Honneth: Redistribution, Recognition, and Global Justice," *Journal of Global Ethics* 4, no. 2 (2008): 141–153, 141.

[4] UNDP, "Human Development Report 2014," http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/MWI.pdf (accessed December 2014).

[5] See Ian Taylor, *China's New Role in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009); Chris Alden, *China in Africa: Partner, Competitor Or Hegemon?* (New York: Zed Books, 2007); Deborah Bräutigam, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); *Chinese and African Perspectives on China in Africa*, Axel Harneit-Sievers et al., eds. (Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2010); *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, eds. (Oxford: Fahamu, 2007).

[6] See Dambisa Moyo, *Winner Take All: China's Race for Resources and What it Means for the World* (New York: Basic Books, 2012); Nelson B. Villoria, "China's Growth and the Agricultural Exports of Sub-Saharan Southern Africa," *European Journal of Development Research* 21, no. 4 (2009): 531–550, 532.

[7] See Peter Kragelund, "Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure? Chinese Investments in the Zambian Mining and Construction Sectors," *European Journal of*

Development Research 21, no. 4 (2009): 644–661; Helmut Asche and Margot Schüller, *Chinas Engagement in Afrika—Chancen und Risiken für Entwicklung* (Hamburg: Giga, 2008); Ndubisi Obiorah, "Who's Afraid of China in Africa? Towards an African Civil Society Perspective on China-Africa Relations," in *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, Firoze Manji et al., eds. (Oxford: Fahamu, 2007): 35–55.

[8] See Asche and Schüller, *Chinas Engagement in Afrika*; Alison Ayers, "Beyond Myths, Lies and Stereotypes: The Political Economy of a 'New Scramble for Africa'," *New Political Economy* 18, no. 2 (2013): 227–257; Giorgia Giovannetti and Marco Sanfilippo, "Do Chinese Exports Crowd-Out African Goods? An Econometric Analysis by Country and Sector," *European Journal of Development Research* 21, no. 4 (2009): 506–530.

[9] See Taylor, *China's New Role in Africa*; Chidaushe Moreblessings, "China's Grand Re-Entrance: Mirage or Oasis?," in *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, eds. (Oxford: Fahamu Publications, 2007), 107–118; Christine Hackenesch, "Aid Donor Meets Strategic Partner? The European Union's and China's Relations with Ethiopia," *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 42, no. 1 (2013): 7–36.

[10] See Moyo, *Winner Take All*, 156–157.

[11] See Taylor, *China's New Role*; Anabela Lemos and Daniel Ribeiro, "Taking Ownership or Just Changing Owners?" in *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, eds. (Oxford: Fahamu Publications, 2007): 63–70.

[12] Pieterse, "Global Rebalancing," 22; and Chidaushe, "China's Grand Re-Entrance."

[13] Bräutigam, *The Dragon's Gift*, 310.

[14] See Harneit-Sievers, *Chinese and African Perspectives*.

[15] See Giles Mohan and Ben Lampert, "Negotiating China: Reinserting African Agency into China-Africa Relations," *African Affairs* 112, no. 446 (2013): 92–110.

[16] See Marek Hanusch, "African Perspectives on China-Africa: Modeling Popular Perceptions and their Economic and Political Determinants," *Oxford Development Studies* 40, no. 4 (2012): 492–516.

[17] Asche and Schüller, *Chinas Engagement in Afrika*; Hackenesch, *Aid Donor Meets Strategic Partner*.

[18] Kristina Jönsson, Anne Jerneck and Malin Arvidson, *Politics and Development in a Globalised World: An Introduction* (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012).

[19] Aram Ziai, "The Millennium Development Goals: Back to the Future?," *Third World Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (2011): 92–110; OECD, "The Paris Declaration on Aid Ef-

fectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action," http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf (accessed July 27, 2013).

[20] "The Paris Declaration," 3.

[21] Amy Barnes and Garret W. Brown, "The Idea of Partnership Within the Millennium Development Goals: Context, Instrumentality and the Normative Demands of Partnership," *Third World Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (2011): 172–175.

[22] Maria E. Baaz, *The Paternalism of Partnership: A Postcolonial Reading of Identity in Development Aid* (New York: Zed Books, 2005).

[23] Barnes et al., "The Idea of Partnership," 165.

[24] Volker Heins, "Realizing Honneth," 141.

[25] Ibid., 141–153.

[26] Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking Recognition," *New Left Review* 3 (2000): 107–120; Nancy Fraser, "Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World," *New Left Review* 36 (2005): 69–89.

[27] Allen Buchanan, "Recognitional Legitimacy and the State System," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 28, no. 1 (1999): 46–78.

[28] Thomas Lindemann, "The Case for an Empirical and Social-Psychological Study of Recognition in International Relations," *International Theory* 5, no. 1 (2013): 150–155.

[29] Jens Bartelson, "Three Concepts of Recognition," *International Theory* 5, no. 1 (2013): 107–129, 118.

[30] Ibid.

31 Ibid., 107–128. A similar approach to recognition is the differentiation between "thin and thick recognition" by Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller. See Alexis Keller and Pierre Allan, "The Concept of a Just Peace, or Achieving Peace Through Recognition, Renouncement, and Rule," in *What is a Just Peace?*, Pierre Allen and Alexis Keller, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 195–215.

[32] Axel Honneth, *Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994).

[33] Honneth, *Das Ich im Wir*, 7-32.

[34] See Jürgen Haacke, "The Frankfurt School and International Relations: On the Centrality of Recognition," *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 1 (2005), 181-194;

Reinhard Wolf, "Respekt. Ein unterschätzter Faktor in den internationalen Beziehungen," *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 15, no. 1 (2008): 5–42.

[35] Honneth, *Das Ich im Wir*, 181-201.

[36] Ibid., 184.

[37] Ibid., 186.

[38] Wolf, *Respekt*, 14.

[39] Honneth uses the term "zweite Ebene" ("second level"), which Bartelson refers to as "moral recognition." I use the term "political/diplomatic" to describe this form of recognition.

[40] Honneth, *Das Ich im Wir*, 187–188.

[41] Ibid., 187–189.

[42] Ibid., 190–191.

[43] Ibid., 192.

[44] Ibid.,194–199.

[45] Wolf, "Respekt," 36.

[46] Ibid., 10.

[47] Ibid., 17.

[48] Ibid., 18-19.

[49] Patchen Markell, "Recognition and Redistribution," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, John S. Dryzek et al., eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 450–469.

[50] It is difficult to operationalize the concept of recognition. By starting off with open questions about the participants' evaluation of the projects, I obtained knowledge about their context and overall beliefs that helped me interpret their answers corresponding leading questions. By posing questions about partnership, visibility, and symbolism, I aim directly addresses issues of recognition. See Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann, *Interviewing: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing* (London: Sage Publications, 2009).

[51] Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Discourse Analysis* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999).

[52] Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Ethnic Groups," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html (accessed December 2014).

[53] Uwe Flick, *Qualitative Sozialforschung. Eine Einführung* (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 2007): 154–155.

[54] Ibid., 216–218.

[55] In the following text, the interviewees are denoted by numbers. For instance, "int. 20" means interviewee number 20. A complete list of interviewees is available at: http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=3994235&fileOId=3994245.

[56] Li Lin, "Malawi Confirms Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with China," *Xinhuanet*, January 14, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/14/content—7421771.htm (accessed July 29, 2013).

[57] Bräutigam, *The Dragon's Gift*, 67-70.

[58] Government of Malawi, *The Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP): 2010/11-2014/15: Building National Capacity for Sustained Growth and Development* (Lilongwe: Government of Malawi, n.d.).

[59] While some sources state that *Sogecoa* is a "private construction company," other sources state that the AFECC is a Chinese state-owned enterprise, see AidData, "Tracking Chinese Development Finance to Africa, Organization: Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group Co., Ltd. (AFECC)," http://aiddatachina.org/organizations/1346 (accessed July 29, 2013).

[60] I converted the value from the budget indicated in a report by the Malawian government, denominated in Malawi kwacha. Due to the high instability of the Malawi kwacha exchange rate, it is not possible for me to indicate the exact amount of money granted for this project.

[61] AidData, "Tracking Chinese Development Finance to Africa, Kwacha Presidential Hotel, International Conference Centre and Presidential Villas," http://aiddatachina.org/projects/776 (accessed July 29, 2013).

[62] AidData, "Tracking Chinese Development Finance to Africa, Construction of University of Science and Technology," http://aiddatachina.org/projects/828 (accessed July 29, 2013).

[63] "Oil Exploration on Lake Malawi Turns Fishy," *Malawi Today* (July 9, 2012).

[64] Government of Malawi, *Malawi Aid Atlas 2010/2011FY*, http://www.mw.undp.org/content/dam/malawi/docs/capdev/AID%20ATLAS%202010-11%20-%20Malawi.pdf (accessed March 09, 2013).

[65] It is unclear whether the money provided by China qualifies as Official Development Aid (ODA), as classified by members of the Donor Assistance Committee (DAC) at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or as Other Official Flows (OFF). OOF is used to describe money from governments that does not correspond to ODA criteria. Unfortunately, the Chinese Government does not provide the statistical data to clarify this question. For more on this subject, see Deborah Bräutigam, "Aid 'With Chinese Characteristics': Chinese Foreign Aid and Development Finance Meet the OECD-DAC Aid Regime," *Journal of International Development* 23, no. 5 (2011): 752–764.

[66] Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (London: Pearson Longman, 2009).

[67] Krasner refers to autonomy, effective governance, and recognition as key attributes of the "ideal-typical sovereign state", see Stephen D. Krasner, "Recognition: Organized Hypocrisy Once Again," *International Theory* 5, no. 1 (2013): 170–176.

[68] David Williams, "Development, Intervention and International Order," *Review of International Studies* 40, no. 5 (2013): 1–19.

[69] Bräutigam, *The Dragon's Gift*, 68.

[70] Ibid.,77.

[71] Ibid., 134.

[72] Honneth, *Das Ich im Wir*, 187.

[73] Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 168.

[74] Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 166.

[75] Williams, "Development, Intervention and International Order."

[76] Mark Tran, "Britain Suspends Aid to Malawi," *The Guardian* (July 14, 2011); Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, "Regierungsverhandlungen mit Malawi abgeschlossen," http://www.bmz.de/de/presse/aktuelleMeldungen/2011/dezember/20111208_pm_232_malawi/index.html (accessed August 6, 2013).

[77] *Entwicklungspolitik*, "Deutschland sagt Malawi umfangreiche Unterstützung zu," http://www.epo.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8691:deutschland-sagt-malawi-umfangreiche-unterstuetzung-zu&catid=45&Itemid=90 (accessed August 6, 2013).

[78] Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein, "Civil Society and the State," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, John S. Dryzek et al., eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 363–381.

[79] Nancy Dubosse, "Chinese Development Assistance to Africa: Aid, Trade and Debt," in *Chinese and African Perspectives on China in Africa*, Axel Harneit-Sievers et al., eds. (Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2010): 80.

[80] Baaz, *Paternalism of Partnership*, 10.

[81] Honneth, *Das Ich im Wir*, 105.

[82] Ibid, 110.

[83] Baaz, *Paternalism of Partnership*.

[84] Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*.

Jessica Auchter. *The Politics of Haunting and Memory in International Relations*.

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The figure of the ghost, the spirit doomed forever to wander the interstices of "here" and "there," is one that figures heavily in the human subconscious. What can be more terrifying and yet more fascinating than something that is both dead and alive, both present and absent? It is this problematic nature of ghosts that informs the theoretical thrust of *The Politics of Haunting and Memory in International Relations*. Throughout the work, Auchter draws on Derrida's notion of "hauntology"[1] to trace the ways in which the state manipulates the categories of life and death. "Statecraft," she claims, "is nothing less than the construction of subjectivity itself [...] what it means to be recognised as alive or dead by the state" (p. 170).

This theoretical commitment to "thinking hauntologically" is brought to bear on three case studies involving mass trauma and memorialization: the Rwandan genocide; the deaths of undocumented migrants on the Mexico-US border; and Ground Zero in New York. Drawing on a diverse range of scholarly traditions ranging from psychoanalysis to International Relations, Auchter traces the ways in which the processes of memorialization are bound up with the production of ontological security—predominately in the construction of an "us" (the one who remembers) versus "them" (the one who is remembered)—and how the ghostly hauntings of the victims can ultimately disrupt this process. By paying attention to the ghost as a "thing-in-itself," Auchter argues persuasively for the ways in which practices of memorialization are implicated in state practices of subjectification and control. In particular, she emphasizes the way in which state power works to define who constitutes part of the political community by appropriating dead bodies and imposing national narratives about their deaths. In this sense, "nothing, not even death, is beyond the purview of statecraft" (p174).

Auchter's work is deeply embedded in the theoretical and empirical concerns of what has been dubbed the "spectral turn" in literary criticism and the social sciences. Precipitated in the early 1990s by the publication of Derrida's *Specters of Marx*,[2] the "spectral turn" marked a new area of investigation in which the ghost, or spectre, emerged as an analytical tool in-and-of itself.[3] Where Auchter breaks new ground is in highlighting the ways in which states produce and construct ontological divisions between life and death to further their own ends. What is missing from her analysis, however, is a compelling theory of the state itself, which often seems to flounder somewhere in between a discursive Foucauldian approach to 'governmentality' and a Weberian notion of the Westphalian state defined by its monopoly of territory and violence. The result of this is that although her arguments about statecraft and the construction of the categories of life and death remain compelling, they seem to float without a fixed mooring since the state itself is never satisfactorily defined. Auchter herself comments that this is precisely the point; she intentionally leaves her notion of the state ambiguous since the state itself is "a series of context-dependent practices and processes of its own construction."[4] This is an important idea and would benefit from a little more theoretical engagement with the literature on statecraft and governmentality in order to win over those readers who are unfamiliar with such arguments.[5]

Auchter argues that each of her case studies highlight a different process of statecraft: whether it is the construction of a national narrative; the practice of bordering; or the implication of collective trauma in state domestic and foreign policy. Ultimately, however, her three cases have much more in common than not. They each represent a moment of collective grief and trauma that has implications for the construction of national identity. Significantly, they also involve the deaths of thousands of individuals, many of whom remain unidentified. These qualities make such cases obvious choices for studying the politics of haunting, but for that very reason they fail to address the heart of what is at stake when paying attention to ghosts: that the ghost itself does not have to be the returning spirit of an individual person. Everyone and *everything* can be implicated in the processes of haunting; I can be equally haunted by places, words, smells, sounds, and things as by the ghosts of dead people. Indeed, one of the most significant works on haunting in recent years has been Navaro-Yashin's exploration of the haunting presence of objects and properties abandoned in the aftermath of the 1974 partition of Cyprus.[6] By emphasizing the interrelations between humans and objects, Navaro-Yashin outlines a theory of subjectivity that explains how

the mechanisms of haunting transcend the simple appropriation of death by the state for political purposes, which is the focus of Auchter's work.

In conclusion, *The Politics of Haunting and Memory* makes an important contribution to International Relations theory by widening the scope of analysis to include politics beyond the grave. As Auchter herself states: "the ultimate aim of this project must, at the end, be an ethical imperative [...] to be open to the ghostly" (p175) after all "we're all of us haunted and haunting." Only by attuning ourselves to the ghost as that which disrupts ontology will the constructed nature of reality—and the power relations on which such a construction relies—be revealed to us. ■

Notes

[1] Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International* (New York: Routledge, 1994).

[2] Ibid.

[3] María del Pilar Blanco, and Esther Peeren, *The Spectralities Reader: Ghosts and Haunting in Contemporary Cultural Theory* (London and New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013).

[4] Jessica Auchter, in email correspondence with the author dated 21 November 2014.

[5] There is a diverse body of literature that seeks to counter the realist Westphalian notion of the state with a more discursive and constructivist approach, ranging from arguments about the state as a "mask" that prevents us seeing the reality of political practice (Philip Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1988): 58); an "effect" of state-building practices (Timothy Mitchell, "Society, Economy and the State Effect," in *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*, Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, eds. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006): 169); and as a "fantasy" (Jacqueline Rose, *States of Fantasy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)).

[6] Yael Navaro-Yashin, *The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Post-War Polity* (London and Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012).

Richard Ned Lebow. *The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves*

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Richard Ned Lebow, well-known for his steady production of well-written and ever inspiring books, has now wrapped his mind around the concept of identity and its implications for politics and ethics in *The Politics and Ethics of Identity, In Search of Ourselves*. Truth be told, it is an overwhelming read. Not in the least because Lebow brings together insights of philosophy, psychology, and political science to make his argument that identity does not exist ontologically, but nevertheless is a significant conception for modern humanity. In this book he questions the main assumptions that are generally underpinning studies of identity, namely that everybody possesses a (true) self that needs to be discovered from within, and furthermore sustains a continuous identity that is also unique. Lebow argues in contrast that identities are constructed by practices and beliefs, forthcoming from multiple, conflicted and fragmented selves that interact with the social world through affiliations and social roles played within communities. He does that with a purpose, namely to show that neither politics, nor ethics should per se be connected to our perception of the coherent, sustainable and unique self-identity, but rather to our understanding of identity as a fluid concept.

Lebow argues that identity is constructed through a dialectical relation between the social world that shapes our external sense of identity on the one hand and our individual search for an interior sense of identity on the other. The social world, Lebow argues, offers through the centuries basically four generic strategies that are used to shape identities externally. Through a close inspection of selected dramatic and literary works of the ancient Greek and Romans (Homer and Virgil), the Enlightenment (Mozart), nineteenth-century Germany (with its renewed interest in the ancient Greek; Nietzsche and Hegel), and contemporary times (Christian inspired fantasy, and science fiction), Lebow convincingly shows the four different narratives that have shaped identity formation through the ages, and connects these with empirical examples to show how different political orientations come forth from these different narratives. From a micro-perspective, people have shaped interior iden-

tities, which are formed on a more psychological basis, however, these identities are informed and shaped by the influence of the social world. Because people have had a hard time coping with their multiple selves, they forced themselves to fit a narrative and adapt the ethics involved within such a narrative. In other words, because individuals look for a consistent and unique idea of their selves, they happily adapt their sense of identity to a discourse that is shaped by the social world around them in order to get grip on their own sense of identity. Lebow concludes that these four strategies have led to beliefs about identity that are closely connected with ideas about political order, namely conservatism, totalitarianism, liberalism, and anarchism. Subsequently, with every different strategy comes an ethical stance which is adapted as well. That the need for a consistent and unique identity can therefore lead to disastrous results in the political and ethical realm Lebow emphasizes through his empirical example of early twentieth-century Germany.

It is not for nothing that Lebow therefore pleads in his conclusion for a fluid understanding of ourselves, an acceptance of the incoherence of identity, and an acknowledgement of how we as human beings change over time, including our perceptions and expressions of our selves. Only when we can accept that will we be able to start to understand that turning to a single belief is not an expression of our identity, but rather a choice for limitation forthcoming from a need for security. The same goes for ethics, acknowledging that ethics are created by humans, and are not contingent on beliefs that are shaped by humans in order to make coherent identities. In the end, Lebow thereby formulates a new political theory on the role of identity in political order that stresses the importance of a fluid identity for the good of the community.

Lebow is a skilled writer and, like in his earlier work, shows in this book a thorough knowledge and understanding of the arts and sciences. Furthermore, he knows how to link these different discourses on identity in a new and inspiring way. It is therefore not difficult to be swept away by his arguments and prose. At the same time, that laudable aspect of crossing disciplinary boundaries does not make the read any easier. Even for the informed reader, who may not be up to date with these discourses, it is hard to get a grip on the material. Lebow is so convincing, so well read, and such a gifted storyteller, that any criticism the reader might have is immediately drowned in the overwhelming flood of information. Because, indeed, Lebow's analysis rests on an interpretative reading of specifically chosen texts, texts whose criteria of selection are not clear (beyond the fact that they support Lebow's argument), something that might raise several questions among more positivist scholars. Having

that said, I believe this book should not be read per se as such, but should rather be understood as well-argued advice to humanity: let us try to better cope with our understanding of what identity is, and accept that identities are neither unique nor consistent, but rather fragmented and fluid, with the aim of overcoming the risk of turning ourselves in difficult times to a fixed idea of identity that can lead to disastrous political practices. That message rings clear throughout the book, and maybe it sounds best and loudest the way Lebow has put it forth. This is an inspiring book that deserves to be read a few times, so as to be fully and deeply grasped by its reader. ■

Loveman, Mara. *National Colors: Racial Classification and the State in Latin America*

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When and why do Latin American states engage in official ethno-racial classification, toward what ends, and with what consequences? How are today's struggles over ethno-racial classification constrained by states' previous approaches to census categorisation? These are the questions that Mara Loveman asks at the outset of National Colors, an ambitious and incisive study on the politics and methods of ethno-racial classification in the national censuses of nineteen Latin American countries over a period of two centuries. The book is primarily an empirical study, but it is also theoretically embedded in a vast literature, and makes an important theoretical contribution to the study of race beyond Latin America. Loveman's work shows how race is, to borrow the words of Stuart Hall, "the floating signifier."[1] The apparent fixity of ethno-racial categories in specific historical periods is the outcome of specific political projects, serving particular interests and ends.

The book is chronologically organized into eight chapters, ranging from colonial Latin America to the last census rounds in 2010, tackling a specific problem in each period. It begins, in chapter two, with an account of early attempts by the Iberian empires to rigidly classify and count their colonial subjects. After independence, despite the new polities' official celebration of colour-blind equality, official classifica-

tion by race continued. The reasons for this are explained in more detail in chapters three to five, covering the nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. In their modernizing efforts, the nations-in-making emulated a number of European and US state practices, including censuses, deemed to be the most reliable instrument for measuring and promoting progress by an international scientific community led by the International Statistical Congresses and later the International Statistical Institute. Under the imperatives of racially deterministic theories, national progress in Latin America became synonymous with racial homogenization and population 'whitening'. Soon, however, racial miscegenation became the distinctive feature of Latin American nations, reinterpreted as a regenerative force towards a homogenous, whiter future.

Chapter Six is concerned with the international shift from the 1930s towards the discrediting of race as a scientific category in favour of cultural explanations of difference. Nevertheless, only in the context of re-democratization and the 'multicultural turn' in Latin America since the 1980s—the topic of the seventh chapter—did ethnic diversity become a sign of development. The latter chapter is especially valuable to those with an interest in contemporary social movements and the politics of recognition and (re)distribution. By explicitly placing these movements within an international regime of human rights, Loveman critically explores the interests of and pressures exerted by national and international actors, such as development institutions and NGOs. Today, development is still understood in terms of ethno-racial relations, but it is portrayed through an official celebration of diversity and inclusion, despite the continuing de facto inequalities in the region.

Due to the important role of colonialism in the creation of racial categories, it is understandable that Loveman begins her narrative with colonial attempts at racial classification. Nevertheless, the second chapter seems at odds with the rest of the book, adding very little to the overall argument since it diverts from the book's main focus, modern censuses and nation-building having only been attempted after independence. Moreover, in tackling the difficult task of summarizing 300 years of colonial rule, it has a rather reductive primary focus on the *sociedad de castas of Spanish America*. Additionally, despite Loveman's claim that her analytical approach does not take social boundaries between groups to naturally correspond to official categories, the book remains a study of the state, of elites, and their practices. Therefore, those interested in processes of self-identification or the 'messier' intergroup relations on the ground will find *National Colors* less insightful.

National Colors leaves no doubt that censuses are inherently political, yet inseparable from nation-making, state-building and development ef-

forts. Censuses serve not only to describe and define nations, but also to prescribe policies aimed at 'progress' or, since the mid-twentieth century, 'development'. Loveman shows how modern nationhood is defined in relation to international norms on what constitutes a nation and to international standards for how 'progress' should be measured. Since post-independence Latin American countries entered the world state system as marginal players, this intrinsic relational character of state-building became of central importance. As such, the book evinces how census classifications and racial categories are not only produced by power relations between the categorizers and the categorized within national boundaries, but also between the elites of different national states within international political and scientific fields.

This argument is grounded in a remarkable amount of carefully investigated primary and secondary sources. Loveman's wide comparative and historical lens enables original insights into the much-studied practice of ethno-racial categorisation in Latin America. The vast temporal and geographic span of her analysis allows the author to account for both the continuities and changes of international contexts and regional patterns. Loveman succeeds in this task without shying away from national idiosyncrasies and, for the most part, without falling into crude generalisations. Although the methodology unsurprisingly limits the extent to which nuances can be taken into account, *National Colors* generally successfully navigates national specificities and regional trends—what Loveman calls "period effects" (p. 9)—as well as primary data analysis and broader theoretical conclusions.

One of the most important contributions made by Loveman is that, throughout, *National Colors* investigates the experiences of black and indigenous Latin Americans under one analytical lens, an unusual practice in much of the literature on ethnicity in the region. This is a timely and much-needed approach, which recognises that the classifications of black and indigenous subjects was not only constructed in relation to 'whiteness', but also to each other, thereby creating hierarchies between these subaltern groups that still require sustained investigation. To name one example, the author accounts for the increased visibility of indigenous peoples—defined as the nations' cultural 'others'—and the parallel neglect of racially defined Afro-descendants in national censuses and political agendas since the 'turn to culture', a concern that other authors, such as Charles Hale, Juliet Hooker, and Catherine Walsh, have voiced in their critiques of multiculturalism in the region.

National Colors is not only a rigorous and balanced academic enquiry into the politics and science of censuses and nation-making in Latin America, but also a work committed to a critical engagement with, and

the dismantling of, its continuing ethno-racial inequalities. The book's broad comparative perspective invites us to think about classifications in light of their global history, avoiding national biases and assisting in the deconstruction of racial categories by exposing their ambiguity and fluidity over time. This is very much in line with the work of Stuart Hall on race as a 'floating signifier'—which is not included in the book—and Loveman's theoretical conclusions would certainly have benefited greatly from a dialogue with Hall's work. For those beginning to study race in Latin America, the book offers a comprehensive and invaluable introduction to their history and the present reality. For the experts, it is filled with original insights into much-studied countries, such as Brazil. Finally, through its emphasis on the importance of ethno-racial categorisation in the contemporary as well as future development of Latin American nations, this work counters any doubts about whether race matters in the region—invariably, it does. ■

Notes

[1] *Race: The Floating Signifier,* film directed by Sut Jhally (Northampton, MA: Media Education Foundation, 1997).

Edmond J. Keller. *Identity, Citizenship, and Political Conflict in Africa.*

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Edmond Keller's *Identity, Citizenship, and Political Conflict in Africa* examines the complexities of constructing national identity in post-colonial African states. In his book, Keller argues that identity politics, specifically those related to citizenship rights, are the basis for most contemporary violence on the African continent. Keller traces the development of the concept of "citizenship," arguing that there are two co-existing strands of citizenship in Africa: one based on subnational, communal identity, and the other based on national identity. The complicated interrelation between these two identities creates and sustains violent conflict.

To make sense of identity-based conflicts in Africa, Keller outlines an analytical framework consisting of three factors: political context,

institutional structures, and perceptions of the actors involved. Keller then uses process tracing to explore the relationship between identity and conflict in five African countries: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Rwanda. Overall, *Identity, Citizenship, and Political Conflict* is a lucid text that highlights an important and underdeveloped subject. Keller's case studies are concise and nuanced, providing an excellent starting point for more in depth country analysis. However, at a compact 165 pages (plus endnotes), one wonders if Keller has narrowed the scope of his project too greatly. Specifically, he does not fully develop other dimensions of political conflict and leaves many questions posed in the text unanswered.

The first puzzling omission is the economic dimension of conflict. In one sense, Keller's project is a welcome respite from a deluge of literature on the political economy of African conflicts. In another, the focus on social context neglects important economic aspects of intrastate conflict. At the outset, Keller suggests, "[m]uch of the national civil conflict occurring in Africa today can be attributed to grievances relating to citizenship rights" (p. 5). But where do these grievances come from? And are they fundamentally about citizenship rights? Keller sidesteps a more complex disentanglement of the relationship between citizenship and resource ownership by avoiding cases that are heavily resource-based, such as conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In doing so, Keller misses an opportunity to establish the primacy of identity politics—an assumption that he takes as given from the start of the book—and to rebut existing literature that undervalues the role of ethnicity and social identity in civil conflict.[1]

A second key question emerges from Keller's discussion of communal identities. At times, he conflates autochthony, ethnic identity, and other forms of subnational identity. This is because Keller's analytic framework distinguishes between national and subnational identity, but does not fully disaggregate between different variants of subnational identity. Are we to consider ethnic identity, religious identity, and political ideology all subnational forms of citizenship? Do they function in the same way? This classification becomes dubious if we isolate, for example, religious conflict in Nigeria between Muslims and Christians or the emergence of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Ethiopia from their larger transnational contexts.

The conceptual ambiguity surrounding the idea of 'communal identity' points to more fundamental questions that follow from Keller's work: can individuals possess multiple subnational identities? If so, how can we understand which identity will be the most salient? Keller briefly addresses the first question by asserting, "[i]ndividuals have multiple identi-

ties that are socially constructed and not always politically salient" (p. 24). However, there is little discussion about the mechanisms by which identities become politicized. Keller merely suggests, "[p]olitical stimuli or precipitating event[s] must occur before change is initiated" (p. 46).

One reason Keller cannot fully flesh out these "political stimuli" is because he focuses exclusively on cases in which identity politics begets conflict (or, as some sceptics may point out, in which conflict exacerbates ethnic difference) and does not consider cases in which cleavages do not become salient. Scholars like Daniel Posner have demonstrated how much more fruitful it is to compare across cases in which various subnational identities are and are not politicized. Posner's study of Chewas and Tumbukas, for example, details how demographics and electoral dynamics make this ethnic cleavage salient in Malawi but not in Zambia.[2]

Finally, beyond the immediate stimuli and institutional structures that Keller references, we must not overlook the role of individual agency in identity formation. As Amartya Sen reminds us in *Identity and Violence*, "[a]long with the recognition of the plurality of our identities and their diverse implications, there is a critically important need to see the role of choice in determining the cogency and relevance of particular identities that are inescapably diverse."[3] *Identity, Citizenship, and Political Conflict in Africa* points to the complexit of layered subnational and national identities and does an excellent job of describing them. However, Keller stops short of unpacking the roles of social context and individual agency in identity formation and identity-based conflict. ■

Notes

[1] See, for example, Mats Berdal and David Malone, eds., *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers (2000), Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004), 563–595, and William Reno, "Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa," *Journal of International Affairs* 53, no. 2 (2000) for discussions about how economic opportunity is more important than collective grievance in civil conflicts.

[2] Daniel Posner, "The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi," *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 4 (2004), 529–545.

[3] Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (London: Penguin, 2007).